Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 2
CHAP. II. A ſecond Argument (from the three Requiſites to every Being) examined.
IN the ſecond Chapter, he propoſeth firſt the Opinion of thoſe that ſtile the Underſtanding a Faculty, whereby the Soule receiveth or entertaineth Truth, and Acteth accordingly.
But here his Lordſhip (if I miſtake not) varieth from his former acceptation of Truth; Comparing it not to the Innate Light, or power of Seeing, in the Eye; but to the Advenient Light, which ſtreames to it through the Ayr, bringing with it the Idea, or viſible Species, of the Object ſeen. For, ſoon after, he calls it, thoſe ſweet beams of Light which beat upon us continually; which cannot be meant of any innate Light, but of an advenient Light.
And thus I ſee no inconvenience at all, to ſay, That the Soule, or Underſtanding, by its Innate Light, of Reaſon, (which whether you ſay to be diſtinct from the Soule, or not, it is not much materiall) doth daily receive or entertain new Truths, or new Repreſentations of that Truth of Being which is really exiſtent in Things; either by a reiterate actuall underſtanding of thoſe things which it had formerly underſtood, or by a new apprehenſion of ſomwhat whereof before it was ignorant. Like as the Eye by its innate Power of Seeing, diſcerns new Species (conveyed to it by advenient Light) either from Objects formerly ſeen, or now firſt repreſented.
Next he lays down three Requiſites to the conſtitution of every Being. A Fountaine commu…icating; a Channell entertaining; and Waters imparted. (Conferen…, Collatum, Recipiens.) And he asks Where we ſhall find theſe three, if the Ʋnderſtanding be a Faculty.
I anſwer. If you ſpeak of Advenient light (laſt mentioned) which is a Repreſentative Truth, or an Idea of that R…all Truth which is in the Things Known; I ſay, the Reall Truth (or Veritas Eſſ…ndi) ſends forth this Repreſentative Truth, or Idea, which is conveyed by a Deferent Light (either of Diſcourſe, or Information, or the like) till it come to the Ʋnderſtanding, where it is received and entertained by the Innate Light (or Truth) of Reaſon. Like as the Inherent light of Colour in the Object ſends forth a Repreſentative light of viſible Species, which is conveyed by a Deferent light in the Ayr, till it come to the Eye, where it is entertained by the Innate light, which is the faculty of Seeing.
And, as the Remoteneſſe, or Obſcurity of the Object; the Darkneſſe of the Medium; or the Weakneſſe of the Faculty, may hinder Sight, ſo that we ſee not at all, or not perfectly: In like manner the Distance of the Object, as in things quite out of our reach; or the Obſcurity of them, which ſend forth no Species, or manifeſtation of their eſſence towards us; our imperfect Diſcourſe, or inſufficient Information, which is as a dark Medium; and laſtly, the weakneſſe of our Apprehenſion; doe cauſe Ignorance in the Underſtanding, which is anſwerable to not-ſeeing in the Eye.
Again, as in Ignorance ſo in Errour. A reflection of a falſe Light upon the Object, caſting a falſe ſeeming colour, which may be miſtaken for the true colour of it; an indiſpoſed Medium, as when we ſee through Red glaſſe, &c. and a diſtempered Organ, by reaſon of ſome vitious humours accidentall in the Eye, &c. may cauſe a miſtake and Errour in Sight: So here, when there is a Falſe Light upon the Object, as when we conceive that to be the effect of one thing, which indeed proceeds from ſome other cauſe, fallacia non cauſae pro cauſâ, or the like; a falſe Diſcourſe or Inference, or a falſe Relation, which is as a ſtained Medium; or a distempered Ʋnderſtanding, by reaſon of Paſſion, of l…ſa Phantaſia, or the like; may cauſe an Erroneous Judgement, apprehending things to be otherwiſe then inde…d they are.
And thus I have ſhewed not onelyonly thoſe three requiſites which his Lordſhip requires, but ſome others beſides them; ſuppoſing in the mean time the Ʋnderſtanding to be a Faculty; and taking Truth for thoſe ſweet B…ams of Light, which beat upon us; Advenient Light.
