Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 7
CHAP. VII.
The reaſons why thoſe things that have been mentioned, which have not the eſſence of virtue, have yet by many been miſtaken for true virtue.
THE firſt reaſon that may be given of this, is, that altho' they have not the ſpecific and diſtinguiſhing nature and eſſence of virtue, yet they have ſomething that belongs to the general nature of virtue.—The general nature of true virtue is love. It is expreſſed both in love of benevolence and complacence; but primarily in benevolence to perſons and Beings, and conſequently and ſecondarily in complacence in virtue,—as has been ſhewn. There is ſomething of the general nature of virtue in thoſe natural affections and principles that have been mentioned, in both thoſe reſpects.
IN many of theſe natural affections there is ſomething of the appearance of love to perſons. In ſome of them there appears the tendency and effect of benevolence, in part. Others have truly a ſort of benevolence in them, tho' it be a private benevolence, and in ſeveral reſpects falls ſhort of the extent of true virtuous benevolence, both in its nature and object.
THE laſt mentioned paſſion, natural to mankind in their preſent ſtate, viz. that of pity to others in diſtreſs, tho' not properly of the nature of love, as has been demonſtrated, yet has partly the ſame influence and effect with benevolence. One effect of true benevolence is to cauſe perſons to be uneaſy, when the objects of it are in diſtreſs, and to deſire their relief. And natural pity has the ſame effect.
NATURAL gratitude, tho' in every inſtance wherein it appears it is not properly called love, becauſe perſons may be moved with a degree of gratitude towards perſons on certain occaſions, whom they have no real and proper friendſhip for, as in the inſtance of Saul towards David, once and again, after David's ſparing his life, when he had ſo fair opportunity to kill him: yet it has the ſame or like operation and effect with friendſhip, in part, for a ſeaſon, and with regard to ſo much of the welfare of its object, as appears a deſerved requital of kindneſs received. And in other inſtances it may have a more general and abiding influence, ſo as more properly to be called by the name of love. So that many times men from natural gratitude do really with a ſort of benevolence love thoſe who love them. From this, together with ſome other natural principles, men may love their near friends, love their own party, love their country, &c.
THE natural diſpoſition their is to mutual affection betweeen the ſexes, often operates by what may properly be called love. There is often times truly a kind both of benevolence and complacence. As there alſo is between parents and children.
THUS theſe things have ſomething of the general nature of virtue, which is love: and eſpecially the thing laſt mentioned have ſomething of a love of benevolence. What they are eſſentially defective in, is, that they are private in their nature, they don't ariſe from any temper of benevolence to Being in general, nor have they a tendency to any ſuch effect in their operation. But yet agreeing with virtue in its general nature, they are beautiful within their own private ſphere: i. e. they appear beautiful if we confine our views to that private ſyſtem, and while we ſhut all other things they ſtand in any relation to, out of our conſideration. If that private ſyſtem contain'd the ſum of univerſal exiſtence, then their benevolence would have true beauty; or, in other words, would be beautiful, all things conſidered: but now it is not ſo. Theſe private ſyſtems are ſo far from containing the ſum of univerſal Being, or comprehending all exiſtence which we ſtand related to, that it contains but an infinitely ſmall part of it. The reaſon why men are ſo ready to take theſe private affections for true virtue, is the narrowneſs of their views; and above all, that they are ſo ready to leave the divine Being out of their view, and to neglect him in their conſideration, or to regard him in their thoughts as tho' he were not properly belonging to the ſyſtem of real exiſtence, but as a kind of ſhadowy, imaginary Being, And tho' moſt men allow that there is a God, yet in their ordinary view of things, his Being is not apt to come into the account, and to have the influence and effect of a real exiſtence, as 'tis with other Beings which they ſee, and are converſant with by their external ſenſes. In their views of beauty and deformity, and in the inward ſenſations of diſplicence and approbation which riſe in their minds, 'tis not a thing natural to them to be under the influence of a view of the Deity, as part of the ſyſtem, and as the head of the ſyſtem, and he who is all in all, in compariſon of whom all the reſt is nothing, and with regard to whom all other things are to be viewed, and their minds to be accordingly impreſs'd and affected.
