Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 1 · Introduction
INTRODUCTION
Containing Explanations of Terms, and general Poſitions.
TO avoid all confuſion in our inquiries and reaſonings, concerning the end for which God created the world, a diſtinction ſhould be obſerved between the chief end for which an agent or efficient exerts any act and performs any work, and the ultimate end. Theſe two phraſes are not always preciſely of the ſame ſignification: And tho' the chief end be always an ultimate end, yet every ultimate end is not always a chief end.
A chief end is oppoſite to an inferior end: An ultimate end, is oppoſite to a ſubordinate end. A ſubordinate end is ſomething that an agent ſeeks and aims at in what he does; but yet don't ſeek it, or regard it at all upon it's own account, but wholly on the account of a further end, or in order to ſome other thing, which it is conſidered as a means of. Thus when a man that goes a journey to obtain a medicine to cure him of ſome diſeaſe, and reſtore his health,—the obtaining that medicine is his ſubordinate end; becauſe 'tis not an end that he ſeeks for itſelf, or values at all upon its own account; but wholly as a means of a further end, viz. his health: Separate the medicine from that further end, and it is eſteemed good for nothing; nor is it at all deſired.
AN ultimate end is that which the agent ſeeks in what he does, for it's own ſake: That he has reſpect to, as what he loves, values and takes pleaſure in on it's own account, and not merely as a means of a further end: As when a man loves the taſte of ſome particular ſort of fruit, and is at pains and coſt to obtain it, for the ſake of the pleaſure of that taſte, which he values upon it's own account, as he loves his own pleaſure; and not merely for the ſake of any other good, which he ſuppoſes his enjoying that pleaſure will be the means of.
SOME ends are ſubordinate ends, not only as they are ſubordinated to an ultimate end; but alſo to another end that is itſelf but a ſubordinate end: Yea, there may be a ſucceſſion or chain of many ſubordinate ends, one dependent on another,—one ſought for another: The firſt for the next; and that for the ſake of the next to that,—and ſo on in a long ſeries before you come to any thing, that the agent aims at and ſeeks for it's own ſake:—As when a man ſells a garment to get money—to buy tools—to till his land—to obtain a crop—to ſupply him with food—to gratify the appetite. And he ſeeks to gratify his appetite, on it's own account, as what is grateful in itſelf. Here the end of his ſelling his garment, is to get money; but getting money is only a ſubordinate end: Tis not only ſubordinate to the laſt end, his gratifying his appetite; but to a nearer end, viz. his buying huſbandry tools: And his obtaining theſe, is only a ſubordinate end, being only for the ſake of tilling land: And the tillage of land, is an end not ſought on it's own account, but for the ſake of the crop to be produced: And the crop produced, is not an ultimate end, or an end ſought for itſelf, but only for the ſake of making bread: And the having bread, is not ſought on it's own account, but for the ſake of gratifying the appetite.
HERE the gratifying the appetite, is called the ultimate end; becauſe 'tis the laſt in the chain, where a man's aim and purſuit ſtops and reſts, obtaining in that, the thing finally aimed at. So whenever a man comes to that in which his deſire terminates and reſts, it being ſomething valued on it's own account, then he comes to an ultimate end, let the chain be longer or ſhorter; yea, if there be but one link or one ſtep that he takes before he comes to this end. As when a man that loves honey puts it into his mouth, for the ſake of the pleaſure of the taſte, without aiming at any thing further. So that an end which an agent has in view, may be both his immediate and his ultimate end; his next and his laſt end. That end which is ſought for the ſake of itſelf, and not for the ſake of a further end, is an ultimate end; it is ultimate or laſt, as it has no other beyond it, for whoſe ſake it is, it being for the ſake of itſelf: So that here, the aim of the agent ſtops and reſts (without going further) being come to the good which he eſteems a recompence of it's purſuit for it's own value.
HERE it is to be noted, that a thing ſought, may have the nature of an ultimate, and alſo of a ſubordinate end, as it may be ſought partly on it's own account, and partly for the ſake of a further end. Thus a man in what he does, may ſeek the love and reſpect of a particular perſon, partly on it's own account, becauſe 'tis in itſelf agreable to men to be the objects of other's eſteem and love: And partly, becauſe he hopes, through the friendſhip of that perſon to have his aſſiſtance in other affairs; and ſo to be put under advantage for the obtaining further ends.
A chief end or higheſt end, which is oppoſite not properly to a ſubordinate end, but to an inferior end, is ſomething diverſe from an ultimate end. The chief end is an end that is moſt valued; and therefore moſt ſought after by the agent in what he does. 'Tis evident, that to be an end more valued than another end, is not exactly the ſame thing as to be an end valued ultimately, or for it's own ſake. This will appear, if it be conſidered.
