Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Preface
SIR,
I Have, according to your deſire, peruſed that Treatiſe concerning The Nature of Truth. (The which how farre it ſerves to the expounding the 24. Chapter of Math. I examine not.) One thing that may make it ſeem ſomewhat dark, is, that his Lordſhip ſpeaking of a matter ſomewhat unuſuall, is forced to uſe ſuch Metaphors, for want of native words, which may ſomwhat obſcure it: And his Lordſhip was the leſſe carefull to avoid it, becauſe they being with himſelfe of frequent uſe, and ſufficiently underſtood by him to whom hee wrote, there was the leſſe feare of being not underſtood, or miſ-underſtood: And ſo the leſſe need to prevent it, by ſeeking for ſuch words as might better ſute with an ordinary Reader.
Before I proceed to ſtate the Queſtion, Whether Truth and the Soule be One; It is very requiſite to ſearch, in what ſenſe his Lordſhip underſtands Truth; that through the ambiguous ſenſe, and divers acceptations of the word, we be not confounded in the progreſſe.
Truth in Logick, is when the Propoſition agrees with the Thing; and Falſehood, when they diſagree.
Truth in Ethicks, is when our Words and Actions agree with our Mind; and is oppoſed to a Lye, to Hypocriſie.
And Truth in theſe acceptations is nothing elſe but an Agreement or …onformity of a Type with its Prototype, Archetypi & Ectypi; of a Tranſcript with its Originall▪ of an Idea, or thing repreſenting, with that repreſented; Signi & Signati.
Thus in Logick, Vox eſt ſignum rei, or Imago r…i. If therefore we have that expreſſed in Words, to which in the order of Things there is nothing agreeing; it is a Falſe Copy, or rather no Copy, being drawn according to no Pattern. If that be, which is affirmed to be; it is True, becauſe they are a Copy or Repreſentation of the Things ſo being.
As it is in words, ſo it is alſo in Apprehenſions, in conceptibus; If our mind conceive a thing to be, which is not, or to be otherwiſe then it is, this is a Falſe Apprehenſion, becauſe the Idea in our underſtanding is not a true repreſentation of the Thing.
In Ethicks, our words are to be compared with another Copy; becauſe (thus… they are not the repreſentation of the Things (immediately) but the repreſentation of our Thoughts, or Intentions: Therefore, if our Words do truly expreſſe or repreſent what we Think; It is morally True, that is, it is not a Lye, becauſe they agree with this Copy; but yet they may be Logically Falſe, as not being a true expreſſion of the Thing. If the Idea in our apprehenſion agree with the Things, ſo that we conceive a …ight of them; and our Word▪ be a true repreſentation of this Idea; they do truly alſo repreſent the Things: There is both v…ritas Logica, and veritas Moralis If wee conceive a right of things, and our words expreſſe otherwiſe then we think; this Propoſition is both wayes falſe; for it neither agrees with the thing, nor with our judgement: But our Judgement is Logically true▪ becauſe the Idea in our mind is a true expreſſion of the thing. If we conceive amiſſe, and yet …ffirm as the thing is (if we affirm ſnow to be white, which we conceive to be black,) our Propoſition is Logically true, but Morally falſe; and our conceptus is alſo Logically falſe. If laſtly, wee conceive amiſſe, and ſpeak otherwiſe then wee conceive, and yet diverſe from what wee ought both to think and ſpeak (as if we conceive ſnow to be bl…k, and affirm it to be red:) our Idea or Conceptus is Logically falſe, our Propoſition Logically falſe, and Morally falſe.
Thus i… one▪ intending upon a Signet to grave the Kings▪ Image, mi…th of the true proportion, and with this Signet maketh impreſſion in Wax▪ the wax cont…nes a true repreſentation of the Seale▪ but not the true Image of the King; whereas, if the Signet had been truly graven, and then impreſſion made in the wax; the wax had truly repreſented both the one and the other. Thus is it in Morall and Logicall Truth.
Accordingly, one making a Promiſe with intention to perform it, yet afterward breaks it; this Promiſe is Morally true, becauſe it is a true repreſentation of his Intentions; but it is not Logically true, as not being a repreſentation of his future Actions. And in his ſubſequent Actions there is alſo a kind of Morall falſhood; becauſe they are not conformable to his promiſe, by which they ſhould bee regulated. Or you may ſay, his Promiſe was (Morally) a True expreſſion of his Intention; but his Intention was (Logically) Falſe, as not agreeing with the Thing, becauſe he intended that which was not Futurum Whereas, if he had promiſed, with a purpoſe to breake it, his Promiſe had been Morally Falſe, but his Intention Logically True▪ If, intending to break it, he yet perform it, his Intention is Logically falſe, and his Promiſe Morally falſe, though Logically true. And thus Breach of Promiſe will come under the nature of Injury, or Injuſtice; but not under the nature of a Lye, except it were made to deceive; becauſe it is the true expreſſion of the Intention, which is the immediate rule of Veracity or Morall truth.
