Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 1
CHAP. I.
Shewing wherein the eſſence of true virtue conſiſts.
WHATEVER controverſies and variety of opinions there are about the nature of virtue, yet all (excepting ſome ſceptics, who deny any real difference between virtue and vice) mean by it ſomething beautiful, or rather ſome kind of beauty, or excellency.—'Tis not all beauty, that is called virtue; for inſtance, not the beauty of a building, of a flower, or of the rainbow: but ſome beauty belonging to Beings that have perception and will—'Tis not all beauty of mankind, that is called virtue; for inſtance, not the external beauty of the countenance, or ſhape, gracefulneſs of motion, or harmony of voice: but it is a beauty that has its original ſeat in the mind.—But yet perhaps not every thing that may be called a beauty of mind, is properly called virtue. There is a beauty of underſtanding and ſpeculation. There is ſomething in the ideas and conceptions of great philoſophers and ſtateſmen, that may be called beautiful; which is a different thing from what is moſt commonly meant by virtue. But virtue is the beauty of thoſe qualities and acts of the mind, that are of a moral nature, i. e. ſuch as are attended with deſert or worthineſs of praiſe, or blame. Things of this ſort, it is generally agreed, ſo far as I know, are not any thing belonging meerly to ſpeculation; but to the diſpoſition and will, or (to uſe a general word, I ſuppoſe commonly well underſtood) to the heart. Therefore I ſuppoſe, I ſhall not depart from the common opinion, when I ſay, that virtue is the beauty of the qualities and exerciſes of the heart, or thoſe actions which proceed from them. So that when it is enquired, what is the nature of true virtue? This is the ſame as to enquire, what that is which renders any habit, diſpoſition, or exerciſe of the heart truly beautiful?—I uſe the phraſe true virtue, and ſpeak of things truly beautiful, becauſe I ſuppoſe it will generally be allowed, that there is a diſtinction to be made between ſome things which are truly virtuous, and others which only ſeem to be virtuous, thro' a partial and imperfect view of things: that ſome actions and diſpoſitions appear beautiful, if conſidered partially and ſuperficially, or with regard to ſome things belonging to them, and in ſome of their circumſtances and tendencies, which would appear otherwiſe in a more extenſive & comprehenſive view, wherein they are ſeen clearly in their whole nature and the extent of their connections in the univerſality of things.—There is a general and a particular beauty. By a particular beauty, I mean that by which a thing appears beautiful when conſidered only with regard to its connection with, & tendency to ſome particular things within a limited, and as it were, a private ſphere. And a general beauty is that by which a thing appears beautiful when viewed moſt perfectly, comprehenſively and univerſally, with regard to all its tendencies, and its connections with every thing it ſtands related to.—The former may be without and againſt the latter. As, a few notes in a tune, taken only by themſelves, and in their relation to one another, may be harmonious; which, when conſidered with reſpect to all the notes in the tune, or the entire ſeries of ſound, they are connected with, may be very diſcordant and diſagreable. (Of which more afterwards)—That only therefore, is what I mean by true virtue, which is that, belonging to the heart of an intelligent Being, that is beautiful by a general beauty, or beautiful in a comprehenſive view as it is in itſelf, and as related to every thing that it ſtands in connection with. And therefore when we are inquiring concerning the nature of true virtue, viz. wherein this true and general beauty of the heart does moſt eſſentially conſiſt,—this is my anſwer to the inquiry—
TRUE virtue moſt eſſentially conſiſts in benevolence to Being in general. Or perhaps to ſpeak more accurately, it is that conſent, propenſity and union of heart to Being in general, that is immediately exerciſed in a general good-will.
THE things which were before obſerved of the nature of true virtue, naturally lead us to ſuch a notion of it. If it has its ſeat in the heart, and is the general goodneſs and beauty of the diſpoſition and exerciſe of that, in the moſt comprehenſive view, conſidered with regard to its univerſal tendency, and as related to every thing that it ſtands in connection with; what can it conſiſt in, but a conſent and good-will to Being in general?—Beauty does not conſiſt in diſcord and diſſent, but in conſent and agreement. And if every intelligent Being is ſome way related to Being in general, and is a part of the univerſal ſyſtem of exiſtence; and ſo ſtands in connection with the whole; what can its general and true beauty be, but its union and conſent with the great whole.
