Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 5
CHAP. V.
Of natural conſcience, and the moral ſenſe.
THERE is yet another diſpoſition or principle, of great importance, natural to mankind; which, if we conſider the conſiſtence and harmony of nature's laws, may alſo be look'd upon as in ſome ſort ariſing from ſelf-love, or ſelf-union: and that is a diſpoſition in man to be uneaſy in a conſciouſneſs of being inconſiſtent with himſelf, and as it were, againſt himſelf, in his own actions. This appears particularly in the inclination of the mind to be uneaſy in the conſciouſneſs of doing that to others, which he ſhould be angry with them for doing to him, if they were in his caſe, and he in theirs; or, of forbearing to do that to them, which he would be diſpleaſed with them for neglecting to do to him.
I HAVE obſerved from time to time, that in pure love to others (i. e. love not ariſing from ſelf-love) there's an union of the heart with others; a kind of enlargement of the mind, whereby it ſo extends itſelf as to take others into a man's ſelf: and therefore it implies a diſpoſition to feel, to deſire, and to act as tho' others were one with ourſelves. So, ſelf-love implies an inclination to feel and act as one with ourſelves: which naturally renders a ſenſible inconſiſtence with ourſelves, and ſelf-oppoſition, in what we ourſelves chuſe and do, to be uneaſy to the mind: which will cauſe uneaſineſs of mind to be the conſequence of a male volent and unjuſt behaviour towards others and a kind of diſapprobation of acts of this nature, and an approbation of the contrary. To do that to another, which we ſhould be angry with him for doing to us, and to hate a perſon for doing that to us, which we ſhould incline to and inſiſt on doing to him, if we were exactly in the ſame caſe, is to diſagree with ourſelves, and contradict ourſelves. It would be, for ourſelves both to chuſe and adhere to, and yet to refuſe and utterly reject, as it were the very ſame thing. No wonder, this is contrary to nature. No wonder, that ſuch a ſelf-oppoſition, and inward war with a man's ſelf, naturally begets unquietneſs, and raiſes diſturbance in his mind.
A THUS approving of actions, becauſe we therein act as in agreement with ourſelves, or as one with ourſelves,—and a thus diſapproving and being uneaſy in the conſciouſneſs of diſagreeing and being inconſiſtent with ourſelves in what we do,—is quite a different thing from approving or diſapproving actions becauſe in them we agree and are united with Being in general: which is loving or hating actions from a ſenſe of the primary beauty of true virtue, and odiouſneſs of ſin.—The former of theſe principles is private: the latter is public and truly benevolent in the higheſt ſenſe. The former (i. e. an inclination to agree with ourſelves) is a natural principle: but the latter (i. e. an agreement or union of heart to the great ſyſtem, and to God, the head of it, who is all and all in it) is a divine principle.
IN that uneaſineſs now mentioned, conſiſts very much of that inward trouble men have from reflections of conſcience: and when they are free from this uneaſineſs, and are conſcious to themſelves, that in what they have acted towards others, they have done the ſame which they ſhould have expected from them in the ſame caſe, then they have what is called peace of conſcience, with reſpect to theſe actions. And there is alſo an approbation of conſcience, of the conduct of others towards ourſelves. As when we are blamed, condemned, or puniſhed by them, and are conſcious to ourſelves that if we were in their caſe, and they in ours, we ſhould in like manner, blame, condemn, and puniſh them. And thus men's conſciences may juſtify God's anger and condemnation. When they have the ideas of God's greatneſs, their relation to him, the benefits they have received from him, the manifeſtations he has made of his will to them, &c. ſtrongly impreſſed on their minds, a conſciouſneſs is excited within them of thoſe reſentments, which would be occaſion'd in themſelves by an injurious treatment in any wiſe parallel.
