Two Dissertations Concerning the the World and Virtue, Dissertation 2 · Chapter 4
CHAP. IV.
Of ſelf-love, and its various influence, to cauſe love to others, or the contrary.
MANY aſſert, that all love ariſes from ſelf-love. In order to determine this point, it ſhould be clearly determined what is meant by ſelf-love.
SELF-LOVE, I think, is generally defined—a man's love of his own happineſs. Which is ſhort, and may be thought very plain: but indeed is an ambiguous definition, as the pronoun, his own, is equivocal, and liable to be taken in two very different ſenſes. For a man's own happineſs may either be taken univerſally, for all the happineſs or pleaſure which the mind is in any regard the ſubject of, or whatever is grateful and pleaſing to men; or it may be taken for the pleaſure a man takes in his own proper, private, and ſeparate good. And ſo, ſelf-love may be taken two ways.
1. SELF-LOVE may be taken for the ſame as his loving whatſoever is grateful or pleaſing to him. Which comes only to this, that ſelf-love is a man's liking, and being ſuited and pleaſed in that which he likes, and which pleaſes him; or, that 'tis a man's loving what he loves. For whatever a man loves, that thing is grateful and pleaſing to him, whether that be his own peculiar happineſs, or the happineſs of others. And if this be all that they mean by ſelf-love, no wonder they ſuppoſe that all love may be reſolved into ſelf-love. For it is undoubtedly true, that whatever a man loves, his love may be reſolved into his loving what he loves,—if that be proper ſpeaking—If by ſelf-love is meant nothing elſe but a man's loving what is grateful or pleaſing to him, and being averſe to what is diſagreable, this is calling that ſelf-love, which is only a general capacity of loving, or hating; or a capacity of being either pleaſed or diſpleaſed: which is the ſame thing as a man's having a faculty of will. For if nothing could be either pleaſing or diſpleaſing, agreable or diſagreable to a man, then he could incline to nothing, and will nothing. But if he is capable of having inclination, will and choice, then what he inclines to, and chuſes, is grateful to him; whatever that he, whether it be his own private good, the good of his neighbours, or the glory of God. And ſo far as it is grateful or pleaſing to him, ſo far it is a part of his pleaſure, good or happineſs.
BUT if this be what is meant by ſelf-love, there is an impropriety and abſurdity even in the putting of the queſtion, Whether all our love, or our love to each particular object of our love, don't ariſe from ſelf-love? For that would be the ſame as to enquire, Whether the reaſon why our love is fix'd on ſuch and ſuch particular objects, is not, that we have a capacity of loving ſome things? This may be a general reaſon why men love or hate any thing at all; and therein differ from ſtones and trees, which love nothing, and hate nothing. But it can never be a reaſon why men's love is placed on ſuch and ſuch objects. That a man, in general, loves and is pleaſed with happineſs, or (which is the ſame thing) has a capacity of enjoying happineſs, cannot be the reaſon why ſuch and ſuch things become his happineſs: as for inſtance, why the good of his neighbour, or the happineſs and glory of God, is grateful and pleaſing to him, and ſo becomes a part of his happineſs.
OR if what they mean, who ſay that all love comes from ſelf-love, be not, that our loving ſuch and ſuch particular perſons and things, ariſes from our love to happineſs in general, but from a love to love our own happineſs, which conſiſts in theſe objects; ſo, the reaſon why we love benevolence to our friends, or neighbours, is, becauſe we love our happineſs, conſiſting in their happineſs, which we take pleaſure in:—ſtill the notion is abſurd. For here the effect it made the cauſe of that, of which it is the effect: our happineſs, conſiſting in the happineſs of the perſon beloved, loved, is made the cauſe of our love to that perſon. Whereas, the truth plainly is, that our love to the perſon is the cauſe of our delighting, or being happy in his happineſs. How comes our happineſs to conſiſt in the happineſs of ſuch as we love, but by our hearts being firſt united to them in affection, ſo that we as it were, look on them as our ſelves, and ſo on their happineſs as our own?