If you take Truth for Reaſon; and withall ſuppoſe Reaſon to be diſtinct from the Ʋnderſtanding, and …t alſo from the Soule. You may ſay, The Underſtanding is the Recip…ent; Reaſon the thing Received in it; and that Then and from Thoſe, when and from whence it received its Eſſence, to which Reaſon is a conna…e and appendent Faculty; That is, either from God, by immediate Creation, which many think; or from the Parents, by Propagation, which others▪ …old.
But I ſuppoſe there be few or none, that hold, Reaſon to be diſtinct from the Ʋnderſtanding, and That alſo from the Soule. For when they ſpeak of Reaſon, as a faculty of the Underſtanding; by Ʋnderſtanding they mean, the Soule it ſelfe, quatenus intelligens, being conſidered a… the Subject of Reaſon: And when they ſpeak of the Ʋnderſtanding … a faculty, whereby the Soule is able to conceive and judge of Truth; Then they take the Ʋnderſtanding to be the ſame with Reaſon.
I ſhould rather ſay, That Reaſon, and the Ʋnderſtanding (as it denotes a Faculty) are two words Synonima, denoting the ſame Faculty or Power of Knowing and Judging. Which Faculty I would not grant to be another Thing from the Soule-Knowing, or the Soule-Underſtanding but a Modus▪ As neither doe I allow to Any Naturall-Power, or Faculty, (which they make the ſecond Species of Quality) any other Being then the Being of a Modus, and not the being of … Thing.
And thus we may ſafely ſay, the Soule receives the Faculty of Reaſon or Underſtanding; Thence, from whence it receives its Being: (as a Stone receives its Heavineſſe from that which Produceth it:) That which gave it to Bee gave it to be Thus.
Sometimes indeed Accidents are not received from that which produceth the Subſtance, but from ſome other Efficient; as the Smoothneſſe of Marble proceeds not from the Producer, but from the Poliſher: And yet I hold not, the Smoothneſſe to be One Thing, and the Marble to be another Thing▪ but the Marble to be a Thing, and the Smoothneſſe to be Modus. And thus it muſt be granted in Acqui…te Habits; where the Giver and Receiver are the Same, and the Thing Received Modally, but not really, diſtinct from either.
But for Faculties, or Naturall-Powers; If you look for an Externall Efficient or Giver, it will be the ſame that produceth the Subſtance; But if you be contented with an Efficient per Emanationem, Thus they are ſaid to flow or ariſe from the Form, or Subſtance. And then the Giver and Receiver is the Same; (for the Form which i… the Subject Receiving, is alſo per emanation…m Effectiva, from whence it ariſeth as an Eſſentiall Conſequent:) and if you ſay the Faculty Received is not ſo much as Modally diſtinguiſht from it but onelyonly ratione …; I contend not. But ſo much▪ diſtinction at leaſt, I ſuppoſe, we muſt allow it.
Having thus anſwered his Lordſhips Qu re, I proceed to anſwer his Objections. If the Ʋnderſtanding (ſaith he) be the Recipient, then the Light (of Reaſon) which differenceth us from the Vegetative and Senſitive creatures, lieth in the Ʋnderſtanding, and not in the Soul: And ſo the Soul is either not enlightened at all, but only a Theca to the Intellect; or elſe there be two Enlightened (rationall) Beings in … Reaſonable creature.
For anſwer, Firſt, I ſuppoſe (as I ſaid before) that there are few, if any, that will affirm, the Soul, the Underſtanding, and Reaſon, to be Three things: But they will either ſay, Reaſon Is the Underſtanding, and not in the Underſtanding: or elſe, Reaſon is in the Underſtanding, which Underſtanding is the Soul, conſidered only under this Notion▪ quatenus Intelligens, as it is the Subject of Reaſon. And thus the difficulty appears not; For the Light which differenceth us from Unreaſonable creatures, whether you call it Reaſon, or call it the Underſtanding▪ is ſeated in the Soule, and ſo denominates it Intelligent or Ʋnderſtanding.
But ſecondly, we want not a Recipient for Truth though the Soul be not it, It may be the Underſtanding.
Yet thirdly, though the Soul be not the Immediate Subject, it may yet be the Ʋltimate, which is more then a Theca.
Object. But you will reply, However it be ſo, that wee make this Light to be inherent in the Soul; yet it is not ſufficient to make an Eſſentiall difference between the Reaſonable and Unreaſonable Soul. For though Reaſon be in the Soul, except it alſo Be the Soul, it makes the difference but Accidentall; For thus the Reaſonable and Unreaſonable Soul will not differ in their Eſſence, but only in their Adjuncts.