THERE is ſuch a conſciouſneſs as this oftentimes within men, imply'd in the thoughts and views of the mind, which perhaps on reflection they could hardly give an account of. Unleſs men's conſciences are greatly ſtupify'd, it is naturally and neceſſarily ſuggeſted; and does habitually, ſpontaneouſly, inſtantaneouſly, and as it were inſenſibly ariſe in the mind. And the more ſo for this reaſon, viz. that we have not, nor ever had from our infancy, any other way to conceive of any thing which other perſons act or ſuffer, or of any thing about intelligent, moral agents, but by recalling and exciting the ideas of what we ourſelves are conſcious of in the acts, paſſions, ſenſations, volitions, &c. which we have found in our own minds; and by putting the ideas which we obtain by this means, in the place of another; or as it were ſubſtituting ourſelves in their place. Thus, we have no conception, in any degree, what underſtanding, perception, love, pleaſure, pain, or deſire are in others, but by putting ourſelves as it were in their ſtead, or transferring the ideas we obtain of ſuch things in our own minds by conſciouſneſs, into their place; making ſuch an alteration, as to degree and circumſtances, as what we obſerve of them requires. 'Tis thus in all moral things that we conceive of in others, which are all mental, and not corporeal things; and every thing that we conceive of, belonging to others, more than ſhape, ſize, complexion, ſituation, and motion of their bodies. And this is the only way that we come to be capable of having ideas of any perception or act even of the Godhead. We never could have any notion what underſtanding or vo…ion, love or hatred are, either in created ſpirits or in God, if we had never experienced what underſtanding and volition, love and hatred are in our own minds. Knowing what they are by conſciouſneſs, we can add degrees, and deny limits, and remove changeableneſs and other imperfections, and aſcribe them to God. Which is the only way we come to be capable of conceiving of any thing in the Deity.
BUT though it be ſo, that men in thinking of others do as it were put themſelves in their place, they do it ſo naturally, or rather habitually, inſtantaneouſly, and without ſet purpoſe, that they do it inſenſibly, and can ſcarce give any account of it, and many would think ſtrange if they were told of it. So it may be in men's ſubſtituting themſelves in others place in ſuch exerciſes of conſcience as have been ſpoken of: and the former ſubſtitution leads to the latter, in one whoſe conſcience is not greatly ſtupified. For in all his thoughts of the other perſon, in whatever he apprehends or conceives of his moral conduct to others or to himſelf, if it be in loving or hating him, approving or condemning him, rewarding or puniſhing him, he neceſſarily as it were puts himſelf in his ſtead, for the forementioned reaſon; and therefore the more naturally, eaſily and quietly ſees whether he being in his place ſhould approve or condemn, be angry or pleaſed as he is.
Natural conſcience conſiſts in theſe two things.
1. IN that which has now been ſpoken of: that diſpoſition to approve or diſapprove the moral treatment which paſſes between us and others, from a determination of the mind to be eaſy, or uneaſy, in a conſciouſneſs of our being conſiſtent, or inconſiſtent with ourſelves. Hereby we have a diſpoſition to approve our own treatment of another, when we are conſcious to ourſelves that we treat him ſo as we ſhould expect to be treated by him, were he in our caſe and we in his; and to diſapprove of our own treatment of another, when we are conſcious that we ſhould be diſpleaſed, with the like treatment from him, if we were in his caſe. So we in our conſciences approve of another's treatment of us, if we are conſcious to ourſelves, that if we were in his caſe, and he in ours, we ſhould think it juſt to treat him as he treats us; and diſapprove his treatment of us, when we are conſcious that we ſhould think it unjuſt, if we were in his caſe. Thus men's conſciences approve or diſapprove the ſentence of their judge, by which they are acquitted or condemned.—But this is not all that is in natural conſcience. Beſides this approving or diſapproving from uneaſineſs as being inconſiſtent with ourſelves, there is another thing that muſt preceed it, and be the foundation of it. As for inſtance, when my conſcience diſapproves my own treatment of another, being conſcious to myſelf, that were I in his caſe, I ſhould be diſpleaſed and angry with him for ſo treating me, the queſtion might be aſked, but what would be the ground of that ſuppoſed diſapprobation, diſpleaſure and anger, which I am conſcious would be in me in that caſe?—That diſapprobation muſt be on ſome other grounds.
