Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II.
Shewing how that love, wherein true virtue conſiſts, reſpects the divine Being and created Beings.
FROM what has been ſaid, 'tis evident, that true virtue muſt chiefly conſiſt in love to God; the Being of Beings, infinitely the greateſt and beſt of Beings. This appears, whether we conſider the primary or ſecondary ground of virtuous love. It was obſerved, that the firſt objective ground of that love, wherein true virtue conſiſts, is Being, ſimply conſidered: and as a neceſſary conſequence of this, that Being who has the moſt of Being, or the greateſt ſhare of univerſal exiſtence, has proportionably the greateſt ſhare of virtuous benevolence, ſo far as ſuch a Being is exhibited to the faculties of our minds, other things being equal. But God has infinitely the greateſt ſhare of exiſtence, or is infinitely the greateſt Being. So that all other Being, even that of all created things whatſoever, throughout the whole univerſe, is as nothing in compariſon of the divine Being.
AND if we conſider the ſecondary ground of love, viz. beauty, or moral excellency, the ſame thing will appear. For as God is infinitely the greateſt Being, ſo he is allowed to be infinitely the moſt beautiful and excellent: and all the beauty to be found throughout the whole creation, is but the reflexion of the diffuſed beams of that Being who hath an infinite fulneſs of brightneſs and glory. God's beauty is infinitely more valuable, than that of all other Beings upon both thoſe accounts mentioned, viz. the degree of his virtue, and the greatneſs of the Being poſſeſſed of this virtue. And God has ſufficiently exhibited himſelf, in his Being, his infinite greatneſs and excellency: and has given us faculties, whereby we are capable of plainly diſcovering immenſe ſuperiority to all other Beings, in theſe reſpects. Therefore he that has true virtue, conſiſting in benevolence to Being in general, and in that complacence in virtue, or moral beauty, and benevolence to virtuous Being, muſt neceſſarily have a ſupreme love to God, both of benevolence and complacence. And all true vertue muſt radically and eſſentially, and as it were ſummarily, conſiſt in this. Becauſe God is not only infinitely greater and more excellent than all other Being, but he is the head of the univerſal ſyſtem of exiſtence; the foundation and fountain of all Being and all beauty; from whom all is perfectly derived, and on whom all is moſt abſolutely and perfectly dependant; of whom, and through whom, & to whom is all Being and all perfection; and whoſe Being and beauty is as it were the ſum and comprehenſion of all exiſtence and excellence: much more than the ſun is the fountain and ſummary comprehenſion of all the light and brightneſs of the day.
IF it ſhould be objected, that virtue conſiſts primarily in benevolence, but that our fellow-creatures, and not God, ſeem to be the moſt proper objects of our benevolence; inaſmuch as our goodneſs extendeth not to God, and we cannot be profitable to him.—To this I anſwer,
1. A BENEVOLENT propenſity of heart is exerciſed, not only in ſeeking to promote the happineſs of the Being, towards whom it is exerciſed, but alſo in rejoicing in his happineſs. Even as gratitude for benefits received will not only excite endeavours to requite the kindneſs we receive, by equally benefiting our benefactor, but alſo if he be above any need of us, or we have nothing to beſtow, and are unable to repay his kindneſs, it will diſpoſe us to rejoice in his proſperity.
2. THOUGH we are not able to give any thing to God, which we have of our own, independantly; yet we may be the inſtruments of promoting his glory, in which he takes a true and proper delight. [As was ſhewn at large in the former treatiſe, on God's end in creating the world. Chap. 1. ſect. 4. Whither I muſt refer the reader for a more full anſwer to this objection.]
WHATEVER influence ſuch an objection may ſeem to have on the minds of ſome, yet is there any that owns the Being of a God, who will deny that any love or benevolent affection, is due to God, and proper to be exerciſed towards him? If no benevolence is to be exerciſed towards God, becauſe we cannot profit him, then for the ſame reaſon, neither is gratitude to be exerciſed towards him for his benefits to us; becauſe we cannot requite him. But where is the man, who believes a God and a providence, that will ſay this?
