Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 1
CHAP. …. Whether the Ʋnderſtanding, and Truth underſtood, be One.
IN his firſt Chapter he tells us, That Truth (that is Reaſon) is enthron▪d in the Ʋnderſtanding; and there appears under a double Notion Th… … the Fountain or Ground-work (which is Reaſon it ſelf,) We call it (ſaith he) the form or ſubstance. And then thoſe workings which breathe from thence (the Streams iſſuing from it) viz. the Operations and exerciſe of Reaſon, the effects of a reaſonable ſoule. (We call them uſually, actus primus, and actus ſecundus.)
The firſt of theſe he begins with, proving it to be the Ʋnderſtanding in its Eſſence: (The ſecond he proceeds to in the tenth Chapter.) His Argument is this, What is the Ʋnderſtanding other then a Ray of the Divine Nature, warming and enlivening the Creature, conforming it to the likeneſſe of the Creator? And is not Truth the ſame?
If you take Truth in any other acceptation beſide that laſt mentioned, I ſee not how the Argument will hold: For if you take it either for the Truth of Being, or the Truth of Knowing (in the common acceptation;) for that Eſſence, whereby every Creature both is and may be known to be: It may be granted, that the underſtanding is one of thoſe Rays of the Divine Nature, ſomewhat of that Excellency implanted in Man, of that Image of God whereby Man is conformed to the likeneſſe of the Creator: It will be granted alſo, That the Eſſence or Truth of every Creature, whereby it Is or is Known to be, is a Ray proceeding from the ſame Center, (though to another point of the Circumference,) a Stream iſſuing forth from the ſame Fountaine of Being; and carryes ſome weak Reſemblance, ſome Sparkling of that Primitive Light, or Truth, that Originall Eſſence which is in God; (For thus every Creature hath ſomthing of God in it, Refert quaelibet herba Deum.) Yet will it not follow from hence, That this communicated Ray of Being is the ſame with the Underſtanding. For the Argument will prove erroneous, as being Affirmative in the ſecond Figure, in which no Affirmative Propoſition can be concluded: And the Conſequence will be the ſame with this, [What is the Body of Man but a materiall ſubſtance? And is not a Stone the ſame?] Which you would hardly admit as a ſufficient argument to prove our Body to be a Stone.
If you take Truth for Reaſon, the Argument will admit of a reduction into an exact Form, thus, [That Ray of the Divine Nature, which doth (ſolely, or principally) expreſſe Gods Image in Man, is the Ʋnderſtanding; but Truth or Reaſon is this divine Ray; Therefore Truth (that is Reaſon) is the Ʋnderstanding.]
And this Argument will hold good, if we grant the Soule to be the immediate worker in rationall Operations, without an intervenient Facultie: But (otherwiſe) thoſe that are of the contrary Opinion would deny (or diſtinguiſh) the Major, and ſay, That this divine Ray, this Image of God, conſiſts not wholly in the Underſtanding by it ſelfe, but in the Soule or Underſtanding, accompanied with its ſeverall Faculties and …perations.
And indeed it cannot be denyed, but that the Operations of the Soule do containe part of this Divine Image, …s well as the Soule in its Eſſence; and yet They are the Soules (immediate) Progeny, and are not immediately produced by God.
Now what others admit concerning the Operations, They will a… …rm concerning the Faculties; That they are but parcels of this Ray or Divine Image, That they are but leſſer Rivulets derived from the greater ſtream▪ or branches annexed to it.
Now from hence, [That the Soule in its Eſſence, together with the ſeverall Faculties and Operations wherewith it is endowed, doth make up the chiefeſt part of Gods Image in Man] to prove, [That every part of this Image are the ſame with each other▪] and ſo [the Faculties to be the ſame with the Soule;] is that which they will not allow.
And to preſume, or take for granted, That this Image of God conſiſts but in One ſingle Ray; i… but petere principium, it being no leſſe hard to prove, then that the Faculties and the Soule are One; That Truth (or Reaſon) is One and the S…e with the Underſtanding, or Reaſonable Soule.