Therefore,
2. THE other thing which belongs to the approbation or diſapprobation of natural conſcience, is the ſenſe of deſert, which was ſpoken of before: conſiſting, as was obſerved, in a natural agreement, proportion and harmony between malevolence or injury and reſentment and puniſhment; or between loving and being loved, between ſhewing kindneſs and being rewarded, &c. Both theſe kinds of approving or diſapproving concur in the approbation or diſapprobation of conſcience: the one founded on the other. Thus, when a man's conſcience diſapproves of his treatment of his neighbour, in the firſt place he is conſcious that if he were in his neighbours ſtead, he ſhould reſent ſuch treatment, from a ſenſe of juſtice, or from a ſenſe of uniformity and equality between ſuch treatment and reſentment and puniſhment; as before explained. And then in the next place he perceives, that therefore he is not conſiſtent with himſelf, in doing what he himſelf ſhould reſent in that caſe; and hence diſapproves it, as being naturally averſe to oppoſition to himſelf.
APPROBATION and diſapprobation of conſcience, in the ſenſe now explained, will extend to all virtue and vice; to every thing whatſoever that is morally good or evil, in a mind which does not confine its view to a private ſphere, but will take things in general into its conſideration, & is free from ſpeculative error. For, as all virtue or moral good may be reſolved into love to others, either God or creatures, ſo men eaſily ſee the uniformity and natural agreement there is between loving others, and being accepted and favored by others. And all vice, ſin, or moral evil ſummarily conſiſting in the want of this love to others, or in the contrary, viz. hatred or malevolence, ſo men eaſily ſee the natural agreement there is between hating and doing ill to others, and being hated by them and ſuffering ill from them, or from him that acts for all and has the care of the whole Syſtem. And as this ſenſe of equality and natural agreement extends to all moral good and evil, ſo this lays a foundation of an equal extent with the other kind of approbation and diſapprobation, which is grounded upon it, ariſing from an averſion to ſelf-inconſiſtence and oppoſition. For in all caſes of benevolence or the contrary towards others, we are capable of putting ourſelves in the place of others, and are naturally led to do it, and ſo of reflecting, or being conſcious to ourſelves, how we ſhould like or diſlike ſuch treatment from others. Thus natural conſcience, if the underſtanding be properly enlightned, and errors and blinding ſtupifying prejudices are removed, concurs with the law of God, and is of equal extent with it, and joins its voice with it in every article.
AND thus, in particular, we may ſee in what reſpect this natural conſcience that has been deſcribed, extends to true virtue, conſiſting in union of heart to Being in general, and ſupreme love to God. For, altho' it ſees not, or rather does not taſte its primary and eſſential beauty, i. e. it taſtes no ſweetneſs in benevolence to Being in general, ſimply conſidered, or loves i… not for Being in general's ſake (for nothing but general benevolence itſelf can do that) yet this natural conſcience. common to mankind, may approve of it from that uniformity, equality and juſtice, which there is in it, and the demerit which is ſeen in the contrary, conſiſting in the natural agreement between the contrary and being hated of Being in general. Men by natural conſcience may ſee the juſtice (or natural agreement) there is in yielding all to God, as we receive all from God; and the juſtice there is in being his that has made us, and being willingly ſo, which is the ſame as being dependent on his will, and conformed to his will in the manner of our Being, as we are for our Being itſelf, and in the conformity of our will to his will, on whoſe will we are univerſally and moſt perfectly dependent; and alſo the juſtice there is in our ſupreme love to God, from his goodneſs,—the natural agreement there is between our having ſupreme reſpect to him who exerciſes infinite goodneſs to us, and from whom we receive all well-being.