Anſw. To this I anſwer▪ Firſt, this is a new difficulty not ariſing out of his Lordſhips argument: For though this Light (of Reaſon) be an Accident, yet this hinders not but that there may be his three Requiſites: For an Accident may be truly received, in the Subject, from the Producer.
And yet (ſecondly) This, though a Faculty of the Soul, and not the Soul it ſelf, makes notwithſtanding a Noble difference between a Rationall and Irrationall Soul; ſo that the Soul loſeth not its dignity▪ neither becomes a bare Theca to the Underſtanding or Reaſon: And is ſu…iciently dignified to have ſuch a Divine faculty in it, and of it, by which it produceth it operations, which the Irrationall Soul hath no…. We account thoſe S…ones precious, that have in them ſome rare Vertues: And why not the Soul, indued with ſo Divine a Faculty?
Eſpecially (which is the third thing I reply) ſince it is ſo in the Soule, that is alſo of the Soul. The Honey which Samſon found in the dead Lions carkaſ…, proceeded not from it, but was only accidentally or caſually in it. A Knife touched with a Loadſtone will take up a Needle, or the like; but this attractive Vertue is not from It ſelf, but from the Loadſtone: And you may call the Knife, if you pleaſe, a Theca or Receptacle of this Vertue▪ and ſay, it hath no other then a Relative Excellencie, as it is the Receptacle of an Excellent Vertue; (though indeed to be the Subject of Inheſion, is more then a Theca, or a bare Receptacle.) But in the Loadſtone it is otherwiſe, For there the Attractive Vertue is not onelyonly in it, but of it, or from it ſelfe: It is ſo received in it, that it …owes from it, it is ſui partus. Thus in the Soule, though Reaſon be a Faculty of the Soul, yet is it ſuch a Faculty as floweth from it; and ſo the Soule not only its Receptacle, but alſo its Originall. Thus is Light In the Sunne, and From the Sunne, it is not received aliunde. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Sunne, and not onelyonly Relative, to be the Author and Originall of that which enlightens the whole World. And it is a Reall Excellencie in the Soule (and more then the Excellencie of a Theca) to have from it ſelfe, from its owne Eſſence, ſuch a Faculty whereby it is able to Know and Underſtand.
But you will ſay ſtill, However Reaſon may thus dignifie and diſtinguiſh it from Irrationall Beings; Yet this is but an Accidentall Dignity, an Accidentall Diſtinction, no… Eſſentiall; as conſiſting in that which is in the Soule, but distinct from it. Therefore
Fourthly, Reaſon in the Soule, is not onelyonly an Accidentall, but an Eſſentiall Perfection, an Eſſentiall Conſequent flowing immediately from the Eſſence of the Soul, as an inſeparable endowment: And ſo may make an Eſſentiall difference; (it is Eſſentiall to the Soule that Reaſon ſhould ariſe from it.) And thus that which is diſtinct from a thing, may yet be Eſſentiall to it, viz. Eſſentiale Conſequens, though not Eſſentiale Conſtituens.
But fifthly, (which I conceive to be of the greateſt force) though Reaſon, or the Underſtanding (as a Faculty) be only Eſſentiale Conſequens▪ and ſo, in its Formality, makes onelyonly an Externall difference (aposteriori;) Yet it points out unto us an Eſſentiale Conſtituens, an Eſſentiall Ingredient (as I may ſo call it) from whence this Conſequent doth ariſe. Which is ſomwhat in the Eſſence of the Soule: Whereof we can take no other notice then from its Operations▪ (And this Anſwer holds good, though you ſuppoſe Reaſon to be diſtinct from the Underſtanding, and Both from the Soule: For ſo, that Eſſence (from whence the Underſtanding flows, together with its Immediate and Remote Iſſue, viz. Reaſon and its Operations) will make this Eſſentiall Difference between the Rationall and Irrationall Soul.)
Thus they ſay, prim… Qualitates are not Formae Elementorum, but That from whence theſe firſt Qualities do Eſſentially flow. And though the Qualities make but an Accidentall difference between them, yet the Subſtantiall Forms from whence the Qualities do ariſe make an Eſſentiall difference. (So here: The Rationall Soule is ſuch a Subſtance as is able to give riſe to ſuch Faculties, which the Irrationall Soule is not.)
