Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 1 · Chapter 1 – Chapter 2

Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue · Dissertation 1 · Chapter 1 – Chapter 2

p. 11CHAPTER I.

Wherein is conſidered, what Reaſon teaches concerning this Affair.

SECTION I.

Some Things obſerved in general, which Reaſon dictates.

HAving obſerved theſe things, which are proper to be taken notice of, to prevent confuſion in diſcourſes on this ſubject, I now proceed to conſider what may, and what may not be ſuppos'd to be God's ultimate end in the creation of the world.

AND in the firſt place, I would obſerve ſome things which reaſon ſeems to dictate in this matter. Indeed this affair, ſeems properly to be an affair of divine revelation. In order to be determin'd what was aimed at, or deſign'd in the creating of the aſtoniſhing fabric of the univerſe which we behold, it becomes us to attend to and rely on what he has told us, who was the architect that built it. He beſt knows his own heart, and what his own ends and deſigns were in the wonderful works which he has wrought. Nor is it to be ſuppoſed that mankind, who, while deſtitute of revelation, by the utmoſt improvements of their own reaſon, and advances in ſcience and philoſophy, could come to no clear and eſtabliſhed determination who the author of the world was, p. 12would ever have obtain'd any tolerable ſettled judgment of the end which the author of it propoſed to himſelf in …o vaſt, complicated and wonderful a work of his hands. And tho' it be true, that the revelation which God has given to men, which has been in the world as a light ſhining in a dark place, has been the occaſion of great improvement of their faculties, has taught men how to uſe their reaſon; (in which regard, notwithſtanding the nobleneſs and excellency of the faculties which God had given them, they ſeem'd to be in themſelves almoſt helpleſs.) And tho' mankind now, thro' the long continual aſſiſtance they have had by this divine light, have come to attainments in the habitual exerciſe of reaſon, which are far beyond what otherwiſe they would have arrived to; yet I confeſs it wou'd be relying too much on reaſon, to determine the affair of God's laſt end in the creation of the world, only by our own reaſon, or without being herein principally guided by divine revelation, ſince God has given a revelation containing inſtructions concerning this matter. Nevertheleſs, as in the diſputes and wranglings which have been about this matter, thoſe objections, which have chiefly been made uſe of againſt what I think the ſcriptures have truly revealed, have been from the pretended dictates of reaſon,—I would in the firſt place ſoberly conſider in a few things, what ſeems rational to be ſuppos'd concerning this affair;—and then proceed to conſider what light divine revelation gives us in it.

As to the firſt of theſe, viz. what ſeems in itſelf rational to be ſuppoſed concerning this matter, I think the following things appear to be the dictates of reaſon:

1. THAT no notion of God's laſt end in the creation of the world is agreable to reaſon, which would truly imply or infer any indigence, inſufficiency and mutability in God; or any dependence of the Creator on the creature, for any part of his perfection or happineſs. Becauſe it is evident, by both ſcripture and reaſon, that God is infinitely, eternally, unchangeably, and independently glorious and happy; that he ſtands in no need of, cannot be profited by, or receive any thing from the creature; or be truly hurt, or be the ſubject of any ſufferings or impair of his glory and felicity from any other being. I need not ſtand to produce the proofs of God's p. 13being ſuch a one, it being ſo univerſally allowed and maintained by ſuch as call themſelves chriſtians.—The notion of God's creating the world in order to receive any thing properly from the creature, is not only contrary to the nature of God, but inconſiſtent with the notion of creation; which implies a being's receiving it's exiſtence, & all that belongs to it's being, out of nothing. And this implies the moſt perfect, abſolute and univerſal derivation and dependence. Now, if the creature receives it's all from God entirely and perfectly, how is it poſſible that it ſhould have any thing to add to God, to make him in any reſpect more than he was before, and ſo the Creator become dependent on the creature?

2. WHATSOEVER is good & valuable in itſelf, is worthy that God ſhou'd value for itſelf, & on it's own account; or which is the ſame thing, value it with an ultimate value or reſpect. It is therefore worthy to be ultimately ſought by God, or made the laſt end of his action and operation; if it be a thing of ſuch a nature as to be properly capable of being attained in any divine operation. For it may be ſuppoſed that ſome things, which are valuable and excellent in themſelves, are not properly capable of being attained in any divine operation; becauſe they do not remain to be attained; but their exiſtence in all poſſible reſpects, muſt be conceiv'd of as prior to any divine operation. Thus God's exiſtence and infinite perfection, tho' infinitely valuable in themſelves, and infinitely valued by God, yet can't be ſuppoſed to be the end of any divine operation. For we can't conceive of them as in any reſpect conſequent on any works of God:—But whatever is in itſelf valuable, abſolutely ſo, and that is capable of being ſought and attained, is worthy to be made a laſt end of the divine operation.—Therefore,

3. WHATEVER that be which is in itſelf moſt valuable, and was ſo originally, prior to the creation of the world▪ and which is attainable by the creation, if there be any thing which was ſuperior in value to all others, that muſt be worthy to be God's laſt end in the creation; and alſo worthy to be his higheſt end.—In conſequence of this, it will follow,

4. THAT if God himſelf be in any reſpect properly capable of being his own end in the creation of the world, then p. 14it is reaſonable to ſuppoſe that he had reſpect to himſelf as his laſt and higheſt end in this work; becauſe he is worthy in himſelf to be ſo, being infinitely the greateſt and beſt of Beings. All things elſe, with regard to worthineſs, importance and excellence, are perfectly as nothing in compariſon of him. And therefore if God eſteems, values, and has reſpect to things according to their nature and proportions, he muſt neceſſarily have the greateſt reſpect to himſelf. It would be againſt the perfection of his nature, his wiſdom, holineſs, and perfect rectitude, whereby he is diſpoſed to do every thing that is fit to be done, to ſuppoſe otherwiſe. At leaſt a great part of the moral rectitude of the heart of God, whereby he is diſpoſed to every thing that is fit, ſuitable and amiable in itſelf, conſiſts in his having infinitely the higheſt regard to that which is in itſelf infinitely higheſt and beſt: Yea it is in this that it ſeems chiefly to conſiſt.—The moral rectitude of God's heart muſt conſiſt in a proper and due reſpect of his heart to things that are objects of moral reſpect: That is, to intelligent beings capable of moral actions and relations. And therefore it muſt chiefly conſiſt in giving due reſpect to that Being to whom moſt is due; yea infinitely moſt, and in effect all. For God is infinitely the moſt worthy of regard. The worthineſs of others is as nothing to his: So that to him belongs all poſſible reſpect. To him belongs the whole of the reſpect that any moral agent, either God, or any intelligent Being is capable of. To him belongs all the heart—Therefore if moral rectitude of heart conſiſts in paying the reſpect or regard of the heart which is due, or which fitneſs & ſuitableneſs requires, fitneſs requires infinitely the greateſt regard to be paid to God; and the denying ſupreme regard here, would be a conduct infinitely the moſt unfit. Therefore a proper regard to this Being, is what the fitneſs of regard does infinitely moſt conſiſt in.—Hence it will follow—that the moral rectitude and fitneſs of the diſpoſition, inclination or affection of God's heart, does chiefly conſiſt in a reſpect or regard to himſelf infinitely above his regard to all other beings: Or in other words, his holineſs conſiſts in this.

AND if it be thus fit that God ſhou'd have a ſupreme regard to himſelf, then it is fit that this ſupreme regard ſhou'd appear, in thoſe things by which he makes himſelf known, p. 15or by his word and works; i. e. in what he ſays, and in what he does. If it be an infinitely amiable thing in God, that he ſhould have a ſupreme regard to himſelf, then it is an amiable thing that he ſhou'd act as having a chief regard to himſelf; or act in ſuch a manner, as to ſhew that he has ſuch a regard; that what is higheſt in God's heart, may be higheſt in his actions and conduct. And if it was God's intention, as there is great reaſon to think it was, that his works ſhould exhibit an image of himſelf their author, that it might brightly appear by his works what manner of being he is, and afford a proper repreſentation of his divine excellencies, and eſpecially his moral excellence, conſiſting in the diſpoſition of his heart; then 'tis reaſonable to ſuppoſe that his works are ſo wrought as to ſhew this ſupreme reſpect to himſelf, wherein his moral excellency does primarily conſiſt.

