Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 3 – Chapter 5
CHAP. III. The ſame Argument further proſecuted and examined, in this and the enſuing Chapters.
IN the next Chapter he ſhewes, That if we make the Ʋnderſtanding and Truth to be One, (which I ſuppoſe will be eaſily granted; there being but few or none which make the Soule, the Underſtanding, and Reaſon (that is, Truth) to be Three diſtinct things:) then will it be eaſie to find theſe three Requiſites: For thus Light or Truth is Diſpenſed; By the Father of Light; and hath for its Recipient, the whole Reaſonable creature, conſisting of Body and Soule. All which I admit, (as likewiſe will thoſe that be his greateſt adverſaries:) onelyonly with this Proviſo, That he make the entire Reaſonable creature to be ſubjectum Denominationis, and not ſubjectum Inhaeſionis, to Reaſon or Truth.
Next, he ſpends ſome time to clear this, How the whole Reaſonable Creature can be ſaid to be the Recipient; which labour, in my judgement, might have been ſpared: For I cannot ſee any reaſon to fear, but that it will as eaſily be granted, that the Reaſonable Creature may be the Subject of Reaſon; as that the Ayr illuminate is the ſubject of Light: without any fear of Identity in the Thing Received with the Recipient.
But it ſeems his Lordſhip ſpeaks of another kind of Recipiency beſide the Recipiency of a Subject: Such a kind of Recipiency as where the Recipiens and Receptum be the ſame. No Being (ſaith he) but it is the thing Receiving and Received: For conſider any Individuall Being you pleaſe, Vegetative or Rationall, or what you will; Who is it that entertaineth this Being, but the Being it ſelfe which is entertained? Who is it that receiveth from the Womb of Eternity that reaſonable creature, but the creature received?
You may diſtinguiſh them thus, The Recipiency of a Being, and the Recipiency of a Form: And ſo, the Fountain or Efficient, dat Eſſe, and dat Habere. In the firſt kind of Giving and Receiving, the Recipient and the thing Received muſt of neceſſity be the ſame; Thus the Efficient or Producer of Light, dat Lucido ESSE Lucidum, dat Luci Eſſe Lucem, not dat Lucido eſſe Lucem. But in the ſecond it is otherwiſe, not dat Lucido HABERE Lucidum, nor Luci HABERE Lucem, but Lucido Habere Lucem. Thus the Efficient or Fountain of Reaſon, dat Rational… Eſſe Rationalem, Habere Rationem.
(But how his Marginall note ſtands good, viz. That in all things the Agent and the Patient must be One, becauſe The thing Receiving and Received are One, I cannot conceive; For thus he makes God and the Reaſonable creature to be One: For, if I miſtake no…, the Fountain or Efficient is the Agent, and the Recipient the Patient.)
And indeed he muſt of neceſſity admit this diſtinction of Recipiency: For otherwiſe his Fundamentall Axiom would have failed. For if we allow no Recipiency, but the Recipiency of a Subject, whereby it receives or entertains a▪ Form▪ It will not be Univerſall… true, That to the conſtitution of every Being, there muſt be the three Requiſites formerly mentioned. For Subſtantiae non ſunt in ſubjecte; Compleat Subſtances are not communicated or imparted To a Subject Receiving (a…d ſo would want a Recipient,) but are onelyonly made to Be, and to be the Subject Receiving other things.
But … deſire his Lordſhip to conſider, Whether, admitting ſuch a Reception, wherein every thing is its own Recipient; he do not lay open ſo wide a gap, that his adverſaries may make an Eſcape; and Himſelfe break that Net wherein his Adverſary ſhould have been taken? Whether, in anſwering an Objection, he doe not overthrow his principall Argument? For how eaſie is it to ſay, That Truth, though it be neither Soule, Intellect, nor Reaſon; Yet it is a Faculty (or what you will) Proceeding from God, and its own Recipient. And ſo, though they imagine an hundred Faculties in the Soule, one dependent upon another; yet they ſhall never be put to a ſtraight to find either a Fountain or a Recipient: For God, of neceſſity, muſt be the Fountain of all Being whatſoever (either mediatè or immediatè;) And that Being whatſoever it is, ſhall be its own Recipient. Therfore the Soule (in this ſenſe) hath not the Body for its Recipient; neither did God communicate or beſtow a living Soule upon Adam's earthly Body, when he breathed into it the breath of Life: But he gave To the Soule, to Be a Soul. Neither is the Soule a Recipient to the Underſtanding, Nor It to Reaſon, no… any of theſe to Truth, (if they be diſtinct things:) But each of theſe their own Recipient. Neither (laſtly) is the entire Reaſonable Creature a Recipient of Truth or Reaſon (as he would have it) But Truth is its own Recipient. And then muſt he hold his hand from Concluding as he doth in the Cloſe of this Chapter, That the totum exiſtens conſiſting of Matter and Form: the Reaſonable creature, is the Recipient of this Truth: Except he will ſay, Veritas eſt Animal rationale, & Animal rationale est Veritas▪
But how, the Ignorance of this Point ſhould give the ground to that Question, whether the Soule or the Body be Contentum; (which he admoniſheth us of) I cannot ſee. For though it be granted, that Every thing be its own Contentum; yet this difficulty remaineth as firm as before. For, Is not Water its own Contentum: Is not the Veſſell alſo its own Contentum? Yet he will not deny, but that (in another ſenſe) the Water is contained in the Veſſell; nor can he ſay, That the Veſſell is contained in the Water: So though the Soule and Body be either of them their own Contentum and Recipient (quia datur Animae▪ ut ſit Ani…a; datur Corpori, ut ſit Corpus:) Yet that the one may not be Locu… ▪ and the other Locatum; one the Subject, and the other an Adjunct (which is the meaning of that Queſtion) will not from hence appear.
