Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 6
CHAP. VI. Whether all things bee this one Truth.
IN the next place he proceeds to a Conſequent or Corollary, ariſing out of his former Theſis, viz. That All things, are this One Truth.
I confeſſe, I was at a ſtand a great while, and could not imagine any ſhew of Conſequence between theſe propoſitions: If Truth or Reaſon, be the ſame with the Soule or Ʋnderstanding; then is it alſo the ſame with All things elſe. Why ſo. This Argument (ſaith he) will preſſe all things that are.
This Argument? which Argument? Doth he mean that argument which was laſt propounded, towards the end of the fifth chapter, [That becauſe God is one ſimple act; therefore, not only the Soule and its Faculties muſt be One, but even All Creatures muſt be One, becauſe there is in All ſomewhat of Gods Image, whoſe Eſſence is Ʋnity?] If this be his Argument, I ſhall content my ſelf with a bare deniall of the Conſequence, till I ſee ſome ſhew of proofe. For, That Unity is Gods Eſſence, is (in my judgement) groſſely falſe▪ Or, were it true, yet, That becauſe God is One, therefore the Creatures muſt alſo All be One; hath no ſtrength: For this Ʋnity in God is equivalent to an infinite Multiplicity. And, That One ſimple Efficient, may not produce diſtinct Effects, ſeems to me a Paradox.
Or is it his ſecond Argument, propounded in the ſecond chapter, and proſecuted in thoſe that follow; [That, to the conſtitution of every Creature there muſt be a Being communicated, a Fountain from whence, and a Recipient to which; the which Recipient muſt be the ſame with the Being received?] From hence perhaps he might prove, That every thing is the ſame with its own Being: But That very thing ſhould be the ſame with each other, or the ſame with reaſon, or the underſtanding; follows not.
Is it then his firſt Argument, propounded towards the end of the firſt chapter? Which perhaps his Lordſhip lookes at as the principall Argument; and at all that follows, only as a Proſecution of that; (Though his Marginall notes, and the Titles of Chapters (which I queſtion whether or noe they be of his Lordſhips doing) point out to us diſtinct Arguments, in the beginning of the ſecond, and in the end of the fifth chapter.)
The Argument was this, The Ʋnderstanding is nothing but a Ray of the Divine Nature, &c. And is not Truth the ſame? which I underſtood, as you may ſee, thus, [The Underſtanding is Gods Image in Man, And this Image conſiſts in Truth, or the Light of Reaſon; therefore Truth, or Reaſon, is the Underſtanding.] And thus the Syllogiſme will be true in the firſt figure, if you tranſpoſe the Premiſes and convert the Concluſion. Or thus, [The Image of God in Man is the Underſtanding; And this Image is Truth▪ therefore (ſome) Truth is the Underſtanding:] And thus it will be true in the third figure. And beſide theſe two forms, … ſee not how that Argument can be reduced to a true Syllogiſme. Now chuſe you which form you pleaſe; yet how … ſhould follow from hence, [That All things elſe are this One Truth,] I do not yet perceive.
It may be his Lordſhip would have his Argument thus ordered (in the ſecond figure) [The Underſtanding is a Ray of Divinity; And Truth alſo is a Ray of Divinity: therefore Truth is the Underſtanding, or Truth and the Underſtanding are One.] And if this be the form of his argument; I will eaſily grant, that it preſſeth all things that are, as much as this. For, is not this Syllogiſme in the ſame form, [The bleſſed Angels are Spirituall Subſtances; And the damned Spirits are Spirituall ſubſtances; Therefore the damned Spirits are bleſſed Angels, and the bleſſed Angels damned Spirits?] Then which Conſequent, ſcarce any thing could be leſſe probable. And thus indeed he may prove all things that are to be One Truth, one Underſtanding, yea one Stone, or what you will: For take any two Beings whatſoever, and they will both be ſound to be Rays of Divinity, becauſe both proceed from the …ame Originall and Fountain of Being in the Divine Eſſence; and therefore (according to this Argument) they will be both One.