IF any ſuch thing can be ſuppoſed as an union of heart to ſome particular Being, or number of Beings, diſpoſing it to benevolence to a private circle or ſyſtem of Beings, which are but a ſmall part of the whole; not implying a tendency to an union with the great ſyſtem, and not at all inconſiſtent with enmity towards Being in general; this I ſuppoſe not to be of the nature of true virtue: altho' it may in ſome reſpects be good, and may appear beautiful in a confined and contracted view of things.—But of this more afterwards.
IT is abundantly plain by the holy ſcriptures, and generally allowed, not only by chriſtian divines, but by the more conſiderable deiſts, that virtue moſt eſſentially conſiſts in love. And I ſuppoſe, it is owned by the moſt conſiderable writers, to conſiſt in general love of benevolence, or kind affection: tho', it ſeems to me, the meaning of ſome in this affair is not ſufficiently explained; which perhaps occaſions ſome error or confuſion in diſcourſes on this ſubject.
WHEN I ſay, true virtue conſiſts in love to Being in general, I ſhall not be likely to be underſtood, that no one act of the mind or exerciſe of love is of the nature of true virtue, but what has Being in general, or the great ſyſtem of univerſal exiſtence, for its direct and immediate object: ſo that no exerciſe of love or kind affection to any one particular Being, that is but a ſmall part of this whole, has any thing of the nature of true virtue.—But, that the nature of true virtue conſiſts in a diſpoſition to benevolence towards Being in general. Tho', from ſuch a diſpoſition may ariſe exerciſes of love to particular Beings, as objects are preſented and occaſions ariſe. No wonder, that he who is of a generally benevolent diſpoſition, ſhould be more diſpoſed than another to have his heart moved with benevolent affection to particular Perſons, whom he is acquainted and converſant with, and from whom ariſe the greateſt and moſt frequent occaſions for exciting his benevolent temper.—But my meaning is, that no affections towards particular perſons, or Beings, are of the nature of true virtue, but ſuch as ariſe from a generally benevolent temper, or from that habit or frame of mind, wherein conſiſts a diſpoſition to love Being in general.
AND perhaps it is needleſs for me to give notice to my readers, that when I ſpeak of an intelligent Being's having a heart united and benevolently diſpoſed to Being in general, I thereby mean intelligent Being in general. Not inanimate things, or Beings that have no perception or will; which are not properly capable objects of benevolence.
LOVE is commonly diſtinguiſhed into love of benevolence and love of complacence.—Love of benevolence is that affection or propenſity of the heart to any Being, which cauſes it to incline to its well-being, or diſpoſes it to deſire and take pleaſure in its happineſs. And if I miſtake not, 'tis agreable to the common opinion, that beauty in the object is not always the ground of this propenſity: but that there may be ſuch a thing as benevolence, or a diſpoſition to the welfare of thoſe that are not conſidered as beautiful; unleſs mere exiſtence be accounted a beauty. And benevolence or goodneſs in the divine Being is generally ſuppoſed, not only to be prior to the beauty of many of its objects, but to their exiſtence: ſo as to be the ground both of their exiſtence and their beauty, rather than they the foundation of God's benevolence; as 'tis ſuppoſed that it is God's goodneſs which moved him to give them both Being and beauty. So that if all virtue primarily conſiſts in that affection of heart to Being, which is, exerciſed in benevolence, or an inclination to its good, then God's vertue is ſo extended as to include a propenſity not only to Being actually exiſting, & actually beautiful, but to poſſible Being, ſo as to incline him to give Being, beauty and happineſs—But not now to inſiſt particularly on this—What I would have obſerved at preſent, is, that it muſt be allowed, benevolence doth not neceſſarily preſuppoſe beauty in its object.
WHAT is commonly called love of complacence, preſuppoſes beauty.—For it is no other than delight in beauty; or complacence in the perſon or Being beloved for his beauty.
