Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 1 · Chapter 2 · Sect 1 – Sect 2
SECT. I.
The ſcriptures repreſent God as making himſelf his own laſt end in the creation of the world.
IT is manifeſt, that the ſcriptures ſpeak, on all occaſions, as tho' God made himſelf his end in all his works: and as tho' the ſame being, who is the firſt cauſe of all things, were the ſupream and laſt end of all things. Thus in Iſai. 44. 6. "Thus ſaith the Lord, the king of Iſrael, and his redeemer the Lord of hoſts, I am the firſt, I alſo am the laſt, and beſides me there is no God". Cap. 48. 12. "I am the firſt, and I am the laſt". Rev. 1. 8. I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the ending, ſaith the Lord, which is, and was, and which is to come, the almighty. ver. 11. I am alpha and omega, the firſt and the laſt. ver. 17. I am the firſt and the laſt". Cap. 21. 6. "And he ſaid unto me, it is done, I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end". Cap. 22. 13. "I am alpha and omega, the beginning and the end, the firſt and the laſt".
AND when God is ſo often ſpoken of as the laſt as well as the firſt, and the end as well as the beginning, what is meant (or at leaſt implied) is, that as he is the firſt efficient cauſe and fountain from whence all things originate; ſo he is the laſt final cauſe for which they are made; the final term to which they all tend in their ultimate iſſue. This ſeems to be the moſt natural import of theſe expreſſions; and is confirmed by other parallel paſſages; as Rom. 11. 36. "For of him and thro' and to him are all things". Col. 1. 16. "For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, viſible and inviſible, whether they be thrones or dominions, principalities and powers, all things were created by him, and for him". Heb. 2. 10. "For it became him, by whom are all things, and for whom are all things". In Prov. 16. 4. 'tis ſaid expreſly, "The Lord hath made all things for himſelf".
AND the manner is obſervable, in which God is ſaid to be the laſt, to whom, and for whom are all things. 'Tis evidently ſpoken of as a meet and ſuitable thing, a branch of his glory; a meet prerogative of the great, infinite and eternal being; a thing becoming the dignity of him who is infinitely above all other beings; from whom all things are, and by whom they conſiſt, and in compariſon with whom, all other things are as nothing.
SECT. II.
WHerein ſome poſitions are advanced concerning a juſt method of arguing in this affair, from what we find in holy ſcriptures.
WE have ſeen that the ſcriptures ſpeak of the creation of the world as being for God, as its end. What remains therefore to be enquired into, is, which way do the ſcriptures repreſent God as making himſelf his end?
IT is evident that God don't make his exiſtence or being the end of the creation; nor can he be ſuppoſed to do ſo without great abſurdity. His being and exiſtence can't be conceived of but as prior to any of God's acts or deſigns: they muſt be preſuppoſed as the ground of them. Therefore it can't be in this way that God makes himſelf the end of his creating the world. He can't create the world to the end that he may have exiſtence; or may have ſuch attributes and perfections, and ſuch an eſſence. Nor do the ſcriptures give the leaſt intimation of any ſuch thing. Therefore, what divine effect, or what is it in relation to God, that is the thing which the ſcripture teacheth us to be the end he aimed at in his works of creation, in deſigning of which, he makes himſelf his end?
IN order to a right underſtanding of the ſcripture doctrine, and drawing juſt inferences from what we find ſaid in the word of God relative to this matter; ſo to open the way to a true and definitive anſwer to the above enquiry, I would lay down the following poſitions,
Poſition, 1. THAT which appears to be ſpoken of as God's ultimate end in his works of providence in general, we may juſtly ſuppoſe to be his laſt end in the work of creation—This appears from what was obſerved before (under the fifth particular of the introduction) which I need not now repeat.
