Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 3
CHAP. III.
Concerning the ſecondary and inferior kind of beauty.
THOUGH this which has been ſpoken of, alone, is juſtly eſteemed the true beauty of moral agents, or ſpiritual Beings: this alone being what would appear beautiful in them, upon a clear & comprehenſive view of things: and therefore alone is the moral amiableneſs of Beings that have underſtanding and will, in the eyes of him that perfectly ſees all things as they are. Yet there are other qualities, other ſenſations, propenſities and affections of mind, and principles o… action, that often obtain the epithet of virtuous, and by many are ſuppoſed to have the nature of true virtue: which are intirely of a diſtinct nature from this, and have nothing of that kind; and therefore are erroneouſly confounded with real virtue:— as may particularly and fully appear from things which will be obſerved in this and the following chapters.
THAT conſent, agreement, or union of Being to Being, which has been ſpoken of, viz. the union or propenſity of minds to mental or ſpiritual exiſtence, may be called the higheſt, and firſt, or primary beauty, that is to be found among things that exiſt: being the proper and peculiar beauty of ſpiritual and moral Beings, which are the higheſt and firſt part of the univerſal ſyſtem, for whoſe ſake all the reſt has exiſtence. Yet there is another, in…erior, ſecondary beauty, which is ſome image of this, and which is not peculiar to ſpiritual Beings, but is found even in inanimate things: which conſiſts in a mutual conſent and agreement of different things, in form, manner, quantity, and viſible end or deſign; called by the various names of regularity, order, uniformity, ſymmetry, proportion, harmony, &c. Such is the mutual agreement of the various ſides of a ſquare, or equilateral triangle, or of a regular polygon. Such is, as it were, the mutual conſent of the different parts of the periphery of a circle, or ſurface of a ſphere, and of the correſponding parts of an ellipſis. Such is the agreement of the colours, figures, dimenſions, and diſtances of the different ſpots on a cheſs board. Such is the beauty of the figures on a piece of chints, or brocade. Such is the beautiful proportion of the various parts of an human body, or countenance. And ſuch is the ſweet mutual conſent and agreement of the various notes of a melodious tune. This is the ſame that Mr. HUTCHESON, in his treatiſe on beauty, expreſſes by uniformity in the midſt of variety. Which is no other than the conſent or agreement of different things, in form, quantity.&c He obſerves, that the greater the variety is, in equal uniformity, the greater the beauty. Which is no more than to ſay, the more there are of different mutually agreeing things, the greater is the beauty. And the reaſon of that is, becauſe 'tis more conſiderable to have many things conſent one with another, than a few only.
THE beauty which conſiſts in the viſible fitneſs of a thing to its uſe, and unity of deſign, is not a diſtinct ſort of beauty from this. For it's to be obſerved, that one thing which contributes to the beauty of the agreement & proportion of various things, is their relation one to another; which connects them, and introduces them together into view and conſideration, and whereby one ſuggeſts the other to the mind, and the mind is led to compare them and ſo to expect and deſire agreement. Thus the uniformity of two or more pillars, as they may happen to be found in different places, is not an equal degree of beauty, as that uniformity in ſo many pillars in the correſponding parts of the ſame building. So means and an intended effect are related one to another. The anſwerableneſs of a thing to its uſe is only the proportion, fitneſs, and agreeing of a cauſe or means to a viſibly deſigned effect, and ſo an effect ſuggeſted to the mind by the idea of the means. This kind of beauty is not intirely different from that beauty which there is in fitting a mortiſe to its tenon. Only when the beauty conſiſts in unity of deſign, or the adaptedneſs of a variety of things to promote one intended effect, in which all conſpire, as the various parts of an ingenious complicated machine, there is a double beauty, as there is a twofold agreement and conformity. Firſt, there is the agreement of the various parts to the deſigned end. Secondly, thro' this, viz. the deſigned end or effect, all the various particulars agree one with another as the general medium of their union whereby they being united in this third, they thereby are all united one to another.