WHEN we are conſidering with ourſelves, what would be moſt fit and proper for God to have a chief reſpect to, in his proceedings in general, with regard to the univerſality of things, it may help us to judge of the matter with the greater eaſe & ſatisfaction to conſider, what we can ſuppoſe would be judged and determined by ſome third being of perfect wiſdom and rectitude, neither the creator nor one of the creatures, that ſhou'd be perfectly indifferent and diſintereſted. Or if we make the ſuppoſition, that wiſdom itſelf, or infinitely wiſe juſtice and rectitude were a diſtinct diſintereſted perſon, whoſe office it was to determine how things ſhall be moſt fitly and properly order'd in the whole ſyſtem, or kingdom of exiſtence, including king and ſubjects, God and his creatures; and upon a view of the whole, to decide what regard ſhould prevail and govern in all proceedings. Now ſuch a judge in adjuſting the proper meaſures and kinds of regard that every part of exiſtence is to have, would weigh things in an even balance; taking care, that greater, or more exiſtence ſhould have a greater ſhare than leſs, that a greater part of the whole ſhould be more looked at and reſpected, than the leſſer in proportion (other things being equal) to the meaſure of exiſtence,—that the more excellent ſhould be more regarded than the leſs excellent:—So that the degree of regard ſhould always be in a proportion, compounded of the proportion of exiſtence, and proportion of excellence, or according to the degree of greatneſs and goodneſs, conſider'd p. 16conjunctly.—Such an arbiter, in conſidering the ſyſtem of created intelligent beings by itſelf, would determine, that the ſyſtem in general, conſiſting of many millions, was of greater importance, and worthy of a greater ſhare of regard, than only one individual. For however conſiderable ſome of the individuals might be ſo that they might be much greater and better, and have a greater ſhare of the ſum total of exiſtence and excellence than another individual, yet no one exceeds others ſo much … to countervail all the reſt of the ſyſtem. And if this judge conſider not only the ſyſtem of created beings, but the ſyſtem of being in general, comprehending the ſum total of univerſal exiſtence, both creator and creature; ſtill every part muſt be conſidered according to it's weight and importance, or the meaſure it has of exiſtence and excellence. To determine then, what proportion of regard is to be allotted to the creator, and all his creatures taken together, both muſt be as it were put in the balance;—the ſupreme Being, with all in him, that is great, conſiderable, & excellent, is to be eſtimated and compared with all that is to be found in the whole creation: And according as the former is found to out-weigh, in ſuch proportion is he to have a greater ſhare of regard.—And in this caſe, as the whole ſyſtem of created beings in compariſon of the creator, would be found as the light duſt of the balance (which is taken notice of by him that weighs) and as nothing and vanity; ſo the arbiter muſt determine accordingly with reſpect to the degree in which God ſhould be regarded by all intelligent exiſtence, and the degree in which he ſhould be regarded in all that is done thro' the whole univerſal ſyſtem; in all actions and proceedings, determinations and effects whatever, whether creating, preſerving, uſing, diſpoſing, changing, or deſtroying. And as the creator is infinite, and has all poſſible exiſtence, perfection and excellence, ſo he muſt have all poſſible regard. As he is every way the firſt and ſupreme, and as his excellency is in all reſpects the ſupreme beauty and glory, the original good, and fountain of all good; ſo he muſt have in all reſpects the ſupreme regard. And as he is God over all, to whom all are properly ſubordinate, and on whom all depend, worthy to reign as ſupreme head with abſolute and univerſal dominion; ſo it is fit that he ſhou'd be ſo regarded by all & in all proceedings & effects thro' the whole ſyſtem: …hat this univerſality of things in their whole compaſs and p. 17ſeries ſhould look to him and reſpect him in ſuch a manner as that reſpect to him ſhould reign over all reſpect to other things and that regard to creatures ſhould univerſally be ſubordinate and ſubject.

WHEN I ſpeak of regard to be thus adjuſted in the univerſal ſyſtem, or ſum total of exiſtence, I mean the regard of the ſum total; not only the regard of individual creatures, or all creatures, but of all intelligent exiſtence, created, and uncreated. For 'tis fit, that the regard of the creator ſhould be proportioned to the worthineſs of objects, as well as the regard of creatures. Thus we muſt conclude ſuch an arbiter, as I have ſuppoſed, would determine in this buſineſs, being about to decide how matters ſhould proceed moſt fitly, properly, and according to the nature of things. He would therefore determine, that the whole univerſe, including all creatures animate and inanimate, in all it's actings, proceedings, revolutions, and entire ſeries of events, ſhould proceed from a regard and with a view, to God, as the ſupream and laſt end of all: That every wheel, both great and ſmall, in all it's rotations, ſhou'd move with a conſtant invariable regard to him as the ultimate end of all; as perfectly and uniformly, as if the whole ſyſtem were animated and directed by one common ſoul: Or, as if ſuch an arbiter as I have before ſuppoſed, one poſſeſſed of perfect wiſdom and rectitude, became the common ſoul of the univerſe, and actuated and governed it in all it's motions.

THUS I have gone upon the ſuppoſition of a third perſon, neither creator nor creature, but a diſintereſted perſon ſtepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and ſtate what is moſt fit and proper between them. The thing ſuppoſed is impoſſible; but the caſe is nevertheleſs juſt the ſame as to what is moſt fit and ſuitable in itſelf. For it is moſt certainly proper for God to act, according to the greateſt fitneſs, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greateſt fitneſs is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a diſtinct perſon to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beſide God and the created ſyſtem, nor can be, ſo there is no need of any, ſeeing God himſelf is poſſeſſed of that perfect diſcernment and rectitude which have been ſuppoſed. It belongs to him as ſupream arbiter, and to his infinite wiſdom p. 18and rectitude, to ſtate all rules and meaſures of proceedings. And ſeeing theſe attributes of God are infinite, and moſt abſolutely perfect, they are not the leſs fit to order and diſpoſe, becauſe they are in him, who is a being concern'd, and not a third perſon that is diſintereſted.—For being intereſted unfits a perſon to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwiſe than as intereſt tends to blind & miſlead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God ſhould be in danger of either, is contrary to the ſuppoſition of his being poſſeſſed of diſcerning and juſtice abſolutely perfect. And as there muſt be ſome ſupream judge of fitneſs and propriety in the univerſality of things, as otherwiſe there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whoſe are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is ſo to ſtate all things according to the moſt perfect fitneſs and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a diſtinct perſon. We may therefore be ſure it is and will be done.

I SHOULD think that theſe things might incline us to ſuppoſe, that God has not forgot himſelf, in the ends which he propoſed in the creation of the world; but that he has ſo ſtated theſe ends (however he is ſelf-ſufficient, immutable, and independent) as therein plainly to ſhew a ſupreme regard to himſelf. Whether this can be, or whether God has done thus, muſt be conſidered afterwards, as alſo what may be objected againſt this view of things.

5. WHATSOEVER is good, amiable and valuable in itſelf, abſolutely and originally, which facts and events ſhew that God aimed at in the creation of the world, muſt be ſuppoſed to be regarded, or aimed at by God ultimately, or as an ultimate end of creation.—For we muſt ſuppoſe from the perfection of God's nature, that whatſoever is valuable and amiable in itſelf, ſimply and abſolutely conſidered, God values ſimply for itſelf; 'tis agreable to him abſolutely on it's own account; becauſe God's judgment and eſteem are according to truth. He values and loves things accordingly, as they are worthy to be valued and loved. But if God values a thing ſimply, and abſolutely, for itſelf, and on it's own account, then 'tis the ultimate object of his value; he don't value it merely for the ſake of a further end to be attained by it. For to ſuppoſe that he values it only for ſome farther end, p. 19is in direct contradiction to the preſent ſuppoſition, which is, that he values it abſolutely, and for itſelf.—Hence it moſt clearly follows, that if that which God values ultimately, and for itſelf, appears in fact and experience, to be what he ſeeks by any thing he does, he muſt regard it as an ultimate end. And therefore if he ſeeks it in creating the world, or any part of the world, 'tis an ultimate end of the work of creation.—Having got thus far, we may now proceed a ſtep farther, and aſſert.

6. WHATSOEVER thing is actually the effect or conſequence of the creation of the world, which is ſimply and abſolutely good and valuable in itſelf, that thing is an ultimate end of God's creating the world.—We ſee that it is a good that God aimed at by the creation of the world; becauſe he has actually attained it by that means. This is an evidence that he intended to attain, or aimed at it. For we may juſtly infer what God intends, by what he actually does; becauſe he does nothing inadvertently, or without deſign. But whatever God intends to attain from a value for it; or in other words, whatever he aims at in his actions and works, that he values; he ſeeks that thing in thoſe acts and works. Becauſe, for an agent to intend to attain ſomething he values by means he uſes, is the ſame thing as to ſeek it by thoſe means. And this is the ſame as to make that thing his end in thoſe means. Now it being by the ſuppoſition what God values ultimately, it muſt therefore by the preceeding poſition, be aimed at by God as an ultimate end of creating the world.

SECT. II.

Some farther obſervations concerning thoſe things which reaſon leads us to ſuppoſe God aimed at in the creation of the world, ſhewing particularly what things that are abſolutely good, are actually the conſequence of the creation of the world.

FROM what was laſt obſerved it ſeems to be the moſt proper and juſt way of proceeding, as we would ſee what light reaſon will give us reſpecting the particular end or ends God p. 20had ultimately in view in the creation of the world, to conſider what thing or things, are actually the effect or conſequence of the creation of the world, that are ſimply and originally valuable in themſelves. And this is what I would directly proceed to, without entring on any tedious metaphyſical enquiries wherein fitneſs, amiableneſs, or valuableneſs conſiſts; or what that is in the nature of ſome things, which is properly the foundation of a worthineſs of being loved and eſteemed on their own account. In this I muſt at preſent refer what I ſay to the ſenſe and dictates of the reader's mind, on ſedate and calm reflection.—I proceed to obſerve,

1. IT ſeems a thing in itſelf fit, proper and deſirable, that the glorious attributes of God, which conſiſt in a ſufficiency to certain acts and effects, ſhould be exerted in the production of ſuch effects, as might manifeſt the infinite power, wiſdom, righteouſneſs, goodneſs, &c. which are in God. If the world had not been created, theſe attributes never would have had any exerciſe. The power of God, which is a ſufficiency in him to produce great effects, muſt for ever have been dormant and uſeleſs as to any effect. The divine wiſdom and prudence would have had no exerciſe in any wiſe contrivance, any prudent proceeding or diſpoſal of things; for there would have been no objects of contrivance or diſpoſal. The ſame might be obſerved of God's juſtice, goodneſs and truth.—Indeed God might have known as perfectly that he poſſeſſed theſe attributes, if they had never been exerted or expreſſed in any effect. But then if the attributes which conſiſt in a ſufficiency for correſpondent effects, are in themſelves excellent, the exerciſes of them muſt likewiſe be excellent. If it be an excellent thing that there ſhould be a ſufficiency for a certain kind of action or operation, the excellency of ſuch a ſufficiency muſt conſiſt in it's relation to this kind of operation or effect; but that could not be, unleſs the operation itſelf were excellent. A ſufficiency for any act or work is no farther valuable, than the work or effect is valuable.**As we muſt conceive of things, the end and perfection of theſe attributes does as it were conſiſt in their exerciſe: … The end of wiſdom (ſays Mr. … in his Sermon … the opening of the preſbyterian church of Philadelphia) is deſign; the end of power is action; the end of goodneſs is doing good. To ſuppoſe theſe perfections not to be exerted, would be to repreſent them as inſignificant. Of what uſe would God's wiſdom be, if … had nothing to deſign o… direct? To what purpoſe his almightineſs, if it never bro't any thing to paſs? And of what avail his goodneſs, if it never did any good?" As God therefore p. 21eſteems theſe attributes themſelves valuable, and delights in them; ſo 'tis natural to ſuppoſe that he delights in their proper exerciſe and expreſſion. For the ſame reaſon that he eſteems his own ſufficiency wiſely to contrive and diſpoſe effects, he alſo will eſteem the wiſe contrivance and diſpoſition itſelf. And for the ſame reaſon as he delights in his own diſpoſition, to do juſtly, and to diſpoſe of things according to truth and juſt proportion; ſo he muſt delight in ſuch a righteous diſpoſal itſelf.