Thus Hypocriſie, or Diſſimulation, is a branch of Morall Falſehood; becauſe Actio and Geſt…s, are Index animi, as well as Words.
And this I conceive to be the Nature of, and Difference between Logicall and Morall Truth.
There is yet another Truth, and you may call it a Phyſicall Truth, … Formall or Eſſentiall Truth: Thus that which hath the Eſſentialls of a Man, is verè Homo; ſo an Infant is a true Man. Thus we ſay, a true Church, true Faith, true Grace, true Gold, (not counterfeit:) thus a Syllogiſme in a right form, is a true Syllogiſme, though the Propoſitions be falſe. And the like.
(But miſtake me not; by Morall Truth, or Naturall Truth, &c. I underſtand not, Truths about Naturall things, or Morall things, (though the words be oft-times ſo taken:) For I am not now diſtributing Truth into its ſeverall Species, or ſeverall Parts; but am ſhewing the Ambiguity of the Word, and ſo diſtinguiſhing it into its ſeverall Acceptations. Thus Morall or Ethicall Truth, is that Acceptation of Truth that is uſuall in Ethicks: Logicall Truth, is that Accep…ation of …uth, which is uſed in Logick, &c.)
But … …pp…, we … y…t …rre from that Acc…pt…tion of Truth, in which … Lo… ▪ ſpeaketh: I will therefore come ſomewhat ne…rer. … … the Logicall and Morall …ptat…n … Truth, we have a Metap…yſicall acc…ptat… …s and V…rum are …ermini conv…r…ib…les. And Truth is taken in … ſuch acc…ptation, when it is divided into veri…s Eſſendi and Cognoſc…ndi.
Veritas Eſſend…, or the truth of Being, is that per quam res ver… …ſt: And thus Ens & Verum conver…untur. Quic …uid eſt, ver… eſt▪ For except it have a Reall and True Being (and not a Suppoſed Being) it is not …ind…d) a Being, but is Su…oſ…d …o be.
Veritas …ognoſce…di is that per quam res ver… Cognoſcitur. And thus alſo Ens & Verum conver…u…t…r: For whatſoev…r is, may b…e …n…wn to be. This Veritas i… nothing …lſe but Cognoſcibilitas: Th…re…ore Veritas, as it is Affectio Entis, is d…fin…d by ſome to be Convenie…ia r…i, ſeu Co…formit…s rei, …um I…tell…ct…; (…ive humano …ive di….) Thus Truth in the Things and Knowledge in the Underſtanding have …elation to each other as Objectum a… P…tentia. As Colour in the Object to Sight in the Eye.
Colour, as it is inherent in a Body, makes it to be Coloured (cor…us coloratum:) The ſame Colour, as it ſtands in relation to the Eye, makes it to be Viſible (corpus viſibil….) Thus Eſſence, or Being, as it is in the …hing, conſtitutes it in the nature of a Thing, or a Being: And the ſa…e …nce in the thing, as it hath relation to the Underſtanding, makes it …ognoſ…ibile. …n the firſt ſenſe it is Veritas Eſſendi▪ in the ſecond it is Veritas Cognoſ…end…. (Where t…e conſ…uction will be ſomewhat hard, exc…t you give Philoſophers leave to uſe the G… …d in a Poſſive ſignification, which amongſt pure …rammaria…s is more ra…ly …und.) For by the ſ…me E…ſe…c… by which it is Ens, by the ſame it is Cognoſcibile; That Being by which it is, by the ſame it …y be …own to be: As by the ſame Colour, by which the object is Color…tum, it is alſo Viſibile.
And this … conceive to be the right acceptation of Metaphyſicall Truth, or Truth as it is taken in Metaphyſicks for an Affection of Being: not being a Thing Really di…inc… for that thing, that truly is, and may be truly known to be; But (as they call it) Modus Entis.