THE reaſon, or at leaſt one reaſon why God has made this kind of mutual conſent and agreement of things beautiful and grateful to thoſe intelligent Beings that perceive it, probably is, that there is in it ſome image of the true, ſpiritual original beauty, which has been ſpoken of: conſiſting in Being's conſent to Being, or the union of minds or ſpiritual Beings in a mutual propenſity and affection of heart. The other is an image of this, becauſe by that uniformity diverſe things become as it were one, as it is in this cordial union. And it pleaſes God to obſerve analogy in his works, as is manifeſt in fact in innumerable inſtances; and eſpecially to eſtabliſh inferior things in an analogy to ſuperior. Thus, in how many inſtances has he formed brutes in analogy to the nature of mankind? and plants, in analogy to animals, with reſpect to the manner of their generation, nutrition, &c. And ſo he has conſtituted the external world in an analogy to things in the ſpiritual world, in numberleſs inſtances; as might be ſhewn, if it were neceſſary, and here were proper place and room for it.—Why ſuch analogy in God's works pleaſes him, 'tis not needful now to inquire. It is ſufficient that he makes an agreement or conſent of different things, in their form, manner, meaſure, &c. to appear beautiful, becauſe here is ſome image of an higher kind of agreement and conſent of ſpiritual Beings. It has pleaſed him to eſtabliſh a law of nature, by virtue of which the uniformity and mutual correſpondence of a beautiful plant, and the reſpect which the various parts of a regular building ſeem to have one to another, and their agreement and union, & he conſent or concord of the various notes of a melodious tune, ſhould appear beautiful; becauſe therein is ſome image of the conſent of mind, of the different members of a ſociety or ſyſtem of intelligent Beings, ſweetly united in a benevolent agreement of heart.—And here by the way, I would further obſerve, probably ▪tis with regard to this image or reſemblance, which ſecondary beauty has of true ſpiritual beauty, that God has ſo conſtituted nature, that the preſenting of this inferior beauty, eſpecially in thoſe kinds of it which have the greateſt reſemblance of the primary beauty, as the harmony of ſounds, and the beauties of nature, have a tendency to aſſiſt thoſe whoſe hearts are under the influence of a truly virtuous temper, to diſpoſe them to the exerciſes of divine love, and enliven in them a ſenſe of ſpiritual beauty.
FROM what has been ſaid we may ſee, that there are two ſorts of agreement or conſent of one thing to another. (1.) There is a cordial agreement; that conſiſts in concord and union of mind and heart: which, if not attended (viewing things in general) with more diſcord than concord, is true virtue, and the original or primary beauty, which is the only true moral beauty.—(2.) There is a natural union or agreement: which, tho' ſome image of the other, is intirely a diſtinct thing; the will, diſpoſition, or affection of the heart having no concern in it, but conſiſting only in uniformity and conſent of nature, form, quantity, &c▪ (as before deſcribed) wherein lies an inferior ſecondary ſort of beauty, which may, in diſtinction from the other, be call'd natural beauty.—This may be ſufficient to let the reader know how I ſhall hereafter uſe the phraſes of cordial, and natural agreement; and moral, ſpiritual, divine, and primary original beauty, and ſecondary, or natural beauty.
CONCERNING this latter, inferior kind of beauty, the following things may be obſerved.
1. THE cauſe why ſecondary beauty is grateful to Men, is only a law of nature, which God has fixed, or an inſtinct he has given to mankind; and not their perception of the ſame thing which God is pleaſed to have regard to, as the ground or rule by which he has eſtabliſhed ſuch a law of nature.—This appears in two things.
(1.) THAT which God has reſpect to, as the rule or ground of this law of nature he has given us, whereby things having a ſecondary beauty are made grateful to men, is their mutual agreement and proportion, in meaſure, form &c. But in many inſtances perſons that are gratify'd, and have their minds affected, in preſenting this beauty, don't reflect on that particular agreement and proportion, which according to the law of nature is the ground and rule of beauty in the caſe, yea, are ignorant of it. Thus, a man may be pleaſed with the harmony of the notes in a tune, and yet know nothing of that proportion or adjuſtment of the notes, which by the law of nature is the ground of the melody. He knows not, that the vibrations in one note regularly co-incide with the vibrations in another; that the vibrations of a note co-incide in time with two vibrations of its octave; and that two vibrations of a note co-incide with three of its fifth, &c.—Yea, he may not know, that there are vibrations of the air in the caſe, or any correſponding motions in the organs of hearing, in the auditory nerve, or animal ſpirits.—So, a man may be affected and pleaſed with a beautiful proportion of the features in a face, and yet not know what that proportion is, or what meaſures, quantities, and diſtances it conſiſts in.