But his Argument thus ordered, will prove but a plaine Fallacy, offending againſt the Laws of the ſecond figure, wherein no affirmative propoſition can be concluded.
The moſt that he can prove from hence will be this, That there is ſome common Praedicate, which may be affirmed of Both; and ſo That there is ſome General Nature in which they both agree. And this I am confident there is none will ever deny that grants but this propoſition, Quicquid eſt, eſt E…s, That All Beings, whatſoever agree in the generall nature of a Being. For then they may all be the Subjects of the common Praediate Ens.
But this is farre enough from proving, All things to be One and the Same. For to aſſume [That whatſoever things agree in a Ʋniverſall Nature, are alſo the ſame Numericall and Individuall Exiſtence;] is ſuch a propoſition as Logick will not admit of.
Yea, though his Argument ſhould proceed thus, [The Specificall Eſſence of the Underſtanding, conſiſts in this, that it is a Ray of the Divine Nature; And the Specificall Eſſence, as well of Truth, as of all Beings whatſoever, is the Same, viz. That it is a Ray of the Divine Nature; And therefore all things whatſoever agree in the ſame ſpecificall Eſſence;) And (conſequently) all things whatſoever, having the ſame ſpecificall Eſſence with each other, muſt alſo be One and the Same with each other.] I ſay, though his Argument proceeded thus, yet would it little availe to prove All things to be One and the ſame. For, beſides, that the Specificall Eſſence of the Underſtanding (and ſo of other things) conſiſteth not in being a Ray of Divinity; Beſides this, I ſay, although they had all the ſame Specificall Eſſence; Yet doth it not follow that they muſt be all One and the Same. For are there not many Individualls under the ſame Species, whereof One is not the Other? Doth not the Soule of Peter and the Soule of Judas agree in all the …ame Specificall and Eſſentiall Praedicates, whilſt notwithſtanding it may be truly ſaid, that the Soule of Peter is not the Soule of Judas, and again, that the Soule of Judas is not the ſoule of Peter? What Eſſentiall difference is there beeween water in the Baltick Sea, and that in the Mediterran…an, …ince they are both but Integrall Parts of the ſame Homogeneall Ocean? Yet how true it is withall, That the Baltick Sea▪ is not the Mediterranean Sea; and That the Water which is now in the Baltick, is diſtinct from that which at the ſame time is in the Mediterranean Sea? Two drops of Water taken out of the ſame ſpoonfull, be they in their Eſſentialls never ſo Conſonant, in their Accidents never ſo Like; Yet we may truly ſay This is not the Other, nor the Other This. How then can it follow, That Truth is One with the Underſtanding, and That All things are this One Truth, Becauſe all Being is but a Ray of Divinity.
It follows indeed, That if all Things have the ſame Specificall Eſſence, then are they all, Things of the ſame nature; (but that they are all the Same Thing, it follows not.)
Thus much therefore I ſuppoſe will be granted him by all, That All things are of the Same (at leaſt Genericall) nature, becauſe all things have a Being; And, When he hath proved their Specificall eſſence to be the ſame, It will be granted alſo, That they are all, Things of the ſame Specificall nature; and (if you will) That All Being falls under the ſame Praedicament▪ (Though yet a Predicamentall diſtinction be not always a Reall diſtinction; no, not a par…e rei.)
But is this all he ſeeks to prove? I ſuppoſed he had laboured to ſhew That the Light of Truth or Reaſon was not onelyonly of the ſame nature with the Underſtanding, but That it was the Ʋnderſtanding. Otherwiſe he proves leſſe then his greateſt Adverſaries would have granted him. For thoſe that contend for the greateſt Diſtinction between the Soule and its Faculties, doe not yet maintain a more Reall or Phyſicall diſtinction between them, then is between One Soule and another, which yet agree in the ſame Eſſentiall Praedicates. And if you allow them the ſame diſtance between the Soul and the Underſtanding, which is between the Soule and a Stone, yea between two Soules, They will tell you it is more then they deſire: For they will grant that the Soule with all its Faculties, and the Body with all its Members, do conſtitute the ſame Suppoſitum; which is a more Phyſicall, a more Reall Union, then is between two Soules, though agreeing in every Eſſentiall Praedicate.