MEN who have benevolence to others, have pleaſure when they ſee others happineſs, becauſe ſeeing their happineſs gratifies ſome inclination that was in their hearts before. They before inclined to their happineſs; which was by benevolence or good-will; and therefore when they ſee their happineſs, their inclination is ſuited, and they are pleaſed. But the Being of inclinations and appetites is prior to any pleaſure in gratifying theſe appetites.
2. SELF-LOVE, as the phraſe is uſed in common ſpeech, moſt commonly ſignifies a man's regard to his confined private ſelf, or love to himſelf with reſpect to his private intereſt.
BY private intereſt I mean that which moſt immediately conſiſts in thoſe pleaſures, or pains, that are perſonal. For there is a comfort, and a grief, that ſome have in others pleaſures, or pains; which are in others originally, but are derived to them, or in ſome meaſure become their's, by virtue of a benevolent union of heart with others. And there are other pleaſures and pains that are originally our own, and not what we have by ſuch a participation with others. Which conſiſt in perceptions agreeable, or contrary, to certain perſonal inclinations implanted in our nature; ſuch as the ſenſitive appetites and averſions. Such alſo is the diſpoſition or the determination of the mind to be pleaſed with external beauty, and with all inferior ſecondary beauty, conſiſting in uniformity, porportion, &c. whether in things external or internal, and to diſlike the contrary deformity. Such alſo is the natural diſpoſition in men to be pleaſed in a perception of their being the objects of the honor and love of others, and diſpleaſed with others hatred and contempt. For pleaſures and uneaſineſſes of this kind are doubtleſs as much owing to an immediate determination of the mind by a fixed law of our nature, as any of the pleaſures or pains of external ſenſe. And theſe pleaſures are properly of the private and perſonal kind; being not by any participation of the happineſs or ſorrow of others, through benevolence. 'Tis evidently meer ſelf-love, that appears in this diſpoſition. It is eaſy to ſee, that a man's love to himſelf will make him love love to himſelf, and hate hatred to himſelf. And as God has conſtituted our nature, ſelf-love is exerciſed in no one diſpoſition more than in this, Men, probably, are capable of much more pleaſure and pain thro' this determination of the mind, than by any other perſonal inclination, or averſion, whatſoever. Tho' perhaps we don't ſo very often ſee inſtances of extreme ſuffering by this means, as by ſome others, yet we often ſee evidences of men's dreading the contempt of others more than death: and by ſuch inſtances may conceive ſomething what men would ſuffer, if univerſally hated and deſpiſed; and may reaſonably infer ſomething of the greatneſs of the miſery, that would ariſe under a ſenſe of univerſal abhorrence, in a great view of intelligent Being in general, or in a clear view of the Deity, as incomprehenſibly and immenſely great, ſo that all other Beings, are as nothing and vanity,—together with a ſenſe of his immediate continual preſence, and an infinite concern with him and dependence upon him,—and living conſtantly in the midſt of moſt clear and ſtrong evidences and manifeſtations of his hatred and contempt and wrath.
BUT to return,—Theſe things may be ſufficient to explain what I mean by private intereſt; in regard to which, ſelf-love, moſt properly ſo called, is immediately exerciſed.