—Beſides that diſagreement and diſcord appears worſe to natural ſenſe (as was obſerved before) in things nearly related and of great importance: and therefore it muſt appear very ill, as it reſpects the infinite Being, and in that infinitely great relation which there is between the creator and his creatures. And 'tis eaſy to conceive how that ſenſe which is in natural conſcience, ſhould ſee the deſert of puniſhment, which there is in the contrary of true virtue, viz. oppoſition and enmity to Being in general. For, this is only to ſee the natural agreement there is between oppoſing Being in general, and being oppoſed by Being in general; with a conſciouſneſs how that if we were infinitely great. we ſhould expect to be regarded according to our greatneſs, and ſhould proportionably reſent contempt. Thus natural conſcience, if well inform'd, will approve of true virtue, and will diſapprove and condemn the want of it, and oppoſition to it; and yet without ſeeing the true beauty of it. Yea, if men's conſciences were fully enlightned, if they were delivered from being confined to a private ſphere, and brought to view and conſider things in general, and deliver'd from being ſtupefy'd by ſenſual objects and appetites, as they will be at the day of judgment, they would approve nothing but true virtue, nothing but general benevolence, and thoſe affections and actions that are conſiſtent with it, and ſubordinate to it. For they muſt ſee that conſent to Being in general, and ſupreme reſpect to the Being of Beings, is moſt juſt; and that every thing which is inconſiſtent with it, and interferes with it, or flows from the want of it, is unjuſt, and deſerves the oppoſition of univerſal exiſtence.
THUS has God eſtabliſhed and ordered, that this principle of natural conſcience, which though it implies no ſuch thing as actual benevolence to Being in general, nor any delight in ſuch a principle, ſimply conſider'd, and ſo implies no truly ſpiritual ſenſe or virtuous taſte, yet ſhould approve and condemn the ſame things that are approved and condemned by a ſpiritual ſenſe or virtuous taſte.
THAT moral ſenſe which is natural to mankind, ſo far as it is diſintereſted, and not founded in aſſociation of ideas, is the ſame with this natural conſcience that has been deſcribed. The ſenſe of moral good and evil, and that diſpoſition to approve virtue, and diſapprove vice, which men have by natural conſcience, is that moral ſenſe, ſo much inſiſted on in the writings of many of late: a miſunderſtanding of which ſeems to have been the thing that has miſled thoſe moraliſts who have inſiſted on a diſintereſted moral ſenſe, univerſal in the world of mankind, as an evidence of a diſpoſition to true virtue, conſiſting in a benevolent temper, naturally implanted in the minds of all men. Some of the arguments made uſe of by theſe writers, do indeed prove that there is a moral ſenſe or taſte, univerſal among men, diſtinct from what ariſes from ſelf-love. Though I humbly conceive, there is ſome confuſion in their diſcourſes on the ſubject, and not a proper diſtinction obſerved in the inſtances of men's approbation of virtue, which they produce. Some of which are not to their purpoſe, being inſtances of that approbation of virtue, that was deſcribed, which ariſes from ſelf-love. But other inſtances prove that there is a moral taſte, or ſenſe of moral good and evil, natural to all, which don't properly ariſe from ſelf-love Yet … conceive there are no inſtances of this kind which may no… be refer'd to natural conſcience, and particularly to that which I have obſerved to be primary in the approbation of natural conſcience, viz. a ſenſe of deſert and approbation o… that natural agreement there is, … manner and meaſure, in juſtice. But I think it is plain from what has been ſaid, that neither this, not any thing elſe wherein conſiſts the ſenſe of moral good and even which there is in natural conſcience, is of the nature of a truly virtuous taſte, or determination of mind to reliſh and delight in the eſſen…a… beauty of true virtue, ariſing from a virtuous benevolence of heart.