If you ask What this Subſtantiall Form is? You know the ordinary anſwer; Dic formam lapidi… & eris mihi magnus Apollo. (It is a hard thing, by his own confeſſion, to find out the Form of any Being, much more to diſcover the Being of a Form, pag. 32.) Tell me the Being of Any thing, and I will tell you the Being of This. If I ask What the Soule is? (which to be we are ſure:) You will ſay perhaps, a Spirituall Subſtance: And that is all you can ſay, for the Eſſence of it. But if I ask, what it is To be Spirituall? what, To be a Subſtance? I ſuppoſe you cannot tell me otherwiſe, then by Negations, or Effects. And (thus) they will do in the Elementall Forms; They are not theſe Qualities, but ſomething from whence they ariſe. (And ſo for the ſubſtance of the Soule, It is not theſe Faculties but the Originall of them.)
If you will ſay, There is no ſuch Something, as this ſubſtantiall Form of the Elements; becauſe we cannot tell you what this Something is.
(To omit, that by the ſame reaſon you might baniſh all Being, becauſe none can tell you, what Being is: For if you ſay (and that is all you can ſay) that Being is a Ray communicated from the Originall Entity in God: This tells us at the moſt, but whence it is, not what it is.)
I ſay, If you deny, that there be any other Forms of the Elements (beſide their Qualities) whereby they differ one from another; Then need we look no further: For then theſe Faculties, though but Accidents, may be ſufficient to make an Eſſentiall difference in the Rationall Soule from the Irrationall.
But further, If you can perſwade them, that the Eſſence or Form of the Elements, and their Accidents or Prime Qualities, are the ſame: I doubt not, but then they will as eaſily grant, the Soul and its Faculties to be the ſame alſo.
And thus I have anſwered according to their opinion that hold the Soul and its Faculties diſtinct: And have ſhewed, that we are not ſo farre to ſeek for a Recipient of Reaſon, or Truth, as his Lordſhip might imagine. And indeed there is nothing more difficult in this particular, then in all Accidents whatſoever; their Subject is their Recipient, and ſo is the Subject of Truth, or Reaſon, Its Recipient.
But there is another kind of Recipiency (which I ſhall touch in the next Chapter) which (if I miſtake not) will cut the ſinews of this Argument, and leave it of no force.
But in the mean time (having found a Recipient) we muſt ſeek for a Fountaine, from whence this Light of Reaſon, or Truth, is derived. For that is his Lordſhips next demand; Who is it that communicateth this Light?
For the anſwering of this, I ſhall firſt propound another Qu…re of the ſame nature, and then apply mine anſwer joyntly to both. I ask therefore firſt, whether Fire (ſuppoſing it to be an Element) be not the true Recipient of Heat? and the Loadſtone the true Recipient of the Attractive virtue that is in it? and the Sunne, the true Recipient of Light? If ſo, then I demand, From whence they are received? What is the Fountain from which they are communicated?
If you ſpeak of an Internall Fountain, from whence they flow by an Eſſentiall Emanation; The Recipient and the Fountain will be the ſame. And ſo, if you ſay the Body of the Sunne, of the Fire, of the Loadſtone, be the immediate Recipients of their Light, Heat, and Virtue; Then muſt I ſay, That theſe ſeverall Bodies are the ſeverall Fountains from whence (reſpectively) thoſe Qualities do proceed. If you ſ…y, That theſe Qualities are Received (ſubje…tantur) immediately, in the Form or Eſſence of theſe bodies, and not in the entire Subſtance; I muſt ſay alſo, They do ariſe from theſe Forms, and flow from them by an Eſſentiall Emanation. And the Definitive Reſolution of this Quare depends upon the determination of that Queſtion in Philoſophy, whether Accidents be ſubjected immediately in the Form, or in the Comp…ſitum: and (conſequently) whether they flow from the Form immediately, or jointly from Matter and Form together. Which queſtions it is not materiall for me to determine; for take which ſide you pleaſe, I ſhall ſoon finde both the Fountain and a Recipient.