AND here I would obſerve, that if we take ſelf-love in this ſenſe, ſo love to ſome others may truly be the effect of ſelf-love; i. e. according to the common method and order, which is maintain'd in the laws of nature. For no created thing has power to produce an effect any otherwiſe than by virtue of the laws of nature. Thus, that a man ſhould love thoſe that are of his party, when there are different parties contending one with another; and that are warmly engaged on his ſide, and promote his intereſt,— this is the natural conſequence of a private ſelf-love. Indeed there is no metaphyſical neceſſity, in the nature of things, that becauſe a man loves himſelf, and regards his own intereſt, he therefore ſhould love thoſe that love him, and promote his intereſt; i. e. to ſuppoſe it to be otherwiſe, implies no contradiction. It will not follow from any abſolute metaphyſical neceſſity, that becauſe bodies have ſolidity, coheſion, and gravitation towards the centre of the earth, therefore a weight ſuſpended on the beam of a balance ſhould have greater power to counter-balance a weight on the other ſide, when at a diſtance from the fulcrum, than when it is near. It implies no contradiction, that it ſhould be otherwiſe: but only as it contradicts that beautiful proportion and harmony, which the author of nature obſerves in the laws of nature he has eſtabliſhed. Neither is there any abſolute neceſſity, the contrary implying a contradiction, that becauſe there is an internal mutual attraction of the parts of the earth, or any other ſphere, whereby the whole becomes one ſolid coherent body, therefore other bodies that are around it, ſhould alſo be attracted by it, and thoſe that are neareſt, be attracted moſt. But according to the order and proportion generally obſerved in the laws of nature, one of theſe effects is connected with the other, ſo that it is juſtly look'd upon as the ſame power of attraction in the globe of the earth, which draws bodies about the earth towards its centre, with that which attracts the parts of the earth themſelves one to another; only exerted under different circumſtances. By a like order of nature, a man's love to thoſe that love him, is no more than a certain expreſſion or effect of ſelf-love. No other principle is needful in order to the effect, if nothing intervenes to counter-vail the natural tendency of ſelf-love. Therefore there is no more true virtue in a Man's thus loving his friends meerly from ſelf-love, than there is in ſelf-love itſelf, the principle from whence it proceeds. So, a man's being diſpoſed to hate thoſe that hate him, or to reſent injuries done him, ariſes from ſelf-love in like manner as the loving thoſe that love us, and being thankful for kindneſs ſhewn us.
But it is ſaid by ſome, that 'tis apparent, there is ſome other principle concerned in exciting the paſſions of gratitude and anger, beſides ſelf-love, viz. a moral ſenſe, or ſenſe of moral beauty and deformity, determining the minds of all mankind to approve of, and be pleaſed with virtue, and to diſapprove of vice, and behold it with diſplicence; and that their ſeeing or ſuppoſing this moral beauty or deformity, in the kindneſs of a benefactor, or oppoſition of an adverſary, is the occaſion of theſe affections of gratitude or anger. Otherwiſe, why are not theſe affections excited in us towards inanimate things, that do us good, or hurt? Why don't we experience gratitude to a garden, or fruitful field? And why are we not angry with a tempeſt, or blaſting mildew, or an overflowing ſtream? We are very differently affected towards thoſe that do us good from the virtue of generoſity, or hurt us from the vice of envy and malice, than towards things that hurt or help us, which are deſtitute of reaſon and will.—Now concerning this, I would make ſeveral remarks.
1. THOSE who thus argue, that gratitude and anger can't proceed from ſelf-love, might argue in the ſame way and with equal reaſon, that neither can theſe affections ariſe from love to others: which is contrary to their own ſcheme.
THEY ſay, that the reaſon why we are affected with gratitude and anger towards men, rather than things without life, is moral ſenſe: which they ſay, is the effect of that principle of benevolence or love to others, or love to the public, which is naturally in the hearts of all mankind.—But now I might ſay, according to their own way of arguing, gratitude and anger cannot ariſe from love to others, or love to the public, or any ſenſe of mind that is the fruit of public affection. For, how differently are we affected towards thoſe that do good or hurt to the public from underſtanding and will, and from a general public ſpirit, or public motive,—I ſay, how differently affected are we towards theſe, from what we are towards ſuch inanimate things as the ſun and the clouds, that do good to the public, by enlightning and enlivening beams and refreſhing ſhowers; or mildew, and an overflowing ſtream, that does hurt to the public, by deſtroying the fruits of the earth! Yea, if ſuch a kind of argument be good, it will prove that gratitude and anger cannot ariſe from the united influence of ſelf-love, and public love, or moral ſenſe ariſing from public affection. For, if ſo, why are we not affected towards inanimate things, that are beneficial or injurious both to us and the public, in the ſame manner as to them that are profitable or hurtful to both on choice and deſign, and from benevolence, or malice?