THERE ſeems to be an inconſiſtence in ſome writers on morality, in this reſpect, that they don't wholly exclude a regard to the Deity out of there ſchemes of morality, but yet mention it ſo ſlightly, that they leave me room and reaſon to ſuſpect they eſteem it a leſs important and a ſubordinate part of true morality; and inſiſt on benevolence to the created ſyſtem in ſuch a manner, as would naturally lead one to ſuppoſe, they look upon that as by far the moſt important and eſſential thing in their ſcheme. But why ſhould this be? If true virtue conſiſts partly in a reſpect to God, then doubtleſs it conſiſts chiefly in it. If true morality requires that we ſhould have ſome regard, ſome benevolent affection to our creator, as well as to his creatures, then doubtleſs it requires the firſt regard to be paid to him; and that he be every way the ſupream object of our benevolence▪ I… his being above our reach, and beyond all capacity of being profited by us, don't hinder but that nevertheleſs he is the proper object of our love, then it don't hinder that he ſhould be loved according to his dignity, or according to the degree in which he has thoſe things wherein worthineſs of regard conſiſts, ſo far as we are capable of it. But this worthineſs none will deny, conſiſts in theſe two things, greatneſs and moral goodneſs. And thoſe that own a God, don't deny that he infinitely exceeds all other Beings in theſe. If the Deity is to be look'd upon as within that ſyſtem of Beings which properly terminates our benevolence, or belonging to that whole, certainly he is to be regarded as the head of the ſyſtem, and the chief part of it; if it be proper to call him a part, who is infinitely more than all the reſt, and in compariſon of whom and without whom all the reſt are nothing, either as to beauty or exiſtence. And therefore certainly, unleſs we will be atheiſts, we muſt allow that true virtue does primarily and moſt eſſentially conſiſt in a ſupream love to God; and that where this is wanting, there can be no true virtue.
BUT this being a matter of the higheſt importance, I ſhall ſay ſomething further to make it plain, that love to God is moſt eſſential to true virtue; and that no benevolence whatſoever to other Beings can be of the natue of true virtue, without it.
AND therefore let it be ſuppoſed, that ſome Beings, by natural inſtinct or by ſome other means, have a determination of mind to union and benevolence to a particular perſon, or private ſyſtem, *It may be here noted, that when hereafter I uſe ſuch a phraſe as private ſyſtem of Beings, or others ſimilar, I thereby intend any ſyſtem or ſociety of Beings that contains but a ſmall part of the great ſyſtem comprehending the univerſality of exiſtence. I think, that may well be called a private ſyſtem, which is but an infinitely ſmall part of this great whole we ſtand related to. I therefore alſo call that affection, private affection, which is limited to ſo narrow a circle: and that general affection or benevolence, which has Being in general for it's object.which is but a ſmall part of the univerſal ſyſtem of Being: and that this diſpoſition or determination of mind is independant on, or not ſubordinate to benevolence, to Being in general. Such a determination, diſpoſition, or affection of mind is not of the nature of true virtue.
THIS is allowed by all with regard to ſelf love; in which, good-will is confined to one ſingle perſon only. And there are the ſame reaſons, why any other private affection or good-will tho' extending to a ſociety of perſons, independent of, and unſubordinate to, benevolence to the univerſality, ſhould not be eſteemed truly virtuous. For, notwithſtanding it extends to a number of perſons, which taken together are more than a ſingle perſon, yet the whole falls infinitely ſhort of the univerſality of exiſtence; and if put in the ſcales with it, has no greater proportion to it than a ſingle perſon.
HOWEVER, it may not be amiſs more particularly to conſider the reaſons why private affections, or good-will limited to a particular circle of Beings, …alling infinitely ſhort of the whole exiſtence, and not dependent upon it, nor ſubordinate to general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue.
1. SUCH, a private affection, detached from general benevolence and independent on i…, as the caſe may be, will be againſt general benevolence, or o… a contrary tendency; and will ſet a perſon againſt general exiſtence, and make him an enemy to it—As it is with ſelfiſhneſs, or when a man is governed by a regard to his own private intereſt, independent of regard to the publick good, ſuch a temper expoſes a man to act the part of an enemy to the publick. As, in every caſe wherein his private intereſt ſeems to …aſh with the publick; or in all thoſe caſes wherein ſuch things are preſented to his view, that ſuit his perſonal appetites or private inclinations, but are inconſiſtent with the good of the publick. On which account a ſelfiſh, contracted, narrow ſpirit is generally abhorred, and is eſteemed baſe and ſordid.—But if a man's affection takes in half a dozen more and his regards extend ſo far beyond his own ſingle perſon as to take in his children and family; or if it reaches further ſtill, to a larger circle, but falls infinitely ſhort of the univerſal ſyſtem, and is excluſive of Being in general; his private affection expoſes him to the ſame thing, viz. to purſue the intereſt of its particular object in oppoſition to general exiſtence: which is certainly contrary to the tendency of true virtue; yea, directly contrary to the main and moſt eſſential thing in its nature, the thing on account of which chiefly its nature and tendency is good. For the chief and moſt eſſential good that is in virtue, is its favouring Being in general. Now certainly, if private affection to a limited ſyſtem had in itſelf the eſſential nature of virtue, it would be impoſſible, that it ſhould in any circumſtance whatſoever have a tendency and inclination directly contrary to that wherein the eſſence of virtue chiefly conſiſts.
