Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 6
CHAP. VI.
of particular inſtincts of nature, which in ſome reſpects reſemble virtue.
THERE are various diſpoſitions and inclinations natural to men, which depend on particular laws of nature, determining their minds to certain affections and actions towards particular objects; which laws ſeem to be eſtabliſhed chiefly for the preſervation of mankind, tho' not only for this, but alſo for their comfortably ſubſiſting in the world. Which diſpoſitions may be called inſtincts.
SOME of theſe inſtincts reſpect only ourſelves perſonally: ſuch are many of our natural appetites and averſions. Some of them are not wholly perſonal, but more ſocial, and extend to others: ſuch are the mutual inclinations between the ſexes, &c.—Some of theſe diſpoſitions are more external and ſenſitive: ſuch are ſome of our natural inclinations that are perſonal; as thoſe that relate to meat and drink. And of this ſort alſo are ſome diſpoſitions that are more ſocial, and in ſome reſpects extend to others: as, the more ſenſitive inclinations of the ſexes towards each other. Beſides theſe inſtincts of the ſenſitive kind, there are others that are more internal and mental: conſiſting in affections of the mind, which mankind naturally exerciſe towards ſome of their fellow-creatures, or in ſome caſes towards men in general. Some of theſe inſtincts that are mental and ſocial, are what may be called kind affections; as having ſomething in them of benevolence, or a reſemblence of it. And others are of a different ſort, having ſomething in them that carries an angry appearance; ſuch as the paſſion of jealouſy between the ſexes, eſpecially in the male towards the female.
'TIS only the former of theſe two laſt mentioned ſorts, that it is to my purpoſe to conſider in this place, viz thoſe natural inſtincts which appear in benevolent affections, or which have the appearence of benevolence, and ſo in ſome reſpects reſemble virtue. Theſe I ſhall therefore conſider; and ſhall endeavour to ſhew that none of them can be of the nature of true virtue.
THAT kind affection which is exerciſed towards thoſe who are near one to another in natural relation, particularly the love of parents to their children, called natural affection, is by many refer'd to inſtinct. I have already conſidered this ſort of love as an affection that ariſes from ſelf-love; and in that view, and in that ſuppoſition have ſhewn, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. But if any think, that natural affection is more properly to be refer'd to a particular inſtinct of nature, than to ſelf-love, as its cauſe, I ſhall not think it a point worthy of any controverſy or diſpute. In my opinion, both are true; viz. that natural affection is owing to natural inſtinct, and alſo that it ariſes from ſelf-love. It may be ſaid to ariſe from inſtinct, as it depends on a law of nature. But yet it may be truly reckoned as an affection ariſing from ſelf-love; becauſe, tho' it ariſes from a law of nature, yet that is ſuch a law as according to the order and harmony every where obſerved among the laws of nature, is connected with, and follows from ſelf-love: as was ſhewn before. However, it is not neceſſary to my preſent purpoſe, to inſiſt on this. For if it be ſo, that natural affection to a man's children or family, or near relations, is not properly to be aſcribed to ſelf-love, as its cauſe, in any reſpect, but is to be eſteemed an affection ariſing from a particular independent inſtinct of nature, which the creator in his wiſdom has implanted in men for the preſervation and well-being of the world of mankind, yet it cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For it has been obſerved, and I humbly conceive, proved before (chap. II.) that if any Being or Beings have by natural inſtinct, or any other means, a determination of mind to benevolence, extending only to ſome particular perſons or private ſyſtem, however large that ſyſtem may be, or however great a number of individuals it may contain, ſo long as it contains but an infinitely ſmall part of univerſal exiſtence, and ſo bears no proportion to this great and univerſal ſyſtem,—ſuch limited private benevolence, not ariſing from, nor being ſubordinate to benevolence to Being in general, cannot have the nature of true virtue.
HOWEVER, it may not be amiſs briefly to obſerve now, that 'tis evident to a demonſtration, thoſe affections cannot be of the nature of true virtue, from theſe two things.