1. THAT two different ends may be both ultimate ends, and yet not be chief ends. They may be both valued for their own ſake, and both ſought in the ſame work or acts, and yet one valued more highly and ſought more than another: Thus a man may go a journey to obtain two different benefits or enjoyments, both which may be agreable to him in themſelves conſidered, and ſo both may be what he values on their own account and ſeeks for their own ſake; And yet one may be much more agreable than the other: And ſo be what he ſets his heart chiefly upon, and ſeeks moſt after in his going a journey. Thus a man may go a journey partly to obtain the poſſeſſion and enjoyment of a bride that is very dear to him, and partly to gratify his curioſity in looking in a teleſcope, or ſome new-invented and extraordinary optic glaſs: Both may be ends he ſeeks in his journey, and the one not properly ſubordinate or in order to another. One may not depend on another; and therefore both may be ultimate ends: But yet the obtaining his beloved bride may be his chief end, and the benefit of the optic glaſs, his inferior end. The former may be what he ſets his heart vaſtly moſt upon; and ſo be properly the chief end of his journey.
2. AN ultimate end is not always the chief end, becauſe ſome ſubordinate ends may be more valued and ſought after than ſome ultimate ends. Thus for inſtance, a man may aim at theſe two things in his going a journey; one may be to viſit his friends, and another to receive a great eſtate, or a large ſum of money that lies ready for him, at the place to which he is going. The latter, viz. his receiving the ſum of money may be but a ſubordinate end: He may not value the ſilver and gold on their own account, but only for the pleaſure, gratifications and honor; that is the ultimate end, and not the money which is valued only as a means of the other. But yet the obtaining the money, may be what is more valued, and ſo an higher end of his journey, than the pleaſure of ſeeing his friends; tho' the latter is what is valued on its own account, and ſo is an ultimate end.
BUT here ſeveral things may be noted:
FIRST, That when it is ſaid, that ſome ſubordinate ends may be more valued than ſome ultimate ends, 'tis not ſuppoſed that ever a ſubordinate end is more valued than that ultimate end or ends to which it is ſubordinate; becauſe a ſubordinate end has no value, but what it derives from its ultimate end: For that reaſon it is called a ſubordinate end, becauſe it is valued and ſought, not for it's own ſake, or it's own value, but only in ſubordination to a further end, or for the ſake of the ultimate end, that it is in order to. But yet a ſubordinate end may be valued more than ſome other ultimate end that it is not ſubordinate to, but is independent of it, and don't belong to that ſeries, or chain of ends. Thus for inſtance: If a man goes a journey to receive a ſum of money, not at all as an ultimate end, or becauſe he has any value for the ſilver and gold for their own ſake, but only for the value of the pleaſure and honor that the money may be a means of. In this caſe it is impoſſible that the ſubordinate end, viz. his having the money ſhould be more valued by him than the pleaſure and honor, for which he values it. It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe that he values the means more than the end, when he has no value for the means but for the ſake of the end, of which it is the means: But yet he may value the money, tho' but a ſubordinate end, more than ſome other ultimate end, to which it is not ſubordinate, and with which it has no connection. For inſtance, more than the comfort of a friendly viſit; which was one end of his journey.
SECONDLY, Not only is a ſubordinate end never ſuperior to that ultimate end, to which it is ſubordinate; but the ultimate end is always (not only equal but) ſuperior to it's ſubordinate end, and more valued by the agent; unleſs it be when the ultimate end entirely depends on the ſubordinate: So that he has no other means by which to obtain his laſt end, and alſo is looked upon as certainly connected with it,—then the ſubordinate end may be as much valued as the laſt end; becauſe the laſt end, in ſuch a caſe, does altogether depend upon, and is wholly and certainly conveyed by it. As for inſtance, if a pregnant woman has a peculiar appetite to a certain rare fruit that is to be found only in the garden of a particular friend of her's, at a diſtance; and ſhe goes a journey to go to her friend's houſe or garden, to obtain that fruit—the ultimate end of her journey, is to gratify that ſtrong appetite: The obtaining that fruit, is the ſubordinate end of it. If ſhe looks upon it, that the appetite can be gratified by no other means than the obtaining that fruit; and that it will certainly be gratified if ſhe obtains it, then ſhe will value the fruit as much as ſhe values the gratification of her appetite. But otherwiſe, it will not be ſo: If ſhe be doubtful whether that fruit will ſatisfy her craving, then ſhe will not value it equally with the gratification of her appetite itſelf; or if there be ſome other fruit that ſhe knows of, that will gratify her deſire, at leaſt in part; which ſhe can obtain without ſuch inconvenience or trouble as ſhall countervail the gratification; which is in effect, fruſtrating her of her laſt end, becauſe her laſt end is the pleaſure of gratifying her appetite, without any trouble that ſhall countervail, and in effect deſtroy it. Or if it be ſo, that her appetite cannot be gratified without this fruit, nor yet with it alone, without ſomething elſe to be compounded with it,—then her value for her laſt end will be divided between theſe ſeveral ingredients as ſo many ſubordinate, and no one alone will be equally valued with the laſt end.