2. PRIVATE affections, if not ſubordinate to general affection, is not only liable, as the caſe may be, to iſſue in enmity to Being in general, but has a tendency to it as the caſe certainly is, and muſt neceſſarily be. For he that is influenced by private affection, not ſubordinate to regard to Being in general, ſets up its particular or limited object above Being in general; and this moſt naturally tends to enmity againſt the latter, which is by right the great ſupreme, ruling, and abſolutely ſovereign object of our regard. Even as the ſetting up another prince as ſupreme in any kingdom, diſtinct from the lawful ſovereign, naturally tends to enmity againſt the lawful ſovereign. Wherever it is ſufficiently publiſhed, that the ſupreme, infinite, and all-comprehending Being requires a ſupreme regard to himſelf; and inſiſts upon it, that our reſpect to him ſhould univerſally rule in our hearts, and every other affection be ſubordinate to it, and this under the pain of his diſpleaſure (as we muſt ſuppoſe it is in the world of intelligent creatures, if God maintains a moral kingdom in the world) then a conſciouſneſs of our having choſen and ſet up another prince to rule over us, and ſubjected our hearts to him, and continuing in ſuch an act, muſt unavoidably excite enmity, and fix us in a ſtated oppoſition, to the ſupreme Being. This demonſtrates, that affection to a private ſociety of ſyſtem, independent on general benevolence, cannot be of the nature of true virtue. For this would be abſurd, that it has the nature and eſſence of true virtue, and yet at the ſame time has a tendency oppoſite to true virtue.
3. NOT only would affection to a private ſyſtem, unſubordinate to regard to Being in general, have a tendency to oppoſition to the ſupreme object of virtuous affection, as its effect and conſequence, but would become itſelf an oppoſition to that object. Conſidered by itſelf in its nature, detach'd from its effects, it is an inſtance of great oppoſition to the rightful ſupreme object of our reſpect. For it exalts its private object above the other great and infinite object; and ſets that up as ſupreme, in oppoſition to this. It puts down Being in general, which is infinitely ſuperior in itſelf and infinitely more important, in an inferior place; yea, ſubjects the ſupreme general object to this private infinitely inferior object: which is to treat it with great contempt and truly to act in oppoſition to it, and to act in oppoſition to the true order of things, and in oppoſition to that which is infinitely the ſupreme intereſt; making this ſupreme and infinitely important intereſt, as far as in us lies, to be ſubject to, and dependent on, an intereſt infinitely inferior. This is to act againſt it, and to act the part of an enemy to it. He that takes a ſubject, and exalts him above his prince, ſets him as ſupreme inſtead of the prince, and treats his prince wholly as a ſubject, therein acts the part of an enemy to his prince.
FROM theſe things, I think, it is manifeſt, that no affection limited to any private ſyſtem, not dependent on, nor ſubordinate to Being in general, can be of the nature of true virtue; and this, whatever the private ſyſtem be, let it be more or leſs extenſive, conſiſting of a greater or ſmaller number of individuals, ſo long as it contains an infinitely little part of univerſal exiſtence, and ſo bears no proportion to the great all-comprehending ſyſtem.—And conſequently, that no affection whatſoever to any creature, or any ſyſtem of created beings, which is not dependent on, nor ſubordinate to a propenſity or union of the heart to God, the ſupreme and infinite Being, can be of the nature of true virtue.
FROM hence alſo it is evident, that the divine virtue, or the virtue of the divine mind, muſt conſiſt primarily in love to himſelf, or in the mutual love and friendſhip which ſubſiſts eternally and neceſſarily between the ſeveral perſons in the God-head, or that infinitely ſtrong propenſity there is in there divine perſons one …o another. There is no need of multiplying words, to prove that it muſt be thus, on a ſuppoſition that virtue in its moſt eſſential na…e, conſiſts in benevolent …ffect on or propenſity of heart towards Being in general; and ſo flowing out to particular Beings, in a greater or leſſer degree, according to the meaſure of exiſtence and beauty which they are poſſeſſed of.—It will alſo follow from the foregoing things, that God's goodneſs and love to created Beings, is derived from, and ſubordinate to his love to himſelf. [In what manner it is ſo, I have endeavoured in ſome meaſure to explain in the preceeding diſcourſe of God's end in creating the world.]
