A Sum of Moral Philosophy, Part 5 – Part 6
V. Things required to temporall Happinesse.
HAppinesse is a Vertue common not for our selues only, but for the good of others.
An happy mans imployment must be beneficence: his reward esteeme and credit among the people.Tria bono…um genera req…irun… ad …elicitatem.
That he may be best in performance, and highest repute, he must hauehave the goods of
Minde.
Body.
Fortune.
The mind as most inward, so affordeth goods most proper to felicity; A man for morall goodnesse is to be iudged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not ouermuch to bee desired, yet if offered they are to be receaued; we take them for continency, not necessity, as vsefull to set forth our Vertues both to the good and view of others.
Riches and the goods of Fortune serue for the weale of the body, the body for the soule, the soule for God. foreign.
Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods inward: they make not a man happy, but adorne him; they giuegive his luster, not his being.
The thing that makes happinesse properly and principally is vertue; yet Fortune must grace it; as the Stones & Timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, before we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. Seneca.
Vertue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Counsell, though his vnderlings be rebellious; Hee is able to keepe him in guard, though abroad there be mutinies; Hee may bee happy in himselfe in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can beare, if a greater weight should be laid vponupon him, and can suffer cold, though in the interim his teeth chatter.
An happy man vseth ill fortune, as a good Captaine bad armes, though vnframable, yet vsing them according to art military, or as a skilfull craftsman shewing his art on a shooe of bad leather, both may doe well, but better, if their meanes were better.
The goods of the mind are either
1 Wit for iudging.
2 Will for choosing, what we hauehave iudged.
3 Power for prosecuting what we hauehave chosen.
4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions,
Habits are the lowest gifts of the minde.
1 They are gotten by vse and custome, the other art naturall.
2 They worke on passions, whose grounds is sense.
The other are without sense, sith
1 Prosecution
2 Choice.
3 Iudgement
4 Power
5 Wit.
6 Will.
are inseparate substances.
Habits are only for the corporall.
Their kinds are
Intellectuall,
Morall.
The intellectuall, some by doctrine, & instinction, and are 5, to wit,
1 Vnderstanding for contēplatiō
2 Science for contēplatiō
3 Sapience. for contēplatiō
4 Prudence. for action,
5 Arte for action,
The morall come by vse, and custome, viz
If ruling passion, it is Vertue.
If ruled by it, it is Vice.
Their properties are
1 To be begotten by vsus.
2 Being gotten long to continue with vsus.
Qualitas acquisita difficultèr mobilis.
The difference betwixt the worke of nature, and of manners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the action, as first we hauehave the power of laughing, before the act: Manners are first in action, then in habit.
The goods of the Body are
1 Health.
2 Strength.
3 Grace of person.
Though Vertue could appeare in deformity, yet it is more honourable in a comely personage; as the Ruby planted in Iron hath his luster, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.
The goods of fortune are
1 Wealth.
2 Worth of birth.
3 Reputation and credit.
4 Friends.
5 Goods of Posterity.
1 Goods either in
Money.
Goods.
Lands.
The vse and end
1 For necessity principall.
2 Then for pleasure
1 Not of pampering.
2 But of recreation.
It is requisite for pourveiance: Poverty and Want are repining: necessity of hauing armeth to Importunity and impudency in procuring: Thence the beggers life, though most to be pittied for want, yet deserues least favour for their boldnesse. The Pythagoreans would hauehave an happy man wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like over-much light, it quels the eye-sight. That wee must wish for no more prosperity, then may fit vsus for action, as the Pilot takes not the shippe of most weight, but of most convenience for coasting: That the evills of much prosperity are greater, then they of adversity; as in the body superfluities worke more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as affliction compells our minde; so height of wealth puffes it vp, and empties it: Hence we see the rich often iniurious and incroaching: A happy man by wisdome prevents these.
2 Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there be no staine of blood. Low birth deiects the minde.
Bastardy is dishonourable, as debarring inheritance to the common rites of a Citizen.
Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child, as Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly giuen, gaue this the reason of it, that surely his father was drunken, when he begot him: Contrarily it was Diophantes brag, that he could prevaile in any demand with the Athenians, sith his father Themistocles could doe so before him.
3 Reputation is either viz: in
Height of place, as preferments.
Good opinion of our fellow Cittizens.
1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd gouernours come in rather by intention then right: Optimates is an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry thēselues, that Sud consilia optimo cui{que} debentur: They are defined by Tully, Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, Cicero pro Sextio.nec naturâ improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti: Hence hee ranges even rusticks and trades-men, so they be honest.