2. On the ſuppoſition of its being indeed ſo, that men love thoſe who love them, & are angry with thoſe who hate them, from the natural influence of ſelf-love; 'tis not at all ſtrange that the author of nature, who obſerves order, uniformity and harmony in eſtabliſhing its laws, ſhould ſo order that it ſhould be natural for ſelf-love to cauſe the mind to be affected differently towards exceedingly different objects; and that it ſhould cauſe our heart to extend itſelf in one manner towards inanimate things, which gratify ſelf-love, without ſenſe or will, and in another manner towards Beings which we look upon as having underſtanding and will, like ourſelves, and exerting theſe faculties in our favor, and promoting our intereſt from love to us. No wonder, ſeeing we love ourſelves, that it ſhould be natural to us to extend ſomething of that ſame kind of love which we have for ourſelves, to them who are the ſame kind of Beings as ourſelves, and comply with the inclinations of our ſelf-love, by expreſſing the ſame ſort of love towards us.
3. IF we ſhould allow that to be univerſal, that in gratitude and anger there is the exerciſe of ſome kind of moral ſenſe (as 'tis granted, there is ſomething that may be ſo called.) All the moral ſenſe, that is eſſential to thoſe affections, is a ſenſe of DESERT; which is to be refer'd to that ſenſe of juſtice, before ſpoken of, conſiſting in an apprehenſion of that ſecondary kind of beauty, that lies in uniformity and proportion: which ſolves all the difficulty in the objection.—This, or ſome appearance of it, to a narrow private view, indeed attends all anger and gratitude. Others love and kindneſs to us, or their ill-will and injuriouſneſs, appears to us to deſerve our love, or our reſentment. Or, in other words, it ſeems to us no other than juſt, that as they love us, and do us good, we alſo ſhould love them, and do them good. And ſo it ſeems juſt, that when others hearts oppoſe us, and they from their hearts do us hurt, our hearts ſhould oppoſe them, and that we ſhould deſire they themſelves may ſuffer in like manner as we have ſuffered: i. e. there appears to us to be a natural agreement, proportion, and adjuſtment between theſe things. Which is indeed a kind of moral ſenſe, or ſenſe of a beauty in moral things. But, as was before ſhewn, it is a moral ſenſe of a ſecondary kind, and is intirely different from a ſenſe or reliſh of the original eſſential beauty of true virtue; and may be without any principle of true virtue in the heart. Therefore doubtleſs 'tis a great miſtake in any to ſuppoſe, all that moral ſenſe which appears and is exerciſed in a ſenſe of deſert, is the ſame thing as a love of virtue, or a diſpoſition and determination of mind to be pleaſed with true virtuous beauty, conſiſting in publick benevolence. Which may be further confirm'd, if it be conſidered that even with reſpect to a ſenſe of juſtice or deſert, conſiſting in uniformity [and agreement between others actions towards us, and our actions towards them, in a way of well-doing, or of ill-doing] 'tis not abſolutely neceſſary to the being of theſe paſſions of gratitude and anger, that there ſhould be any notion of juſtice in them, in any publick or general view of things;—as will appear by what ſhall be next obſerved.
