A Sum of Moral Philosophy, Part 7 – Part 8
VII. Of Passions in generall.
PAssions are the matter of Vertue.Materia Virtutis.
They are the nailes, that fasten soule and body together.
In them we note their
1 Rising and increase.
2 Issues and consequence.
3 Prevention and stopping.
Their rising partly from
1 The soules nature.
2 The occurrences of obiects.
The soule growes in passion
1 Not by the vnderstanding part.
2 But by the sensitiue part, which
1 Iudgeth a Truth.
2 Induceth a colour of Truth.
The sensitiue works for passion
Abroad by the fiue outward senses.
Within by the imagination or fancy.
The worke of the phantasie is to resume what the memory hath retained, and the common sense iudged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.
These appearances goe masked vnderunder the habit of
Truth.
Good.
If of truth, they perswade a weak vnderstanding & so breed, viz.
1 Curiosity
2 Folly
3 Giddines
and hence are
1 Hereticks.
2 Poets
3 Fond studēts.
these erre in the Theory.
If of good they perswade a weake will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and erre in the practike: That which makes a fancy ventrous & resolued in these collections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soule, and as phantasie is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.
Hence arise the tenents against the Stoickes.
1 Passions are a naturall part of the soule.
2 They may be moderated well from their excurrence, but cannot be throughly barred of their existence in vsus.
3 They are not in themselues evill, but in their degrees.
4 They are often profitable, and meanes to further vertue, as feare teaches vsus to avoid evill, selfe-louelove to prosecute our good, Mercy and pitty teaches a King: Clemency and anger wheteth our valour.
5 Their excesse is not positiuely evill, but vponupon circumstances, as with my friend I may be angry for his fault, but bee reconciled againe: with my foe I may be more implacable.
6 Though strengthned by opinion, yet not proceeding from without vsus, but naturall apprehensions within.
7 In a man two parts
Vnderstanding
Sense
both in reluctance to the other.
1 Vnderstanding takes the good of most worth for honestie.
Hence ariseth conscience, or foreign.
2 Sense takes the good of most
Pleasure.
Profit
hence are passions.
The will hath two inclinations to follow, either
Reason, or
Sense.
In iudgement we often condemne, what in passion wee prosecute.
—Video meliora, probo{que}.
Deteriora sequor—
obiects that moue our phantasie are
Evills to be avoided.
Goods to be followed.
The ground that perswades our soule to appehend these obiects, is selfe-louelove.
This as it is
1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man.
2 Ruled by Sense is bad: and nurseth passions.
It may be defined,—An inordinate inclination of the affecting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason.
The issues of passions are
Generall.
Speciall,
1 The Generall are.
1 Rebellion against reason.
2 Division in themselues.
3 Insatiable in their extent.
4 Importunate for action. Hence they worke headinesse, and suddaine resolution.
5 Desirous of things
1 Foolish.
2 Inconvenient,
3 Impossible.
6 Inconstancy of prosecution.
2 The speciall are.
1 Driuing the body to distemper by
1 Raising the humors.
2 Altering the Complexion.
3 Forecing new motions.
As in feare the blood chilleth, in anger boyles, in griefe the heart closeth, in ioy opens.
2 Blinding the Iudgement; The Reason is,
The Vnderstanding receiues her notice from the fancyes impression: which befriending Passion representeth often to the Iudgement not true and reall, but apparent and conceited shapes.
3 Perverting our will.
The will inclines oftner to passion, then Iudgement, because passion is giuen more to choice and liberty.
The Iudgement is precise and setled to one part.
The prevention of passions is to
Discouer
Temper
them
1 Discouery is had,
1 From the vse of company; as Augustus judged of his two daughters Iulia and Livia, finding one delighted to converse with graue men, the other with yongsters; pronounced the one staid, the other light.
2 From the view of complections; as the Cholericke breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure, slegme, sloth; melancholy, sadnesse.
3 From the vse of talke, as if it be
1 Suddaine.
2 Often.
3 Personally impeaching.
4 Censuring.
2 To discouer our selues obserue we what our enimies speake of vsus. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in vsus, when our selues are blinded with selfe-louelove.
After the discouery ou… Passions must be tempered.
The temper of them must be reason, and wisdome checking the sence, and stopping the Excurrence of Phantasie.