IF virtue be the beauty of an intelligent Being, and virtue conſiſts in love, then it is a plain inconſiſtence, to ſuppoſe that virtue primarily conſiſts in any love to its object for its beauty; either in a love of complacence, which is delight in a Being for his beauty, or in a love of benevolence, that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. For that would be to ſuppoſe, that the beauty of intelligent Beings primarily conſiſts in love to beauty; or, that their virtue firſt of all conſiſts in their love to virtue. Which is an inconſiſtence, and going in a circle. Becauſe it makes virtue, or beauty of mind, the foundation or firſt motive of that love wherein virtue originally conſiſts, or wherein the very firſt virtue conſiſts; or, it ſuppoſes the firſt virtue to be the conſequence and effect of virtue. So that virtue is originally the foundation and exciting cauſe of the very beginning or firſt Being of virtue, Which makes the firſt virtue, both the ground, and the conſequence, both cauſe and effect of itſelf. Doubtleſs virtue primarily conſiſts in ſomething elſe beſides any effect or conſequence of virtue. If virtue conſiſts primarily in love to virtue, then virtue, the thing loved, is the love of virtue; ſo that virtue muſt conſiſt in the love of the love of virtue. And if it be inquired, what that virtue is, which virtue conſiſts in the love of the love of, it muſt be anſwered, 'tis the love of virtue. So that there muſt be the love of the love of the virtue, and ſo on in infinitum. For there is no end of going back in a circle. We never come to any beginning, or foundation. For 'tis without beginning and hangs on nothing.
THEREFORE, if the eſſence of virtue or beauty of mind lies in lo…e, or a diſpoſition to love, it muſt primarily conſiſt in ſomething different both from complacence, which is a de…ight in beauty, and alſo from any benevolence that has the beauty of its object for its foundation. Becauſe 'tis abſurd, to ſay that virtue is primarily and firſt of all the conſequence of itſelf. For this makes virtue primarily prior to itſelf.
NOR can virtue primarily conſiſt in gratitude; or one Being's benevolence to another for his benevolence to him. Becauſe this implies the ſame inconſiſtence. For it ſuppoſes a benevolence prior to gratitude, that is the cauſe of gratitude. Therefore the firſt benevolence, or that benevolence which has none prior to it, can't be gratitude.
THEREFORE there is room left for no other concluſion than that the primary object of virtuous love is Being, ſimply conſidered; or, that true virtue primarily conſiſts, not in love to any particular Beings, becauſe of their virtue or beauty, nor in gratitude, becauſe they love us; but in a propenſity and union of heart to Being ſimply conſidered; exciting abſolute Benevolence (if I may ſo call it) to Being in general.—I ſay, true virtue primarily conſiſts in this. For I am far from aſſerting, that there is no true virtue in any other love than this abſolute benevolence. But I would expreſs what appears to me to be the truth, on this ſubject, in the following particulars.
THE firſt object of a virtuous benevolence is Being, ſimply conſidered: and if Being, ſimply conſidered, be its object, then Being in general is its object; and the thing it has an ultimate propenſity to, is the higheſt good of Being in general. And it will ſeek the …ood of every individual Being unleſs it be conceived as not conſiſtent with the higheſt good of Being in general. In which caſe the good of a particular Being, or ſome Beings, may be given up for the ſake of the higheſt good of Being in general. And particularly if there be any Being that is looked upon as ſtatedly and irreclaimably oppoſite and an enemy to Being in general, then conſent and adherence to Being in general will induce the truly virtuous heart to forſake that Being, and to oppoſe it.
AND further, if Being, ſimply conſidered, be the firſt object of a truly virtuous benevolence, then that Being who has moſt of Being, or has the greateſt ſhare of exiſtence, other things being equal, ſo far as ſuch a Being is exhibited to our faculties or ſet in our view, will have the greateſt ſhare of the propenſity and benevolent affection of the heart.—I ſay, other things being equal, eſpecially becauſe there is a ſecondary object of virtuous benevolence, that I ſhall take notice of preſently. Which is one thing that muſt be conſidered as the ground or motive to a purely virtuous benevolence. Pure benevolence in its firſt exerciſe is nothing elſe but Being's uniting, conſent, or propenſity to Being; appearing true and pure by its extending to Being in general, and inclining to the general higheſt good, and to each Being, whoſe welfare is conſiſtent with the higheſt general good, in proportion to the Degree of exiſtence *I ſay,—in proportion to the degree of exiſtence,—becauſe one Being may have more exiſtence than another, as he may be greater than another. That which is great, has more exiſtence, and is further from nothing, than that which is little. One Being may have every thing poſitive belonging to it, or every thing which goes to it's poſitive exiſtence (in oppoſition to defect) in an higher degree than another; or a greater capacity and power, greater underſtanding, every faculty and every poſitive quality in an higher degree. An Arch-angel muſt be ſuppoſed to have more exiſtence, and to be every way further removed from non entity, than a worm, or a flea.underſtand, other things being equal.