2. IT ſeems to be a thing in itſelf fit and deſirable, that the glorious perfections of God ſhould be known, and the operations and expreſſions of them ſeen by other beings beſides himſelf. If it be fit, that God's power and wiſdom, &c. ſhould be exerciſed and expreſſed in ſome effects, and not lie eternally dormant, then it ſeems proper that theſe exerciſes ſhould appear, and not be totally hidden and unknown. For if they are, it will be juſt the ſame as to the above purpoſe, as if they were not. God as perfectly knew himſelf and his perfections, had as perfect an idea of the exerciſes and effects they were ſufficient for, antecedently to any ſuch actual operations of them, as ſince. If therefore it be nevertheleſs a thing in itſelf valuable, and worthy to be deſired, that theſe glorious perfections be actually expreſſed and exhibited in their correſpondent effects; then it ſeems alſo, that the knowledge of theſe perfections, and the expreſſions and diſcoveries that are made of them, is a thing valuable in itſelf abſolutely conſidered; and that 'tis deſirable that this knowledge ſhould exiſt. As God's perfections are things in themſelves excellent, ſo the expreſſion of them in their proper acts and fruits is excellent; and the knowledge of theſe excellent perfections, and of theſe glorious expreſſions of them, is an excellent thing, the exiſtence of which is in itſelf valuable and deſirable.—'Tis a thing infinitely good in itſelf that God's glory ſhould be known by a glorious ſociety of created beings. p. 22And that there ſhould be in them an increaſing knowledge of God to all eternity, is an exiſtence, a reality infinitely worthy to be, and worthy to be valued and regarded by him, to whom it belongs to order that to be, which, of all things poſſible, is fitteſt & beſt. If exiſtence is more worthy than defect and non-entity, and if any created exiſtence is in itſelf worthy to be, then knowledge or underſtanding is a thing worthy to be; and if any knowledge, then the moſt excellent ſort of knowledge, viz. that of God and his glory. The exiſtence of the created univerſe conſiſts as much in it as in any thing: Yea this knowledge, is one of the higheſt, moſt real and ſubſtantial parts, of all created exiſtence, moſt remote from non-entity and defect.

3. As it is a thing valuable and deſirable in itſelf that God's glory ſhould be ſeen and known, ſo when known, it ſeems equally reaſonable and fit, it ſhould be valued and eſteemed, loved and delighted in, anſwerably to it's dignity. There is no more reaſon to eſteem it a fit and ſuitable thing that God's glory ſhould be known, or that there ſhould be an idea in the underſtanding correſponding unto the glorious object, than that there ſhould be a correſponding diſpoſition or affection in the will. If the perfection itſelf be excellent, the knowledge of it is excellent, and ſo is the eſteem and love of it excellent. And as 'tis fit that God ſhould love and eſteem his own excellence, 'tis alſo fit that he ſhould value and eſteem the love of his excellency. For if it becomes any being greatly to value another, then it becomes him to love to have him valued and eſteemed: And if it becomes a being highly to value himſelf, it is fit that he ſhould love to have himſelf valued and eſteemed. If the idea of God's perfection in the underſtanding be valuable, then the love of the heart ſeems to be more eſpecially valuable, as moral beauty eſpecially conſiſts in the diſpoſition and affection of the heart.

4. As there is an infinite fulneſs of all poſſible good in God, a fulneſs of every perfection, of all excellency and beauty, and of infinite happineſs. And as this fulneſs is capable of communication or emanation ad extra; ſo it ſeems a thing amiable and valuable in itſelf that it ſhould be communicated or flow forth, that this infinite fountain of good ſhould ſend forth abundant ſtreams, that this infinite fountain of light p. 23ſhould, diffuſing it's excellent fulneſs, pour forth light all around.—And as this is in itſelf excellent, ſo a diſpoſition to this, in the divine being, muſt be looked upon as a perfection or an excellent diſpoſition, ſuch an emanation of good is, in ſome ſenſe, a multiplication of it; ſo far as the communication or external ſtream may be looked upon as any thing beſides the fountain, ſo far it may be looked on as an increaſe of good. And if the fulneſs of good that is in the fountain, is in itſelf excellent and worthy to exiſt, then the emanation, or that which is as it were an increaſe, repetition or multiplication of it, is excellent and worthy to exiſt. Thus it is fit, ſince there is an infinite fountain of light and knowledge, that this light ſhould ſhine forth in beams of communicated knowledge and underſtanding: And as there is an infinite fountain of holineſs, moral excellence and beauty, ſo it ſhould flow out in communicated holineſs.—And that as there is an infinite fulneſs of joy and happineſs, ſo theſe ſhould have an emanation, and become a fountain flowing out in abundant ſtreams, as beams from the ſun.

FROM this view it appears another way to be a thing in itſelf valuable, that there ſhould be ſuch things as the knowledge of God's glory in other beings, and an high eſteem of it, love to it, and delight and complacence in it: This appears I ſay in another way, viz. as theſe things are but the emanations of God's own knowledge, holineſs and joy.

THUS it appears reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that it was what God had reſpect to as an ultimate end of his creating the world, to communicate of his own infinite fulneſs of good; or rather it was his laſt end, that there might be a glorious and abundant emanation of his infinite fulneſs of Good ad extra, or without himſelf, and the diſpoſition to communicate himſelf, or diffuſe his own FULNESS,**I ſhall often uſe the phraſe God's fulneſs, as ſignifying and comprehending all the good which is in God natural and moral, either excellence or happineſs: partly becauſe I know of no better phraſe to be uſed in this general meaning; and partly becauſe I am led hereto by ſome of the inſpired writers, particularly the apoſtle Paul, who often uſeth the phraſe in this ſenſe. which we muſt conceive p. 24of as being originally in God as a perfection of his nature, was what moved him to create the world. But here as much as poſſible to avoid confuſion, I obſerve, that there is ſome impropriety in ſaying that a diſpoſition in God to communicate himſelf to the creature, moved him to create the world. For tho' the diffuſive diſpoſition in the nature of God, that moved him to create the world, doubtleſs inclines him to communicate himſelf to the creature, when the creature exiſts; yet this can't be all: Becauſe an inclination in God to communicate himſelf to an object, ſeems to preſuppoſe the exiſtence of the object, at leaſt in idea. But the diffuſive diſpoſition that excited God to give creatures exiſtence, was rather a communicative diſpoſition in general, or a diſpoſition in the fulneſs of the divinity to flow out and diffuſe itſelf. Thus the diſpoſition there is in the root and ſtock of a tree to diffuſe and ſend forth it's ſap and life, is doubtleſs the reaſon of the communication of it's ſap and life to it's buds, leaves and fruits, after theſe exiſt. But a diſpoſition to communicate of it's life and ſap to it's fruits, is not ſo properly the cauſe of it's producing thoſe fruits, as it's diſpoſition to communicate itſelf, or diffuſe it's ſap and life in general. Therefore to ſpeak more ſtrictly according to truth, we may ſuppoſe, that a diſpoſition in God, as an original property of his nature, to an emanation of his own infinite fulneſs, was what excited him to create the world; and ſo that the emanation itſelf was aimed at by him as a laſt end of the creation.

SECT. III.

WHerein it is conſidered how, on the ſuppoſition of God's making the forementioned things his laſt end, he manifeſts a ſupreme and ultimate regard to himſelf in all his works.

IN the laſt ſection I obſerved ſome things, which are actually the conſequence of the creation of the world, which ſeem abſolutely valuable in themſelves, and ſo worthy to be made God's laſt end in this work. I now proceed to enquire, how God's making ſuch things as theſe his laſt end is conſiſtent with his making himſelf his laſt end, or his manifeſting an ultimate reſpect to himſelf in his acts and works. Becauſe p. 25this is a thing I have obſerved as agreable to the dictates of reaſon, that in all his proceedings he ſhould ſet himſelf higheſt.—Therefore I would endeavour to ſhew with reſpect to each of the forementioned things, 'that God, in making them his end, makes himſelf his end, ſo as in all to ſhew a ſupreme and ultimate reſpect to himſelf; and how his infinite love to himſelf and delight in himſelf, will naturally cauſe him to value and delight in theſe things: Or rather how a value to theſe things is implied in his love to himſelf, or value of that infinite fulneſs of good that is in himſelf.