Men by reason teach birds to speake, dogs to hunt, horses to curveat, though sense perswade the contrary.
And we discharge our selues of the meat wee hauehave eaten with pleasure, when we heare it was polluted or forbidden.
The way to temper them is not to roote out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their motion, but their skips: and Lycurgus should not so much cut downe the vines ro barre drunkennesse, as hauehave planted cesterns of water to hauehave allayed the heat thereof. It was Zeno his saying of musicall instruments, that euen barren wood & dead guts would speake, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.
Wisedome must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they ouer-grow.
Our waies to slacke them are,
1 To bend to the other extreame; as if my sight be scattered by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black obiect: And Epamminandas way to stop his surfet on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draught of Vineger.
2 Abstinence from things hurtfull, though lawfull.
3 Stop all occasions, that are motiues to set passion on head.
4 Barre selfe conceits, and fancifull apprehensions.
5 Yeeld not to inconstancy and fleeting.
6 Labour to mortifie the Flesh.
If passion be too violent, that we cannot slack it, our labour must be,
1 To stay execution; As Archytas professed to his baylife that carelesly kept his ground, that were he not angry, hee would tell him part of his minde: And Plato would not himselfe beat his man, while he was moued, but gaue him vp to Spensippus to be handled by him.
2 To conceale it in what we may; for it breeds disrespect, if wee open our yeelding to it: this made Plutarch to be vpbraided by his servant, when he could not dissemble his anger that it was a shame for him to be angry, sith he had written a booke to the contrary.
A man (saith Plato) is sometimes his owne lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his owne vassall, when sence and passion.
VIII The division and number of Passions.
THe bent and aime of all passions are either,
The gaining of a good:
The avoidance of evill.
Good & evill are gained avoided by 2 inclinations of the soule
1 The concupiscible that affects.
2 The irascible that prosecuts & venters on what we affect.
Both these hauehave their obiects
Good.
Evill.
The attainment of the
Good breeds pleasure.
Evill breeds griefe.
Thence
Pleasure
Griefe
are the heads of all passion.
The passions aiming at good are either
1 LoueLove.
2 Desire.
3 Hope.
4 Boldnesse.
5 Pleasure.
The good presented is affected first by
LoueLove
Desire
these proceed from the concupiscible,
Then it is prosecuted for attainment by
Hope
Boldnesse
these proceede out of the …rascible.
Then being attained there resorts pleasure: this only for the good present, the other for the Good absent.
The passions aiming at the avoidance of evell are.
1 Hate opposite to louelove.
2 Abomination or detesting, opposite to desire being but the vehemence or high degree of hate, as desire is of LoueLove,
3 Despaire opposite to hope.
4 Feare to boldnesse.
5 Paine or Griefe the Issue of all, when the evill is in presence.
As
Goods
Evills
come
Nearer or
further of
their attainment, so they partake more or lesse
Pleasure of
Griefe,
These 10 Passions are simple, seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone, or Griefe alone,
There are seauen mixt passions.
These worke either
on our selues.
or on others.
1 They that worke on our selues are 2.
1 Shamefastnesse
2 Repentance mixt of
1 Feare for infamy.
2 Sorrow for fault.
3 Desire of Amendment
2 They that worke on others, are either
for them
or against them.
1 For them are 2.
3 Pitty whose obiect is the evill of another, which wee would hauehave remoued.
Mixt of
Griefe for the evills befalling
Desire for the removall of them.
4 Zeale, conceaved in the behalfe of one we louelove.
Mixt of
1 Griefe for the wrongs done.
2 Anger against the party wronging.
3 LoueLove to the party wronged.
4 Boldnesse to right him in what we may.
The passions that worke against another either
In thought only.
Or in deed.
1 In thought, 1.
5 Iealousy or suspition mixt with
Griefe.
Anger.
Feare.
Hate.
2 In deed, 2.
6 Anger mixt with either
1 Griefe for wrongs.
2 Hate against the party wronging.
3 Desire of revenge.
4 Boldnesse in venturing.
7 Maligning: this is different from anger, sith anger is moued vponupon wrong done: This without that motiue: only because it is well with another.
This containes
Envy muttering at anothers good.
foreign, ioying at others fall.
The former mixt of
Hate
Griefe.
Desire of falling.
The latter of
Hate.
Ioy for the Evill fallen.
This of Passions in generall.