But (if I miſtake not) that which he was about to prove, was, not that the Underſtanding is of the ſame Nature with Truth, but that it is Truth. His ſuppoſition in the firſt words of the …. Chap▪ is, If the Intellect, the Soul, Light, and Truth are all but One, &c. Not, A like, or of the ſame nature. And p. 22. If you make the Ʋnderſtanding▪ the Soule, Light, Truth One, then are you delivered out of theſe ſtreights, &c. And pag. 10. If the Ʋnderſtanding be enricht with Truth, then is it, it ſelfe that Truth, that Light; Thus he frequently calls them One and the ſame▪ Now To be, … ſelfe that Truth▪ and To be of the ſame nature with Truth, is far different. And if he prove no other but a Logicall Union, That Truth and the Underſtanding are of the ſame (Genericall or Specificall) nature; we may y…t ſafely deny a Phyſicall or Reall Union or Identity; and ſay, Truth is not the Ʋnderſtanding, nor is the Underſtanding Truth, (though of the ſame nature with Truth) as well as ſay, This drop of water is not the Other drop, though This and the Other be of the ſame nature. Neither can the ſame Argument (taken in the ſame ſenſe, without Equivocation and Ambiguity) poſſibly prove a Phyſicall and Reall Identity between the Soule and its Faculties; and alſo a Logicall or Specificall Identity between It and all things elſe. It is impoſſible by the ſame argument to prove, The Soul and its Faculties to be One Thing, and, The Soule with All things elſe to be Things of the ſame Nature: Theſe to be T…lta, and Thoſe to be Id…m.
But to omit the conſequence and dependance of This, upon that which went before: I will examine it as an entire propoſition by it ſelfe, Whether All things are One?
And if ſo, Then muſt it be either thus underſtood, That All things are One and the Same by a Phyſicall Identity; This is the Other, and the Other is This; Bucephalus is Alexander, and Alexander is Bucephalus: and (by the ſame reaſon) the Bread in the Lords Supper is the Body of Chriſt, and the Body of Chriſt is this Bread, by Conſubſtantion. In which ſenſe it ſeems ſo impoſſible, that (in my judgement) it needs no Refutation.
Or thus, That all things are One and the Same by an Integrall Identity; that is, They be all Parts of the ſame Whole: all Members of the ſame Integrum, the ſame Aggregatum. And in this ſenſe it is True indeed, but there is nothing New in it, nothing Strange: For who ever denied, that All things, as parts, as members, do conſtitute the foreign, One Ʋniverſe? That the whole Aggregatum, the whole Heap or Multitude of Creatures do make One World?
Or (laſtly) thus, That All things whatſoever are One, by a Logicall Identity, as being all of the ſame Nature. And if he ſpeak of a Genericall Nature, this will be as eaſily granted as the former: For none deny, that all things agree in the Genericall Univerſall nature of a Being: And whether Ens be Genus Ʋnivocum, or Gen… Anagolum, yet it is predicated or affirmed of All Beings; Only that which He calls Truth, Others call Being, both meaning no other then the Formalis ratio Entis, propter quam dicitur Eſſe.
Put if he ſpeak of a Specifical… Nature, wherein he would have all things to agree; making the Univerſe to be One Homogeneall Body, (which …e ſeems to mean here; though he meant, I ſuppoſe, a Phyſicall Unity, when he ſaid, The Soule and Truth w…re One:) Then are we to enquire, whether thoſe things which agree in a Univerſall Genericall Nature, may not admit of a Specificall difference? And for This, it will not be ſufficient to prove That every Being is a Ray of Divinity iſſuing from the Center of Being in God, or That the Eſſence and Form of every particular thing is a Roy of Divinity: Except it be proved▪ That every Being is This Ray, that it is ſuch a Ray.