BUT it further appears from this—If the approbation of conſcience were the ſame with the approbation of the inclination of the heart, or the natural diſpoſition and determination of the mind, to love and be pleaſed with virtue, then approbation and condemnation of conſcience would always be in proportion to the virtuous temper of the mind; or rather, the degree would be juſt the ſame. In that perſon who had a high degree of a virtuous temper, therefore, the teſtimony of conſcience in favor of virtue would be equally full: But he that had but little, would have as little a degree of the teſtimony of conſcience for virtue, & againſt vice. But, I think, the caſe is evidently otherwiſe. Some men, thro' the ſtrength of vice in their hearts, will go on in ſin againſt clearer light and ſtronger convictions of conſcience, than others. If conſcience's approving duty and diſapproving ſin, were the ſame thing as the exerciſe of a virtuous principle of the heart, in loving duty and hating ſin, then remorſe of conſcience will be the ſame thing as repentance: and juſt in the ſame degree as the ſinner feels remorſe of conſcience for ſin▪ in the ſame degree is his heart turned from the love of ſin to the hatred of it, inaſmuch as they are the very ſame thing.
CHRISTIANS have the greateſt reaſon to believe, from the ſcriptures, that in the future day of the revelation of the righteous judgment of God when ſinners ſhall be call'd to anſwer before their judge, and all their wickedneſs, in all its aggravations, brought forth, and clearly manifeſted in the perfect light of that day, and God will reprove them, and ſet their ſins in order before them, their conſciences will be greatly awakened and convinced, their mouths will be ſtopped, all ſtupidity of conſcience will be at an end, and conſcience will have its full exerciſe: and therefore their conſciences will approve the dreadful ſentence of the judge againſt them, and ſeeing that they have deſerved ſo great a puniſhment, will join with the judge in condemning them. And this, according to the notion I am oppoſing, would be the ſame thing as their being brought to the fulleſt repentance; their hearts being perfectly changed to hate ſin and love holineſs; and virtue or holineſs of heart in them will be brought to the moſt full and perfect exerciſe. But how much otherwiſe, have we reaſon to ſuppoſe, it will then be? viz. That the ſin and wickedneſs of their heart will come to its higheſt dominion and compleateſt exerciſe; that they ſhall be wholly left of God, and given up to their wickedneſs, even as the devils are! When God has done waiting on ſinners, and his ſpirit done ſtriving with them, he will not reſtrain their wickedneſs, as he does now. But ſin ſhall then rage in their hearts, as a fire no longer reſtrained or kept under. 'Tis proper for a judge when he condemns a criminal, to endeavour ſo to ſet his guilt before him as to convince his conſcience of the juſtice of the ſentence. This the almighty will do effectually, and do to perfection, ſo as moſt thoro'ly to awaken and convince the conſcience. But if natural conſcience, and the diſpoſition of the heart to be pleaſed with virtue, were the ſame, then at the ſame time that the conſcience was brought to its perfect exerciſe, the heart would be made perfectly holy: or, would have the exerciſe of true virtue and holineſs in perfect benevolence of temper. But inſtead of this, their wickedneſs will then be brought to perfection, and wicked men will become very devils, and accordingly will be ſent away as curſed into everlaſting fire prepared for the devil and his angels.
BUT ſuppoſing natural conſcience to be what has been deſcribed, all theſe difficulties and abſurdities are wholly avoided. Sinners, when they ſee the greatneſs of the Being, whom they have lived in contempt of, and in rebellion on and oppoſition to, and have clearly ſet before them their obligations to him, as their creator, preſerver, benefactor, &c. together with the degree in which they have acted as enemies to him, may have a clear ſenſe of the deſert of their ſin, conſiſting in the natural agreement there is between ſuch contempt and oppoſition of ſuch a Being, and his deſpiſing and oppoſing them; between their being and acting as ſo great enemies to ſuch a God, and their ſuffering the dreadful conſequences of his being & acting as their great enemy: and their being conſcious within themſelves of the degree of anger, which would naturally ariſe in their own hearts in ſuch a caſe, if they were in the place and ſtate of their judge. In order to theſe things there is no need of a virtuous benevolent temper, reliſhing and delighting in benevolence, and loathing the contrary. The conſcience may ſee the natural agreement between oppoſing and being oppoſed, between hating and being hated, without abhorring malevolence from a benevolent temper of mind, or without loving God from a view of the beauty of his holineſs. Theſe things have no neceſſary dependence one on the other.