THE ſecond object of a virtuous propenſity of heart is benevolent Being.—A ſecondary ground of pure benevolence is virtuous benevolence itſelf in its object. When any one under the influence of general benevolence, ſees another Being poſſeſs'd of the like general benevolence, this attaches his heart to him, and draws forth greater love to him, than meerly his having exiſtence: becauſe ſo far as the Being beloved has love to Being in general, ſo far his own Being is, as it were, enlarged; extends to, and in ſome ſort comprehends, Being in general: and therefore he that is governed by love to Being in general, muſt of neceſſity have complacence in him, and the greater degree of benevolence to him, as it were out of gratitude to him for his love to general exiſtence, that his own heart is extended and united to, and ſo looks on its intereſt as its own. 'Tis becauſe his heart is thus united to Being in general, that he looks on a benevolent propenſity to Being in general, wherever he ſees it, as the beauty of the Being in whom it is; an excellency, that renders him worthy of eſteem, complacence, and the greater good-will.
BUT ſeveral things may be noted more particularly concerning this ſecondary ground of a truly virtuous love.
1. THAT loving a Being on this ground neceſſarily ariſes from pure benevolence to Being in general, and comes to the ſame thing. For he that has a ſimple and pure good-will to general entity or exiſtence, muſt love that temper in others, that agrees and conſpires with itſelf. A ſpirit of conſent to Being muſt agree with conſent to Being. That which truly and ſincerely ſeeks the good of others, muſt approve of, and love that which joins with him in ſeeking the good of others.
2. THIS which has been now mentioned as a ſecondary ground of virtuous love, is the thing wherein true moral or ſpiritual beauty primarily conſiſts. Yea, ſpiritual beauty conſiſts wholly in this, and the various qualities and exerciſes of mind which proceed from it, and the external actions which proceed from theſe internal qualities and exerciſes. And in theſe things conſiſts all true virtue, viz. in this love of Being, and the qualities and acts which ariſe from it.
3. As all ſpiritual beauty lies in theſe virtuous principles and acts, ſo 'tis primarily on this account they are beautiful, viz. that they imply conſent and union with Being in general. This is the primary and moſt eſſential beauty of every thing that can juſtly be called by the name of virtue, or is any moral excellency in the eye of one that has a perfect view of things. I ſay,—the primary and moſt eſſential beauty,—becauſe there is a ſecondary and inferior ſort of beauty; which I ſhall take notice of afterwards.
4. THIS ſpiritual beauty, that is but a ſecondary ground of a virtuous benevolence, is the ground, not only of benevolence, but complacence, and is the primary ground of the latter; that is, when the complacence is truly virtuous. Love to us in particular, and kindneſs received, may be a ſecondary ground: but this is the primary objective foundation of it.
5. IT muſt be noted, that the degree of the aimableneſs or valuableneſs of true virtue, primarily conſiſting in conſent and a benevolent propenſity of heart to Being in general, in the eyes of one that is influenced by ſuch a ſpirit, is not in the ſimple proportion of the degree of benevolent affection ſeen, but in a proportion compounded of the greatneſs of the benevolent Being or the degree of Being and the degree of benevolence. One that loves Being in general, will neceſſarily value good-will to Being in general, wherever he ſees it. But if he ſees the ſame benevolence in two Beings, he will value it more in two, than in one only. Becauſe it is a greater thing, more favorable to Being in general, to have two Beings to favor it, than only one of them. For there is more Being, that favors Being: both together having more Being than one alone. So, if one Being be as great as two, has as much exiſtence as both together, and has the ſame degree of general benevolence, it is more favorable to being in general than if there were general benevolence in a Being that had but half that ſhare of exiſtence. As a large quantity of gold, with the ſame degree of preciouſneſs, i. e. with the ſame excellent quality of matter, is more valuable than a ſmall quantity of the ſame metal.
6. IT is impoſſible that any one ſhould truly reliſh this beauty, conſiſting in general benevolence, who has not that temper himſelf. I have obſerved, that if any Being is poſſeſs'd of ſuch a temper, he will unavoidably be pleaſed with the ſame temper in another. And it may in like manner be demonſtrated, that 'tis ſuch a ſpirit, and nothing elſe, which will reliſh ſuch a ſpirit. For if a Being, deſtitute of benevolence, ſhould love benevolence to Being in general, it would prize and ſeek that which it had no value for. Becauſe to love an inclination to the good of Being in general, would imply a loving and prizing the good of Being in general. For how ſhould one love and value a diſpoſition to a thing, or a tendency to promote a thing, and for that very reaſon, becauſe it tends to promote it,—when the thing itſelf is what he is regardleſs of, and has no value for, nor deſires to have promoted.