If you look for an Externall, Phyſicall Fountain, or Efficient; we muſt ſay, That the ſame Fountain from whence they have their Eſſence, from the ſame do they receive with their Eſſence their Inſeparable Accidents, or Eſſentiall Conſequents, by a Comproduction. Thus the Sunne received its inherent Light by Creation, together with its Eſſence, from God: For in the Creation of the Subſtance, the Accidents are alſo Concreated. So Fire produced by a naturall Agent, receives its Heat comproduced, or congenerated, and conferred upon it together with its Eſſence from the ſame Efficient.
Now in any of theſe ways, it will not be hard to find a Fountain of Truth, an Originall from whence the Light of Reaſon or Truth may be conferred; Though we hold the Underſtanding and the Soule to be diſtinct.
If you ask an Internall Fountain; It will be anſwered, That Reaſon▪ or the Faculty of Underſtanding, flows from the Eſſence of the Soule, as an Eſſentiall Conſequent; and is received and inherent in the Soule▪ (For I think not fitting to ſay, that it is inherent in the whole Reaſonable Creature (jointly) conſiſting of Body and Soule; becauſe it remains in the Soule ſeparate, without the Body.) Or (if you look at them as Three things) then Reaſon muſt be ſaid to flow from the Ʋnderſtanding, and It from the Soule; and to be received, by Inherence, in the Underſtanding, as That alſo is received in the Soule.
If you enquire for an Externall Efficient; So the Faculties are either Concreated with the Soule by God; or elſe comproduced by the Parents by Propagation. And ſo we want not a Fountain, from whence Reaſon may be communicated.
I proceed to his Lordſhips proſecution of this Quaere. This Light (of Truth or Reaſon) muſt be conveyed (ſaith he) to the Ʋnderſtanding, from the Soule, from ſome other Creature, or from God himſelfe; but neither of theſe▪ ways; therefore not all.
I ſee not why Any or All of theſe Fountains may not be admitted to be the Source of Reaſon, in a ſeverall way.
Firſt, why may not the Soule be the Fountain of Reaſon or the underding Faculty; as well as the Eſſence of Fire is the Fountain of its Heat, and the Eſſence of the Magnet the Fountain of its Virtue? not by Phyſicall Production, but by Eſſentiall Emanation? Indeed, I like not to ſay, The Soule communicates Reaſon to the Underſtanding, (as to a Third thing;) For I have ſaid before, the Recipient and the Fountain in this way of conveyance, viz. per emanation…m, are the Same: like as in I…manent acts, the Agent and the Patient are the ſame. But I ſay, That Reaſon or the underſtanding Faculty, which the Soule as Recipient entertains In it ſelfe; it hath alſo From itſelf, as being the Fountain. (But if you take the Underſtanding as a third thing from both; then the Soul muſt not be ſaid to be the Immediate Fountain, but the Underſtanding muſt be ſaid to be the (Immediate) both Source and Chanell.)
And thus his Lordſhips reaſon troubleth me not, viz. If the Soul communicate Light, then Hath it Light already, and ſo this Faculty, the Ʋnderſtanding, is in vain. I ſay, the Soule hath This Light, which both flows from the Soule as an Eſſentiall Conſequent, and is Inherent in the Soule as an Inſeparable Accident.
Next, why may not the Soule, or Ʋnderſtanding (whether you will) receive this Light of Reaſon from another Creature? I mean, from the Parent, by Procreation; producing both its Eſſence, and Adjuncts, as well Eſſentiall as Accidentall, together▪ not by Eſſentiall Emanation, as before, but by Phyſicall Production?
To the Reaſon annexed, viz. That if a Creature produce a Faculty in the Soule or Ʋnderstanding that Creature muſt produce it by an intervenient Faculty, and That faculty muſt be produced by another Faculty, and ſ… in infinitum; I anſwer, The faculty of Reaſon (together with the Soul) was produced by the Parent (according to this ſuppoſition,) and that by an Intervenient Faculty, viz. the Generative Faculty in the Parent… And yet ſhall we not proceed in infinitum, For This generative faculty was produced by Another, and That again by Another, aſcending ſtill upwards till we come to the Generative Faculty of Adam, which was immediately produced of God, without an intervenient Faculty▪ either by Concreation with the Soule; or by Infuſion, when he pronounced that bleſſing Increaſe and multiply.