Poſ. 2. WHEN any thing appears by the ſcripture to be the laſt end of ſome of the works of God, which thing appears in fact, to be the reſult, not only of this work, but of God's works in general. And altho' it be not mentioned as the end of thoſe works, but only or ſome of them, yet being actually the reſult of other works as well as that, & nothing appears peculiar, in the nature of the caſe, that renders it a fit, and beautiful and valuable reſult of thoſe particular works, more than of the reſt; but it appears with equal reaſon deſirable and valuable in the caſe of all works, of which it is ſpoken of in the word of God as (and ſeen in fact to be) the effect; we may juſtly infer, that thing to be the laſt end of thoſe other works alſo. For we muſt ſuppoſe it to be on account of the valuableneſs of the effect, that it is made the end of thoſe works of which it is expreſly ſpoken of as the end: and this effect, by the ſuppoſition, being equally, and in like manner the reſult of the work, and of the ſame value, 'tis but reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that it is the end of the work, of which it is naturally the conſequence, in one caſe as well as in another.
Poſ. 3. THE ultimate end of God's creating the world, being alſo (as was before obſerved) the laſt end of all God's works of providence, and that in the higheſt ſenſe, and being above all other things important, we may well preſume that this end will be chiefly inſiſted on in the word of God, in the account it gives of God's deſigns and ends in his works of providence—and therefore, if there be any particular thing, that we find more frequently mentioned in ſcripture as God's ultimate aim in his works of providence, than any thing elſe, this is a preſumption that this is the ſupreme and ultimate end of God's works in general, and ſo the end of the work of creation.
Poſ. 4. THAT which appears from the word of God to be his laſt end with reſpect to the moral world, or God's laſt end in the creation and diſpoſal of the intelligent part of the ſyſtem, and in the moral government of the world, that is God's laſt end in the work of creation in general. Becauſe it is evident, from the conſtitution of the world itſelf, as well as from the word of God, that the moral part is the end of all the reſt of the creation. The inanimate unintelligent part is made for the rational as much as a houſe is prepared for the inhabitant. And it is evident alſo from reaſon and the word of God, that it is with regard to what is moral in them, or for the ſake of ſome moral good in them, that moral agents are made & the world made for them.—But it is further evident that whatſoever is the laſt end of that part of creation that is the end of all the reſt, and for which all the reſt of the world was made, muſt be the laſt end of the whole. If all the other parts of a watch are made for the hand of the watch, to move that aright, and for a due and proper regulation of that, then it will follow, that the laſt end of the hand, is the laſt end of the whole machine.
Poſ. 5. THAT, which appears from the ſcripture to be God's laſt end in the chief work or works of his providence, we may well determine is God's laſt end in creating the world. For as was obſerved, we may juſtly infer the end of a thing from the uſe of it. We may juſtly infer the end of a clock, a chariot, a ſhip, or water-engine from the main uſe to which it is applied. But God's providence is his uſe of the world he has made. And if there be any work or works of providence that are evidently God's main work or works, herein appears and conſiſts the main uſe that God makes of the creation.—From theſe two laſt poſitions we may infer the next, viz.
Poſ. 6. WHATEVER appears by the ſcriptures to be God's laſt end in his main work or works of providence towards the moral world, that we juſtly infer to be the laſt end of the creation of the world. Becauſe as was juſt now obſerved, the moral world is the cheif part of the creation and the end of the reſt; and God's laſt end in creating that part of the world, muſt be his laſt end in the creation of the whole. And it appears by the laſt poſition, that the end of God's main work or works of providence towards them, or the main uſe he puts them to, ſhews the laſt end for which he has made them; and conſequently the main end for which he has made the whole world.
Poſ. 7. THAT which divine revelation ſhews to be God's laſt end with reſpect to that part of the moral world which are good, or which are according to his mind, or ſuch as he would have them be; I ſay that which is God's laſt end with reſpect to theſe (i. e. his laſt end in their being, and in their being good) this we muſt ſuppoſe to be the laſt end of God's creating the world. For it has been already ſhewn that God's laſt end in the moral part of creation muſt be the end of the whole. But his end in that part of the moral world that are good, muſt be the laſt end for which he has made the moral world in general. For therein conſiſts the goodneſs of a thing, viz. in its fitneſs to anſwer its end: or at leaſt this muſt be goodneſs in the eyes of the author of that thing. For goodneſs in his eyes is its agreableneſs to his mind. But an agreableneſs to his mind in what he makes for ſome end or uſe, muſt be an agreableneſs or fitneſs to that end. For his end in this caſe is his mind. That which he chiefly aims at in that thing, is chiefly his mind with reſpect to that thing. And therefore they are good moral agents, who are fitted for the end for which God has made moral agents: as they are good machines, inſtruments and utenſils that are fitted to the end they are deſigned for. And conſequently that which is the chief end to which in being good they are fitted that is the chief end of utenſils. So that which is the chief end to which good created moral agents in being good are fitted, this is the chief end of moral agents, or the moral part of the creation; and conſequently of the creation in general.