YEA, we are apt thro' the narrowneſs of our views, in judging of the beauty of affections and actions to limit our conſideration to only a ſmall part of the created ſyſtem. When private affections extend themſelves to a conſiderable number, we are very ready to look upon them as truly virtuous, and accordingly to applaud them highly. Thus it is with reſpect to love to a large party, or a man's love to his country. For tho' his private ſyſtem contains but a ſmall part even of the world of mankind, yet being a conſiderable number, thro' the contracted limits of the mind and the narrowneſs of his views, they are ready to fill his mind and engroſs his …ight, and to ſeem as if they were all. Hence among the Romans love to their country was the higheſt virtue: tho' this affection of theirs, ſo much extolled among them, was employ'd as it were for the deſtruction of the reſt of the world of mankind.—The larger the number is, that private affection extends to, the more apt men are, thro' the narrowneſs of their ſight, to miſtake it for true virtue; becauſe then the private ſyſtem appears to have more of the image of the univerſal ſyſtem. Whereas, when the circle it extends to, is very ſmall, it is not ſo apt to be look'd upon virtuous, or not ſo virtuous. As, a man's love to his own children.—
AND this is the reaſon why ſelf-love is by nobody miſtaken for true virtue. For tho' there be ſomething of the general nature of virtue in this, here is love and good-will, yet the object is ſo private, the limits ſo narrow, that it by no means engroſſes the view; unleſs it be of the perſon himſelf, who thro' the greatneſs of his pride may imagine himſelf as it were all. The minds of men are large enough to take in a vaſtly greater extent: and tho' ſelf-love is far from being uſeleſs in the world, yea, 'tis exceeding neceſſary to ſociety, beſides its directly and greatly ſeeking the good of one, yet every body ſees that if it be not ſubordinate to, and regulated by, another more extenſive principle, it may make a man a common enemy to the ſyſtem he is related to. And tho' this is as true of any other private affection, notwithſtanding its extent may be to a ſyſtem that contains thouſands of individuals, and thoſe private ſyſtems bear no greater proportion to the whole of univerſal exiſtence, than one alone, yet they bear a greater proportion to the extent to the view and comprehenſion of men's minds, and are more apt to be regarded as if they were all, or at leaſt as ſome reſemblance of the univerſal ſyſtem.
Thus I have obſerved how many of theſe natural principles, which have been ſpoken of, reſemble virtue in its primary operation, which is benevolence. Many of them alſo have a reſemblance of it in its ſecondary operation, which is its approbation of and complacence in virtue itſelf. Several kinds of approbation of virtue have been taken notice of, as common to mankind, which are not of the nature of a truly virtuous approbation, conſiſting in a ſenſe and reliſh of the eſſential beauty of virtue, conſiſting in a Being's cordial union to Being in general, from a ſpirit of love to Being in general. As particularly, the approbation of conſcience, from a ſenſe of the inferior and ſecondary beauty which there is in virtue, conſiſting in uniformity, and from a ſenſe of deſert, conſiſting in a ſenſe of the natural agreement of loving and being beloved, ſhewing kindneſs and receiving kindneſs. So from the ſame principle, there is a diſapprobation of vice, from a natural oppoſition to deformity and diſproportion, and a ſenſe of evil deſert, or the natural agreement there is between hating and being hated, oppoſing and being oppoſed, &c. together with a painful ſenſation naturally ariſing in a ſenſe of ſelf-oppoſition and inconſiſtence.—Approbation of conſcience is the more readily miſtaken for a truly virtuous approbation, becauſe by the wiſe conſtitution of the great governor of the world (as was obſerved) when conſcience is well informed, and thoroughly awakened, it agrees with the latter fully and exactly, as to the object approved, tho' not as to the ground and reaſon of approving. It approves all virtue, and condemns all vice. It approves true virtue, and indeed approves nothing that is againſt it, or that falls ſhort of it; as was ſhewn before. And indeed natural conſcience is implanted in all mankind, there to be as it were in God's ſtead, and to be an internal judge or rule to all, whereby to diſtinguiſh right and wrong.
IT has alſo been obſerved, how that virtue, conſiſting in benevolence, is approved, and vice, conſiſting in ill-will, is diſliked, from the influence of ſelf-love, together with aſſociation of ideas, in the ſame manner as men diſlike thoſe qualities in things without life or reaſon, with which they have always connected the ideas of hurtfulneſs, malignancy, perniciouſneſs; but like thoſe things with which they habitually connect the ideas of profit, pleaſantneſs, comfortableneſs, &c. This ſort of approbation or liking of virtue, and diſlike of vice, is eaſily miſtaken for true virtue, not only becauſe thoſe things are approved by it that have the nature of virtue, and the things diſliked have the nature of vice, but becauſe here is much of reſemblance of virtuous approbation, it being complacence from love; the difference only lying in this, that it is not from love to Being in general, but from ſelf-love.