Laſtly, why may not this and other Faculties be produced in the Soule and with the Soule, by immediate creation, from God? I mean, if Soules be daily created, as moſt ſuppoſe; Or, if not, yet at leaſt the Faculties in Adams Soule might be by God Created or Concreated with it, notwithſtanding that they be diſtinct.
But you aske, Why then did not God immediately and intrinſecally communicate this to the Soule it ſelfe, rather then as a Faculty, or by a Faculty? If he did not, it was becauſe he Would not; and we cannot give account of this will. God might have created immediately all Mankind, as he did the Angels; yet we ſee he pleaſed rather, that they ſhould be produced by Generation, one from another: But who can give us any other account of this his pleaſure, ſave onelyonly his Will? So neither, why Reaſon ſhould be an Accidentall Faculty, rather then M…d… Subſtan…i…li…; that is, why he ſhould produce it mediante animâ, rather then by himſelf immediately, together with it: he might do either.
But, in generall, By what means ſoever (ſaith he) Truth (or Reaſon) be conv…yed; if the Ʋnderstanding do at all, receive Truth, then it is Truth▪ For God doth not communicate Light, but to Light.
If he mean, God gives Lucem non niſi Lucido; or Lumen non niſi Luminoſo; I grant it, ſaking the words i… ſenſu compoſito, but not inſenſu diviſo. (And ſo God gives not Animam niſi Animato, nor Rationem niſi Rationali) That is, God gives not Light but to that which is Light (…. Lucide or Illuminate,) viz. when that Light is beſtowed: But in ſ…nſu diviſo, That this was (before) Lucid, it is not to be admitted. Light communicated to the Ayr, makes it Illuminate, but finds it not ſo. God inſpires not a Soule, but into a Living-creature: And ſo breathing into Adam the breath of Life, he made him a Living-creature; but found him (his body) Inanimate, a …ump of Earth. So here; God gives not the Light of Reaſon, but to that which is Light, or Inlightned, viz. Then Inlightned when this Light of Reaſon is beſtowed.
But if by this, God gives not Light but to Light, he means, Lucem non dat niſi Luci, or Lumen non niſi Lumini; I cannot admit it, either in ſenſu compoſito, or in diviſo. When the Sunne imparts Light (Lumen) to the Ayr; the Ayr is Illuminate or Enlightned: But, that the Ayr is Lumen, I muſt never grant, till we ceaſe to hold, Lumen non eſt Corpus. So if God communicate to the Soule or Underſtanding the Light of Reaſon; the Soule or Underſtanding becomes thereby Illuminate or Enlightned with Reaſon: But, that the Soule or Underſtanding, is this Light, this Reaſon; follows no more then if you would ſay, That Water is Heat when it grows Hot; The Ayr is Light (Lumen,) when it is Enlightned; A Body becomes a Colour when it is Coloured; Any Subſtance whatſoever is metamorphiſed into an Accident, when (as a Subject) it Receives that Accident; or That the Body of Adam, formed out of the Duſt, was made a Soule, when it received a Soule inſpired.
That which is annexed as a proof; Becauſe Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum recipientis, (together with the illuſtrations following;) proves no more but this, Whatſoever is conferred▪ is no further forth conferred, then as the Subject is capable of, and actually doth receive it. And this we grant, That the Soule or Underſtanding, upon which the Light of Reaſon is conferred; is a fit Subject to receive or entertaine Reaſon, and is actually indued with Reaſon. And ſo I admit that which he cites of Dr. Twiſſe, Neither a quality permanent, nor an act immanent unleſſe they be made INHERENT IN the Soule, (obſerve the phraſe) and the latter alſo produced by it, can be ſaid to be given to the Soule. Hee ſaith, It is Inherent in the Soule, not that it is the Soule.
Lastly, How paſſeth (ſaith he) this Light from the Ʋnderstanding to the Soule? there being as vast a diſtance between It and the Soule, as between It and the will, (ſuppoſing them diſtinct Faculties) whence grow thoſe inextricable diſputes, How the Will is made to Underſtand, what the Underſtanding judgeth fit to be Willed.
But here his Lordſhip varies ſomewhat the ſtate of the Queſtion in altering the acceptation of the word Truth, from truth underſtanding, to truth underſtood, and inſtead of innate truth of Reaſon, ſpeaks of the advenient truth, which is a Conceptus or Idea framed to repreſent the truth of Being in the Object. For we cannot conceive Reaſon, which is now looked upon as a permanent Faculty, to be tranſient from one ſubject to another.