Poſ. 8. THAT, which the word of God requires the intelligent and moral part of the world to ſeek as their main end, or to have reſpect to in that they do, and regulate all their conduct by, as their ultimate & higheſt end, that we have reaſon to ſuppoſe is the laſt end for which God has made them; and conſequently by poſition fourth, the laſt end for which he has made the whole world. A main difference between the intelligent and moral parts, and the reſt of the world, lies in this, that the former are capable of knowing their creator, and the end for which he made them, and capable of actively complying with his deſign in their creation and promoting it; while other creatures can't promote the deſign of their creation, only paſſively and eventually. And ſeeing they are capable of knowing the end for which their author has made them, 'tis doubtleſs their duty to fall in with it. Their wills ought to comply with the will of the creator in this reſpect, in mainly ſeeking the ſame as their laſt end which God mainly ſeeks as their laſt end. This muſt be the law of nature and reaſon with reſpect to them. And we muſt ſuppoſe that God's reveal'd law, and the law of nature agree; and that his will, as a lawgiver, muſt agree with his will as a creator. Therefore we juſtly infer, that the ſame thing which God's revealed law requires intelligent creatures to ſeek as their laſt and greateſt end, that God their creator has made their laſt end, and ſo the end of the creation of the world.
Poſ. 9. WE may well ſuppoſe that what ſeems in holy ſcripture from time to time to be ſpoken of as the main end of the goodneſs of the good part of the moral world, ſo that the reſpect and relation their virtue or goodneſs has to that end, is what chiefly makes it valuable and deſirable; I ſay, we may well ſuppoſe that to be the thing which is God's laſt end in the creation of the moral world; and ſo by poſition fourth, of the whole world. For the end of the goodneſs of a thing, is the end of the thing. Herein, it was obſerved before, muſt conſiſt the goodneſs or valuableneſs of any thing in the eyes of him that made it for his uſe. viz. its being good for that uſe, or good with reſpect to the end for which he made it.
Poſ. 10. THAT which perſons who are deſcribed in ſcripture as approved ſaints, and ſet forth as examples of piety, ſought as their laſt and higheſt end in the things which they did, and which are mentioned as parts of their holy converſation, or inſtances of their good and approved behaviour; that we muſt ſuppoſe, was what they ought to ſeek as their laſt end; and conſequently by the preceeding poſition, was the ſame with God's laſt end in the creation of the world.
Poſ. 11. THAT which appears by the word of God to be that end or event, in the deſire of which, the ſouls of the good parts of the moral world, eſpecially of the beſt, and in their beſt frames, do moſt naturally and directly exerciſe their goodneſs in, and in expreſſing of their deſire of this event or end, they do moſt properly and directly expreſs their reſpect to God; we may, I ſay, well ſuppoſe, that event or end to be the chief and ultimate end of a ſpirit of piety and goodneſs, and God's chief end in making the moral world, and ſo the whole world. For doubtleſs the moſt direct and natural deſire and tendency of a ſpirit of true goodneſs in the good and beſt part of the moral world is to the chief end of goodneſs, and ſo the chief end of the creation of the moral world. And in what elſe can the ſpirit of true reſpect and friendſhip to God be expreſs'd by way of deſire, than deſires of the ſame end, which God himſelf chiefly and ultimately deſires and ſeeks in making them and all other things.
Poſ. 12. SINCE the holy ſcriptures teach us that Jeſus Chriſt is the head of the moral world, and eſpecially of all the good part of it; the chief of God's ſervants, appointed to be the head of his ſaints and angels, and ſet forth as the chief and moſt perfect pattern and example of goodneſs; we may well ſuppoſe by the foregoing poſitions, that what he ſought as his laſt end, was God's laſt end in the creation of the world.