Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII.
In what reſpects virtue or moral good is founded in ſentiment; and how far it is founded in the reaſon and nature of things.
THAT which is called virtue, is a certain kind of beautiful nature, form or quality that is obſerved in things. That form or quality is called beautiful to any one beholding it to whom it is beautiful, which appears in itſelf agreable or comely to him, or the view or idea of which is immediately pleaſant to the mind. I ſay, agreable in itſelf and immediately pleaſant, to diſtinguiſh it from things which in themſelves are not agreable nor pleaſant, but either indifferent or diſagreable, which yet appear eligible and agreable indirectly for ſomething elſe that is the conſequence of them, or with which they are connected. Such a kind of indirect agreableneſs or eligibleneſs in things, not for themſelves, but for ſome thing elſe, is not what is called beauty. But when a form or quality appears lovely, pleaſing and delightful in itſelf, then it is called beautiful; and this agreableneſs or gratefulneſs of the idea is what is called beauty. It is evident therefore by this, that the way we come by the idea or ſenſation or beauty, is by immediate ſenſation of the gratefulneſs of the idea called beautiful; and not by finding out by argumentation any conſequences, or other things that it ſtands connected with; any more than taſting the ſweetneſs of honey, or perceiving the harmony of a tune, is by argumentation on connections and conſequences. And this manner of being affected with the immediate preſence of the beautiful idea depends not, therefore, on any reaſonings about the idea, after we have it, before we can find out whether it be beautiful, or not; but on the frame of our minds, whereby they are ſo made that ſuch an idea, as ſoon as we have it, is grateful, or appears beautiful.
THEREFORE, if this be all that is meant by them who affirm, virtue is founded in ſentiment and not in reaſon, that they who ſee the beauty there is in true virtue, don't perceive it by argumentation on its connexions and conſequences, but by the frame of their own minds, or a certain ſpiritual ſenſe given them of God, whereby they immediately perceive pleaſure in the preſence of the idea of true virtue in their minds, or are directly gratified in the view or contemplation of this object, this is certainly true.
BUT if thereby is meant, that the frame of mind, or inward ſenſe given them by God, whereby the mind is diſpoſed to delight in the idea or view of true virtue, is given arbitrarily, ſo that if he had pleaſed he might have given a contrary ſenſe and determination of mind, which would have agreed as well with the neceſſary nature of things, this I think is not true.
VIRTUE, as I have obſerved, conſiſts in the cordial conſent or union of Being to Being in general. And, as has alſo been obſerved, that frame of mind, whereby it is diſpoſed to reliſh and be pleaſed with the view of this, is benevolence or union of heart itſelf to Being in general, or a univerſally benevolent frame of mind: becauſe he whoſe temper is to love Being in general, therein muſt have a diſpoſition to approve and be pleaſed with love to Being in general. Therefore now the queſtion is, whether God in giving this temper to a created mind, whereby it unites to or loves Being in general, acts ſo arbitrarily, that there is nothing in the neceſſary nature of things to hinder but that a contrary temper might have agreed or conſiſted as well with that nature of things, as this?
AND in the firſt place I obſerve, that to aſſert this, would be a plain abſurdity, and contrary to the very ſuppoſition. For here 'tis ſuppoſed, that virtue in its very eſſence conſiſts in agreement or conſent of Being to Being. Now certainly agreement itſelf to Being in general muſt neceſſarily agree better with general exiſtence, than oppoſition & contrariety to it.
I OBSERVE ſecondly, that God in giving to the creature ſuch a temper of mind, gives that which is agreable to what is by abſolute neceſſity his own temper and nature. For, as has been often obſerved, God himſelf is in effect▪ Being in general; and without all doubt it is in itſelf neceſſary, and impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe, that God ſhould agree with himſelf, be united with himſelf, or love himſelf: and therefore, when he gives the ſame temper to his creatures, this is more agreable to his neceſſary nature, than the oppoſite temper: yea, the latter would be infinitely contrary to his nature.
LET it be noted, thirdly, by this temper only can created Beings be united to, and agree with one another. This appears, becauſe it conſiſts in conſent and union to Being in general; which implies agreement and union with every particular Being, except ſuch as are oppoſite to Being in general, or excepting ſuch caſes wherein union with them is by ſome means inconſiſtent with union with general exiſtence. But certainly if any particular created Being were of a temper to oppoſe Being in general, that would infer the moſt univerſal and greateſt poſſible diſcord, not only of creatures with their creator, but of created Beings one with another.