Now with regard to the firſt of the particulars mention'd above, viz. God's regard to the exerciſe and expreſſion of thoſe attributes of his nature, in their proper operations and effects, which conſiſt in a ſufficiency for theſe operations, 'tis not hard to conceive that God's regard to himſelf, and value for his own perfections, ſhould cauſe him to value theſe exerciſes and expreſſions of his perfections; and that a love to them will diſpoſe him to love their exhibition and exertment: Inasmuch as their excellency conſiſts in their relation to uſe, exerciſe and operation; as the excellency of wiſdom conſiſts in it's relation to, and ſufficiency for, wiſe deſigns and effects. God's love to himſelf, and his own attributes, will therefore make him delight in that, which is the uſe, end and operation of theſe attributes. If one highly eſteem and delight in the virtues of a friend, as wiſdom, juſtice, &c. that have relation to action, this will make him delight in the exerciſe and genuine effects of theſe virtues: So if God both eſteem, and delight in his own perfections and virtues, he can't but value and delight in the expreſſions and genuine effects of them. So that in delighting in the expreſſions of his perfections, he manifeſts a delight in his own perfections themſelves: Or in other words, he manifeſts a delight in himſelf; and in making theſe expreſſions of his own perfections his end, he makes himſelf his end.

AND with reſpect to the ſecond and third particulars, the matter is no leſs plain. For he that loves any being, and has a diſpoſition highly to prize, and greatly to delight in his virtues and perfections, muſt from the ſame diſpoſition be well pleaſed to have his excellencies known, acknowledged, eſteemed and prized by others. He that loves and approves p. 26any being or thing, he naturally loves and approves the love and approbation of that thing, and is oppoſite to the diſapprobation and contempt of it. Thus it is when one loves another, and highly prizes the virtues of a friend. And thus it is fit it ſhould be, if it be fit that the other ſhould be beloved, and his qualification priz'd. And therefore thus it will neceſſarily be, if a being loves himſelf and highly prizes his own excellencies: And thus it is fit it ſhould be, if it be fit he ſhould thus love himſelf, and prize his own valuable qualities. That is, 'tis fit that he ſhould take delight in his own excellencies being ſeen, acknowledged, eſteemed, and delighted in. This is implied in a love to himſelf and his own perfections. And in ſeeking this, and making this his end, he ſeeks himſelf, and makes himſelf his end.

AND with reſpect to the fourth and laſt particular, viz. God's being diſpoſed to an abundant communication, and glorious emanation of that infinite fulneſs of good which he poſſeſſes in himſelf; as of his own knowledge, excellency, and happineſs, in the manner which he does; if we thoro'ly and properly conſider the matter, it will appear, that herein alſo God makes himſelf his end, in ſuch a ſenſe, as plainly to manifeſt and teſtify a ſupreme and ultimate regard to himſelf.

MEERLY in this diſpoſition to diffuſe himſelf, or to cauſe an emanation of his glory and fulneſs, which is prior to the exiſtence of any other being, and is to be conſider'd as the inciting cauſe of creation, or giving exiſtence to other beings, God can't ſo properly be ſaid to make the creature his end, as himſelf.—For the creature is not as yet conſidered as exiſting. This diſpoſition or deſire in God, muſt be prior to the exiſtence of the creature, even in intention and foreſight. For it is a diſpoſition that is the original ground of the exiſtence of the creature; and even of the future intended and foreſeen exiſtence of the creature.—God's love, or benevolence, as it reſpects the creature, may be taken either in a larger, or ſtricter ſenſe. In a larger ſenſe it may ſignify nothing diverſe from that good diſpoſition in his nature to communicate of his own fulneſs in general; as his knowledge, his holineſs, and happineſs; and to give creatures exiſtence in order to it. This may be called benevolence p. 27or love, becauſe it is the ſame good diſpoſition that is exerciſed in love: 'Tis the very fountain from whence love originally proceeds, when taken in the moſt proper ſenſe; and it has the ſame general tendency and effect in the creature's well-being.—But yet this can't have any particular preſent or future created exiſtence for its object; becauſe it is prior to any ſuch object, and the very ſource of the futurition of the exiſtence of it. Nor is it really diverſe from God's love to himſelf; as will more clearly appear afterwards.

BUT God's love may be taken more ſtrictly, for this general diſpoſition to communicate good, as directed to particular objects: Love in the moſt ſtrict and proper ſenſe, preſuppoſes the exiſtence of the object beloved, at leaſt in idea and expectation, and repreſented to the mind as future. God did not love angels in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, but in conſequence of his intending to create them, and ſo having an idea of future exiſting angels. Therefore his love to them was not properly what excited him to intend to create them. Love or benevolence ſtrictly taken, preſuppoſes an exiſting object, as much as pity, a miſerable ſuffering object.

THIS propenſity in God to diffuſe himſelf, may be conſider'd as a propenſity to himſelf diffuſed; or to his own glory exiſting in its emanation. A reſpect to himſelf, or an infinite propenſity to, and delight in his own glory, is that which cauſes him to incline to its being abundantly diffuſed, and to delight in the emanation of it. Thus that nature in a tree, by which it puts forth buds, ſhoots out branches, and brings forth leaves and fruit, is a diſpoſition that terminates in its own compleat ſelf. And ſo the diſpoſition in the ſun to ſhine, or abundantly to diffuſe its fulneſs, warmth and brightneſs, is only a tendency to its own moſt glorious and compleat ſtate. So God looks on the communication of himſelf, and the emanation of the infinite glory and good that are in himſelf to belong to the fulneſs and compleatneſs of himſelf; as tho' he were not in his moſt compleat and glorious ſtate without it. Thus the church of Chriſt (toward whom, and in whom are the emanations of his glory and communications of his fulneſs) is called the fulneſs of Chriſt: As tho' he were not in his compleat ſtate p. 28without her; as Adam was in a defective ſtate without Eve. And the church is call'd the glory of Chriſt, as the woman is the glory of the man, I Cor. xi. 7.—Iſai. xlvi. 13. I will place ſalvation in Zion, for Iſrael my glory. **Very remarkable is that place, Joh. xii. 23, 24. "And Jeſus anſwered them ſaying: the hour is come that the ſon of man ſhould be glorified. Verily I ſay unto you, except a corn of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone; but if it die it bringeth forth much fruit." He had reſpect herein, to the bleſſed fruits of Chriſt's death, in the converſion, ſalvation, and eternal happineſs and holineſs of thoſe that ſhould be redeemed by him. This conſequence of his death, he calls his glory; and his obtaining this fruit he calls his being glorified: As the flouriſhing beautiful produce of a corn of wheat ſown in the ground is its glory. Without this he is alone as Adam was before Eve was created: But from him by his death proceeds a glorious offspring; in which he is communicated, that is his fulneſs and glory: As from Adam in his deep ſleep proceeds the woman a beautiful companion to fill his emptineſs, and relieve his ſolitarineſs. By Chriſt's death, his fulneſs is abundantly diffuſed in many ſtreams; and expreſſed in the beauty and glory of a great multitude of his ſpiritual offspring.John 12:23John 12:24—Indeed after the creatures are intended to be created, God may be conceiv'd of as being moved by benevolence to theſe creatures, in the ſtricteſt ſenſe, in his dealings with, and works about them. His exerciſing his goodneſs, and gratifying his benevolence to them in particular, may be the ſpring of all God's proceedings thro' the univerſe; as being now the determin'd way of gratifying his general inclination to diffuſe himſelf. Here God's acting for himſelf, or making himſelf his laſt end, and his acting for their ſake, are not to be ſet in oppoſition; or to be conſidered as the oppoſite parts of a disjunction: They are rather to be conſidered as coinciding one with the other, and implied one in the other. But yet God is to be conſidered as firſt and original in his regard; and the creature is the object of God's regard conſequentially and by implication as being as it were comprehended in God; as ſhall be more particularly obſerv'd preſently.

BUT how God's value for and delight in the emanations of his fulneſs in the work of creation, argues his delight in the infinite fulneſs of good there is in himſelf, and the ſupreme p. 29reſpect and regard he has for himſelf; and that in making theſe emanations of himſelf his end, he does ultimately make himſelf his end in creation, will more clearly appear by conſidering more particularly the nature and circumſtances of theſe communications of God's fulneſs which are made, and which we have reaſon either from the nature of things, or the word of God to ſuppoſe ſhall be made.

ONE part of that divine fulneſs which is communicated, is the-divine knowledge. That communicated knowledge which muſt be ſuppos'd to pertain to God's laſt end in creating the world, is the creatures knowledge of him. For this is the end of all other knowledge: And even the faculty of underſtanding would be vain without this. And this knowledge is moſt properly a communication of God's infinite knowledge which primarily conſiſts in the knowledge of himſelf. God in making this his end, makes himſelf his end. This knowledge in the creature, is but a conformity to God. 'Tis the image of God's own knowledge of himſelf. 'Tis a participation of the ſame: 'Tis as much the ſame as 'tis poſſible for that to be, which is infinitely leſs in degree: As particular beams of the ſun communicated, are the light and glory of the ſun in part.

BESIDES God's perfections, or his glory, is the object of this knowledge, or the thing known; ſo that God is glorified in it, as hereby his excellency is ſeen. As therefore God values himſelf, as he delights in his own knowledge; he muſt delight in every thing of that nature: As he delights in his own light, he muſt delight in every beam of that light: And as he highly values his own excellency, he muſt be well pleaſed in having it manifeſted, and ſo glorified.

ANOTHER thing wherein the emanation of divine fulneſs that is, and will be made in conſequence of the creation of the world, is the communication of virtue and holineſs to the creature. This is a communication of God's holineſs; ſo that hereby the creature partakes of God's own moral excellency; which is properly the beauty of the divine nature. And as God delights in his own beauty, he muſt neceſſarily delight in the creatures holineſs; which is a p. 30conformity to, and participation of it, as truly as the brightneſs of a jewel, held in the ſun's beams, is a participation, or derivation of the ſun's brightneſs, tho' immenſly leſs in degree.—And then it muſt be conſidered wherein this holineſs in the creature conſiſts; viz. in love, which is the comprehenſion of all true virtue; and primarily in love to God, which is exerciſed in an high eſteem of God, admiration of his perfections, complacency in them, and praiſe of them. All which things are nothing elſe but the hearts exalting, magnifying, or glorifying God; which as I ſhew'd before, God neceſſarily approves of, and is pleaſed with, as he loves himſelf, and values the glory of his own nature.

