Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 10
CHAP. X. Whether the Operations of the Soule be the Soules Eſſence.
HAving done (in the former chapters) with the firſt Notion of Truth, as it is the Fountain or Source of Knowing, as well Naturall as Habituall. In this tenth Chapter, he comes to the ſecond Conſideration, or Notion of Truth; denoting the Streams proceeding from this Fountaine: The Actions, and Effects of a Reaſonable Soule. Indeavouring to prove, The particular and various Workings of the Soule, in Concluſions, ſimple Apprehenſions, Negations, and Affirmations &c. to be all One and the Same, both with each other, and with the Soule. The Fountain and the Stream (ſaith he) make but One River: I adde, The Root and the Branches make but one Tree. Yet the Root is not a Branch, neither are the Branches the Root.
To prove this, he compares the Nature of the Soule or Ʋnderſtanding (For, ſaith he, we have proved them both one) with their Irradiations and Actings. His Argument tends to this effect: The Souls Eſſence, ſaith he, is no other thing then Activity (Actus) and therefore muſt be either Potentia agendi, or ipſa Actio; Actus Primus, or Actus ſecundus. And if it be Actus, either Primus or Secundus, ▪which he conceives to differ only in Time) it must be ſtill in work, and Is no longer then it Acts: Which Act can be no other but a Work of Reaſon; elſe how can it conſti…ute a Rationall Soule? And if ſo, then how doth it differ f…om Thought or Ratiocina…ion? The Operations therefore of the Soule (Concluſions, Sayings, Actions) are the Being, the Form of the Soule.
Are they ſo? But, I ſuppoſe, the Soule at ſome times produceth no (Rationall) Act at all, (as in ſleep: Doth it then ceaſe to be a Rationall Soule, when it ceaſeth to produce Rationall Operations? (For when its Eſſence ceaſeth, It ſelfe ceaſeth to Bee. Doth a Stone ceaſe to be Heavy, when it ceaſeth to Fall downwards? I think not.
But I will conſider the Argument diſtinctly. He hath proved (he ſaith) that the Soule and the Ʋnderstanding are both One. This, though I would not ſtick to grant, Yet (as I have formerly ſaid) I ſee not any Argument, in his foregoing diſcourſe, to prove That the Soule and Ʋnderstanding are all One; but what will be of equall force to prove, The Soule and the Body to be all One. And if he will allow between the Soule, the Underſtanding, and its Operations, a diſtinction as Reall, a… Eſſentiall, as there is between the Body and the Soule; I am confident there is no rationall Man that will deſire more.
The Nature or Being of the Soule (ſaith he) is nothing but Activity. That the Soule is Actus, is confeſſed, I grant, by all: But whether Activity may be taken in the ſame ſenſe, I queſtion. This Actus (ſaith he) whether Primus or Secundus (which differ but in Time, and ſo differ not at all, becauſe Time is nothing) c… be no other but a Work of Reaſon: And ſo the Soules Operation will be its Form and Eſſence. That Actus primus and actus ſecundus, (Gravity and Deſcenſion) differ only in Time, I grant not: For this is not a Diſtribution of Actus into its Species; but a Diſtinction of an Ambiguous term. Actus in the firſt ſenſe ſignifies Actuality (not Action) and it is oppoſed ſomtimes to Potentia ad Eſſe, ſomtimes to Potentia ad Formam; ſiue ſit forma Subſtantialis, ſiue Accidentalis, (but never to Potentia ad Operari;) And thus Actus is no other but that Eſſence, per quam res aut actu-Eſt, aut eſt actu-Tale. Actus in the ſecond ſenſe ſignifies, not Actuality, but Action, or Operain; and is oppoſed to Potentia ad Operari.
I ſay therefore, the Eſſenc… or Nature of the Soule or Underſtanding is Actus; It is Actus Primus; It is that whereby the Soule & actu Est, & eſt Hoc, or eſt Tale (viz. in genere ſubſtantiae,) Such a Being, Such a ſubſtance. Its Faculties (if diſtinct) are alſo Actus, (yet not Actions:) Which you may ſay to be Actus ſecundi (as ſome doe) becauſe they are a ſecondary actuality, whereby the Soule becoms, not a Being, or Such a Being; but a Being So qualified, So adorned: Or rather I ſhould ſay they be Actus Primi, becauſe (though Accidentall, yet) they are not Operations (which I conceive to be the trueſt meaning of Actus ſecundus, though I confeſſe ſome attribute it to all Accidents,) but Forms; Operative indeed, but not Operations.