Fourthly, I OBSERVE, there is no other temper but this, that a man can have, and agree with himſelf, or be without ſelf-inconſiſtence, i. e. without having ſome inclinations and reliſhes repugnant to others. And that for theſe reaſons. Every Being that has underſtanding and will, neceſſarily loves happineſs. For, to ſuppoſe any Being not to love happineſs, would be to ſuppoſe he did not love what was agreable to him; which is a contradiction: or at leaſt would imply, that nothing was agreable or eligible to him, which is the ſame as to ſay, that he has no ſuch thing as choice, or any faculty of will. So that every Being who has a faculty of will, muſt of neceſſity have an inclination to happineſs. And therefore, if he be conſiſtent with himſelf, and has not ſome inclinations repugnant to others, he muſt approve of thoſe inclinations whereby Beings deſire the happineſs of Being in general, and muſt be againſt a diſpoſition to the miſery of Being in general: becauſe otherwiſe he would approve of oppoſition to his own happineſs. For, if a temper inclined to the miſery of Being in general prevailed univerſally, 'tis apparent, it would tend to univerſal miſery. But he that loves a tendency to univerſal miſery, in effect loves a tendency to his own miſery: and as he neceſſarily hates his own miſery, he has then one inclination repugnant to another.—And beſides, it neceſſarily follows from ſelf-love, that men love to be loved by others; becauſe in this others love agrees with their own love. But if men loved hatred to Being in general, they would in effect love the hatred of themſelves: and ſo would be inconſiſtent with themſelves, having one natural inclination contrary to another.
THESE things may help us to underſtand why that ſpiritual and divine ſenſe, by which thoſe that are truly virtuous and holy, perceive the excellency of true virtue, is in the ſacred ſcriptures called by the name of light, knowledge, underſtanding, &c. If this divine ſenſe were a thing arbitrarily given, without any foundation in the nature of things, it would not properly be called by ſuch names. For, if there were no correſpondence or agreement in ſuch a ſenſe with the nature of things, any more than there would have been in a diverſe or contrary ſenſe, the idea we obtain by this ſpiritual ſenſe could in no reſpect be ſaid to be a knowledge or perception of any thing beſides what was in our own minds. For this idea would be no repreſentation of any thing without. But ſince it is otherwiſe, ſince it is agreable, in the reſpects abovementioned, to the nature of things and eſpecially ſince 'tis the repreſentation and image of the moral perfection and excellency of the divine Being, hereby we have a perception of that moral excellency, of which we could have no true idea without it. And it being ſo, hereby perſons have that true knowledge of God, which greatly enlightens the mind in the knowledge of divine things in general, and does (as might be ſhewn, if it were neceſſary to the main purpoſe of this diſcourſe) in many reſpects aſſiſt perſons to a right underſtanding of things in general, to underſtand which our faculties were chiefly given us, and which do chiefly concern our intereſt; and aſſiſts us to ſee the nature of them, and the truth of them, in their proper evidence. Whereas, the want of this ſpiritual ſenſe, and the prevalence of thoſe diſpoſitions that are contrary to it, tends to darken and diſtract the mind, and dreadfully to delude and confound men's underſtandings.
AND as to that moral ſenſe, common to mankind, which there is in natural conſcience, neither can this be truly ſaid to be no more than a ſentiment arbitrarily given by the creator, without any relation to the neceſſary nature of things: but is eſtabliſhed in an agreement with the nature of things; ſo as no ſenſe of mind that can be ſuppoſed, of a contrary nature and tendency could be. This will appear by theſe two things.—
1. THIS moral ſenſe, if the underſtanding be well informed, and be exerciſed at liberty and in an extenſive manner, without being reſtrained to a private ſphere, approves the very ſame things which a ſpiritual and divine ſenſe approves; and thoſe things only; though not on the ſame grounds, nor with the ſame kind of approbation. Therefore, as that divine ſenſe has been already ſhewn to be agreable to the neceſſary nature of things, ſo this inferior moral ſenſe, being ſo far correſpondent to that, muſt alſo ſo far agree with the nature of things.
2. IT has been ſhewn, that this moral ſenſe conſiſts in approving the uniformity and natural agreement there is between one thing and another. So that by the ſuppoſition it is agreable to the nature of things. For therein it conſiſts, viz. a diſpoſition of mind to conſent to, or like, the agreement of the nature of things, or the agreement of the nature and form of one thing with another. And certainly ſuch a temper of mind as likes the agreement of things to the nature of things, is more agreable to the nature of things than an oppoſite temper of mind.
HERE it may be obſerved—As the uſe of language is for mankind to expreſs their ſentiments or ideas to each other, ſo that thoſe terms in language, by which things of a moral nature are ſignified, are to expreſs thoſe moral ſentiments or ideas that are common to mankind; therefore 'tis, that moral ſenſe which is in natural conſcience, that chiefly governs the uſe of language among mankind, and is the mind's rule of language in theſe matters among mankind; 'tis indeed the general natural rule which God has given to all men, whereby to judge of moral good and evil. By ſuch words, right and wrong, good and evil, when uſed in a moral ſenſe, is meant in common ſpeech that which deſerves praiſe or blame, reſpect or reſentment. But as has been often obſerv'd, mankind in general have a ſenſe of deſert, by this natural moral ſenſe.