4. THOSE authors, who hold that that moral ſenſe which is natural to all man-kind, conſiſts in a natural reliſh of the beauty of virtue, and ſo ariſes from a principle of true virtue implanted by nature in the hearts of all—they hold that true virtue conſiſts in publick benevolence. Therefore, if the affections of gratitude and anger neceſſarily imply ſuch a moral ſenſe as they ſuppoſe, then theſe affections imply ſome delight in the publick good, and an averſion of the mind to publick evil. And if this were ſo, then every time any man feels anger for oppoſition he meets with, or gratitude for any favour, there muſt be at leaſt a ſuppoſition of a tendency to publick injury in that oppoſition, and a tendency to publick benefit in the favour that excites his gratitude. But how far is this from being true? As, in ſuch inſtances as theſe, which, I preſume, none will deny to be poſſible, or unlike to any thing that ever happens among mankind. A ſhip's crew enter into a conſpiracy againſt the maſter, to murder him, and run away with the ſhip, and turn pirates: but before they bring their matters to a ripeneſs for execution, one of them repents, and opens the whole deſign; whereupon the reſt are apprehended and brought to juſtice. The crew are enraged with him that has betray'd them, and earneſtly ſeek opportunity to revenge themſelves upon him.—And for an inſtance of gratitude, a gang of robbers that have long infeſted the neighbouring country, have a particular houſe whither they reſort, and where they meet from time to time, to divide their booty or prey, and hold their conſultations for carrying on their pernicious deſigns. The magiſtrates and officers of the country, after many fruitleſs endeavours to diſcover their ſecret haunt and place of reſort, at length by ſome means are well informed where it is, and are prepared with ſufficient force to ſurprize them, and ſieze them all, at the place of rendezvous, at an hour appointed when they underſtand they will all be there. A little before the arrival of the appointed hour, while the officers with their bands are approaching, ſome perſon is ſo kind to theſe robbers, as to give them notice of their danger, ſo as juſt to give them opportunity to eſcape. They are thankful to him, and give him a handful of money for his kindneſs.—Now in ſuch inſtances, I think, it is plain, that there is no ſuppoſition of a public injury in that which is the occaſion of their anger; yea, they know the contrary. Nor is there any ſuppoſition of public good in that which excites their gratitude; neither has publick benevolence, or moral ſenſe, conſiſting in a determination to approve of what is for the public good, any influence at all in the affair. And though there be ſome affection, beſides a ſenſe of uniformity and proportion, that has influence in ſuch anger and gratitude, it is not public affection or benevolence, but private affection; yea, that affection which is to the higheſt degree private, conſiſting in a man's love of his own perſon.
5. THE paſſion of anger, in particular, ſeems to have been unluckily choſen as a medium to prove a ſenſe and determination to delight in virtue, conſiſting in benevolence, natural to all mankind.
FOR, if that moral ſenſe which is exerciſed in anger, were that which aroſe from a benevolent temper of heart, being no other than a ſenſe or reliſh of the beauty of benevolence, one would think, a diſpoſition to anger ſhould increaſe, at leaſt in ſome proportion, as a man had more of a ſweet, benign, and benevolent temper: which ſeems ſomething diſagreable to reaſon, as well as contrary to experience, which ſhews that the leſs men have of benevolence, and the more they have of a contrary temper, the more are they diſpoſed to anger and deep reſentment of injuries.
AND though gratitude be that which many ſpeak of as a certain noble principle of virtue, which God has implanted in the hearts of all mankind; and though it be true, there is a gratitude, that is truly virtuous, and the want of gratitude, or an ungrateful temper, is truly vicious, and argues an abominable depravity of heart (as I may have particular occaſion to ſhew afterwards) yet I think, what has been obſerved, may ſerve to convince ſuch as impartially conſider it, not only that not all anger, or hating thoſe which hate us, but alſo that not all gratitude, or loving thoſe which love us, ariſes from a truly virtuous benevolence of heart.