If you aske What is the Form of this Activity (or Actuality rather) of this Actus primus which is the Soules Eſſence, If it be not Rationall Workings? (Which is all one as if you ſhould ask What is the Eſſence of an Eſſence? and againe, What is the Eſſence of That Eſſence? in infinitum. I anſwer, The Form of this Actus is It ſelfe, Its Eſſence. What can be the Form of Rationality, but ipſa Rationalitas? Humanitas you may ſay is Forma Hominis; but will you ask again, What is that which is forma Humanitatis? If you do we muſt anſwer ſtill, that it is Humanitas, and ſtay there. Except you would have us invent one Abſtract upon the neck of another, and ſay Humanitatitudo. And thus I think ſomebody hath been trying practiſes; For if you ask what is the Form of Honorificum, or Honorificabile, they can tell you It is Honorificabilitas, or Honorificabilitudo; and aske again what ſhall be Forma Honorificabilitudinis, they will tell you, It is Honorificabilitudinitas.) I ſay, we muſt not enquire for the Form of a Form, or the Eſſence of an Eſſence: For every thing hath its Eſſence (poſitive) and its Hae…ciety, not from any other thing, but from It ſelfe; Though it may have an Externall, a Relative, or Accidentall denomination from ſome Adjunct.
(And therefore to ſay, Materiae individuatur a Formâ, as though the Matter of a dead Corps, were not the ſame matter that was in the living Man, is a doctrine which I could never digeſt. For ſo all Generation, will become Creation; For if it be the Form which makes this Matter to be This, then cannot one Form ſucceed another in the ſame Matter: becauſe if the Form precedent gave it its Individuation, and made it to be this, and not other matter; when this Form is aboliſhed, the Matter which is joyned with the ſuccedent Form will not be This, but Other matter: If This Form make it to be This Matter, then Another Form will make it to be Other Matter. And if ſo, then is both Matter and Form produced de novo; which muſt needs be Creation, becauſe it is not made of any thing prae-exiſtent, nothing remaining of what before was.)
Hee proceeds thus, If the Form of this Activity (Actus) be not th…ſe Reaſonable Workings; then must it be either of a baſer allay, or of a higher ſtamp.
For anſwer, I will but demand in generall, which his Lordſhip judgeth to be moſt E…cellent, the End, or the Mean…? That which is willed, not for its own ſake, but for ſomwhat elſe, ſeems to be of leſſe worth then That for whoſe ſake it is deſired: And yet the Mean…, being the Ends Efficient, how can it be Inferiour? I ſay therefore that A…us primus is the Efficient of Actus ſecundus; and This the (partiall) End of the other: And leave it to his Lordſhips conſideration, Whether he will eſteem thee more Noble.
Hee tells us ſoon after, That if we distinguiſh between the Act and the Power, the Act muſt ever be firſt in Order, Dignity, and Nature.
But (under his Lordſhips favour) I conceive that the Act is firſt neither in Order, in Dignity, nor in Nature. The Cauſe is before the Effect, in Excellency, becauſe Cauſa (aequivoca) eſt Nobilior Effecto; for nothing can produce an Effect more noble then it ſelfe. 2 In Nature, Cauſa eſt prior Effecto; For that is defined to be Naturâ prius, A qu… non redit eſſendi conſequutio; Now I demand, Whether of theſe two may be without the Other? The Act, or the Power? And 3 in Order: For he ſpeaks I ſuppoſe either of the Order of Production, or the Order of Intention; If he ſpeak of the firſt; The Order of Production, is Ordo naturae Generantis, and ſo that which is firſt in Nature, muſt be alſo firſt in Order: If he ſpeak of the Order of Intention; then the End (if it be the Sole end) may ſeem to be preferred before the means; But this is a Morall Excellency, and a Morall Order; not a Naturall or Phyſicall Excellency, ſuch as we are now ſpeaking of. But I demand withall, Whether Action be the ſole End of the Soule? that is, Whether the Soule in its Eſſence might not be produced either for its Own Excellency or for the Excellency of ſome Other end beſide the Excellency of its Operation or Actus Secundus? And if ſo, then can it not be concluded That even its Morall Excellency, in genere Finis, is inferiour to the Excellency of its Operation.
But his Lordſhip admits not at all of this diſtinction between actus primus and actus ſecundus; ſo as that actus primus ſhould be the Being or Subſtance, and actus ſecundus the Product. But why? They forget, ſaith he, that Omnis Virtus conſiſtit in Actione.