And now we be come ſomwhat n…e…er that acceptation of Truth wherein his Lo… ▪ takes it; though (if I miſtake him not) that ſenſe wherein he uſeth it, is ſomewhat diſtinct from all theſe: For whether you conſider the Truth of …eing, or the Truth of Knowledge▪ they are in themſelves really the Same, and the ſame …l… really with that Ens, t… Being, which tru…y Is, and is truly K…o…n … be: which thing … a being, and as truly Cognoſ…ble, when there is no Underſtanding preſent to take notice of it, as when it is actually Underſ…d. …e a… an Object is …uly Col…u…ed, and truly Viſible, even then when …re is no …ye preſent to behold it. And therefore this truth cannot be One with the Underſtanding▪ becauſe it may be then and there where the Underſtanding is not.
Again, Truth being (as I ſaid) One with the Thing known, if it … alſo One with the Underſtanding, or the Soule; the Underſtanding or Soule knowing ſhall be One with the Thing understood: A S…one and the Soule ſhall be one Individuall Being: For how can Truth be the ſame with the Stone, and the ſame with the Soul, except the Soul and the Stone be the ſame.
Object. But you will ſay thi… is that he contends for, not only, that Truth underſtood is one with the Soul; but that both the Thing underſtood, and the Sou… underſtanding, are this Truth.
Anſw. 1. To proceed therefore. If the Stone underſtood, and the Soule underſtanding, be the Same; then when began this Unity, … Identy? Were they the Same before the Stone was actually underſtood? Or did they then contract this Unity, when firſt the Soul did actually Know it?
Why they ſhould be the ſame, Before the act of Knowing; there … no more reaſon, then why one …ne ſhould be the ſame with …ne; …y one man ſhould be the ſame with another man: And ſo Peter or Paul might be …s truly ſaid to b…ray Christ, as Ju…, if Peter and Judas be one and the ſame.
And if they ſhould …n …ntr… a… Unity, (and not before when the Underſtanding …o…h …ſ… Actually underſtand it; we muſt ta…e … ſaying, Intell…ct…s i…ellig…do …m…a …it …mn…a▪ in a more gr…e … it w… m…. A…, … …y j…emen…, it i… utt…ly impoſſible, for that which hath … been Al…ud … be made Idem; …s alſo for that which is O…, to …e made A…ud a ſ…ipſ…. I ſay, … i… impoſſible for two things to be made one …nd the ſ…me, by a Re…ll Identitie.
'Tis true, Two things may be ſo united as to be made One Aggrega…um; as the Body and the ſoul make one M…n, the Divi…y and Humanity of Chriſt make …n… Perſon: But that two things can become the ſame; that the Soule is the Body, and the Body the Soule; that the Humanity of Chriſt is his Divinity, and his Divinity his Humanity; I conceive not onelyonly falſe, but impoſſible. The Hand and the Foot (with the reſt of the members) make one Body; but neither the Hand is the Foot, nor is the Foot the Hand, but really diſtinct.
Anſw. 2. But further, as it is hard to ſhew, when this neer kindred either of Affinity, or Conſanguinity; this Union either of Identity, or of Identification, had its firſt Originall: So, if there be any ſuch Ʋnion, (either con…ate or contracted) between the Soul and a Stone: Then will not onelyonly One but All Soules (at leaſt, all ſoules actually underſtanding and apprehending it) be the ſame with this Stone. And theſe Soules, being one and the ſame with this one individuall ſtone, they will be one and the ſame with each other.
Thus we ſhall have but one Soule informing all Bodies; not by a Pythagoricall Metempſychoſis▪ by tranſlating of ſoules from one body to another, but as A…mus Averroiſticus, one ſoule extended through the whole Univerſe, informing ſo many men as there be bodies, wherof every man is partaker tanquam communis aur…: Nay neerer, for of the Ayr each takes a part; but as for this Soul, each Is, each Hath this Soule entire.
Neither doth it inferre onelyonly an Identity of Soules, but an Identity of Objects alſo: For all▪ Objects being apprehended by one Soul, they become all One with it: And being all one with the ſame numericall Soule, they muſt be alſo One with each other.
So that all Soules will thus be One, all Objects will be but One, and this One Object one and the ſame with that One Soule; and all the World but Ʋnum Ens, whoſe every parcell is alteri …dem; the ſame with each other.
Object. You'l ſay, All this is no more then he contends for; to make Truth▪ One with the Soule; and that all things that are, are nothing but this One Truth.
