Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 11
CHAP. XI. Whether Time and Place be onelyonly Imaginary.
IN the next Chapter, we are called to conſider of the nature of Time and Place: which his Lordſhip occaſionally falls upon, by reaſon of an Obiection, That lays ſo ſtrong a ſiege to his Opinion, that I doubt hi… Lordſhips Anſwer will hardly raiſe it. It ariſeth from hence;
There a…e in the Soule various Operations and Workings, diſtinct in Time, and diſtinct in Place: which Diſtinction, though it may have an externall denomination in reſpect of Time and Place; yet ariſeth not from thence, but is Internall or Intrinſecall to the Operations themſe…ves; This Operation is not the Other, and the Other is not This. And thi… diſtinction would remain though the diſtinct Operations were performed in the ſame Time, in the ſame Place: Caſ…r and Pompey were not the ſame man, though Contemporary. The Water which to day runs down a River, is not the ſame water with that which yesterd…y ran in the ſame Place, the ſame Channell. Two Angels, though coexiſtent at th… ſ…me Time in the ſame Place▪ the ſame part of the Ayr, are not yet the ſame Angel. Thus Nutrition, and Volition, or Intellection, though at the ſame Time, performed by the ſame Soule reſident i… the ſame Body, are yet diſtinct Acts. And on the contrary, a man remains the ſame man to Day, that he was Yeſterd…y; at This place, that he was …t Another place; though both Time and Place be altered.
Now there being in the Soule various Actings, distinct both in Time and Place (though they receive not their diſtinction from either are there not then ſo many ſeverall Soules▪ (viz. if the Operations be the Souls Eſſence?) This is the Objection.
His Lordſhip ſuppoſing all the Difference between theſe Acts to ariſe from Time and Place, thinks that if he prove Time and Place to be Nothing, then theſe Acts will not be Diſtinct, but the ſame,; and ſo may conſtitute the ſame Soule.
But, whether Place and Time be any thing or nothing, whether they alter any thing or nothing in this point; Yet ſure we are that This Man is not the Other Man. This Soule not Another Soule, This Action is not the Other Action: And ſo the difficulty remains as hard; there will be various Operations ſtill.
He brings ſeverall Simile's to illuſtrate it. Complexion Lineaments, Harmony, though they be in themſelves Diverſe, yet they make up One pleaſing Being, which we call Beauty. A Flame ariſing from divers Thorns is but One Flame. A Stream ſupplied from ſeverall Springs, is but One Stream. I may adde, Many Members make up One Body; Many Creatures One World. (Yet ſtill One Member is not the Other; The water received from One Spring, is not the ſame water which came from the Other Spring, though both runne in the ſame Channell.)
But will he ſay, So is it in our caſe? That (in the ſame manner) ſeverall Acts doe conſtitute One Soule? Are theſe Actions its Integrall Parts, as the Members are of the Body; and ſeverall Waters of One Stream? &c. Are they a Piece of the Whole and make up the totum Compoſitum? Then is the Soule Diviſible; Then doth it loſe ſome part of it ſelfe, and becomes maimed at the ceſſation of every Action.
But he makes not the Soule perhaps to be conſtituted of theſe Actions, as ſo many Integrall Parts; But, ſaith he, The Soule is One Act, diſtinguiſhed to our Notton by ſeverall apparitions.
If ſo, then his Simile's drawn from Integrall Parts conſtituting the whole Compoſitum, will not hold.
But (ſecondly) I deny that all theſe Operations are but one Action in various Shapes. They are all Actions of the ſame Soule, but they are not all the ſame Action. The Soule, If you will may be called, One Soule under Various Shapes; But theſe Various Shapes cannot be ſaid to be One Shape. Like as Wax faſhioned ſucceſſively in ſeveral Moulds, is the ſame Wax in ſeverall Figures; but that theſe are all the Same Figure, we cannot ſay. Actions performed by the ſame Soule, are all Modi of the Same Thing, of the ſame Soule; but they are not all the ſame Modus. This is not the Other.
And this we may hold, whatever become of Time and Place for this Diſtinction ariſeth not from Them. A man is the ſame Man to day, that he was Yeſterday, though the Time be not the ſame. He is the ſame Man at York, that he was at London, though the Place be not the ſame. Time and Place doe neither make the Same to be Two, nor Two to be the Same; One to be Two, nor Two to be One: Yet what hinders but that Things and Actions may have an Intrinſicall Difference one from another.
Theſe various Beings, therfore, not being Differenced by theſe Circumstances of Time and Place, (th…ugh Different in both,) It is leſſe materiall for me to enquire What they are? or Whether they be ſome thing or nothing? Only I deſire to know, wherein the ſtrength of that Argument conſiſts, which is by us ſo often urged againſt Papiſts and Lutherans, concerning their Tranſubſtantiation, and Conſubſtantiation; viz. How Chriſts body can be at the Same Time in Severall Places? For, that i… might be ſucceſſively in all theſe Places at ſeverall Times, we deny not: Now, if at Severall Times it may be in divers Places; why may it not be ſo, at the Same Time, if Time and Place be Nothing? Againe, Severall Places at the ſame Time may contein ſeverall Bodies (v. g Bread, and Chriſts Body;) now why may not the Same place con…ine them, if Place be nothing? Why not Together, as well as Succeſſively, if Time be nothing?