But Truth Ʋnderſtood, how it may be conveyed from the Underſtanding to the Soul; I ſhall Then perhaps better tell when he ſhews me, How the Viſible Species are conveyed from the Organ to the Soul, or Faculty, ſeeing. That the Organ receives ſpecies, he will not deny; for elſe the Soul might as well ſee, when the Eye is out: That the Soul alſo (by the Organ) doth apprehend theſe Species, muſt likewiſe bee yeelded; elſe why ſhould not the Eye of a dead man ſee? That the Soule and the Organ are diſtinct, muſt needs be granted; for we ſee them really ſeparated by death, whereas nothing can be ſeparated from it ſelfe: And when I am informed, How the Soule and the Organ, being diſtinct, are conjoyned in Seeing; I ſhall better be able to reſolve, How the Soule and the Faculty, though diſtinct, may joyntly Ʋnderſtand.
Till then, it might ſuffice, in generall to ſay, That, As by the Organ the Soule S…th, ſo by Reaſon or the Underſtanding-faculty, the Soule Knows and Underſtandeth: (only allowing ſuch diſproportion as muſt be allowed between a Materiall and Immateriall inſtrument.) And it ſeems to be no more vaſt diſtance between a Faculty and the Soule, then is between an Organ and the Soule. So that if by Viſible Species in the Organ, the Soule may ſee; why not by Intellectuall Species in the Underſtanding (though a Faculty) may the Soule Ʋnderſtand?
But, becauſe I love not to anſwer a difficulty only by oppoſing another; you may reſolve it thus. We are not to conceive, there is any ſuch vaſt Gulfe between the Soule and the Underſtanding (though a Faculty) as that Truth ſhould need a Ferry-boat to wa…t it over: For as the Eye doth not firſt ſee, and then Inform the Soule or Viſive Faculty, what it hath ſeene; but the Organ and the Faculty joyntly concurre to the Act of Seeing: So neither doth the Underſtanding firſt Receive and Entertain Truth, and afterward inform the Soule, what it hath Underſtood: But the Soule with and by this Faculty of Reaſon or Underſtanding, doth Know and Underſtand; Both concurring to the ſame Act. (Thus a Stone, by its Heavineſſe, deſcends; Fire, by its Heat, warms; by its Light▪ ſhines; Glaſſe, by its Smoothneſſe, reflects light; a Knife, by a communicated Faculty from the Magnet, draws iron: And yet (in ſome of theſe at leaſt) you muſt of neceſſity grant a diſtinction ex parte rei.)
There is indeed ſometimes a Reflex act of the Soule, whereby it Knows▪ what is Ʋnderstood: But we muſt not think, that it is an act of the Soules Eſſence, ſurveying or taking account of the Ʋnderſtanding Faculty, what it hath done; But the Soule, by this underſtanding Faculty, reflects upon a former Act, which It ſelfe by the ſame Faculty had formerly performed.
The Gulfe is likewiſe fordable between the Ʋnderſtanding and the Will, though they be diſtinct faculties. Not as if the Will by an act of Knowledge ſhould Underſtand what the Intellect doth dictate: But the Soule, which by its faculty of Underſtanding Knows, doth by its Willing faculty Command, and by its Loco-motive Execute. So that neither the Will Knows what the Ʋnderſtanding Judgeth, nor the Inferiour Faculties what the Will Commands; But the Soule by ſeverall Faculties executes ſeverall Functions. Thus when the Soule by the Eye diſcovers a danger imminent, by the Hand it endeavours to divert it: And yet there is no Meſſenger diſpatcht between, to inform the Hand, what the Eye hath ſeen; notwithſtanding that the Hand and the Eye are Really diſtinct, yea Locally diſtant.
As for mine own Opinion, I could eaſily grant, The diſtinction of the Faculties, from the Soule, and among themſelves, to be neither Reall, nor a parte rei. And concerning the firſt, I am ſufficiently confident: But for the ſecond, whether the Diſtinction be Modall (i. à parte Rei) or meerly Rationall (rationis rati…cina…,) I do yet deſire a convincing Demonſtration to determine.