A Sum of Moral Philosophy, Part 2 – Part 4
II, Of Particular Ends.
NO Action so suddaine, but proposeth some end: As actions are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite affects them as either in shew or substance good.Omnia apperunt Bonum.
Desire naturally is for preservation; Evill as it is evill is an enimie to being: Hence the ayme of all Appetite must bee some good Appetites are either
1 Naturall, as common Inclinations to a genenerall good of being: as for the Earth to beare downewards, the fire vpwards,
2 Sensitiue called appetitus sensitivus, whose issues are, to wit
Griefe for things to to be avoided.
2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted.
3 Rationall, partly from the Vnderstanding, that iudges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.
Hence ariseth three sorts of Good, viz.
1 Bonum Entis: The obiect proper to the naturall.
2 Bonum sensus: Whose satisfactiō is delight.
3 Bonum Moris: Whose manager is Reason.
If reason be gouernesse, we apprehend true good.
If lead by Passion, we follow appearances.
Passion sets a colour on Evill, & perswades the good of it.
Hence are all vitious desires.
Our way for such obiects is with Annibal to beare the gilded pillars in Iuno's Temple,Cic. 1. Divin. before we venter to feast on them.
— Ʋerispeciem dignoscere calle
Ne qua sub arato mendosum timeat auro.
Things are desired, either as
1 Vsefull only to others, not for themselues, so riches in themselues are nothing, but are desired for vse only.
2 Vsefull both for others, & desirable in themselues: so Virtues of themselues are comely, and are as meanes to happinesse.
3 Desirable only for themselues, not for others as felicity the last good, foreign, finis finium.
That we often fayle of the end intended, is for the want of either
1 Iudgen ent in choice of the right meanes.
2 Ability in not prosecuting that we hauehave chosen.
3 Constancie in not persevering in what wee hauehave chosen, and began to prosecute.
The excellency of one end aboue another is knowne,
1 If that end hauehave the most worthy meanes directing to it
Hence the end of Policy is aboue others as hauing the meanes of other Practick ends subalternate to it.
2 If it comprehend the speciall end intended by actions of lesse worth, as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military.
Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.
Felicity is the best of ends: our soule affecteth it: Vertues worke it: Constancy in goodnesse perfects it: It selfe is the vp-shot of all practicke ends.
III. Of Ʋniversall Ends. Felicity.
FElicity is the proposall of the best good.
We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgement: Passion goes by opinion, an as opinion is staggering, so must such proposals be. Hence, to some pleasure, to others wealth, to others honour is Felicity; all are pleasures for the time, but content not.
This Felicity is not true, but forged.
True felicity is from an vprightnesse of judgement.
That we may finde it out, seeke we what in a man can be Of
1 Greatest perfection.
2 Sole sufficiencie.
3 Quietnesse of minde.
1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the best goods.
2 Sole sufficiency that there be
1 Contentation in what we enioy
2 No want of what wee enioy not
This keeps vsus from repining.
3 Quiet of mind that there bee
1 Integrity towards God.
2 True dealing with men Body or fortune
3 Not doting on the goods of Body or fortune
4 Stopping extravagancy of passions.
But vsing them alwaies as helps not as ends.
A breach in any of these marres tranquillity.
In a man we consider a double carriage, either as
1 Liuing in this life only Morall.
2 Preparing himselfe for a future life, Christian.
Hence Stoicks and Platonickes held, we were free of two Citties
1 The greater,—Heaven.
2 The lesser, —The World.
This world as it beares the image of the Heauenly, and is the way of our iournying thither: So the actions of the one truely morall, are not in opposition to the Christian Each of these liues hauehave in their end
1 Greatest perfection.
2 Sole sufficiency.
3 Truest quietnesse of minde.
The felicity of the one is presence of all good, when the soule is separated.
The meanes to get this generall is Religion.
The felicity of the other is presence of all good, whilst we liue.
The meanes to get it, is common honestie, or vniversall justice.
Liuing in this world our worke is either in
Soule only.
Soule and Body.
The worke of our soule only is immanent.
The perfection of it is contemplation.
The obiect and ayme of it is Truth.
The satisfaction is content and quietnesse of minde.
The meanes to attaine it, is Sapience and Pondering.
That is an habit generally wrought by two particulars
1 Vnderstanding for conceit, and apprehension of principles.
2 Science for inference of conclusions.
This true felicity, sith in it is
1 True perfection,
2 Sole sufficiencie,
3 Quietnesse of mind
is tearmed Felicitas contemplatiua.
Our worke both in Soule and Body is transient, so called because the action of the soule were secret were it not, that the spreading of the body displaied it: The operations of the soule properly are punctuall and indiuisible: As they partake of the body, so they open themselues both to the view, and vse of others: Hence arise actions of practise, their speciall ayme is the good of others,Homo animal politicum. and sith we are not for our selues only, but to be vsefull to others, & society arises out of community of nature our speciall felicity, for vse must bee practicke.
Felicitas Practica.
There are two speciall Felicities then.
As sinne and vice being in all a double misery
1 Darknesse of vnderstanding for discerning truth.
2 Depravation of will for affecting goodnesse.
So to remedy these our perfection must be
Contemplatiue for the one.
Practicke for the other.
These come not of the strength of men, sith the blind cannot iudge of colours, the perverse cannot will goodnesse.
They are giuen of God, if any gift comes from aboue to man, saith Aristotle; foreign.
It is most fit it should bee our felicity, foreign.
The sterne to manage these must be faith.
Without it
Contemplation is curiosity.
Good actions but fashion, & vaine-glory
This is the aime of the heathen goodnesse.
With it
Contemplation is wisdome.
Action is
1 Duty to God.
2 Charity to our neighbour
3 Salvation to our selues.
This alone is mans felicity.
IV. Temporall happinesse described.
Felicita… est Actio.THe perfection of things is in their operation: Idlenesse, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.
To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,
In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.
Actions is a power common to all; communities commend not, sith commendation aymes at a speciall, and preferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a speciall action of man, that proceeds from the soule not as it is vegetatiue,Animi. and sensitiue (so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rationall, only proper to man.
In the reasonable Soule we consider two parts, the one
Governing.Secundum Virtutem.
Governed.
The governing part is by
Wit,
Will regulating our soules actions, and stopping their vnwarrantable excurrence: This called Recta Ratio, or Virtus.
The part to be gouerned is the seat of Passions.
Though they naturally sprout from the stemme of reason, and are proper to men only, yet in themselues they are wild and vnruly, but strength of reason must order them, Our perfection is not
in the latter which must obey.
but in the former, which must gouerne.
Reasons in strength and actions of Vertue are nothing,In vita p…rfecta. vnlesse they are continued: Perfection of good must bee with out Ruptures: The intercedents of an after evill marres the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must be a worke of honesty to the end of our daies.
This felicity ends with our life, and therefore temporall.
The other beginnes after death, and is eternall.