HENCE it rarely happens among mankind, that a ſubordinate end is equally valued with it's laſt end; becauſe the obtaining of a laſt end rarely depends on one ſingle, uncompounded means, and is infallibly connected with that means: Therefore, mens laſt ends are commonly their higheſt ends.
THIRDLY, If any being has but one ultimate end, in all that he does, and there be a great variety of operations, his laſt end may juſtly be looked upon as his ſupreme end: For in ſuch a caſe, every other end but that one, is an end to that end; and therefore no other end can be ſuperior to it. Becauſe, as was obſerved before, a ſubordinate end is never more valued, than the end to which it is ſubordinate.
MOREOVER, the ſubordinate effects, events or things brought to paſs, which all are means of this end, all uniting to contribute their ſhare towards the obtaining the one laſt end, are very various; and therefore, by what has been now obſerved, the ultimate end of all muſt be valued, more than any one of the particular means. This ſeems to be the caſe with the works of God, as may more fully appear in the ſequel.
FROM what has been ſaid, to explain what is intended by an ultimate end, the following things may be obſerved concerning ultimate ends in the ſenſe explained.
FOURTHLY, Whatſoever any agent has in view in any thing he does, which he loves, or which is an immediate gratification of any appetite or inclination of nature; and is agreable to him in itſelf, and not meerly for the ſake of ſomething elſe, is regarded by that agent as his laſt end. The ſame may be ſaid, of avoiding of that which is in itſelf painful or diſagreable: For the avoiding of what is diſagreable is agreable. This will be evident to any bearing in mind the meaning of the terms. By laſt end being meant, that which is regarded and ſought by an agent, as agreable or deſireable for it's own ſake; a ſubordinate that which is ſought only for the ſake of ſomething elſe.
FIFTHLY, From hence it will follow, that, if an agent in his works has in view more things than one that will be brought to paſs by what he does, that are agreable to him, conſider'd in themſelves, or what he loves and delights in on their own account,—then he muſt have more things than one that he regards as his laſt ends in what he does. But if there be but one thing that an agent ſeeks, as the conſequence of what he does that is agreable to him, on it's own account, then there can be but one laſt end which he has in all his actions and operations.
BUT only here a diſtinction muſt be obſerved of things which may be ſaid to be agreable to an agent, in themſelves conſider'd in two ſenſes. (1.) What is in itſelf grateful to an agent, and valued and loved on its own account, ſimply and abſolutely conſidered, and is ſo univerſally and originally, antecedent to, and independent of all conditions, or any ſuppoſition of particular caſes and circumſtances. And (2.) What may be ſaid to be in itſelf agreable to an agent, hypothetically and conſequentially: Or, on ſuppoſition or condition of ſuch and ſuch circumſtances or on the happening of ſuch a particular caſe. Thus, for inſtance: A man may originally love ſociety. An inclination to ſociety may be implanted in his very nature: And ſociety may be agreable to him antecedent to all preſuppoſed caſes and circumſtances: And this may cauſe him to ſeek a family. And the comfort of ſociety may be originally his laſt end, in ſeeking a family. But after he has a family, peace, good order and mutual juſtice and friendſhip in his family, may be agreable to him, and what he delights in for their own ſake: and therefore theſe things may be his laſt end in many things he does in the government and regulation of his family. But they were not his original end with reſpect to his family. The juſtice and peace of a family was not properly his laſt end before he had a family, that induced him to ſeek a family, but conſequentially. And the caſe being put of his having a family, then theſe things wherein the good order and beauty of a family conſiſt, become his laſt end in many things he does in ſuch circumſtances. In like manner we muſt ſuppoſe that God before he created the world, had ſome good in view, as a conſequence of the world's exiſtence that was originally agreable to him in itſelf conſidered, that inclined him to create the world, or bring the univerſe, with various intelligent creatures into exiſtence in ſuch a manner as he created it. But after the world was created, and ſuch and ſuch intelligent creatures actually had exiſtence, in ſuch and ſuch circumſtances, then a wiſe, juſt regulation of them was agreable to God, in itſelf conſidered. And God's love of juſtice, and hatred of injuſtice, would be ſufficient in ſuch a caſe to induce God to deal juſtly with his creatures, and to prevent all injuſtice in him towards them. But yet there is no neceſſity of ſuppoſing, that God's love of doing juſtly to intelligent beings, and hatred of the contrary, was what originally induced God to create the world, and make intelligent beings; and ſo to order the occaſion of doing either juſtly or unjuſtly. The juſtice of God's nature makes a juſt regulation agreable, and the contrary diſagreable, as there is occaſion, the ſubject being ſuppoſed, and the occaſion given: But we muſt ſuppoſe ſomething elſe that ſhould incline him to create the ſubjects or order the occaſion.
