Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 8
CHAP. VIII. The Nature of Habits Whether they be one with Truth or the Soules Eſſence.
IN the eighth Chapter, he ſpeaks ſomewhat concerning the nature of Habits. And this is to be adjoyned to the end of the 5. Chapter: the 6. and 7. Chapters, (wherein he inferres a Corollary, concerning the Eſſence of All things▪ That it is One, That it is Ʋnity;) being inſerted as a Parentheſis. He had in the fifth Chapter affirmed That the Soul is nothing but Truth; Yet (ſaith he) while I affirm, that the Soule is nothing but this Truth, I doe not refuſe the doctrine of Habits, either Infuſed or Acquiſite.
But before I proceed, It is not amiſſe to give notice of a different acceptation of Truth here, from that before. He ſpake before of the Truth or Light of Reaſon, which he contended, to be One with the Soul, and not a diſtinct Faculty. This Light was an Innate or Connate Light, which hath its Originall and its Period with the Soule: For when the Soule begins, the Light of Reaſon begins, and this Light of Reaſon is no ſooner extinct, then when the Soule ſhall ceaſe to be. But the Light of Habituall Knowledge, (whether Infuſed or Acquiſite,) is not an Innate Light, but an Advenient Light; ſubſequent to the Soules firſt Exiſtence, and really ſeparable from it. Yet may it be Antecedent to another degree of Advenient Light, viz. Actuall Knowledge, which may proceed from Habituall.
This Advenient Light of Habituall knowledge differs from Innate Light of Reaſon; as a Habit in the firſt ſpecies of Quality, from Naturalis potentia, or a Faculty, in the ſecond ſpecies. And ſo, howſoever it may be true, That a Faculty or Naturall Power, may be ſo farre the Same with the Soule, as that it differ only ratione ratiocinatâ; Yet in a Habit, we muſt of neceſſity grant a diſtinction ex parte rei. For where there may be a Reall Separation (and not onelyonly Mentall) there muſt needs be granted a Diſtinction in re. Now that in all Habits there may be a reall Separation, is apparent: For (though, it may be, ſome Habits acquired or infuſed cannot be loſt when they are once had, as Grace, &c. yet) before the acquiſition or infuſion of ſuch Habits, the Soule was actually without them. Indeed it is true, That theſe Habits cannot ſubſiſt without the Soule; and therefore they may not be imagined to be Really diſtinct, as res & res; yet becauſe the Soule may exiſt without theſe; therefore they muſt have a Modall diſtinction in re, as res & modus. Thus the Roundneſſe of a piece of Coyn, though, when it is, it is the ſame Thing with the Silver, not being a Thing added, but only a Modification, a moulding or faſhioning of the Former thing; yet muſt it be Diſtinct from the eſſence of the Silver, though not a Thing diſtinct: Otherwiſe when this Silver looſeth its Roundneſſe, it ſhould looſe its Eſſence and become ſomwhat elſe; whereas the Silver in this form, is not really diſtinct from it ſelfe in another forme, but the ſame Metall, the ſame Silver.
There being then this difference between a Habite and a Faculty: Though Reaſon ſhould be One with the ſoule without ſo much as a Modall diſtinction; yet follows it not, that a Habit hath the ſame Reall Identity, but that it may be diſtinguiſhed ex parte rei.
Habits he diſtinguiſheth into Infuſed and Acquiſite. When the ſoul (ſaith he) by vertue of its Being is cleare in ſuch a Truth; it is ſaid to be an Infuſed habit: when by frequent action, ſuch a Truth is Connaturall to the Soule, it may be ſtiled an Habit Acquiſite, though &c.
Whether or no this be the genuine diſtinction between an Acquiſite and Infuſed Habit, it is not materiall ſtrictly to examine. If the ſoule by its Eſſence be cleare in ſuch a Truth; that is, be ready to act according to ſuch a Truth: I ſhould call this a Faculty or Naturall power, rather then an Habit. Thus Gravity in a Stone, whereby it is naturally prone to deſcend, I ſhould not call an Habit, but a Faculty. (Though Heavineſſe, in another relation, be neither a Faculty nor an Habit, but qualitas Patibilis. And ſo perhaps may Knowledge, as it is an accidentall Form informing the ſoule, be referred to the ſame ſpecies of Quality, though it can hardly be called by that Name: For a Habit quatenus ſic, is ſo called, not with any relation to the Subject, but in relation to Acts, which ſlow from it, or are produced by it.)
This Proneneſſe or Aptneſſe for operation which is in any thing immediatly from its Eſſence, is a naturall Power or Faculty; And a Habit, is a further Readineſſe, and Pliableneſſe, or Facility of working according to this Faculty: A Habit therefore alwayes preſuppoſeth a Faculty, as being but a Facilitation of it. And when as by Reaſon a man hath an Ability to underſtand: by Habituall Knowledge, he hath a Readineſſe to underſtand.