All actions, ſaith he are Nothing if Time be Anything; Becauſe the Time allotted for every Action, be it never ſo ſhort, may be divided into ſeverall parts, many ſubdiviſions of Time. True. But is there not t…e ſame Reaſon of Actions that is of Time? are not they diviſible into as many parts, whereof every parcell anſwers to a portion of that Time? There is the ſame reaſon in every Continuum, be it Magnitude, Diſtance Time, Place, Duration, Motion, Action, or whatever: They are all equally diviſible in ſemper diviſibilia. If it be Actio Inſtantanea, it is diſpatched in an Inſtant, not in Time: If it be Actus Continuus, it is capable of as many diviſions as is that Time in which it is performed.
This not being well weighed ſaith he, hath raiſed that Question, [How God ſhould ſee All things?] If in their Exiſtences▪ then they are Coeternall with him: If only in their Cauſes, then are they not Preſent. Which difficulty, he ſuppoſeth, is diſſolved, by making Time to be Nothing, and Al things to be exi…ent, in their Beings, with God from all Eternity. (Which of how dangerous a conſequence it may prove his Lordſhip is not aware.)
That God befo…e the worlds Creation, did co-exiſt to this Inſtant; I doe confidently affirm; Y…t, that all things preſent, d…d exiſt before they were produced, I cannot aſſent; which I doubt not but to reconcile, (if I were now diſcuſſing that queſtion ex profeſſo, and not glancing at it in tranſitu) allowing notwithſtanding to Time and Place, their due reality; not making Temporall and Locall difference to be only Imaginary.
As likewiſe, How Permane…cy in God may conſiſt with Succeſſion in the Creature; and How Acts (of Creation, Preſervation, Redemption, Decree, the Execution of that Decree) may be Eternall, as they pr…ceed from God, though in the Creature recipiantur in Tempore▪ In Place we make no ſcruple of it, to affirm that anima eſt tota in toto & t…ta in qualibet parte, that the Whole Soule may be preſent to one Point, or part of the Body, without ceaſing to be Wholly preſent to another part; (Or, if poſſibly in the Soul, and Created Spirituall ſubſtances, it may be queſtioned; yet doubtleſſe, in God himſelfe, it muſt needs be granted, that he is Ʋbique Totus:) Now, if it be not repugnant to be coexiſtent to one Point of Place, without ceaſing to coexiſt to another point though Diſtant; Why not to one Point of Time, without ceaſing to be preſent to another, though Succeſſive?
The next Objection, Concerning the nature of Evill, is of leſſe force againſt his Tenet. For, That Good and Evill may coexiſt in One entire Act; That there may be ſome Degrees of Goodneſſe in an Action, and yet not that Perfection of Goodneſſe, that ought to be; may as well be granted, as That the Twilight hath not [So much] Light, and [So much] poſitive darkneſſe, but that it hath not ſo [Much] Light as the Midday. But yet in the mean time it may be doubted, whether the Nature of Evill be meerly Privative. It is true indeed, The nature of (Moral) Evill is a Non-conformity (or Difformity rather) to Gods Law: But why may not this non-conformity ariſe ex praeſentiâ non debiti, as well as ex abſentiâ debiti, or ex defectu debiti ineſſe? May not a Line diſagree from its meaſure, by being too Long, as well as by being too Short? The not diſtinguiſhing between bonum Metaphyſicum, and bonum Morale, may perhaps have cauſed ſome errour in this aſſertion. But I ſtand not now to decide it: You ſhall find more of it in the next chapter.
But that which is aſſumed as a ground of this Aſſertion, is farre more improbable then the Aſſertion it ſelfe. viz. That Contradictions may be ſimul, ſemel, & eodem reſpectu, in the ſame Subject.
What neceſſity his Lordſhip had to embrace this opinion of Anaxagoras, Democritus &c. (as he ſaith,) againſt Aristotle; I do not diſcern. Neither can I ſee, wherein this co-exiſtence of Contradictions doth appeare. For the Preſence of an Inferiour Degree, and the Negation of a Farther Degree, are no Contradictions, becauſe they are not ad idem. And ſuch a Coexiſtence Aristotle and his followers will not deny; Elſe how can they ſpeak of Qualitates Remiſſae? Nay more, They will grant an Inferiour Degree, to conſiſt, not only with the Negation of a Farther Degree, but even with the Preſence of its Contrary; For they deny not but that there may be Contrary qualities in the ſame Subject in Remiſſis gradibus, (as Heat and Cold in warm water, though not in gradibus Intenſis.