So that perfection of God which we call his faithfulneſs, or his inclination to fulfil his promiſes to his creatures, could not properly be what moved him to create the world; nor could ſuch a fulfilment of his promiſes to his creatures, be his laſt end, in giving the creatures being. But yet after the world is created, after intelligent creatures are made, and God has bound himſelf by promiſe to them, then that diſpoſition which is called his faithfulneſs may move him in his providential diſpoſals towards them: And this may be the end of many of God's works of providence, even the exerciſe of his faithfulneſs in fulfilling his promiſes. And may be in the lower ſenſe his laſt end. Becauſe faithfulneſs and truth muſt be ſuppoſed to be what is in itſelf amiable to God, and what he delights in for its own ſake. Thus God may have ends of particular works of providence, which are ultimate ends in a lower ſenſe, which were not ultimate ends of the creation.
So that here we have two ſorts of ultimate ends; one of which may be called an original, and independent ultimate end; the other conſequential and dependent. For 'tis evident, the latter ſort are truly of the nature of ultimate ends: Becauſe, tho' their being agreable to the agent, or the agent's deſire of them, be conſequential on the exiſtence, or ſuppoſition of proper ſubjects and occaſion; yet the ſubject and occaſion being ſuppoſed, they are agreable and amiable in themſelves. We may ſuppoſe that to a righteous Being, the doing juſtice between two parties, with whom he is concerned, is agreable in itſelf, and is loved for it's own ſake, and not merely for the ſake of ſome other end: And yet we may ſuppoſe, that a deſire of doing juſtice between two parties, may be conſequential on the being of thoſe parties, and the occaſion given.
THEREFORE I make a diſtinction between an end that in this manner is conſequential, and a ſubordinate end.
IT may be obſerved, that when I ſpeak of God's ultimate end in the creation of the world, in the following diſcourſe, I commonly mean in that higheſt ſenſe, viz. the original ultimate end.
SIXTHLY, It may be further obſerved, that the original ultimate end or ends of the creation of the world is alone, that which induces God to give the occaſion for conſequential ends, by the firſt creation of the world, and the original diſpoſal of it. And the more original the end is, the more extenſive and univerſal it is. That which God had primarily in view in creating, and the original ordination of the world, muſt be conſtantly kept in view, and have a governing influence in all God's works, or with reſpect to every thing that he does towards his creatures.
AND therefore,
SEVENTHLY, If we uſe the phraſe ultimate end in this higheſt ſenſe, then the ſame that is God's ultimate end in creating the world, if we ſuppoſe but one ſuch end, muſt be what he makes his ultimate aim in all his works, in every thing he does either in creation or providence. But we muſt ſuppoſe that in the uſe, which God puts the creatures to that he hath made, he muſt evermore have a regard to the end, for which he has made them. But if we take ultimate end in the other lower ſenſe, God may ſometimes have regard to thoſe things as ultimate ends, in particular works of providence, which could not in any proper ſenſe be his laſt end in creating the world.
EIGHTHLY, On the other hand, whatever appears to be God's ultimate end in any ſenſe, of his works of providence in general, that muſt be the ultimate end of the work of creation itſelf. For tho' it be ſo that God may act for an end, that is an ultimate end in a lower ſenſe, in ſome of his works of providence, which is not the ultimate end of the creation of the world: Yet this doth not take place with regard to the works of providence in general. But we may juſtly look upon whatſoever has the nature of an ultimate end of God's works of providence in general, that the ſame is alſo an ultimate end of the creation of the world; for God's works of providence in general, are the ſame with the general uſe that he puts the world to that he has made. And we may well argue from what we ſee of the general uſe which God makes of the world, to the general end for which he deſigned the world. Tho' there may be ſome things that are ends of particular works of providence, that were not the laſt end of the creation, which are in themſelves grateful to God in ſuch particular emergent circumſtances; and ſo are laſt ends in an inferior ſenſe: Yet this is only in certain caſes, or particular occaſions. But if they are laſt ends of God's proceedings in the uſe of the world in general, this ſhews that his making them laſt ends don't depend on particular caſes and circumſtances, but the nature of things in general, and his general deſign in the being and conſtitution of the univerſe.
NINETHLY, If there be but one thing that is originally, and independent on any future, ſuppoſed caſes, agreable to God, to be obtained by the creation of the world, then there can be but one laſt end of God's work, in this higheſt ſenſe: But if there are various things, properly diverſe one from another, that are, abſolutely and independently on the ſuppoſition of any future given caſes, agreable to the divine being, which are actually obtained by the creation of the world, then there were ſeveral ultimate ends of the creation, in that higheſt ſenſe.