If therefore all thoſe Rays that have iſſued forth of that Center of infinite Being, If the Streams derived from this Fountain be exactly of the ſame nature, without any Specificall difference; Then is it becauſe God could not ſend forth Diſtinct and Different Rays, or becauſe he would not. If we make God an Agent ſo Uniform, as that we will admit no poſſible Variety, not ſo much as in the Object, or Manner of his Actions; what difference is there between the moſt Determinate Naturall Agent, and God the moſt abſolutely Free Agent? if in his operations we admit not of this choice, to work Thus rather then Th…? But if he could work in ſeverall manners, by communicating Rays of divers natures, but would not; how then hath he manif…ſted foreign, the exceeding great Var…y of his Wiſdom and Power? For there cannot be ſo much as an Accidentall Variety in the Creatures, except there be ſomewhat Reall produced in the One which is not in the other; which cannot be, if all Being, all Entity whatſoever be exactly of the ſame Specificall nature.
I grant therefore, an Integrall Unity; whereby all things are parts of the ſame Aggregatum, the ſame World: I grant likewiſe a Genericall Unity▪ whereby all things agree in the generall nature of a Being: But if he cont…nd further for an Identicall or an Hom…geneall Unity (wherby each is other, or of the ſame Particular nature, without any other then a Graduall difference;) I muſt deny both. And Mr. Sadler (his Lordſhips Champion) denies it with me: For ſo he, Corporall Ʋnion in materials which … [miſ…ll] … Identity, i… at beſt but a …old touch in … point or …o, … moſt diſdainfull …mbrace (at … dista…) of thoſe Beings which hav… much foreign, but lit…l… foreign. If the Unity of all things be Identicall, how is i… [miſcalled] Identity▪ If Homogeneall, how is there much foreign and …t little foreign ▪
His Lordſhips Reaſons to perſwade this Identity▪ come next to be examined▪ Why (ſaith he) may it not be ſo▪ ſince … All Being is derived from the ſame Ʋn…f…r… Fo…tai…; ſince 2 All i… the ſame in nature (…) a Beam of that excellent Light; And▪ All entertained in the ſame manner by every Individuall Exiſtence, viz. By a Similitude and Ʋnion of nature▪
If his Lordſhip ſpeak of a Phyſicall Identity, It is eaſie to ſay, This Soule is not the Other Soule▪ This drop of water is not the Other drop▪ though both produced by the ſame Uniform Agent, and in the ſame manner: This Beam of Light is not the other Beam, though both ſhining forth from the …ame Sunne: Becauſe One (uniform) Agent may produce Two Effects.
If he ſpeak of a Likeneſſe in Nature, It will be ſaid, That the ſame Agent may produce not only Two effects, but Ʋnlike effects. e. g. The ſame Sunne produceth Heat and Light. Here theſe ſeverall Beings are 1 derived from the ſame Fountain the Sunne, which hath either Virtually or Formally both▪ Heat and Light; They are 2 both Beam… iſſuing in the ſame manner from their Fountain; and 3 Their Eſſence is in the ſame manner received, viz. by being what they are, and Informing a Subject recipient: Yet can I not think that Light, and Heat are either the Same Thing, or of the ſame (ſpecificall) Nature: (However ſome fondly dream that Light and Heat are the ſame:) For then whatſoever is H…t, muſt alſo be Light (Lucide▪) which holds not in ſcalding Lead: and whatſoever is Light, muſt alſo▪ even in the ſame degree▪ be H…t, which holds not in Snow, which is Lucide; nor in Ice, which being tranſparent …i… alſo Illuminate.
Object. If you object a Diſparity in the Example, becauſe Light and Heat, though they both proceed from the Sunne, yet the one from the Sunnes Heat, the other from the Sunnes Light, and that therefore their Fountain is not the ſame; whereas in Gods Eſſence being abſolutely Simple in it ſelfe, and Ʋniform in its operations, we may not imagine ſeverall Fountains from whence ſeverall Streams may proceed.