CHAP. IV. Whether the Ʋnderſtanding, faculty may not be the Recipient of Truth.
IN the 4. Chapter he proceeds, further to ſhew, That the Ʋnderſtanding cannot … this Recipient. And if he ſpeak of ſuch a Recipiency as where the Recipient and the Receptum be the ſame; his Adverſaries, that ſay, Truth and the Underſtanding to be diſtinct, will contend for this as well as He: For neither will They ſay, datur Intellectu… ſe eſſe Rationem, nor datur Rationi ut ſit Intellectus. But if he ſpeak of the Re…ipiency of a Subject, I ſee not from what hath yet been ſaid, why the Underſtanding (if diſtinct) may not be the Subject of Reaſon; why they may not ſay, Datur Intellectui Habere Rationem: Since it is granted in Logi…k, That one Accident may be the immediate Subject, though not the Ʋltimate Subject of another. And ſo, if any will have the Soul the Intellect, and Truth or Reaſon, to be tria diſtincta: They muſt ſay, The Intellect is the immediate Subject of Reaſon, and the Soule the Ʋltimate. And then call the Underſtanding either a Quality, a Faculty, or Virtus quâ, it is no great matter; (we will not contend with his Lordſhip for the name.) For Virtus quâ i… but a Faculty, and a Faculty, (or po…tia naturalis) is the ſecond ſpecies of Quality.
CHAP. V. Whether the Soule and Truth in the Soule, be one.
THe like Anſwer muſt be given to that in the 5. Chapter, Whether the Soule (without an intervenient Faculty) may not be the Recipient of Truth? For we cannot ſay, Datur Animae ut ſit Veritas; except we agree to make the Soule and Reaſon one: But we may ſay Datur Animae ut ſit Subjectum veritatis, or Subjectum Rationis, though we …old them diſtinct. As may appeare at large by what I have ſaid upon the ſecond Chapter.
That which is further added in this Chapter, whether as a Su…ſive to inforce this, or as a New Argument▪ viz. That our Soule reſembles God, who is Ʋnus & ſimplex actus, and therefore it ſelfe muſt be ſimple in its Operations▪ and we muſt not expect firſt an Eſſence, and then a Faculty whereby it worketh, &c. may as well be urged, to prove, That our Soule and Body are the ſame, becauſe Man was made after Gods Image, who is …nus & ſimplex, not conſiſting of Parts. Or (if you inſtance particularly in the Soule) It may as well follow, That we know not one thing (ſucceſſively) After another, nor (diſcurſively) By another; but by One entire Act like God, becauſe the Soule bears the Image of God, and Ʋnitas (which I grant not) is formalis ratio Dei.
That which is laſtly added, concerning a Reſemblance of the Trinity, in Truth thus underſtood: Is no way peculiar to this acceptation of Truth; But holds as well in every degree of Being whatſoever. All Entity or Being, As it lieth involved in the Originall▪ Fountain of Being, which is Gods Eſſence, may repreſent patrem intelligentem; As it deſcends from above, filium intellectum; As it is received in the Creature, and maketh it to Be, ſpiritum dilectum.
And thus I have ſurveyed his Lordſhips reaſons to prove, the Soule and Truth to be One. Underſtanding by Truth, or Light, the Light of Reaſon; which is the Originall or actus …rimus, from whence Rationall Operations doe proceed; And therefore muſt needs be the firſt of thoſe Nations of Truth laid down in his firſt Chapter.
And, that it cannot be any other acceptation of Truth, that is here meant, is very apparent; If we look upon the other acceptations of Truth; which we ſhall find to be no way conſonant either with his Method or his Arguments. For if you conſider of Truth underſtood, or the Idea of Truth entertained in the Mind by actuall Apprehenſion; This will have no Being, either in the Underſtanding, or elſewhere, till ſuch time as the Underſtanding it ſelfe frames this Conceptus: But (as ye…) we have nothing to doe with the Operations of the …tellect▪ (For he proceeds not to conſider the Operations or Effects of the Reaſonable Soule, till he come to the 10. Chapter▪) But with ſomething ante… dent them, which is the Fountain from whence theſe Operations doe proceed; which can be no other but Reaſon. Yea, himſelfe affirms it in this 5. Chapter, pag. 23.) And likewiſe that acceptation of Truth, for the Truth either of Being, or of Cognoſcibility, in the Object hath no conjunction with the Underſtanding, till it be actually underſtood: And, even Then, we cannot make it to be One with the Underſtanding, except we make thoſe things to be One, which have neither coexiſtence of Place, nor coexiſtence of Time; For thoſe things may be underſtood, which were many thouſand Yeares paſt, and many thouſand Miles diſtant.