Nay we Forget it not, but we Deny it. For if you ſpeak of Morall Virtue, est virtus tacuiſſe, &c. but▪ To hold ones peace, is no Action: If he ſpeak of Phyſicall Virtue or Excellency, of naturall Perfection; then doe I deny, that all Naturall Exc…llency conſiſts in Action; for the Eſſence it ſelfe is Bonum Phyſicum: But if he ſpeak of Phyſicall Efficiency, then I grant, that Virtus Efficientis, or Efficientis Efficientia, conſiſtit in Actione; The Efficacy, or Efficiency of a Thing conſiſts in its Operation: But what then? May not an Eſſence Be without Action, becauſe it cannot Act without Action? Muſt its Eſſence be Action, becauſe its Efficacy is Action? In ordinary Philoſophy, operatio Sequitur eſſe, Operation Proceeds from the Eſſence, and not Conſtitutes it.
But, ſaith he; What is this their Actus primus? What is the Form of it? (I have ſaid, Its Own Eſſence; It is It ſelfe its Own Form, and the Form or Eſſence of the Soule: We muſt not enquire for the Eſſence of an Eſſence, nor for the Eſſence of a thing out of It ſelfe:) What is with them, the Form of a Reaſonable Soule? Is it not Reaſon? (Yes it is) And this Reaſon i… not Potentia Ratiocinandi, But Ratio: (he meaneth, I ſuppoſe Ratiocinatio, rather then Ratio; for Ratio and Potentia ratiocinandi are all one:) For if you diſtinguiſh between the Act and the Power the Act muſt ever be firſt, in Order, Dignity, and Nature: (But this I grant not.) So then, what is the Form of this primus Actus? is it not ſome Act? (Yes, but not an Action or Operation.) If it be, then muſt it exiſt, elſe you allow it but a bare Notionall Being; And if it exiſt, mu…t it not be that which you call actus ſecundus? I anſwer, It is Actus, (aliquid actu) but not an Action; It Exiſts alſo, and yet is not Actus Secundus, but the Form from whence actus ſecundus flows.
He proceeds; If it be not an Act (or action) then is it nothing elſe but a Power or Faculty depending upon ſomewhat elſe (viz upon the Soule;) and if this be the nature of the Firſt, what ſhall the ſecond Being (which is its Effect, and ſo Lower) be but a Notion. (Yet he ſaid even now, that the Act is before the Power in Order, Dignity, and Nature▪ and yet the Act is the Power'… Effect: How then …oth he now affirm, that the Effect is ſomewhat Lower then the Firſt Being?) I anſwer, It is not an Action; neither yet is it a Diſtinct (dependent) Faculty, (if we make the Soule and the Facul…y to be the ſame;) but the Souls Eſſence. But yet though we ſhould admit Reaſon to be a diſtinct Facul…y, (as ſ…me doe) and ſo, not to be the Soules actus primus, but actus afficiens: Yet doth, it not follow that the Operation muſt be onelyonly a Notion. Heavineſſe is not the Stones Eſſence, but an Accidentall Form, a Power or Faculty of Gravitation; yet is not its Deſcenſion onelyonly Imaginary but Reall. Heat in water is not its Eſſence, but a ſeparabl… Accident; yet its Calefaction, it Heating or Scalding, is not meerly Notionall, but Reall. So might it be here: there may be (notwithſtanding this Argument) a Faculty or Accidentall Form in the Soule, which may be an Actus Primus in reſpect of its Operations, (though, no… actus primoprimu… which is the Soules …ſſence,) from whence thoſe Operations, or Actus Secundi may proceed, which ye… might be Reall, and not Imaginary.
… he had (as he ſpeaks) ſet that distinction of Subſtance and Accident▪ (which he ſeems to challenge as an aged Impoſture) upon the Rack; I would willingly▪ have examined its forc'd confeſſion.
… the mean time, I ſee not from what ground …e can ſtrongly conclude, That this Activity (as he ſpeaks,) this Actus primus, conſiſts in Action; or That It and actus ſecundus are the ſ…me; and both One with Truth.
You will ask me, What diſtinction therefore will I allow between actus primus and ſecundus; between the Agent and its Action? I anſwer, The One is Res, the Other is Modus; and ſo the diſtinction is Modall: Neither more nor leſſe diſtinction will I admit of. And ſo doing, I diſſent not from the Opinion of others: For (as I remember) Suarez (not to inſtance in others) makes Action to be a Modus; And though he make a Tranſient Action to be Modus Patientis, (in which I aſſent not to him;) yet an Immanent Act (ſuch as are Rationall Operations) is with Him, Modus Agentis.