IN this a ſenſation of ſecondary beauty differs from a ſenſation of primary and ſpiritual beauty, conſiſting in a ſpiritual union and agreement. What makes the latter grateful, is perceiving the union itſelf. 'Tis the immediate view of that wherein the beauty fundamentally lies, that is pleaſing to the virtuous mind.
(2.) AS was obſerv'd before, God in eſtabliſhing ſuch a law that mutual natural agreement of different things, in form, quantity, &c. ſhould appear beautiful or grateful to men, ſeems to have had regard to the image and reſemblance there is in ſuch a natural agreement, of that ſpiritual cordial agreement, wherein original beauty conſiſts, as one reaſon why he eſtabliſhed ſuch a law. But it is not any reflection upon, or preception of, ſuch a reſemblance of this to ſpiritual beauty, that is the reaſon why ſuch a form or ſtate of objects appear beautiful to men: but their ſenſation of pleaſure, on a view of this ſecondary beauty is immediately owing to the law God has eſtabliſhed, or the inſtinct he has given.
2. ANOTHER thing obſervable concerning this kind of beauty, is, that it affects the mind more (other things being equal) when taken notice of in objects which are of conſiderable importance, than in little trivial matters. Thus, the ſymmetry of the parts of a human body, or countenance, affects the mind more than the beauty of a flower. So, the beauty of the ſolar ſyſtem, more than as great and as manifold an order and uniformity in a tree. And the proportions of the parts of a church, or a palace, more than the ſame proportions in ſome little ſlight compoſitions, made to pleaſe children.
3. IT may be obſerved (which was hinted before) that not only uniformity and proportion, &c. of different things is requiſite in order to this inferior beauty, but ſome relation or connection of the things thus agreeing one with another. As, the uniformity or likeneſs of a number of pillars, ſcattered hither and thither, does not conſtitute beauty, or at leaſt by no means in an equal degree as uniformity in pillars connected in the ſame building, in parts that have relation one to another So if we … unlike, and very diſproportion'd, in diſtant places, which have no relation to each other, this excites no ſuch idea of deformity, as diſagreement and inequality or diſproportion in things related and connected: and the nearer the relation and the ſtricter the connection, ſo much the greater and more diſguſtful is the deformity, conſiſting in their diſagreement.
4. THIS ſecondary kind of beauty, conſiſting in uniformity and proportion, not only takes place in material and external things, but alſo in things immaterial; and is, in very many things, plain and ſenſible in the latter, as well as the former: and when it is ſo, there is no reaſon why it ſhould not be grateful to them that behold it, in theſe, as well as the other, by virtue of the ſame ſenſe or the ſame determination of mind to be gratify'd with uniformity and proportion. If uniformity and proportion be the things that affect, and appear agreable to, this ſenſe of beauty, then why ſhould not uniformity and proportion affect the ſame ſenſe in immaterial things, as well as material, if there be equal capacity of diſcerning it in both? and indeed more in ſpiritual things (caeteris paribus) as theſe are more important than things meerly external and material?
THIS is not only reaſonable to be ſuppoſed, but is evident in fact, in numberleſs inſtances. There is a beauty of order in ſociety, beſides what conſiſts in benevolence, or can be refer'd to it, which is of the ſecondary kind. As, when the different members of ſociety have all their appointed office, place and ſtation, according to their ſeveral capacities and talents, and every one keeps his place, and continues in his proper buſineſs. In this there is a beauty, not of a different kind from the regularity of a beautiful building, or piece of ſkilful architecture, where the ſtrong pillars are ſet in their proper place, the pilaſters in a place fit for them, the ſquare pieces of marble in the pavement in a place ſuitable for them, the pannels in the walls and partitions in their proper places, the corniſhes in places proper for them, &c. As the agreement of a variety in one common deſign, of the parts of a building, or complicated machine, is one inſtance of that regularity, which belongs to the ſecondary kind of beauty, ſo there is the ſame kind of beauty in immaterial things, in what is called wiſdom, conſiſting in the united tendency of thoughts, ideas, and particular volitions, to one general purpoſe: which is a diſtinct thing from the goodneſs of that general purpoſe, as being uſeful and benevolent.