The reason may be, the ground of evill society must be religion, and justice; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evill doers, nor reward for the well deseruing. Wealth and Power make a Society spracke, and passable, but iustice informes, and acts it: This is as the soule to quicken it, that as the Organe to vent and spread it: Hence the right of gouernance principally is due to the best in life.
2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Vertuous.
It opens it selfe in
Words
Works
of service.
Three things breed in a man credit
Wisdome.
Honesty.
LoueLove and kindnesse.Arist. 2. Rhet.
The speciall of these is Honesty: for a man truely honest hath that wisdome, that he can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his louelove is such, that he will labour to benefit all, and iniurie none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it selfe into praise for actions extraordinary, into honour, glory and admiring: honour and admiration ascends vpward, and is the title due to the extreame point of goodnesse: We yeeld it to things of most distance, & farthest out of our compasse: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the persons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore Pythagoras boasted he had got his good by Philosophy, that he had learned to wonder at nothing, sith admiration proceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of iudgement.
As in Nature there is excesse and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also.
Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envy.
In vicina versamur invidiâ, simplicius longe posita miramur
Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to vertue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good he exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himselfe: Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: Non vt optimis par sit, sed vt malis melior.
Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: it admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may bee given and taken of equalls: Glory is for a superiour onelyonly; praise recants downe-wards to conferre with defects, and after conference to extoll the better deserts of the other: Glory admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.
Hence Felicitas bonum
Honorable.
Non laudabile.
4 Goods of posterity as of
Children
Kindred
somewhat to be respected of an happy man.
It followes him after death as a complement of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary happen.
5 Friends are requisite to happinesse partly for
Vse.
Comfort.
1 For vse, sith a man cannot rely vponupon the purchase of his owne hands only, but he often requires an helpe: Management of things are sundry, and sith they must each hauehave their severall dispatch, they cannot so well be compassed by one.
2 For comfort, sith a man is pliable to vtter himselfe to some one of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in revealing them. —Strangulat inclusus dolor. Againe our nature abandoneth solitarinesse: Presence of friends keepes vsus from feeding on our owne hearts, like Bellepheron in the wildernesse.
Ipse suum cor edens hominum vestigia vitat.
To friendship three things are required,
1 Virtus, vt pulchrum.
2 Consuetudo, vt iucundum.
3 Ʋsus, vt necessarium.
Vertue the ground, that must b…gin it.
Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.
Vse and helpe, that must shew, vtter and exercise it.
As it is the prop and stay of mans life, and followes immediatly from the sociablenesse of his nature, so it relies on three goods
The end of all appetites
Bonum honestum.
Bonum vtile.
Bonum iucundum.
Friends must not be
suddenly gotten.
many in multitude.
1 Suddaine friends hauehave but small root of louelove.
It was Zeuxis answere when hee was reprehended for sloe painting, that hee must bestowe time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue for ever. Observance of their passions and qualities must precede, before we enter to cl…se with them.
1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to vsus.
2 Whether they incroach not too fast into our acquaintance, for towardnesse of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so lesse intire, or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.
2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channell must hauehave many shallowes, that is cut into sundry streames. One bragged to Chilo, that he knewe not many his enimies: he replied that by that he knewe not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenure precise, and proper to one, not to bee enlarged to multitudes: Agesilaus would vse all in courtesie, but he was familiar and friendly but to few.
The Giant that had 50 bellies, was faine to hauehave an 100 hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly hauehave but two hands. Amicitia tantum inter dues.
Men of worth hauehave many fellowes, few friends.
Friendship is when they follow principally for Vertue.
When they follow for goods outward
Countenance.
Power.
1 Countenance: It is greatnesse of retinue vsefull to men of place. In pace decus, in bello praesidium.
2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselues, depresse their adversaries. In gouerment it is good to vse men of one ranke equally: for to countenance some extraordinarily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In favour it is best to vse men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more carefull, and the rest more officious.
VI. The Stoicks tenent of Happinesse.
HAppinesse being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him, nothing so worthy of him as vertue. It proceeds immediatly from his soule, as pertaking both of wit and will.
Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be styled
Vertuous.
Happy.
To liue according to vertue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The Reasons are three.
1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose worke is for the best, and vertue is naught but the perfection of God.
2 Man by nature an image of God, as Vertue and Goodnesse flowes immediatly from the one, so ought from the other.
3 Our soule hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and will of Good: the conioyning of both is mans nature, which of it selfe must both iudge and affect true good: this only is vertue. Vertue is tearmed by them any speciall action proper to any speciall nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature actiue, and vertuous: As things are most materiall, so are they lesse quicke: Hence soules are most vertuous, and this vertue is their felicitie.