THERE is alſo, as has been ſhewn, a liking of ſome virtues, and diſlike of ſome vices, from the influence of the natural inſtinct of pity. This men are apt to miſtake for the exerciſe of true virtue, on many accounts. Here is not only a kind of complacence, and the objects of complacence are what have the nature of virtue, and the virtues indeed very amiable, ſuch as humanity, mercy, tenderneſs of heart, &c. and the contrary very odious; but beſides, the approbation is not meerly from ſelf-love, but from compaſſion, an affection that reſpects others, and reſembles benevolence, as has been ſhewn.
ANOTHER reaſon, why the things which have been mentioned, are miſtaken for true virtue, is, that there is indeed a true negative moral goodneſs in them. By a negative moral goodneſs, I mean the negation or abſence of true moral evil. They have this negative moral goodneſs, becauſe a being without them would be an evidence of a much greater moral evil. Thus, the exerciſe of natural conſcience in ſuch and ſuch degrees, wherein appears ſuch a meaſure of an awakening or ſenſibility of conſcience, tho' it be not of the nature of real poſitive virtue or true moral goodneſs, yet has a negative moral goodneſs; becauſe in the preſent ſtate of things, it is an evidence of the abſence of that higher degree of wickedneſs, which cauſes great inſenſibility or ſtupidity of conſcience. For ſin, as was obſerved, is not only againſt a ſpiritual and divine ſenſe of virtue, but is alſo againſt the dictates of that moral ſenſe which is in natural conſcience. No wonder, that this ſenſe being long oppoſed and often conquered, grows weaker. All ſin has its ſource from ſelfiſhneſs, or from ſelf-love, not ſubordinate to regard to Being in general. And natural conſcience chiefly conſiſts in a ſenſe of deſert, or the natural agreement between ſin and miſery. But if ſelf were indeed all, and ſo more conſiderable than all the world beſides, there would be no ill deſert in his regarding himſelf above all, and making all other intereſts give place to private intereſt.—And no wonder that men by long acting from the ſelfiſh principle, and by being habituated to treat themſelves as if they were all, increaſe in pride, and come as it were naturally to look on themſelves as all, and ſo to loſe entirely the ſenſe of ill deſert in their making all other intereſts give place to their own.—And no wonder that men by often repeating acts of ſin, without puniſhment, or any viſible appearance of approaching puniſhment, have leſs and leſs ſenſe of the connection of ſin with puniſhment. That ſenſe which an awakned conſcience has of the deſert of ſin, conſiſts chiefly in a ſenſe of its deſert of reſentment of the Deity, the fountain and head of univerſal exiſtence. But no wonder that by a long continued worldly and ſenſual life, men more and more loſe all ſenſe of the Deity, who is a ſpiritual and inviſible Being. The mind being long involved in, and engroſs'd by ſenſitive objects, becomes ſenſual in all its operations, and excludes all views and impreſſions of ſpiritual objects, and is unfit for their contemplation. Thus the conſcience and general benevolence are entirely different principles, & ſenſe of conſcience differs from the holy complacence of a benevolent and truly virtuous heart. Yet wickedneſs may by long habitual exerciſe greatly diminiſh a ſenſe of conſcience. So that there may be negative moral goodneſs, in ſenſibility of conſcience, as it may be an argument of the abſence of that higher degree of wickedneſs, which cauſeth ſtupidity of conſcience.
So with reſpect to natural gratitude, tho' there may be no virtue meerly in loving them that love us, yet the contrary may be an evidence of a great degree of depravity, as it may argue a higher degree of ſelfiſhneſs, ſo that a man is come to look upon himſelf as all, and others as nothing, and ſo their reſpect and kindneſs as nothing. Thus an increaſe of pride diminiſhes gratitude.—So does ſenſuality, or the increaſe of ſenſual appetites, & coming more and more under the power and impreſſion of ſenſible objects, tends by degrees to make the mind inſenſible to any thing elſe; and thoſe appetites take up the whole ſoul; and thro' habit and cuſtom the water is all drawn out of other channels, in which it naturally flows, and is all carried as it were into one channel.
IN like manner natural affection, and natural pity, tho' not of the nature of virtue, yet may be diminiſhed greatly by the increaſe of thoſe two principles of pride and ſenſuality, and as the conſequence of this, being habitually diſpoſed to envy, malice, &c. Theſe luſts when they prevail to a high degree may overcome and diminiſh the exerciſe of thoſe natural principles: even as they often overcome and diminiſh common prudence in a man, as to ſeeking his own private intereſt, in point of health, wealth, or honor, and yet no one will think it proves that a man's being cunning, in ſeeking his own perſonal and temporal intereſt has any thing of the nature and eſſence of true virtue.