THEREFORE here may ariſe a queſtion, which may deſerve to be conſidered, viz Seeing it is thus, that ſentiment among mankind is the rule of language, as to what is called by the name of good and evil, worthy and unworthy; and 'tis apparent, that ſentiment, at leaſt as to many particulars, by ſome means or other is different in different perſons, in different nations; that being thought to deſerve praiſe by one, which by others is thought to be worthy of blame; how therefore can virtue and vice be any other than arbitrary, not at all determined by the nature of things, but by the ſentiments of men with relation to the nature of things?
IN order to the anſwering this queſtion with clearneſs, it may be divided into two: viz. Whether men's ſentiments of moral good and evil are not arbitrary, or rather caſual and accidental? And, whether the way of their uſing words in what they call good and evil, is not arbitrary, without reſpect to any common ſentiment in all, conformed to the nature of things?
As TO the firſt, I would obſerve, that the general diſpoſition or ſenſe of mind exerciſed in a ſenſe of deſert of eſteem or reſentment, may be the ſame in all: though as to particular objects and occaſions with regard to which it is exerciſed, it may be very various in different men or bodies of men, through the partiality or error that may attend the view or attention of the mind. In all, a notion of deſert of love, or reſentment, may conſiſt in the ſame thing, in general, viz. a ſuitableneſs, or natural uniformity and agreement between the affections and acts of the agent, and the affections and treatment of others ſome way concerned; or the natural agreement between love (or ſomething that ſome way implies love, or proceeds from it, or tends to it) and love; a natural agreement between treating well, and being well treated; the natural agreement between hating (or ſomething that ſome way partakes of the nature of hatred) and being hated, &c. I ſay, this general notion of deſert may be the ſame: and yet occaſions and objects through variety of apprehenſions about theſe occaſions and objects, and the various manner in which they are viewed, by reaſon of the partial attention of the mind, may be extremely various; and example, cuſtom, education, and aſſociation may have a hand in this, in ways innumerable. But 'tis needleſs to dwell long on this, ſince things which have been ſaid by others (Mr. Hutcheſon, in particular) may abundantly ſhew, that the differences which are to be found among different perſons and nations, concerning moral good and evil, are not inconſiſtent with a general moral ſenſe, common to all mankind.
NOR, ſecondly, is the uſe of the words, good and evil, right and wrong, when uſed in a moral ſenſe, altogether unfix'd and arbitrary, according to the variety of notions, opinions, and views, that occaſion the forementioned variety of ſentiment. For tho' the ſignification of words is determined by uſe, yet that which governs in the uſe of terms is general or common uſe. And mankind, in what they would ſignify by terms, are obliged to aim at a conſiſtent uſe: becauſe it is eaſily found that the end of language, which is to be a common medium of manifeſting ideas and ſentiments, cannot be obtained any other way than by a conſiſtent uſe of words; both that men ſhould be conſiſtent with themſelves, and one with another, in the uſe of them. But men can't call any thing right or wrong, worthy or ill-deſerving, conſiſtently, any other way than by calling things ſo, which truly deſerve praiſe or blame, i. e. things, wherein (all things conſidered) there is moſt uniformity in connecting with them praiſe or blame. There is no other way that they can uſe theſe terms conſiſtently with themſelves. Thus, if thieves or traitors may be angry with informers, that bring them to juſtice, and call their behaviour by odious names, yet herein they are inconſiſtent with themſelves; becauſe, when they put themſelves in the place of thoſe that have injured them, they approve the ſame things they condemn. And therefore ſuch are capable of being convinced, that they apply theſe odious terms in an abuſive manner. So, a nation that proſecutes an ambitious deſign of univerſal empire, by ſubduing other nations with fire and ſword, may affix terms that ſignify the higheſt degrees of virtue, to the conduct of ſuch as ſhew the moſt engaged, ſtable, reſolute ſpirit in this affair, and do moſt of this bloody work. But yet they are capable of being convinced, that they uſe theſe terms inconſiſtently, and abuſe language in it, and ſo having their mouths ſtopped.—And not only will men uſe ſuch words inconſiſtently with themſelves, but alſo with one another, by uſing them any otherwiſe than to ſignify true merit or ill-deſerving, as before explained. For there is no way elſe, wherein men have any notion of good or ill-deſert, that mankind in general can agree in. Mankind in general ſeem to ſuppoſe ſome general ſtandard or foundation in nature for an univerſal conſiſtence in the uſe of the terms whereby they expreſs moral good and evil; which none can depart from but thro' error and miſtake. This is evidently ſuppoſed in all diſputes they may have one with another, about right and wrong; and in all endeavors uſed to evince or prove that any thing is either good or evil, in a moral ſenſe.
FINIS
End of the text · Jonathan Edwards, Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue (1765)