ANOTHER part of God's fulneſs which he communicates, is his happineſs. This happineſs conſiſts in enjoying and rejoicing in himſelf: And ſo does alſo the creatures happineſs. 'Tis, as has been obſerved of the other, a participation of what is in God; and God and his glory are the objective ground of it. The happineſs of the creature conſiſts in rejoicing in God; by which alſo God is magnified and exalted: Joy, or the exulting of the heart in God's glory, is one thing that belongs to praiſe.—So that God is all in all, with reſpect to each part of that communication of the divine fulneſs which is made to the creature. What is communicated is divine, or ſomething of God: And each communication is of that nature, that the creature to whom it is made, is thereby conform'd to God, and united to him; and that in proportion as the communication is greater or leſs. And the communication itſelf, is no other, in the very nature of it, than that wherein the very honor, exaltation and praiſe of God conſiſts.

AND 'tis farther to be conſidered, that the thing which God aimed at in the creation of the world, as the end which he had ultimately in view, was that communication of himſelf, which he intended throughout all eternity. And if we attend to the nature and circumſtances of this eternal emanation of divine good, it will more clearly ſhew how in making this his end, God teſtifies a ſupreme reſpect to himſelf, and makes himſelf his end. There are many reaſons to think that what God has in view, in an increaſing communication of himſelf throughout eternity, is an increaſing p. 31knowledge of God, love to him, and joy in him.—And 'tis to be conſider'd that the more thoſe divine communications increaſe in the creature, the more it becomes one with God: For ſo much the more is it united to God in love, the heart is drawn nearer and nearer to God, and the union with him becomes more firm and cloſe: and at the ſame time the creature becomes more and more conform'd to God. The image is more and more perfect, and ſo the good that is in the creature comes forever nearer and nearer to an identity with that which is in God. In the view therefore of God, who has a comprehenſive proſpect of the increaſing union and conformity through eternity, it muſt be an infinitely ſtrict and perfect nearneſs, conformity, and oneneſs. For it will for ever come nearer and nearer to that ſtrictneſs and perfection of union which there is between the Father and the Son: So that in the eyes of God, who perfectly ſees the whole of it, in its infinite progreſs and increaſe, it muſt come to an eminent fulfilment of Chriſt's requeſt, in Joh. xvii. 21, 23.—"That they all may be one, as thou father art in me, & I in thee, that they alſo may be one in us, I in them and thou in me, that they may be made perfect in one." In this view, thoſe elect creatures which muſt be looked upon as the end of all the reſt of the creation, conſidered with reſpect to the whole of their eternal duration, and as ſuch made God's end, muſt be viewed as being, as it were, one with God. They were reſpected as brought home to him, united with him, centering moſt perfectly in him, and as it were ſwallowed up in him: ſo that his reſpect to them finally coincides and becomes one and the ſame with reſpect to himſelf.—The intereſt of the creature, is, as it were, God's own intereſt, in proportion to the degree of their relation and union to God. Thus the intereſt of a man's family is look'd upon as the ſame with his own intereſt; becauſe of the relation they ſtand in to him; his propriety in them, and their ſtrict union with him. But conſider God's elect creatures with reſpect to their eternal duration, ſo they are infinitely dearer to God, than a man's family is to him.—What has been ſaid, ſhews that as all things are from God as their firſt cauſe and fountain; ſo all things tend to him, and in their progreſs come nearer & nearer to him through all eternity: which argues that he who is their firſt cauſe is their laſt end.

p. 32SECT. IV.

Some objections conſidered which may be made againſt the reaſonableneſs of what has been ſaid of God's making himſelf his laſt end.

Object. 1. Some may object againſt what has been ſaid, as inconſiſtent with God's abſolute independence and immutability: particularly the repreſentation that has been made, as tho' God were inclined to a communication of his fulneſs and emanations of his own glory, as being his own moſt glorious and compleat ſtate. It may be tho't that this don't well conſiſt with God's being ſelf-exiſtent from all eternity; abſolutely perfect in himſelf, in the poſſeſſion of infinite and independent good. And that in general, to ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his end, in the creation of the world, ſeems to ſuppoſe that he aims at ſome intereſt or happineſs of his own, not eaſily reconcileable with his being happy, perfectly & infinitely happy in himſelf. If it could be ſuppoſed that God needed any thing; or that the goodneſs of his creatures could extend to him; or that they could be profitable to him; it might be fit, that God ſhould make himſelf, and his own intereſt, his higheſt and laſt end in creating the world: and there would be ſome reaſon and ground for the preceeding diſcourſe. But ſeeing that God is above all need and all capacity of being added to and advanced, made better or happier in any reſpect; to what purpoſe ſhould God make himſelf his end; or ſeek to advance himſelf in any reſpect by any of his works? How abſurd is it to ſuppoſe that God ſhould do ſuch great things with a view to obtain, what he is already moſt perfectly poſſeſſed of, and was ſo from all eternity; and therefore can't now poſſibly need, nor with any colour of reaſon be ſuppos'd to ſeek?

Anſwer 1. MANY have wrong notions of God's happineſs, as reſulting from his abſolute ſelf-ſufficience, independence, and immutability. Tho' it be true, that God's glory and happineſs are in and of himſelf, are infinite and can't be added to, unchangeable for the whole and every part of which he is perfectly independent of the creature; p. 33yet it don't hence follow, nor is it true, that God has no real and proper delight, pleaſure or happineſs, in any of his acts or communications relative to the creature; or effects he produces in them; or in any thing he ſees in the creatures qualifications, diſpoſitions, actions and ſtate. God may have a real and proper pleaſure or happineſs in ſeeing the happy ſtate of the creature: yet this may not be different from his delight in himſelf; being a delight in his own infinite goodneſs; or the exerciſe of that glorious propenſity of his nature to diffuſe and communicate himſelf, and ſo gratifying this inclination of his own heart.—This delight which God has in his creature's happineſs, can't properly be ſaid to be what God receives from the creature. For 'tis only the effect of his own work in, and communications to the creature; in making it, and admiting it to a participation of his fulneſs. As the ſun receives nothing from the jewel that receives its light, and ſhines only by a participation of its brightneſs.

WITH reſpect alſo to the creature's holineſs; God may have a proper delight and joy in imparting this to the creature, as gratifying hereby his inclination, to communicate of his own excellent fulneſs. God may delight with true and great pleaſure in beholding that beauty which is an image and communication of his own beauty, an expreſſion and manifeſtation of his own lovelineſs. And this is ſo far from being an inſtance of his happineſs not being in and …om himſelf, that 'tis an evidence that he is happy in himſelf, or delights and has pleaſure in his own beauty. If he did not take pleaſure in the expreſſion of his own beauty, it would rather be an evidence that he don't delight in his own beauty; that he hath not his happineſs and enjoyment in his own beauty and perfection.—So that if we ſuppoſe God has real pleaſure and happineſs in the holy love and praiſe of his ſaints, as the image and communication of his own holineſs, it is not properly any pleaſure diſtinct from the pleaſure he has in himſelf; but is truly an inſtance of it.

AND with reſpect to God's being glorified in this reſpect, that thoſe perfections wherein his glory conſiſts, are exerciſed and expreſſed in their proper and correſponding effects; p. 34as his wiſdom in wiſe deſigns and well-contrived works,—his power in great effects—his juſtice in acts of righteouſneſs—his goodneſs in communicating happineſs; and ſo his ſhewing forth the glory of his own nature, in its being exerciſed, exhibited, communicated, known, and eſteemed: his having delight herein does not argu… that his pleaſure or happineſs is not in himſelf, and his own glory; but the contrary. This is the neceſſary conſequence of his delighting in the glory of his nature, that he delights in the emanation and effulgence of it.

NOR do any of theſe things argue any dependence in God on the creature for happineſs. Tho' he has real pleaſure in the creature's holineſs and happineſs; yet this is not properly any pleaſure which he receives from the creature. For theſe things are what he gives the creature. They are wholly and entirely from him. Therefore they are nothing that they give to God by which they add to him. His rejoycing therein, is rather a rejoicing in his own acts, and his own glory expreſſed in thoſe acts, than a joy derived from the creature. God's joy is dependent on nothing beſides his own act, which he exerts with an abſolute and independent power. And yet, in ſome ſenſe it can be truly ſaid that God has the more delight and pleaſure for the holineſs and happineſs of his creatures. Becauſe God would be leſs happy, if he was leſs good: or if he had not that perfection of nature which conſiſts in a propenſity of nature to diffuſe of his own fulneſs. And he would be leſs happy, if it were poſſible for him to be hinder'd in the exerciſe of his goodneſs, and his other perfections in their proper effects. But he has compleat happineſs, becauſe he has theſe perfections, and can't be hindred in exerciſing and diſplaying them in their proper effects. And this ſurely is not thus, becauſe he is dependent; but becauſe he is independent on any other that ſhould hinder him.

FROM this view it appears, that nothing that has been ſaid is in the leaſt inconſiſtent with thoſe expreſſions in the Scripture that ſignify that man can't be profitable to God; that he receives nothing of us by any of our wiſdom and righteouſneſs. For theſe expreſſions plainly mean no more p. 35than that God is abſolutely independent of us; that we have nothing of our own, no ſtock from whence we can give to God; and that no part of his happineſs originates from man.