Anſw. I anſwer, That Gods Eſſence, however Simple, is yet equivalent to an infinite Variety: And though we cannot in God ſuppoſe to be Light diſtinct from Heat, and Heat from Light; yet Gods ſimple Eſſence hath virtually both Heat and Light, and all things poſſible. His Eſſence therefore being equivalent both to Heat and Light▪ why may it not produce Heat in one thing, and Light in another thing, and ſo ſeverall Beings in ſeverall Creatures?
(Except you will ſuppoſe, that Gods Eſſence, being Equivalent to, and Productiv… of, all Eſſences poſſible▪ muſt of neceſſity exerciſe all this Equivalency in the production of every Being, and actuate all his Efficacy in every Product, and ſo agere ad extr…m…m virium, which in a Voluntary agent is not Neceſſary; in an Infinite agent is Impoſſible.)
All the Radii or Semidiameters of a Circle proceed from the ſame C…t…r, but they tend not all to the ſ…me point of the Circumference: But the ſame indiviſible Center, which lyes equally oppoſite to every point of the Circumference, As it i… ſuppoſed to lye oppoſite to one point, it ſends …orth One Radius to it, As it lyes oppoſite to another point, it ſends forth Another Radius to that other point, Though the Center remain indiviſibly the ſame. Thus Gods ſimple Eſſence quatenus productiv… Angeli, or, as it virtually contains the Eſſence of an Angel, may produce that Eſſence: And the ſame ſimple divine Eſſence, as it contains virtually the Eſſence of a Stone, may produce a Stone.
And if you ſay, as Dr. Ames concerning the Divine Attributes, That theſe two conſiderations Eſſe productivum Angeli, and eſſe productivum Lapidis, be diſtinct ratione ratioc…atâ, perhaps there will be no great errour; although his Lordſhip admit not of Dr. Ames his opinion; p. 23. For foreign Eſſe productivum Angeli, or poſſe producere Angelum is not the ſame with poſſe producere Lapidem. For although it be the ſame ſimple Eſſence of God whereby he is able to do both, yet this hindreth not but that this ſimple Eſsence may be by us apprehended per i…ad…quat…s conceptus, which is no other but diſtincti… rationis ratiocinat…. The ſame Center conſidered as it is the beginning of One Radius, is diſtinct ratione ratiocinatâ from it ſelf conſidered as the beginning of Another Radius. And ſo the divine Eſſence, quatenus productiva Angeli, may perhaps be diſtinct, ratione ratiocinatâ, from itſelfe quatenus productiva lapidis, without any violation to its Simplicity. They are onelyonly inadaequati conceptus ejuſdem ſimplicis eſſentiae; and a Metaphyſicall Abſtraction may be ſufficiently conſiſtent with a Phyſicall Simplicity of Eſſence.
Thus therefore may it appeare, how the Unity or Simplicity of the Fountain, hinders not but that the Streams may admit of Specificall and Eſſentiall diſtinctions.
But he ſaith ſecondly, All Being is alſo of the ſame nature, viz. a Beam of that excellent Light. Therefore what? Is therefore all Being the Same? How? Phyſically the ſame, (as if that Soule which is of the Same Nature with another▪ muſt needs be that other Soul;) or Metaphyſically, Logically, the ſame; that is, of the ſame Nature? If he mean, the firſt; I ſee not how it follows. If the ſecond; His Antecedent and Conſequent is the …ame; and ſo he Aſſumes what was to be proved.
But for the propoſition it ſelfe, All Being, ſaith he, is of the ſame nature, ſ…il. a Beam of that excellent▪ Light. And this I grant; All Being is of the ſame (Genericall) nature; All Being is a Stream communicated from the Fountain of Being, All Being is a Beam, &c. But (Specifically▪ ) All is not Such a Beam.
If his Lordſhip yet contend, That this Being is alſo Specifically the Same, only with a Graduall Diſtinction.
I deſire, firſt, to know Whence the great Variety in the Creature doth proceed, if all Being be abſolutely Homogeneall? Adde Water to Water, and it remains Water ſtill; In a greater Quantity indeed, but yet without any alteration at all in its Eſſence, it is ſtill but Water. Adde Heat to Heat, it remains Heat ſtill; In a more intenſe degree indeed, but yet it changeth not its nature: Increaſe its Intenſion as long as you will, yet you ſhall never make this Color to become Color. A Deaf man though he See never ſo acutely, it will not help his Hearing.