WITH reſpect to the manner in which a virtuous love in created Beings, one to another, is dependent on, and derived from love to God, this will appear by a proper conſideration of what has been ſaid; that it is ſufficient to render love to any created Being virtuous, if it ariſe from the temper of mind wherein conſiſts a diſpoſition to love God ſupremely. Becauſe it appears from what has been already obſerved, all that love to particular Beings, which is the fruit of a benevolent propenſity of heart to Being in general, is virtuous love. But, as has been remark'd, a benevolent propenſity of heart to Being in general, and a temper or diſpoſition to love God ſupremely, are in effect the ſame thing. Therefore, if love to a created Being comes from that temper or propenſity of the hea…e, it is virtuous.—However, every particular exerciſe of love to a creature may not ſenſibly ariſe from any exerciſe of love to God, or an explicit conſideration of any ſimilitude, conformity, union or relation to God, in the creature beloved.
THE moſt proper evidence of love to a created Being, its ariſing from that temper of mind wherein conſiſts a ſupreme propenſity of heart to God, ſeems to be the agreableneſs of the kind and degree of our love to God's end in our creation and in the creation of all things, and the coincidence of the exerciſes of our love, in their manner, order, and meaſure, with the manner in which God himſelf exerciſes love to the creature in the creation and government of the world, and the way in which God as the firſt cauſe and ſupreme diſpoſer of all things, has reſpect to the creature's happineſs, in ſubordination to himſelf as his own ſupreme end. For the true virtue of created Beings is doubtleſs their higheſt excellency, and their true goodneſs, and that by which they are eſpecially agreable to the mind of their creator—But the true goodneſs of a thing (as was obſerved before) muſt be its agreableneſs to its end, or its fitneſs to anſwer the deſign for which it was made. Or, at leaſt, this muſt be its goodneſs in the eyes of the workman.—Therefore they are good moral agents whoſe temper of mind or propenſity of heart is agreable to the end for which God made moral agents. But, as has been ſhewn, the laſt end for which God has made moral agents, muſt be the laſt end for which God has made all things: it being evident, that the moral world is the end of the reſt of the world; the inanimate and unintelligent world being made for the rational and moral world, as much as a houſe is prepared for the inhabitants.
BY theſe things it appears, that a truly virtuous mind, being as it were under the ſovereign dominion of love to God, does above all things ſeek the glory of God, and makes this his ſupreme, governing, and ultimate end: conſiſting in the expreſſion of God's perfections in their proper effects, and in the manifeſtation of God's glory to created underſtandings, and the communications of the infinite fulneſs of God to the creature; in the creature's higheſt eſteem of God, love to God, and joy in God, and in the proper exerciſes and expreſſions of theſe.—And ſo far as a virtuous mind exerciſes true virtue in benevolence to created Beings, it chiefly ſeeks the good of the creature, conſiſting in its knowledge or view of God's glory and beauty, its union with God, and conformity to him, love to him, and joy in him.—And that temper or diſpoſition of heart, that conſent, union, or propenſity of mind to Being in general, which appears chiefly in ſuch exerciſes, is virtue, truly ſo called; or in other words, true grace and real holineſs. And no other diſpoſition or affection but this is of the natur… … true virtue.
COROLLARY. Hence it appears, that theſe ſchemes of religion or moral philoſophy, which, however well in ſome reſpects, they may treat of benevolence to mankind, and other virtues depending on it, yet have not a ſupreme regard to GOD, and love to him, laid in the foundation, and all other virtues handled in a connection with this, and in a ſubordination to this, are not true ſchemes of philoſophy, but are fundamentally and eſſentially defective—And whatever other benevolence or generoſity towards mankind, and other virtues, or moral qualifications which go by that name, any are poſſeſſed of, that are not attended with a love to God which is altogether above them, and to which they are ſubordinate, and on which they are dependent, there is nothing of the nature of true virtue or religion in them.—And it may be aſſerted in general, that nothing is o… the nature of true virtue, in which God is not the firſt and the laſt; or, which with regard to their exerciſes in general, have not their firſt foundation and ſource in apprehenſions of God's ſupreme dignity and glory, and in anſwerable eſteem and love of him, and have not reſpect to God as the ſupreme end.