So there is a beauty in the virtue called juſtice, which conſiſts in the agreement of different things, that have relation to one another, in nature, manner, and meaſure: and therefore is the very ſame ſort of beauty with that uniformity and proportion, which is obſervable in thoſe external and material things that are eſteemed beautiful. There is a natural agreement and adaptedneſs of things that have relation one to another, and an harmonious correſponding of one thing to another: that he which from his will does evil to others, ſhould receive evil from the will of others, or from the will of him or them whoſe buſineſs it is to take care of the injured, and to act in their behalf: and that he ſhould ſuffer evil in proportion to the evil of his doings. Things are in natural regularity and mutual agreement, not in a metaphorical but literal ſenſe, when he whoſe heart oppoſes the general ſyſtem, ſhould have the hearts of that ſyſtem, or the heart of the head and ruler of the ſyſtem, againſt him: and that in conſequence, he ſhould receive evil, in proportion to the evil tendency of the oppoſition of his heart.—So, there is a like agreement in nature and meaſure, when he that loves, has the proper returns of love: when he that from his heart promotes the good of another, has his good promoted by the other; as there is a kind of juſtice in a becoming gratitude.
INDEED moſt of the duties incumbent on us, if well conſidered, will be found to partake of the nature of juſtice. There is ſome natural agreement of one thing to another; ſome adaptedneſs of the agent to the object; ſome anſwerableneſs of the act to the occaſion; ſome equality and proportion in things of a ſimilar nature, and of a direct relation one to another. So it is in relative duties; duties of children to parents, and of parents to children; duties of huſbands and wives; duties of rulers and ſubjects; duties of friendſhip and good neighbourhood: and all duties that we owe to God, our creator, preſerver, and benefactor; and all duties whatſoever, conſidered as required by God, and as branches of our duty to him, and alſo conſidered as what are to be performed with a regard to Chriſt, as acts of obedience to his precepts, and as teſtimonies of reſpect to him, and of our regard to what he has done for us, the virtues and temper of mind he has exerciſed towards us, and the benefits we have or hope for therefrom.
IT is this ſecondary kind of beauty, which belongs to the virtues and duties required of us, that Mr. Wollaſton ſeems to have had in his eye, when he reſolved all virtue into an agreement of inclinations, volitions and actions with truth. He evidently has reſpect to the juſtice there is in the virtues and duties that are proper to be in one Being towards another; which conſiſts in one Being's expreſſing ſuch affections and uſing ſuch a conduct towards another, as hath a natural ag…erment and proportion to what is in them, and what we receive from them: which is as much a natural conformity of affection and action with its ground, object and occaſion, as that which is between a true propoſition and the thing ſpoken of in it.
BUT there is another and higher beauty in true virtue, and in all truly virtuous diſpoſitions and exerciſes, than what conſiſts in any uniformity or ſimilarity of various things; viz. the union of heart to Being in general, or to GOD the Being of Beings, which appears in thoſe virtues; and which thoſe virtues, when true, are the various expreſſions or effects of. Benevolence to Being in general, or to Being ſimply conſidered, is intirely a diſtinct thing from uniformity in the midſt of variety, and is a ſuperior kind of beauty.
'TIS true, that benevolence to Being in general, when a perſon hath it, will naturally incline him to juſtice, or proportion in the exerciſes of it. He that loves Being, ſimply conſidered, will naturally (as was obſerved before) other things being equal, love particular Beings, in a proportion compounded of the degree of Being, & the degree of virtue or benevolence to Being, which they have. And that is to love Beings in proportion to their dignity. For the dignity of any Being conſiſts in thoſe two things. Reſpect to Being, in this proportion, is the firſt and moſt general kind of juſtice; which will produce all the ſubordinate kinds. So that, after benevolence to Being in general exiſts, the proportion which is obſerved in objects, may be the cauſe of the proportion of benevolence to thoſe objects: but no proportion is the cauſe or ground of the exiſtence of ſuch a thing as benevolence to Being. The tendency of objects to excite that degree of benevolence, which is proportionable to the degree of Being, &c. Is the conſequence of the exiſtence of benevolence; and not the ground of it. Even as a tendency of bodies, one to another, by mutual attraction, in proportion to the quantity of matter, is the conſequence of the Being of ſuch a thing as mutual attraction; and not attraction the effect of proportion.
