Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 9
CHAP. IX. How Knowledge and Affection differ.
FRom what hath been ſpoken in the former Chapter, without adding any more, may appear what is to be ſaid concerning his Ninth Chapter: How it comes to paſſe that ſome of mean Knowledge have Large Affections. For a Speculative Knowledge doth not alwayes Breed Affection, (becauſe the Will doth not alwayes follow the Underſtanding,) though neither doth it Extinguiſh it.
It is true, there is an Affection, which is rather a Blazing (then a Warming, Enlivening) Love, (as the Fools Mirth like the crackling of Thorns;) Which ariſeth either from a Falſe Apprehenſion, or elſe from the Novelty, rather then the ſweetneſſe, of the Object, (as the Smell of Flowers at the firſt approach doth moſt Affect the Senſe, though they be as Sweet afterwards;) And This perhaps may vaniſh, at the preſence of a more Clear or more Continued Light. But the true Warmth of Zeal is not extinguiſhed by the Light of Knowledge, (though Speculative,) but feeds upon it as Fewell: And the greater Growth there is in (eſpecially Experimentall) Knowledge, the greater is the Strength of Affection from it: And, thus, they that Know moſt (experimentally) do alwayes Love moſt: Knowledge and Affection go together.
Yet are we not forced from hence to grant, that Knowledge and Affection are the Same: Betwixt which I muſt needs allow the ſame difference (be it more or leſſe, that is, Reall, or Modall) which is between the Ʋnderſtanding and the Will: Knowledge is not Affection, and Affection is not Knowledge.
And that Objection which his Lordſhip from hence makes to himſelfe, That (ſince men of Largeſt Affections, doe not alwayes Know moſt of God, but ſome of Weaker Affections may Know More;) it might appear from hence, That all Being is not One, differing onelyonly in Degrees; but that there are even different Natures, amongst which one may Excell, while the other is Depreſt: This Objection, I ſay, i… of that force, that I ſee not how all which his Lordſhip brings, can take it away.
The large Encomiums, which he brings for Affectionate Knowledge, preferring it before Speculative, (which he proſecutes very Piouſly, very Judiciouſly, very Affectionately;) though it prove, That Affectionate Knowledge is the more Excellent; Yet doth it not ſhew That Speculative Knowledge is Nothing; or That the Meaſure of Affection alwayes follows the Meaſure of Speculative Knowledge: One of which he ought to have proved, if he conclude that Knowledge and Affection are the Same. A man may truly Know, that Sugar is Sweet, though he neither Taſt its Sweetneſſe, nor be Delighted or Pleaſed with that Taſt. And a Chriſtian is ſometimes to live by Faith and not by Senſe; That is, he is to Truſt, and Reſt upon the Speculative Knowledge of Gods Goodneſſe, and his own Intereſt in it; even then when for the preſent he wants the Senſe of it. He may Know and Beleeve that the Lord is Good, though he doe not Tast and See it. I will wait upon God (ſaith Iſay) which hath Hid his Face from the Houſe Iſrael. He that walketh in darkneſſe, and Sees no Light, muſt yet Truſt in the Name of the Lord, &c.
And thus much for the firſt Notion of Truth, or Reaſon, as it is the groundwork of Rationall Operations. In which, thus far I may go along with his Lordſhip, That Reaſon is but the Soul Intelligent; That Intellec…u…ll Habits are but Reaſon advanced; As likewiſe That its Operations are but Reaſon actuated. The firſt, diſtinguiſhed from the Soule at leaſt ratio…e ratiocinatâ: the two laſt, Modaliter. If he mean no more, I wiſh his expreſſions had been clearer: For then the Notions are not new, but the Words. If he do aliquid grandius moliri; I either Underſtand him not; o… cannot Aſſent to him.
But you will tell me perhaps, that I am miſtaken all this while; His Lordſh…p by Truth intends not Reaſon, as I take it; For the very Title of his firſt Chapter, calls it Truth Ʋnderſtood, and this cannot be Reaſon, for Reaſon is not that which is underſtood, but that whereby we underſtand.
It is true, it do…h ſo: But (ſhall I ſpeak it once for all?) the Titles of his …hapters, and his Marginall Notes, do ſo often claſh with the Text, that I cannot beleeve they were done by the ſame Pen. I… i… like his Lordſhip, writing it but as a Letter to a private Friend, by whom i… i… ſince publiſhed, did not at firſt diſtinguiſh it into chapters, and give it that Analyſis that now appears; and ſince its firſt writing, as the Epiſtle tels us not having ſo much as peruſed it, it is not like he hath added them ſince; But the Publiſher (as in the like caſes is frequent in Treatiſ…s of all ſorts) not to trouble his Lordſhip with ſo ſmall a matter, did it hi… ſelf. Who ever did it, it is like (as elſe where, ſo here) he either did not Apprehend, or not Attend punctually▪ his Lordſhips meaning. For it is clear enough, if we attend it, that that which he there contends to b… the ſ…me with the Ʋnderſtanding, cannot be Truth underſtood; but the Riſe or Groundwork from whence all actions and ſayings, the Effects of a Reaſonab…e Soule, breathe forth. It had been more agreeable to his Lordſhips mind, to have ſaid, Intellectus and Principium Intelligendi are the ſame; and not, that the Ʋnderstanding▪ and Truth-underſtood, are one▪ And ſo his Lordſhips method will be Exact, making the Soule or Underſtanding▪ One with its Faculties, chap. 1. with its Habits, chap. 8. with its Operations, chap. 10. Whereas, how the Object of all theſe, ſhould come firſt, and be that from whence all theſe breathe forth, appears not.