FROM what has been ſaid it appears, that the pleaſure that God hath in thoſe things which have been mentioned, is rather a pleaſure in diffuſing and communicating to the creature, than in receiving from the creature. Surely, 'tis no argument of indigence in God, that he is inclined to communicate of his infinite fulneſs. 'Tis no argument of the emptineſs or deficiency of a fountain, that it is inclined to overflow.—Another thing ſignified by theſe expreſſions of ſcripture is, that nothing that is from the creature, adds to or alters God's happineſs, as tho' it were changeable either by encreaſe or diminution. Nor does any thing that has been advanced in the leaſt ſuppoſe or infer that it does, or is it in the leaſt inconſiſtent with the eternity, and moſt abſolute immutability of God's pleaſure and happineſs.—For tho' theſe communications of God, theſe exerciſes, operations, effects and expreſſions of his glorious perfections, which God rejoyces in, are in time; yet his joy in them is without beginning or change. They were always equally preſent in the divine mind. He beheld them with equal clearneſs certainty and fulneſs in every reſpect, as he doth now. They were always equally preſent; as with him there is no variableneſs or ſucceſſion. He ever beheld and enjoyed them perfectly in his own independent and immutable power and will. And his view of, and joy in them is eternally, abſolutely perfect unchangeable and independent. It can't be added to or diminiſhed by the power or will of any creature: nor is in the leaſt dependent on any thing mutable or contingent.

2. IF any are not ſatisfyed with the preceeding anſwer, but ſtill inſiſt on the objection: let them conſider whether they can deviſe any other ſcheme of God's laſt end in creating the world, but what will be equally obnoxious to this objection in its full force, if there be any force in it. For if God had any laſt end in creating the world, then there was ſomething, in ſome reſpect future, that he aimed at, and deſign'd to bring to paſs by creating p. 36the world: ſomething that was agreeable to his inclination or will: let that be his own glory, or the happineſs of his creatures, or what it will. Now if there be ſomething that God ſeeks as agreeable, or grateful to him, then in the accompliſhment of it he is gratifyed. If the laſt end which he ſeeks in the creation of the world, be truly a thing grateful to him, (as certainly it is if it be truly his end and truly the object of his will) then it is what he takes a real delight and pleaſure in. But then according to the argument of the objection, how he can have any thing future to deſire or ſeek, who is already perfectly, eternally and immutably ſatisfied in himſelf? What can remain for him to take any delight in or to be further gratifyed by, whoſe eternal and unchangeable delight is in himſelf as his own compleat object of enjoyment. Thus the objector will be preſſed with his own objection; let him embrace what notion he will of God's end in the creation. And I think he has no way left to anſwer but that which has been taken above.

IT may therefore be proper here to obſerve, that let what will be God's laſt end, that, he muſt have a real and proper pleaſure in: Whatever be the proper object of his will, he is gratified in. And the thing is either grateful to him in itſelf; or for ſomething elſe for which he wills it: And ſo is his further end. But whatever is God's laſt end, that he wills for it's own ſake; as grateful to him in it ſelf: or which is the ſame thing; it is that which he truly delights in; or in which he has ſome degree of true and proper pleaſure. Otherwiſe we muſt deny any ſuch thing as will in God with reſpect to any thing brought to paſs in time; and ſo muſt deny his work of creation, or any work of his providence to be truly voluntary. But we have as much reaſon to ſuppoſe that God's works in creating and governing the world, are properly the fruits of his will, as of his underſtanding. And if there be any ſuch thing at all, as what we mean by acts of will in God; then he is not indifferent whether his will be fulfilled or not. And if he is not indifferent, then he is truly gratified and pleaſed in the fulfilment of his will: or which is the ſame thing, he has a pleaſure in it. And if he has a real pleaſure in attaining his end, then the attainment of it belongs to his p. 37happineſs. That in which God's delight or pleaſure in any meaſure conſiſts, his happineſs in ſome meaſure conſiſts. To ſuppoſe that God has pleaſure in things, that are brought to paſs in time, only figuratively and metaphorically; is to ſuppoſe that he exerciſes will about theſe things, and makes them his end only metaphorically.

3. THE doctrine that makes God's creatures and not himſelf, to be his laſt end, is a doctrine the fartheſt from having a favourable aſpect on God's abſolute ſelf-ſufficience and independence. It far leſs agrees therewith than the doctrine againſt which this is objected. For we muſt conceive of the efficient as depending on his ultimate end. He depends on this end, in his deſires, aims, actions and purſuits; ſo that he fails in all his deſires actions and purſuits, if he fails of his end.—Now if God himſelf be his laſt end, then in his dependence on his end, he depends on nothing but himſelf. If all things be of him, and to him, and he the firſt and the laſt, this ſhews him to be all in all: He is all to himſelf. He goes not out of himſelf in what he ſeeks; but his deſires and purſuits as they originate from, ſo they terminate in himſelf; and he is dependent on none but himſelf in the beginning or end of any of his exerciſes or operations. But if not himſelf, but the creature, be his laſt end, then as he depends on his laſt end, he is in ſome ſort dependent on the creature.

Object. 2. SOME may object, that to ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his higheſt and laſt end, is diſhonourable to him; as it in effect ſuppoſes, that God does every thing from a ſelfiſh ſpirit. Selfiſhneſs is looked upon as mean and ſordid in the creature! unbecoming and even hateful in ſuch a worm of the duſt as man. We ſhould look upon a man as of a baſe and contemptible character, that ſhould in every thing he did, be governed by ſelfiſh principles; ſhould make his private intereſt his governing aim in all his conduct in life. How far then ſhould we be from attributing any ſuch thing to the ſupream Being, the bleſſed and only potentate! Does it not become us to aſcribe to him, the moſt noble and generous diſpoſitions; and thoſe qualities that are the moſt remote from every thing that is private, narrow and ſordid?

p. 38Anſ. 1. SUCH an objection muſt ariſe from a very ignorant or inconſiderate notion of the vice of ſelfiſhneſs, and the virtue of generoſity. It by ſelfiſhneſs be meant, a diſpoſition in any being to regard himſelf; this is no otherwiſe vicious or unbecoming, than as one is leſs than a multitude; and ſo the public weal is of greater value than his particular intereſt. Among created beings one ſingle perſon muſt be looked upon as inconſiderable in compariſon of the generality; and ſo his intereſt as of little importance compared with the intereſt of the whole ſyſtem: Therefore in them, a diſpoſition to prefer ſelf, as if it were more than all is exceeding vicious. But it is vicious on no other account, than as it is a diſpoſition that don't agree with the nature of things; and that which is indeed the greateſt good. And a diſpoſition in any one to forego his own intereſt for the ſake of others, is no further excellent, no further worthy the name of generoſity than it is a treating things according to their true value; a proſecuting ſomething moſt worthy to be proſecuted; an expreſſion of a diſpoſition to prefer ſomething to ſelf-intereſt, that is indeed preferable in it ſelf.—But if God be indeed ſo great, and ſo excellent, that all other beings are as nothing to him, and all other excellency be as nothing and leſs than nothing, and vanity in compariſon of his; and God be omniſcient and infallible and perfectly knows that he is infinitely the moſt valuable being; then it is fit that his heart ſhould be agreable to this, which is indeed the true nature and proportion of things and agreable to this infallible and all-comprehending underſtanding which he has of them, and that perfectly clear light in which he views them: and ſo 'tis fit and ſuitable that he ſhould value himſelf infinitely more than his creatures.

2. IN created beings, a regard to ſelf-intereſt may properly be ſet in oppoſition to the public welfare; becauſe the private intereſt of one perſon may be inconſiſtent with the public good: at leaſt it may be ſo in the apprehenſion of that perſon. That, which this perſon looks upon as his intereſt may interfere with, or oppoſe the general good—Hence his private intereſt may be regarded and purſued in oppoſition to the public—But this can't be with reſpect to the ſupream Being, the author & head of the whole ſyſtem; p. 39on whom all abſolutely depend; who is the fountain of being and good to the whole. It is more abſurd, to ſuppoſe that his intereſt ſhould be oppoſite to the intereſt of the univerſal ſyſtem, than that the welfare of the head, heart and vitals of the natural body, ſhould be oppoſite to the welfare of the body. And it is impoſſible that God who is omniſcient ſhould apprehend the matter thus; viz. his intereſt, as being inconſiſtent with the good and intereſt of the whole.

3. GOD's ſeeking himſelf in the creation of the world, in the manner which has been ſuppoſed, is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with the good of his creatures, or any poſſibility of being ſo; that it is a kind of regard to himſelf that inclines him to ſeek the good of his creature. It is a regard to himſelf that diſpoſes him to diffuſe and communicate himſelf. It is ſuch a delight in his own internal fulneſs and glory, that diſpoſes him to an abundant effuſion and emanation of that glory. The ſame diſpoſition, that inclines him to delight in his glory, cauſes him to delight in the exhibitions, expreſſions and communications of it. This is a natural concluſion—If there were any perſon of ſuch a taſte and diſpoſition of mind, that the brightneſs and light of the ſun ſeem'd unlovely to him, he would be willing that the ſun's brightneſs and light ſhould be retain'd within itſelf: But they, that delight in it, to whom it appears lovely and glorious, will eſteem it an amiable and glorious thing to have it diffuſed and communicated through the world.

HERE by the way it may be properly conſidered, whether ſome writers are not chargeable with inconſiſtence in this reſpect, viz. that whereas they ſpeak againſt the doctrine of God's making himſelf his own higheſt and laſt end, as tho' this were an ignoble ſelfiſhneſs in God: when indeed he only is fit to be made the higheſt end, by himſelf and all other beings; in as much as he is the higheſt Being, and infinitely greater and more worthy than all others.—Yet with regard to creatures, who are infinitely leſs worthy of ſupreme and ultimate regard, they (in effect at leaſt) ſuppoſe that they neceſſarily at all times ſeek their own happineſs, and make it their ultimate end in all, even their p. 40moſt virtuous actions: And that this principle, regulated by wiſdom and prudence, as leading to that which is their true and higheſt happineſs is the foundation of all virtue and every thing that is morally good and excellent in them.