ANOTHER ſort of affections, which may be properly refer'd to ſelf-love, as its ſource, and which might be expected to be the fruit of it, according to the general analogy of nature's laws, is affections to ſuch as are near to us by the ties of nature; that we look upon as thoſe whoſe Beings we have been the occaſions of, and that we have a very peculiar propriety in, and whoſe circumſtances, even from the firſt beginning of their exiſtence, do many ways lead them, as it were neceſſarily, to an high eſteem of us, and to treat us with great dependence, ſubmiſſion and compliance; and whom the conſtitution of the world makes to be united in intereſt, and accordingly to act as one in innumerable affairs, with a communion in each other's affections, deſires, cares, friendſhips, enmities, and purſuits. Which is the caſe of men's affection to their children.—And in like manner ſelf-love will alſo beget in a man ſome degree of affections towards others, with whom he has connection in any degree parallel.—As to the opinion of thoſe that aſcribe the natural affection there is between parents and children, to a particular inſtinct of nature, I ſhall take notice of it afterwards.
AND as men may love perſons and things from ſelf-love, ſo may love to qualities and characters ariſe from the ſame ſource. Some repreſent as though there were need of a great degree of metaphyſical refining, to make it out, that men approve of others from ſelf-love, whom they hear of at a diſtance, or read of in hiſtory, or ſee repreſented on the ſtage, from whom they expect no profit or advantage. But perhaps it is not conſidered, that what we approve of in the firſt place, is the character; and from the character we approve the perſon. And is it a ſtrange thing, that men ſhould from ſelf-love like a temper or character, which in its nature and tendency falls in with the nature and tendency of ſelf-love; and which, we know by experience and ſelf-evidence, without metaphyſical refining, in the general tends to men's pleaſure and benefit?—And on the contrary, ſhould diſlike what they ſee tends to men's pain and miſery?—Is there need of a great degree of ſubtilty and abſtraction, to make it out, that a child, which has heard and ſeen much, ſtrongly to fix an idea, of the pernicious deadly nature of the rattle-ſnake, ſhould have averſion to that ſpecies or form, from ſelf-love; ſo as to have a degree of this averſion and diſguſt excited by ſeeing even the picture of that animal? And that from the ſame ſelf-love it ſhould be pleaſed and entertain'd with a lively figure and repreſentation of ſome pleaſant fruit, which it has often taſted the ſweetneſs of? or, with the image of ſome bird, which, it has always been told, is innocent, and whoſe pleaſant ſinging it has often been entertain'd with?—Though, the child neither fears being bitten by the picture of the ſnake, nor expects to eat of the painted fruit, or to hear the figure of the bird ſing. I ſuppoſe none, will think it difficult to allow, that ſuch an approbation or diſguſt of a child may be accounted for from its natural delight in the pleaſures of taſte and hearing, and its averſion to pain and death, through ſelf-love, together with the habitual connection of theſe agreeable or terrible ideas with the form and qualities of theſe objects, the ideas of which are impreſſed on the mind of the child by their images.
AND where is the difficulty of allowing, that a child or man may hate the general character of a ſpiteful and malicious man, for the like reaſon as he hates the general nature of a ſerpent; knowing, from reaſon, inſtruction and experience, that malice in men is pernicious to mankind, as well as ſpite or poiſon in a ſerpent? And if a man may from ſelf-love diſapprove the vices of malice, envy, and others of that ſort, which naturally tend to the hurt of mankind, why may he not from the ſame principle approve the contrary virtues of meekneſs, peaceableneſs, benevolence, charity, generoſity, juſtice, and the ſocial virtues in general; which, he as eaſily and clearly knows, naturally tend to the good of mankind?
'TIS undoubtedly true, that ſome have a love to theſe virtues from a higher principle. But yet I think it as certainly true, that there is generally in mankind, a ſort of approbation of them, which ariſes from ſelf-love.