Anſw. If this be his opinion, To prove an Identity of all creatures, becauſe their Being, from whence proceeds their Cognoſcibility, is all One with the Soule, or Underſtanding: His Lord▪ muſt give me leave to diſſent from him, if for no other reaſon, yet becauſe …e diſſents from himſelfe: For if his Argument be good, That all things are One with the Soul, becauſe Truth or Cognoſcibility, (which differs not really from their Eſſence) being the Object of the Soules Operation, muſt alſo be One with the Soule; It will follow alſo, that God is likewiſe One and the Same with the Soul, becauſe He alſo is Cognoſcibilis, and may be known by the Soul: And alſo, that all things elſe are one with God, becauſe they are al known by Him. And ſo he falls upon the firſt of thoſe Errours, which he mentions in the …nd of his Prooemium, immediately before the firſt Chapter; which is, by mounting too high in the exal…ing of Truth, to confound the Creator with the Creature▪ by making her God. Neither doth it onelyonly make Truth to be one with God; but even all things elſe, being one with Truth, to be One with God.
Again, if ſo, how is it that in the end of his 3. Chapter, concerning the Body and the Soule he tells us, not that they are the Same, or that the Body is the Soul, but as husband and wife each bringeth his part towards the making up of the Compoſitum. At leaſt M…. Sadler is miſtaken as well as I, (who is preſumed at leaſt to underſtand his Lor… ▪ mind, ſu…ciently,) who …ells us in his Epiſtle, that Corporall Ʋnion … materialls is ſometimes [Miſcalled] Identity, which is at beſt but a …ld touch in a point or two.
But I ſuppoſe there may be another acception of Truth, which may better ſute with (at leaſt the firſt part of) his Lordſhips diſcourſe. You may call it Veritas Cognoſcendi, as well as the former, bu… in a different ſenſe. There Knowledge was taken in a Paſsive …ſe, and Truth was that which makes the thing Cognoſcib…le, or fit to be underſtood: Here you muſt take it in an Active ſenſe; and ſo Veritas Cognoſcendi, or the Truth of Knowledge, will bee that which makes the underſtanding Cognoſcitivum, or fit to conce…ve and apprehend that Cognoſc…li…y which is in the Obj…ct. And thu… Truth will be that …rinciple, whereby the Soule is able to …hend or conceive that which may be known.
Veritas Cognoſcendi in the former ſenſe, and that in this ſenſe, are both Principia cognoſcendi, Principles of knowledge, but in a ſeverall way. (You may diſtinguiſh them, if you pleaſe, thus; Truth of knowing, and Truth of being known, and veritas cognoſce…di may be … both) They differ as Colour in the Object, from the power of ſeeing in the Eye: The former makes the Object Viſible, and fit to be perceived; the other makes the Eye Viſive, and fit to diſcern it. If the firſt were wanting, Viſion would be hindered, becauſe there is nothing Viſible: (Hence it is that the Ayr, and Spirituall ſubſtanc… are not ſeen even by the ſ…arp…ſt ſight.) If the latter be wanting▪ … ſight is hindered from a deſect in the Organ: (Thus▪ the moſt perſp…ous Colou…s are not diſcerned by a blind Eye; whereas the …ame Colours are in themſelves ſufficiently Viſible, and actually Diſcerned by others▪) Thus Veritas cognoſcendi, in the former ſenſe, makes the Object to be Cognoſcible; Truth, in the latter ſenſe, gives the Underſtanding, or Soule, ability to know it.
Now if you call the Power of ſe…ing, which is in the Eye, by the name of …ate light (…o diſ…gu…ſh i… from Light either in the Object, or in the Medium:) You may alſo call Reaſon, which is this principle of knowing in the Soule, or Underſtanding, by the name of innate Truth, or Light.
And this ſignification of Truth I conceive to be moſt ſutable to his Lor… ▪ meaning. (But Verum, or Truth, in this ſenſe, is not convertible with Ens: For though all Beings have in them Truth, wherby they may be Known, yet all have not this Truth, or Power to Know.)
And thus if you underſtand it, it will not ſeem ſo ſtrange a Paradox, …o … th… Reaſon (which he calle…h Truth) is all one with the Ʋnderſtanding; and that the Ʋnderſtanding is not diſtinct from the Soule. For this will be granted by all thoſe, which affirm that Potenti… non real…ter diſtinguuntur ab Animâ; that the Powers or Faculties of the Soule, are not really diſtinct from the Soule it ſelfe: And theſe a…e … I miſtake not) the greater part of …ound Philoſophers. And …us his Lor… ▪ opinion is but the ſame with theirs in other words. (Yet may we …ll ſpeak diſtinctly of theſe ſeverall Facul…ies; as w… do of the Wiſdom of God, the Power of God, the Will of God, &c. which are as en…rely one with God, as theſe Faculties can be with the Soule.) And thus much for explaining the ſtate of the …. … proceed next to examine the Grounds of this his Lor… ▪ opinion.