Object. 3. To what has been has been ſuppoſed, that God makes himſelf his end in this way, viz. in ſeeking that his glory & excellent perfection ſhould be known, eſteemed, loved and delighted in by his creatures, it may be objected, that this ſeems unworthy of God. It is conſidered as below a truly great man, to be much influenced in his conduct, by a deſire of popular applauſe. The notice and admiration of a gazing multitude, would be eſteemed but a low end, to be aimed at by a prince or philoſopher, in any great and noble enterprize. How much more is it unworthy the great God, to perform his magnificent works, e. g. the creation of the vaſt univerſe, out of regard to the notice and admiration of worms of the duſt: That the diſplays of his magnificence may be gazed at, and applauded by thoſe who are infinitely more beneath him, than the meaneſt rabble are beneath the greateſt prince or philoſopher.

THIS objection is ſpecious. It hath a ſhew of argument; but it will appear to be nothing but a ſhew, if we conſider,

1. WHETHER or no it be not worthy of God, to regard and value what is excellent and valuable in itſelf; and ſo to take pleaſure in its exiſtence.

IT ſeems not liable to any doubt, that there could be nothing future, or no future exiſtence worthy to be deſired or ſought by God, and ſo worthy to be made his end, if no future exiſtence was valuable and worthy to be brought to effect. If when the world was not, there was any poſſible future thing fit and valuable in itſelf, I think the knowledge of God's glory, and the eſteem and love of it muſt be ſo. Underſtanding and will are the higheſt kind of created exiſtence. And if they be valuable, it muſt be in their exerciſe. But the higheſt and moſt excellent kind of their exerciſe, is in ſome actual knowledge and exerciſe of will. And certainly the moſt excellent actual knowledge and p. 41will, that can be in the creature, is the knowledge and the love of God. And the moſt true excellent knowledge of God is the knowledge of his glory or moral excellence: and the moſt excellent exerciſe of the will conſiſts in eſteem and love and a delight in his glory.—If any created exiſtence is in itſelf worthy to be, or any thing that ever was future is worthy of exiſtence, ſuch a communication of divine fulneſs, ſuch an emanation and expreſſion of the divine glory is worthy of exiſtence. But if nothing that ever was future was worthy to exiſt, then no future thing was worthy to be aimed at by God in creating the world. And if nothing was worthy to be aimed at in creation, then nothing was worthy to be God's end in creation.

IF God's own excellency and glory is worthy to be highly valued and delighted in by him, then the value and eſteem hereof by others, is worthy to be regarded by him: for this is a neceſſary conſequence. To make this plain, let it be conſidered how it is with regard to the excellent qualities of another. If we highly value the virtues and excellencies of a friend, in proportion as we do ſo, we ſhall approve of and like others eſteem of them; and ſhall diſapprove and diſlike the contempt of them. If theſe virtues are truly valuable, they are worthy that we ſhould thus approve others eſteem, and diſapprove their contempt of them.—And the caſe is the ſame with reſpect to any Being's own qualities or attributes. If he highly eſteems them, and greatly delights in them, he will naturally and neceſſarily love to ſee eſteem of them in others, & diſlike their diſeſteem. And if the attributes are worthy to be highly eſteem'd by the Being who hath them, ſo is the eſteem of them in others worthy to be proportionably approved and regarded.—I deſire it may be conſidered, whether it be unfit that God ſhould be diſpleas'd with contempt of himſelf? If not, but on the contrary it be fit and ſuitable that he ſhould be diſpleaſed with this, there is the ſame reaſon that he ſhould be pleaſed with the proper love eſteem and honor of himſelf.

THE matter may be alſo cleared, by conſidering what it would become us to approve of and value with reſpect to any public ſociety we belong to, e. g. our nation or country. p. 42It becomes us to love our country; and therefore it becomes us to value the juſt honor of our country. But the ſame that it becomes us to value and deſire for a friend, and the ſame that it becomes us to deſire and ſeek for the community, the ſame does it become God to value and ſeek for himſelf; that is on ſuppoſition it becomes God to love himſelf as well as it does men to love a friend or the public; which I think has been before proved.—

Here are two things that ought particularly to be adverted to—1. That in God the love of himſelf, and the love of the public are not to be diſtinguiſhed, as in man. Becauſe God's Being as it were comprehends all. His exiſtence, being infinite, muſt be equivalent to univerſal exiſtence. And for the ſame reaſon that public affection in the creature is fit and beautiful, God's regard to himſelf muſt be …o likewiſe.—2. In God, the love of what is fit and decent, or the love of virtue, can't be a diſtinct thing from the love of himſelf. Becauſe the love of God is that wherein all virtue and holineſs does primarily and cheifly conſiſt, and God's own holineſs muſt primarily conſiſt in the love of himſelf; as was before obſerved. And if God's holineſs conſiſts in love to himſelf, then it will imply an approbation of and pleaſedneſs with the eſteem and lovelineſs of him in others. For a Being that loves himſelf, neceſſarily loves▪ Love to himſelf. If holineſs in God conſiſt chiefly in love to himſelf, holineſs in the creature muſt chiefly conſiſt in love to him. And if God loves holineſs in himſelf, he muſt love it in the creature.

VIRTUE by ſuch of the late philoſophers as ſeem to be in chief repute, is placed in public affection or general benevolence. And if the eſſence of virtue lies primarily in this, then the love of virtue it ſelf is virtuous, no otherwiſe, than as it is implied in or ariſes from this public affection, or extenſive benevolence of mind. Becauſe if a man truly loves the public, he neceſſarily loves Love to the public.

Now therefore, for the ſame reaſon, if univerſal benevolence in the higheſt ſenſe, be the ſame thing with benevolence to the divine Being, who is in effect univerſal Being, it will follow, that love to virtue itſelf is no otherwiſe virtuous, than as it is implied in or ariſes from love to the p. 43divine Being. Conſequently God's own love to virtue is implied in love to himſelf: and is virtuous no otherwiſe than as it ariſes from love to himſelf. So that God's virtuous diſpoſition, appearing in love to holineſs in the creature, is to be reſolved into the ſame thing with love to himſelf. And conſequently whereinſoever he makes virtue his end he makes himſelf his end.—In fine, God being as it were an all comprehending being, all his moral perfections, as his holineſs, juſtice, grace and benevolence are ſome way or other to be reſolved into a ſupream and infinite regard to himſelf: and if ſo it will be eaſy to ſuppoſe that it becomes him to make himſelf his ſupream and laſt end in his works.

I WOULD here obſerve by the way, that if any inſiſt that it becomes God to love and take delight in the virtue of his creatures for its own ſake, in ſuch a manner as not to love it from regard to himſelf; and that it ſuppoſeth too much ſelfiſhn…ſs to ſuppoſe that all God's delight in virtue is to be reſolv'd into delight in himſelf: This will contradict a former objection againſt God's taking pleaſure in communications of himſelf; viz. that inaſmuch as God is perfectly independent and ſelf-ſufficient therefore all his happineſs and pleaſure conſiſts in the injoyment of himſelf. For in the preſent objection it is inſiſted that it becomes God to have ſome pleaſure, love or delight in virtue diſtinct from his delight in himſelf. So that if the ſame perſons make both objections they muſt be inconſiſtent with themſelves.

2. IN anſwer to the objection we are upon; as to God's creatures whoſe eſteem and love he ſeeks, being infinitely inferior to God as nothing and vanity.—I would obſerve that it is not unworthy of God to take pleaſure in that which in itſelf is fit and amiable, even in thoſe that are infinitely below him. If there be infinite grace and condeſcention in it, yet theſe are not unworthy of God; but infinitely to his honour and glory.

THEY who inſiſt that God's own glory was not an ultimate end of his creation of the world; but that all that he had any ultimate regard to wa… the happineſs p. 44of his creatures; and ſuppoſe that he made his creatures, and not himſelf his laſt end; do it under a colour of exalting and magnifying God's benevolence and love to his creatures.—But if his love to them be ſo great, and he ſo highly values them as to look upon them worthy to be his end in all his great works as they ſuppoſe; they are not conſiſtent with themſelves, in ſuppoſing that God has ſo little value for their love and eſteem. For as the nature of love, eſpecially great love cauſes him that loves to value the eſteem of the perſon beloved: ſo that God ſhould take pleaſure in the creatures juſt love and eſteem will follow both from God's love to himſelf and his love to his creatures. If he eſteem and love himſelf, he muſt approve of eſteem and love to himſelf; and diſapprove the contrary. And if he loves and values the creature, he muſt value and take delight in their mutual love and eſteem: becauſe he loves not becauſe he needs them.

3. As to what is alledged of its being unworthy of great men to be governed in their conduct and atchievements by a regard to the applauſe of the populace: I would obſerve, what makes their applauſe to be worthy of ſo little regard, is their ignorance, giddineſs and injuſtice. The applauſe of the multitude very frequently is not founded on any juſt view and underſtanding of things, but on humour, miſtake, folly and unreaſonable affections. Such applauſe is truly worthy to be diſregarded—But 'tis not beneath a man of the greateſt dignity and wiſdom, to value the wiſe and juſt eſteem of others, however inferior to him. The contrary, inſtead of being an expreſſion of greatneſs of mind, would ſhew an haughty and mean ſpirit. 'Tis ſuch an eſteem in his creatures only, that God hath any regard to: for 'tis ſuch an eſteem only that is fit and amiable in itſelf.