BESIDES what has been already ſaid, the ſame thing further appears from this; that men commonly are moſt affected towards, and do moſt highly approve, thoſe virtues which agree with their intereſt moſt, according to their various conditions in life. We ſee that perſons of low condition are eſpecially enamour'd with a condeſcending, acceſſible, affable temper in the great; not only in thoſe whoſe condeſcention has been exerciſed towards themſelves; but they will be peculiarly taken with ſuch a character when they have accounts of it from others, or when they meet with it in hiſtory, or even in romance.—The poor will moſt highly approve and commend liberality.—The weaker ſex, who eſpecially need aſſiſtance and protection, will peculiarly eſteem and applaud fortitude and generoſity in thoſe of the other ſex, they read or hear of, or have repreſented to them on a ſtage.
AS I think it plain from what has been obſerved, that men may approve, and be diſpoſed to commend a benevolent temper, from ſelf-love, ſo the higher the degree of benevolence is, the more may they approve of it. Which will account for ſome kind of approbation, from this principle, even of love to enemies; viz. as a man's loving his enemies is an evidence of a high degree of benevolence of temper;—the degree of it appearing from the obſtacles it overcomes.
AND it may be here obſerved, that the conſideration of the tendency and influence of ſelf-love may ſhew, how men in general may approve of juſtice from another ground, beſides that approbation of the ſecondary beauty there is in uniformity and proportion, which is natural to all. Men from their infancy ſee the neceſſity of it, not only that it is neceſſary for others, or for human ſociety; but they find the neceſſity of it for themſelves, in inſtances that continually occur: which tends to prejudice them in its favor, and to fix an habitual approbation of it from ſelf-love.
AND again, that forementioned approbation of juſtice and deſert, ariſing from a ſenſe of the beauty of natural agreement and proportion, will have a kind of reflex, and indirect influence to cauſe men to approve benevolence, and diſapprove malice; as men ſee that he who hates and injures others, deſerves to be hated and puniſhed, and that he who is benevolent, and loves others, and does them good, deſerves himſelf alſo to be loved & rewarded by others, as they ſee the natural congruity or agreement and mutual adaptedneſs of theſe things. And having always ſeen this, malevolence becomes habitually connected in the mind with the idea of being hated and puniſhed, which is diſagreable to ſelf-love; and the idea of benevolence is habitually connected and aſſociated with the idea of being loved and rewarded by others, which is grateful to ſelf-love. And by virtue of this aſſociation of ideas, benevolence itſelf becomes grateful, and the contrary diſpleaſing.
SOME vices may become in a degree odious by the influence of ſelf-love, thro' an habitual connection of ideas of contempt with it; contempt being what ſelf-love abhors. So it may often be with drunkenneſs, gluttony, ſottiſhneſs, cowardice, ſloth, niggardlineſs.—The idea of contempt becomes aſſociated with the idea of ſuch vices, both becauſe we are uſed to obſerve that theſe things are commo… objects of contempt, and alſo find that they excite contempt in ourſelves.—Some of them appear marks of …, i. e. of ſmall abilities, and weakneſs of mind, and inſufficiency for any conſiderable effects among mankind.—By others, men's influence is contracted into a narrow ſphere, and by ſuch means perſons become of leſs importance, and more inſignificant among mankind. And things of little importance are naturally little accounted of.—And ſome of theſe ill qualities are ſuch as mankind find it their intereſt to treat with contempt, as they are very hurtful to human ſociety.
THERE are no particular moral virtues whatſoever, but what in ſome or other of theſe ways, & moſt of them in ſeveral of theſe ways, come to have ſome kind of approbation from ſelf love, without the influence of a truly virtuous principle; nor any particular vices, but what by the ſame means meet with ſome diſapprobation.
THIS kind of approbation and diſlike, thro' the joint-influence of ſelf-love and aſſociation of ideas, is in very many vaſtly heightned by education; as this is the means of a ſtrong, cloſe, and almoſt irrefragable aſſociation, in innumerable inſtances, of ideas which have no connexion any other way than by education; and of greatly ſtrengthning that aſſociation, or connexion, which perſons are led into by other means: as any one would be convinced, perhaps more effectually than in moſt other ways, if they had opportunity of any conſiderable acquaintance with American ſavages and their children.