Firſt, THAT they don't ariſe from a principle of virtue.—A principle of virtue, I think, is own'd by the moſt conſiderable of late writers on morality to be general benevolence or public affection: and I think it has been proved to be union of heart to Being ſimply conſidered; which implies a diſpoſition to benevolence to Being in general. Now by the ſuppoſition, the affections we are ſpeaking of do not ariſe from this principle; and that, whether we ſuppoſe they ariſe from ſelf-love, or from particular inſtincts: becauſe either of thoſe ſources is diverſe from a principle of general benevolence. And,
Secondly, THESE private affections, if they do not ariſe from general benevolence, & they are not connected with it in their firſt exiſtence, have no tendency to produce it. This appears from what has been obſerved: for being not dependent on it, their detach'd and unſubordinate operation rather tends to, and implies oppoſition to Being in general, than general benevolence; as every one ſees and owns with reſpect to ſelf-love. And there are the very ſame reaſons why any other private affection, confined to limits infinitely ſhort of univerſal exiſtence, ſhould have that influence, as well as love that is confined to a ſingle perſon.—Now upon the whole, nothing can be plainer than that affections which don't ariſe from a virtuous principle, and have no tendency to true virtue, as their effect, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
FOR the reaſons which have been given, it is undeniably true, that if perſons by any means come to have a benevolent affection limited to a party that is very large, or to the country or nation in general, of which they are a part, or the public community they belong to, tho' it be as large as the Roman empire was of old, yea, if there could be an inſtinct or other cauſe determining a perſon to benevolence towards the whole world of mankind, or even all created ſenſible natures throughout the univerſe, excluſive of union of heart to general exiſtence and of love to God, nor derived from that temper of mind which diſpoſes to a ſupreme regard to him, nor ſubordinate to ſuch divine love, it cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
IF what is called natural affection, ariſes from a particular natural inſtinct, ſo, much more indiſputably, does that mutual affection which naturally ariſes between the ſexes. I agree with Hutcheſon and Hume in this, that there is a foundation laid in nature for kind affections between the ſexes, that are truly diverſe from all inclinations to ſenſitive pleaſure, and don't properly ariſe from any ſuch inclination. There is doubtleſs a diſpoſition both to a mutual benevolence and mutual complacence, that are not naturally and neceſſarily connected with any ſenſitive deſires. But yet 'tis manifeſt ſuch affections as are limited to oppoſite ſexes, are from a particular inſtinct, thus directing & limiting them; and not ariſing from a principle of general benevolence; for this has no tendency to any ſuch limitation. And tho' theſe affections don't properly ariſe from the ſenſitive deſires which are between the ſexes, yet they are implanted by the author of nature chiefly for the ſame purpoſe, viz. the preſervation or continuation of the world of mankind, to make perſons willing to forſake father and mother, and all their natural relations in the families where they were born and brought up, for the ſake of a ſtated union with a companion of the other ſex, and to diſpoſe to that union in bearing and going through with that ſeries of labours, anxieties, and pains requiſite to the Being, ſupport and education of a family of children. Tho' not only for theſe ends, but partly alſo for the comfort of mankind as united in a marriage-relation.—But I ſuppoſe, few (if any) will deny, that the peculiar natural diſpoſitions there are to mutual affection between the ſexes, ariſe from an inſtinct or particular law of nature. And therefore it is manifeſt from what has been ſaid already, that thoſe natural diſpoſitions cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
ANOTHER affection which is owing to a particular inſtinct, implanted in men for like purpoſes with other inſtincts, is that pity which is natural to mankind, when they ſee others in great diſtreſs.—'Tis acknowledged, that ſuch an affection is natural to mankind. But I think it evident, that the pity which is general and natural, is owing to a particular inſtinct, and is not of the nature of true virtue. I am far from ſaying, that there is no ſuch thing as a truly virtuous pity among mankind. For I am far from thinking, that all the pity or mercy which is any where to be found among them, ariſes meerly from natural inſtinct, or, that none is to be found, which ariſes from that truly virtuous divine principle of general benevolence to ſenſitive Beings. Yet at the ſame time I think, this is not the caſe with all pity, or with that diſpoſition to pity which is natural to mankind in common. I think I may be bold to ſay, this does not ariſe from general benevolence, nor is truly of the nature of benevolence, or properly called by that name.