They would ſay rather, That the Soule is One of thoſe Bra…he…, which (iſſuing from the ſame Root of Being in God, from whence all other Created Beings doe ariſe) divides it ſelfe into ſeverall Twigs. And we have no way to convince them of falſhood in this particular, till we have firſt proved the Soule and its Faculties to be one Simple o… Single Eſſence.
The proſecution or explication of his Lor… ▪. Argument doth no way oppoſe this acceptation of Truth which I have given, but confirms it; which (if I rightly underſtand it) may be thus explained; That Truth (Reaſon) is Light, none will d…ny▪ (by Light underſtand, that internall Principle whereby the Soule can See o… Know, which is ſo called by a Metaphor drawn from the Innate light, (we call it potentia viſiva) whereby the Eye is enabled to See:) That Light (this power or principle of Knowing or Reaſoning) i… a reaſonable creature i… the Fo…ntai… of Life, i… ma…f…s…: (by Life underſtand the Life of the Soule, if I may ſo ſpeak, That which ſpecificates the rationall Soule, and makes i… …) For … … of a reaſonable Soul, (that which makes it to be Reaſonable) is Light, (that principle whereby it know… and underſtands:) And therefore when the Soule informeth, or giveth life to Animal rationale, (making it Rationall) it inableth the Creature to work according to that Light, (according to this principle of Knowing: that is, It inableth the Reaſonable Creature to Know or Underſtand, &c.) Thus whilst Life (that which makes a reaſonable creature to be Reaſonable) and Light (this power of Knowing) is Truth (or Reaſon; And Truth (or Reaſon) is Conformity to God (or Gods Image in us:) And the Ʋnderſtanding alſo, as we yet diſcourſe of it, is this Light (this principle of Reaſoning) to the Soule; The Ʋnderſtanding and Truth (or Reaſon) can be but One.
The whole Argument i… briefly thus; [the Image of God in us, is our Underſtanding; and this Image or divine Radius, conſiſts in Reaſon (which he calls Truth;) therefore Truth or Reaſon is our Underſtanding.] His minor (that this Ray or Beam of Divinity in us, is Truth or Reaſon) is thus proved; [Becauſe Reaſon in us is … derivative Beam, a ſparkling, of that primitive Light (or Wiſdome) which is in God:] And ſo That which enlightens us, and inables us to Know, or Underſtand, according to our meaſure (that which furniſheth Ʋs with Knowledge) is a repreſentation of Gods Sapience or Wiſdome whereby He is ſaid to Know. Now, [that Truth or Reaſon (which is all one) is this derivative Beam of Light, wherby we are able to Know;] and [That this ability to Know or Underſtand, is that which makes u… to be Reaſonable,] is manifeſt. Wherefore he concludes, That, whilst …ur Life (or Rationality) conſists in Light, (that is, in an Ability to know and underſtand) and this Ability conſiſts in Truth (or Reaſon) which is a conformity to God (as being a Stream iſſuing from his Ocean of Wiſdom;) And whilſt (as Reaſon is this abilit… of knowing, ſo) the Ʋnderſtanding alſo is this Light (this Ability or power of Knowing;) The Ʋnderſtanding and Truth (that is, Reaſon) muſt be all One.
Thoſe, who deny his Concluſion, would anſwer, That both Reaſon and the Ʋnderſtanding, doe inable the Soule to Know, or Underſtand, but in a ſeverall way, as diſtinct principles (and therefore are not the ſame:) The one Inſtrumentally or Miniſterially; The other, by uſing this as its Miniſter. Thus Fire, by its Heat, burns; a Stone, by its Heavineſſe, deſcends; Glaſſe, by its L…vity or ſmoothneſſe, re…ecteth; and the like.
If you ſay, the Weight of the Stone, or Smoothneſſe of the Glaſſe, are not Things diſtinct from the Stone and Glaſſe, but rather Modifications of theſe Things; I contend not: For neither doe I hold the Underſtanding, or any other of the Soules Faculties, to be a Thing diſtinct from the Soule; but, at the moſt, only an accidentall Modification of it, not Really diſtinct from it: Yea rather, That it is the Soule it ſelf, quatenus intelligens, (as the Power of God, is God himſelf quatenus potens) admitting no other but a diſtinction of Reaſon.