Object. 4. To ſuppoſe that God makes himſelf his ultimate end in the creation of the world derogates from the freeneſs of his goodneſs, in his beneficence to his creatures: and from their obligations to gratitude for the good communicated. For if God, in communicating his fulneſs, makes himſelf, and not the creatures, his end; then what good he does, he does for himſelf, and not for them; for his own ſake, and not theirs.

p. 45Anſ. God and the creature in this affair of the emanation of the divine fulneſs, are not properly ſet in oppoſition; or made the oppoſite parts of a disjunction. Nor ought God's glory and the creatures good, to be ſpoken of as if they were properly and entirely diſtinct, as they are in the objection. This ſuppoſeth, that God's having reſpect to his glory and the communication of good to his creatures, are things altogether different: that God's communicating his fulneſs for himſelf, and his doing it for them, are things ſtanding in a proper disjunction and oppoſition.—Whereas if we were capable of having more full and perfect views of God and divine things, which are ſo much above us, 'tis probable it would appear very clear to us, that the matter is quite otherwiſe: and that theſe things, inſtead of appearing entirely diſtinct, are implied one in the other. That God in ſeeking his glory, therein ſeeks the good of his creatures. Becauſe the emanation of his glory (which he ſeeks and delights in, as he delights in himſelf & his own eternal glory) implies the communicated excellency and happineſs of his creature. And that in communicating his fulneſs for them, he does it for himſelf. Becauſe their good, which he ſeeks, is ſo much in union and communion with himſelf. God is their good. Their excellency and happineſs is nothing, but the emanation and expreſſion of God's glory: God in ſeeking their glory and happineſs, ſeeks himſelf: and in ſeeking himſelf, i. e. himſelf diffuſed and expreſſed, (which he delights in, as he delights in his own beauty and fulneſs) he ſeeks their glory and happineſs.

THIS will the better appear, if we conſider the degree and manner in which he aimed at the creatures excellency and happineſs in his creating the world; viz. the degree and manner of the creatures glory and happineſs during the whole of the deſign'd eternal duration of the world, he was about to create: which is in greater and greater nearneſs and ſtrictneſs of union with himſelf, and greater and greater communion and participation with him in his own glory and happineſs, in conſtant progreſſion, throughout all eternity. As the creature's good was viewed in this manner when God made the world for it, viz. with reſpect to the whole of the eternal duration of it, and the eternally progreſſive union and communion with him; ſo the creature p. 46muſt be viewed as in infinite ſtrict union with himſelf. In this view it appears that God's reſpect to the creature, in the whole, unites with his reſpect to himſelf. Both regards are like two lines which ſeem at the beginning to be ſeparate, but aim finally to meet in one, both being directed to the ſame center.—And as to the good of the creature itſelf, if viewed in its whole duration, and infinite progreſſion, it muſt be viewed as infinite; and ſo not only being ſome communication of God's glory, but as coming nearer and nearer to the ſame thing in its infinite fulneſs. The nearer any thing comes to infinite, the nearer it comes to an identity with God. And if any good, as viewed by God, is beheld as infinite, it can't be viewed as a diſtinct thing from God's own infinite glory.

THE apoſtle's diſcourſe of the great love of Chriſt to men, Eph. 5. 25. to the end, leads us thus to think of the love of Chriſt to his church; as coinciding with his love to himſelf, by virtue of the ſtrict union of the church with him. Thus "huſbands love your wives, as Chriſt alſo loved the church, and gave himſelf for it—that he might preſent it to himſelf a glorious church. So ought men to love their wives, as their own bodies. He that loveth his wife loveth himſelf—even as the Lord the church; for we are members of his body, of his fleſh, and of his bones."

Now I apprehend that there is nothing in this manner of God's ſeeking the good of the creatures, or in his diſpoſition to communicate of his own fulneſs to them, that at all derogates from the excellence of it, or the creature's obligation.

GOD'S diſpoſition to communicate good, or to cauſe his own infinite fulneſs to flow forth, is not the leſs properly called God's goodneſs, becauſe the good that he communicates, is ſomething of himſelf; a communication of his own glory, and what he delights in as he delights in his own glory. The creature has no leſs benefit by it; neither has ſuch a diſpoſition leſs of a direct tendency to the creature's benefit; or the leſs of a tendency to love to the creature, when the creature comes to exiſt. Nor is this diſpoſition in God to communicate of and diffuſe his own good, the leſs p. 47excellent, becauſe it is implied in his love and regard to himſelf. For his love to himſelf don't imply it any otherwiſe, but as it implies a love to whatever is worthy and excellent. The emanation of God's glory, is in itſelf worthy and excellent, and ſo God delights in it: and his delight in this excellent thing, is implied in his love to himſelf, or his own fulneſs; becauſe that is the fountain, and ſo the ſum and comprehenſion of every thing that is excellent. And the matter ſtanding thus, 'tis evident, that theſe things cannot derogate from the excellency of this diſpoſition in God, to an emanation of his own fulneſs, or communication of good to the creature.

NOR does God's inclination to communicate good in this manner, i. e. from regard to himſelf, or delight in his own glory, at all diminiſh the freeneſs of his beneficence in this communication. This will appear, if we conſider particularly, in what ways, doing good to others from ſelf-love, may be inconſiſtent with the freeneſs of beneficence. And I conceive there are only theſe two ways,

1. WHEN any does good to another from confined ſelf-love, that is oppoſite to a general benevolence. This kind of ſelf love is properly call'd ſelfiſhneſs. In ſome ſenſe, the moſt benevolent generous perſon in the world, ſeeks his own happineſs in doing good to others; becauſe he places his happineſs in their good. His mind is ſo enlarged as to take them, as it were, into himſelf. Thus when they are happy he feels it, he partakes with them, and is happy in their happineſs. This is ſo far from being inconſiſtent with the freeneſs of beneficence, that on the contrary, free benevolence and kindneſs conſiſts in it. The moſt free beneficence that can be in men, is doing good, not from a confined ſelfiſhneſs, but from a diſpoſition to general benevolence, or love to beings in general.

BUT now, with reſpect to the divine being, there is no ſuch thing as ſuch confin'd ſelfiſhneſs in him, or a love to himſelf, oppoſite to general benevolence. It is impoſſible, becauſe he comprehends all entity, and all excellence in his own eſſence. The firſt Being, the eternal and infinite Being, is in effect, Being in general; and comprehends p. 48univerſal exiſtence, as was obſerved before. God in his benevolence to his creatures, can't have his heart enlarged in ſuch a manner as to take in beings that he finds, who are originally out of himſelf, diſtinct and independent. This can't be in an infinite being, who exiſts alone from eternity. But he, from his goodneſs, as it were enlarges himſelf in a more excellent and divine manner. This is by communicating and diffuſing himſelf; and ſo inſtead of finding, making objects of his benevolence: not by taking into himſelf what he finds diſtinct from himſelf, and ſo partaking of their good, and being happy in them; but by flowing forth, and expreſſing himſelf in them, and making them to partake of him, and rejoicing in himſelf expreſſed in them, and communicated to them.

2. ANOTHER thing, in doing good to others from ſelf-love, that derogates from the freeneſs of the goodneſs; is doing good to others from dependence on them for the good we need, or deſire: which dependence obliges. So that in our beneficence we are not ſelf-moved, but as it were, conſtrained by ſomething without ourſelves. But it has been particularly ſhewn already, that God's making himſelf his end, in the manner that has been ſpoken of, argues no dependence; but is conſiſtent with abſolute independence and ſelf-ſufficience.

AND I would here obſerve, that there is ſomething in that diſpoſition in God to communicate goodneſs, which ſhews him to be independent and ſelf-moved in it, in a manner that is peculiar, and above what is in the beneficence of creatures. Creatures, even the moſt gracious of them, are not ſo independent and ſelf-moved in their goodneſs; but that in all the exerciſes of it, they are excited by ſome object that they find: ſomething appearing good, or in ſome reſpect worthy of regard, preſents itſelf, and moves their kindneſs. But God being all and alone is abſolutely ſelf-moved. The exerciſes of his communicative diſpoſition are abſolutely from within himſelf, not finding any thing, or any object to excite them or draw them forth: but all that is good and worthy in the object, and the very being of the object, proceeding from the over flowing of his fulneſs.

p. 49THESE things ſhew that the ſuppoſition of God's making himſelf his laſt end, in the manner ſpoken of, don't at all diminiſh the creature's obligation to gratitude, for communications of good it receives. For if it leſſen it's obligation, it muſt be on one of the following accounts. Either, that the creature has not ſo much benefit by it; or, that the diſpoſition it flows from is not proper goodneſs, not having ſo direct a tendency to the creatures benefit; or that the diſpoſition is not ſo virtuous and excellent in it's kind; or that the beneficence is not ſo free. But it has been obſerved, that none of theſe things take place, with regard to that diſpoſition, which has been ſuppoſed to have excited God to create the world.

I CONFESS there is a degree of indiſtinctneſs and obſcurity in the cloſe conſideration of ſuch ſubjects, and a great imperfection in the expreſſions we uſe concerning them; ariſing unavoidably from the infinite ſublimity of the ſubject, and the incomprehenſibleneſs of thoſe things that are divine. Hence revelation is the ſureſt guide in theſe matters; and what that teaches ſhall in the next place be conſidered. Nevertheleſs, the endeavours uſed to diſcover what the voice of reaſon is, ſo far as it can go, may ſerve to prepare the way, by obviating cavils inſiſted on by many; and to ſatisfy us, that what the word of God ſays of the matter, is not unreaſonable; and thus prepare our minds for a more full acquieſcence in the inſtructions it gives, according to the more natural and genuine ſenſe of words and expreſſions, we find often uſed there concerning this ſubject.

p. 50CHAP. II.

Wherein it is enquired, what is to be learned from holy ſcriptures, concerning God's laſt end in the creation of the world.