IF all that uneaſineſs on the ſight of others extreme diſtreſs, which we call pity, were properly of the nature of benevolence, then they who are the ſubjects of this paſſion, muſt needs be in a degree of uneaſineſs in being ſenſible of the total want of happineſs, of all ſuch as they would be diſpoſed to pity in extreme diſtreſs. For that certainly is the moſt direct tendency and operation of benevolence or good-will, to deſire the happineſs of its object. But now this is not the caſe univerſally, where men are diſpoſed to exerciſe pity. There are many men, with whom that is the caſe in reſpect to ſome others in the world, that it would not be the occaſion of their being ſenſibly affected with any uneaſineſs, to know they were dead (yea men who are not influenced by the conſideration of a future ſtate, but view death as only a ceſſation of all ſenſibility, and conſequently an end of all happineſs) who yet would have been moved with pity towards the ſame perſons, if they had ſeen them under ſome very extreme anguiſh.—Some men would be moved with pity by ſeeing a brute-creature under extreme and long torments, who yet ſuffer no uneaſineſs in knowing that many thouſands of them every day ceaſe to live, and ſo have an end put to all their pleaſure, at butchers ſhambles in great cities.—'Tis the nature of true benevolence …o deſire and rejoice in the proſperity and pleaſure of the object of it; and that, in ſome-proportion to its degree of prevalence. But perſons may greatly pity thoſe that are in extreme pain,, whoſe poſitive pleaſure they may ſtill be very indifferent about. In this caſe, a man may be much moved and affected with uneaſineſs, who yet would be affected with no ſenſible joy in ſeeing ſigns of the ſame perſon's or Being's enjoyment of very high degrees of pleaſure.
YEA, pity may not only be without benevolence, but may conſiſt with true malevolence, or with ſuch ill-will as ſhall cauſe men not only not to deſire the poſitive happineſs of another, but even to deſire his calamity. They may pity ſuch an one when his calamity goes beyond their hatred. A man may have true malevolence towards another, deſiring no poſitive good for him, but evil: and yet his hatred not be infinite, but only to a certain degree. And when he ſees the perſon whom he thus hates, in miſery far beyond his ill-will, he may then pity him: becauſe then the natural inſtinct begins to operate. For malevolence will not overcome the natural inſtinct, inclining to pity others in extreme calamity, any further than it goes, or to the limits of the degree of miſery it wiſhes to its object. Men may pity others under exquiſite torment, when yet they would have been grieved if they had ſeen their proſperity. And ſome men have ſuch a grudge againſt one or another, that they would be far from being uneaſy at their very death, nay, would even be glad of it. And when this is the caſe with them, 'tis manifeſt that their heart is void of benevolence towards ſuch perſons, and under the power of malevolence. Yet at the ſame time they are capable of pitying even theſe very perſons, if they ſhould ſee them under a degree of miſery very much diſproportioned to their ill-will.
THESE things may convince us that natural pity is of a nature very different from true virtue, and not ariſing from a diſpoſition of heart to general benevolence: but is owing to a particular inſtinct, which the creator has implanted in mankind, for the ſame purpoſes as moſt other inſtincts, viz. chiefly for the preſervation of mankind, though not excluſive of their well-being. The giving of this inſtinct is the fruit of God's mercy, and an inſtance of his love of the world of mankind, & an evidence that though the world be ſo ſinful, 'tis not God's deſign to make it a world of puniſhment: and therefore has many ways made a merciful proviſion for men's relief in extreme calamities: and among others has given mankind in general a diſpoſition to pity; the natural exerciſes whereof extend beyond thoſe whom we are in a near connection with, eſpecially in caſe of great calamity; becauſe commonly in ſuch caſes men ſtand in need of the help of others beſide their near friends, and becauſe commonly thoſe calamities which are extreme, without releif, tend to men's deſtruction. This may be given as the reaſon why men are ſo made by the author of nature, that they have no inſtinct inclining as much to rejoice at the ſight of others great proſperity and pleaſure, as to be grieved at their extreme calamity, viz. becauſe they don't ſtand in equal neceſſity of ſuch an inſtinct as that in order to their preſervation. But if pure benevolence were the ſource of natural pity, doubtleſs it would operate to as great a degree in congratulation, in caſes of others great proſperity, as in compaſſion towards them in great miſery.
THE inſtincts God has given to mankind in this world, which in ſome reſpects reſemble a virtuous benevolence, are agreable to the ſtate that God deſigned mankind for here, where he intends their preſervation, and comfortable ſubſiſtence. But in the world of puniſhment, where the ſtate of the wicked inhabitants will be exceeding different, and God will have none of theſe merciful deſigns to anſwer, there, we have great reaſon to think, will be no ſuch thing as a diſpoſition to pity, in any caſe; as alſo there will be no natural affection toward near relations, and no mutual affection between oppoſite ſexes.
To conclude what I have to ſay on the natural inſtinct diſpoſing men to pity others in miſery, I would obſerve, that this is a ſource of a kind of abhorrence in men of ſome vices, as cruelty and oppreſſion; and ſo, of a ſort of approbation of the contrary virtues, hamanity, mercy, &c. Which averſion and approbation, however, ſo far as they ariſe from this cauſe only, are not from a principle of true virtue.