BY this it appears, that juſt affections and acts have a beauty in them, diſtinct from, and ſuperior to, the uniformity and equality there is in them: for which, he that has a truly virtuous temper, reliſhes and delights in them. And that is the expreſſion and manifeſtation there is in them of benevolence to Being in general.—And beſides this, there is the agreement of juſtice to the will and command of God: and alſo ſomething in the tendency and conſequences of juſtice, that is agreable to general benevolence, viz. as in many reſpects it tends to the glory of God, and the general good. Which tendency alſo makes it beautiful to a truly virtuous mind. So that the tendency of general benevolence to produce juſtice, alſo the tendency of juſtice to produce effects agreable to general benevolence, both render juſtice pleaſing to a virtuous mind. And it is on theſe accounts chiefly, that juſtice is grateful to a virtuous taſte, or a truly benevolent heart. But, tho' it be true, there is that in the uniformity and proportion there is in juſtice, which is grateful to a benevolent heart, as this uniformity and proportion tends to the general good; yet that is no argument, that there is no other beauty in it but its agreeing with benevolence. For ſo the external regularity and order of the natural world gratifies benevolence, as it is profitable, and tends to the general good; but that is no argument, that there is no other ſort of beauty in external uniformity and proportion, but only its ſuiting benevolence by tending to the general good.
5. FROM all that has been obſerved concerning this ſecondary kind of beauty, it appears that that diſpoſition or ſenſe of the mind, which conſiſts in determination of mind to approve and be pleaſed with this beauty, conſidered ſimply and by itſelf, has nothing of the nature of true virtue, and is intirely a different thing from a truly virtuous taſte. For it has been ſhewn, that this kind of beauty is intirely diverſe from the beauty of true virtue, whether it takes place in material or immaterial things. And therefore it will follow, that a taſte of this kind of beauty is intirely a different thing from a taſte of true virtue. Who will affirm, that a diſpoſition to approve of the harmony of good muſick, or the beauty of a ſquare, or equilateral triangle, is the ſame with true holineſs, or a truly virtuous diſpoſition of mind! 'Tis a reliſh of uniformity and proportion, that determines the mind to approve theſe things. And if this be all, there is no need of any thing higher, or of any thing in any reſpect diverſe, to determine the mind to approve and be pleaſed with equal uniformity and proportion among ſpiritual things which are equally diſcerned. 'Tis virtuous to love true virtue, as that denotes an agreement of the heart with virtue. But it argues no virtue, for the heart to be pleaſed with that which is intirely diſtinct from it.
THO' it be true, there is ſome analogy in it to ſpiritual and virtuous beauty; as much as material things can have analogy to things ſpiritual (of which they can have no more than a ſhadow) yet, as has been obſerved, men do not approve it becauſe of any ſuch analogy perceived.
AND not only reaſon, but experience plainly ſhews, that men's approbation of this ſort of beauty, does not ſpring from any virtuous temper, and has no connexion with virtue. For, otherwiſe, men's delight in the beauty of ſquares, and cubes, and regular polygons in the regularity of buildings, and the beautiful figures in a piece of embroidery, would encreaſe in proportion to men's virtue; and would be raiſed to a great height in ſome eminently virtuous or holy men; but would be almoſt wholly loſt in ſome others that are very vicious and lewd. 'Tis evident in fact, that a reliſh of theſe things does not depend on general benevolence, or any benevolence at all to any Being whatſoever, any more than a man's loving the taſte of honey, or his being pleaſed with the ſmell of a roſe. A taſte of this inferior beauty in things immaterial, is one thing which has been miſtaken by ſome moraliſts, for a true virtuous principle, implanted naturally in the hearts of all mankind.