ANOTHER reaſon why theſe natural principles and affections are miſtaken for true virtue, is, that in ſeveral reſpects they have the ſame effect, which true virtue tends to; eſpecially in theſe two ways—
1. THE preſent ſtate of the world is ſo ordered and conſtituted by the wiſdom and goodneſs of its ſupreme ruler, that theſe natural principles for the moſt part tend to the good of the world of mankind. So do natural pity, gratitude, parental affection, &c. Herein they agree with the tendency of general benevolence, which ſeeks & tends to the general good. But this is no proof that theſe natural principles have the nature of true virtue. For ſelf-love is a principle that is exceeding uſeful and neceſſary in the world of mankind. So are the natural appetites of hunger and thirſt &c. But yet nobody will aſſert, that theſe have the nature of true virtue.
2. THESE principles have a like effect with true virtue in this reſpect, that they tend ſeveral ways to reſtrain vice, and prevent many acts of wickedneſs.—So, natural affection, love to our party, or to particular friends, tends to keep us from acts of injuſtice towards theſe perſons; which would be real wickedneſs—Pity preſerves from cruelty, which would be real and great moral evil.—Natural conſcience tends to reſtrain ſin in general, in the preſent ſtate of the world.—But neither can this prove theſe principles themſelves to be of the nature of true virtue. For ſo is this preſent ſtate of mankind ordered by a merciful God, that men's ſelf-love does in innumerable reſpects reſtrain from acts of true wickedneſs; and not only ſo, but puts men upon ſeeking true virtue: yet is not itſelf true virtue, but is the ſource of all the wickedneſs that is in the world.
ANOTHER reaſon why theſe inferior affections eſpecially ſome of them, are accounted virtuous, is, that there are affections of the ſame denomination, which are truly virtuous. Thus, for inſtance, there is a truly virtuous pity, or a compaſſion to others under affliction or miſery from general benevolence. Pure benevolence would be ſufficient to excite pity to another in calamity, if there were no particular inſtinct, or any other principle determining the mind thereto. It is eaſy to ſee how benevolence, which ſeeks another's good ſhould cauſe us to deſire his deliverance from evil. And this is a ſource of pity far more extenſive than the other. It excites compaſſion in caſes that are overlook'd by natural inſtinct. And even in thoſe caſes to which inſtinct extends, it mixes its influence with the natural principle, and guides and regulates its operations. And when this is the caſe, the pity which is exerciſed, may be called a virtuous compaſſion.—So there is a virtuous gratitude, or a gratitude that ariſes not only from ſelf-love, but from a ſuperior principle of diſintereſted general benevolence. As 'tis manifeſt, that when we receive kindneſs from ſuch as we love already, we are more diſpoſed to gratitude, and diſpoſed to greater degrees of it, than when the mind is deſtitute of any ſuch friendly prepoſſeſſion. Therefore, when the ſuperior principle of virtuous love has a governing hand, and regulates the affair, it may be called a virtuous gratitude.—So there is a virtuous love of juſtice, ariſing from pure benevolence to Being in general, as that naturally and neceſſarily inclines the heart, that every particular Being ſhould have ſuch a ſhare of benevolence as is proportioned to its dignity, conſiſting in the degree of its Being, and the degree of its virtue. Which is intirely diverſe from an apprehenſion of juſtice, from a ſenſe of the beauty of uniformity in variety: as has been particularly ſhewn already. And ſo it is eaſy to ſee how there may be a virtuous ſenſe of deſert different from what is natural and common. And ſo a virtuous conſcienciouſneſs, or a ſanctified conſcience.—And as when natural affections have their operations mixed with the influence of virtuous benevolence, and are directed and determined hereby, they may be called virtuous, ſo there may be a virtuous love of parents to children, and between other near relatives, a virtuous love of our town, or country, or nation. Yea, and a virtuous love between the ſexes, as there may be the influence of virtue mingled with inſtinct, and virtue may govern with regard to the particular manner of its operation, and may guide it to ſuch ends as are agreable to the great ends and purpoſes of true virtue.
GENUINE virtue prevents that increaſe of the habits of pride and ſenſuality, which tend to over-bear and greatly diminiſh the exerciſes of the forementioned uſeful and neceſſary principles of nature. And a principle of general benevolence ſoftens and ſweetens the mind, and makes it more ſuſceptible of the proper influence and exerciſe of the gentler natural inſtincts, and directs every one into its proper channel, and determines the exerciſe to the proper manner and meaſure, and guides all to the beſt purpoſes.