But if Anaxagoras, or any other, will contend, That perfect Contradictions may …t and together, That the Preſence of an inferiour degree, may ſtand with the Abſence or Negation of the Same degree; It will be in vain to diſpute againſt it. For when I have proved it to be Falſe, they will grant it is ſo, and affirm withall, That notwithſtanding its Falſhood, yet may it alſo be True, becauſe Contradictions are not Inconſiſtent. (Another adverſary perhaps would deale more ſharply with his Lordſhip upon this point: I paſſe it.)
He proceeds to ſhew by divers ſimilitudes, How the ſame thing may take divers ſhapes in our Apprehenſion; And conſequently, that the ſeverall Apparitions of Truth do not forthwith evince the Variety of Truth. All which we deny not, For otherwiſe we cannot acknowledge that there is any distinctio Rationis; Rationall diſtinctions being no other but inadaequati conceptus ejuſdem rei. That there is therefore a Rationall Distinction, we deny not; But that there is Only a Rationall Diſtinction, and not alſo a Reall diſtinction; this is that we deny. Some things we acknowledge to be only Ratione distincta, but Other things we contend to have a Reall diſtinction. Which muſt be overthrown before he can conclude, that all the actions of reaſon which ſeem ſeverall, are but on…, a fixt intire Ʋnity.
He toucheth laſtly, upon Copernicus his Opinion, Which, he ſaith, hath been confuted theſe many yeares by the three leading Senſes. (And yet his margent ſaith, that ſenſe is confuted by Him.) For we [See] the circumvolutions of the Heavens: we [Feel] our ſelves upon a ſtable Foundation; We [Heare] not from the Volutations of the Earth ſuch a black Cant as her heavy rowlings would rumble forth.
But (not to dispute the truth of Copernicus his Opinion) I think I may affirm that Neither of theſe Teſtimonies of Senſe do any way contradict his Aſſertion. For, firſt, I deny that we [See] the Revolution of the Heavens. We diſcern indeed, (and that Truly,) that the Starres at ſeverall times have ſeverall Poſitions in reſpect of our Horizon; (and this is all:) But whether this diverſity of Poſition ariſe from the Motion of the One, or the Other, or Both, our Sight determins not; Affirming only That there is ſuch a diverſe Poſiture. 2 Our ſenſe of [Feeling] aſſures us of thus much, That the Earth is ſuch a Foundation as upon which we reſt; and, that we remain in the ſame Poſiture in reſpect of the Earth and the Air circumſtant; Which may be as well if all jointly Move together, as if all jointly stand ſtill. A man in a Ship under Hatches upon a ſmooth water, ſuppoſeth himſelfe to ſit faſt upon his Seat, (and he doth ſo;) and he ſeeth all things about him to remain at the ſame Diſtance, in the ſame Poſiture, diſcerning no alteration: Yet this hinders not but that He and They may be joyntly moved Together, without being thrown from off his ſeat, upon which he may ſit as firm as if he were on ſhore. And 3 for the ſenſe of [Hearing,] I ſee no reaſon, why it ſhould be more blamed for not hearing the ſound of the Earths Volutation; then for not hearing the Pythagorian Harmony. If the vaſt Celestiall Spheres, whoſe almoſt every Starre doth farre exceed the Terreſtriall Globe, be whirled about with ſuch a ſilent motion, as that the quickeſt Eare cannot diſcern it; Why may not the Earth, a farreleſſer body, paſſe as quietly, without ſuch a diſmall Cant, ſuch an hideous Noiſe, as his Lordſhip doth ſuppoſe? For Noiſe doth not ariſe meerly from Motion; but from the Croſſing or Thwarting of ſeverall motions, from the Claſhing and Colliſion of one Body againſt another, by reaſon that the One (ſtanding) interrupts the Other in its Motion, or Both moving according to ſeverall motions do mutually hinder each others progreſſe: Whereas, if all moved the ſame Way, with the ſame Speed, (as is ſuppoſed in the Motion of the Earth, and the things adjoyning) there would be no ſuch Claſhing, or Interruption of one another, and (conſequently) no Noiſe.
The Senſes Teſtimony therefore doth not contradict the Opinion of Copernicus, The Eye tells us, that the Starres and We are at ſeverall times in ſeverall Poſitures, but, whether it proceed from Their motion or from Ours, it affirmeth not. Our Feeling informs us, that we are not toſſed from Place to Place, that is, from one part of the Earths Superficies to another, but remain upon the ſame part of its Surface: But whether we jointly move together, or jointly reſt immovable, it determins not. The Eare can tell us, That it hears no Noiſe, (for how can it ſince there is none?) But it doth not ſay, There is no Motion. Theſe Witneſſes therefore can teſtifie nothing in this cauſe; Except we ſhould ſuborn them, and put that into their Mouths, which is not within their Knowledge, Or falſify the Records, by ſuppoſing them to ſay That, which they ſay not.