Repl. If he urge, That the …ame Light proceeding through divers Mediums is ſtained with divers Colours; and why may not therefore this Beam of Eſſence, though Homogeneall, being received by divers Creatures, appear in a diverſe Form?
Anſw. I anſwer, the Variety of thoſe appearing Colours proceeds from the Variety of the Medium: But here can be no Variety in the Recipient at all: For if there be no Recipient but the Being Received, then will the Medium be every way as Uniform as this Light or Eſſence received, and ſo cannot cauſe this Variety. It muſt be therefore Various in it ſelf, or elſe it cannot be Variegated in the Recipient.
Secondly, If all Beings be but Gradually diſtinct: I demand Whether the Eſſence of a Man, or the Eſſence of a Magnet be the more Intenſe degree? If the Magnets Eſſence be the higher degree of Light, Why hath not the Magnet the uſe of Reaſon? If Mans Eſſence be the higher degree, Why hath not Man the Loadſtones Magnetick faculty? For if there be onelyonly a bare Graduall diſtinction in their Eſſence: then the Inferiour Eſſence is actually included in the Superiour, with an addition of ſomwhat more: And if included, whence comes it to paſſe that it cannot operate?
Again If the Body and the Soule be abſolutely of the ſame nature …which they muſt be, if Being admit onelyonly of a graduall diſtinction▪) Then the Eſſence of the Soule (being the ſuperiour degree) includes in it the Eſſence of the Body, and ſomewhat more▪ Therefore is it able to operate according to that Eſſence, and to do of it ſelfe, whatſoever the Body can doe. If ſo, then how comes it to paſſe, that the Soule needs the ſervice of the Body? Why may not the Soule ſeparate, perform all Corporeall Operation…, ſince it hath in it Corporeall Eſſence, and ſomewhat more. (Yea, why may not the Soule ſee, when the Eye is put out?) For the adding of Another degree hinders not the Operation of the Former degree, but rather perfects it. Yea what need is there of the Body▪ at all? Non bellè quaeda… faci… d…o, ſufficit unus Huic op…ri; as his Lordſhip ſaith, out of Martiall.
To his third conſideration, I muſt anſwer accordingly as to the ſecond; All Being is received in the ſame manner by every Individuall Exiſtence: That is, Every Creature receives its Being, by being What it is: A Stone and a Plant receive their ſeverall Beings, by being (ſeverally) what they are. But come to particulars, and the caſe is altered: A Stone receives its Being, by being a Stone; and a Plant receives its Being, by being a Plant.
That which followeth in the enſuing part of this Chapter (beſides what I have already touched by the way) I paſſe over as being Explicatory, rather then Probatory. OnelyOnly thus much; The doctrine of the Platoniſts, reducing all Being to Number, muſt either be taken in a Metaphoricall, Analogicall ſenſe, or not taken at all. And being ſo, it availeth little to prove either a Phyſicall or Specificall Identity of Being.
Whence they had this doctrine, I inquire not, as not belonging to the preſent matter in hand.
Neither will I ſtand to debate the controverſie, concerning the Nature of Number▪ whether it be a Reall, or Rationall Being; Which … conceive to have as much Reality as a Relation hath, and no more; that is, hath Fundamentum i… re, but in its Formality, it is onelyonly …li… the birth of Reaſon. And when I am convinced, that Paternity, or …iliation, are Eſſentiall to Humanity; that Fatherhood, or So…ſhip doe conſtitute Manhood▪ or Humane nature; I ſhall alſo grant, that … eſt Prin…ipi… Eſſend… ▪ rather then Conſequent Eſſentians. But, not to projudge the diſcourſe of the next chapter, (wherein Ʋnity is made to be the Eſſence of All things, yea of God himſelfe) I proceed rather to conſider the large … of Unity there expreſt.