Now this Readineſſe or Facility, if it proceed from Often Acting; ſo that from the iterating of former Acts it becomes more prone either to continue or repeate thoſe Acts; It is an Acquiſite Habit: (Somewhat of this may be ſeene in Naturall things; A Wheele being once in motion, it will by a ſmaller force be Continued, then at firſt Begun; yea for a while perſiſt without help.) If this Facility proceed from ſome Accidentall Form produced in it by an Externall Agent, it is an Infuſed Habit: The difference between an Infuſed and an Acquiſit being no other but only in reſpect of the Efficient. Thus the Knowledge of divers Tongues and the Ability to ſpeak them, which was in ſome of the Apoſtles by immediate Infuſion, was an Infuſed Habit; whereas in others (as in Paul) it was Acquiſite; differing from the other, not in Form, but in the Efficient.
A Habit therefore, whether Infuſed or Acquiſite, being but a Facilitation of the Faculty, cannot be a Thing diſtinct from that Faculty, but only a Modus of it, which hath not in it ſelfe a Poſitive Abſolute Being of its own; but is a Modification of another Being: And its Phyſicall Being, Exiſtentia Rei, muſt be the ſame with the Being of that, which is thus Modificated; For it is not ipſum Exiſtens, but Modus Exiſtendi: And this Manner of Exiſting hath not an Exiſtence of its own, diſtinct from the Exiſtence of that which doth exiſt in this manner: Yet its Formall and Metaphyſicall Being is diſtinct. Yea and its Phyſicall Exiſtence, ſuch as it is capable of, that is, Exiſtentia Modi; for not being Res, but Modus rei, we muſt not expect that it ſhould have any Exiſtence of its own beſides the Exiſtence of a Modus: and this Existentia Modi is the actuall Modificating of the Thing Exiſting after this Manner. The which Exiſtence though it be not Exiſtentia Rei, yet it is a Reall Exiſtence, (exiſtentia in re) and not Mentall: For the thing exiſtent is not only ſuppoſed to exiſt in this manner, but indeed doth ſo, thus ordered, thus modificated: and therefore that Modus doth actually, & really modificate, and is not only ſuppoſed ſo to doe.
But if you will not admit (with Scotus) of any Modus entis, as a Medium between Ens & Non-ens, Res et Nihil, a Thing and Nothing; you muſt then ſay, it is Res: for Nothing I am ſure it cannot be: For doubtleſſe there is ſome difference more then Imaginary between Knowledge and Ignorance, between a Square ſtone and a Round ſtone, between Silver Stamped and the ſame Smooth and Plain. This difference I ſhould call Modall, accounting the Roundneſſe &c. not Res but Modus Rei; affirming, that when Wax &c. is put out of one form or faſhion into another, thereis no new Thing propounded; but that which before was, is now otherwiſe ordered.
And thus it is moſt true which his Lordſhip ſpeaks, That Habituall Knowledge, is nothing but Light more or leſſe glorious; It is Reaſon cleared; It's only Facultas facilitata, or facultatis Facilitas: And to this Facility or Readineſſe to operate, I cannot allow a Phyſicall exiſtence of its own; as neither to any Habit whatſoever, as being but Modi and not Entia; It's not a Being, but a Manner of Being; not Ens but aliquid Entis. And I ſhould eaſily be perſwaded to grant the ſame concerning all Accidents whatſoever, which have long ſince been called Entis Entia: And however an Accident hath been accounted to be Res, and ſo to have Exiſtentiam Rei; yet not Subſiſtentiam Rei: Though it have an Existence of its own, yet its Subſiſtence is no other but Subſiſtentia Subjecti.
Yet I cannot with his Lordſhip ſubſcribe to the Platoniſts, to make Knowledge nothing but a Remembrance. (As if there were naturally in our Underſtanding, the Pictures or Pourtraictures of all Truths, but ſo obſcured and covered as it were with duſt, that theſe glorious Colours doe not appear, till ſuch time as they be rubbed and waſhed over anew.) I approve rather of Ariſtotle's Raſa Tabula, (then Plato's Reminiſcentia) making the Underſtanding, of it ſelfe, to have no ſuch Idea or Picture at all, but capable of all. Or thus (I know not how it can be better expreſſed;) The Underſtanding is not as a Table, wherein the Kings Picture is pourtrayed in lively colours, but (hanging in the dark) it appears not, that there are any ſuch Lineaments, till it be Enlightened with the Sunne, and then it preſents us with a Fair Deſcription: But rather as a Glaſſe which is able to Receive and Reflect whatſoever Colours fall upon it, though (before) it had none of them.
For I demand, What Principle is there implanted in nature to enform me, Whether there ever were ſuch a City as Troy? Whether it were ſo deſtroyed? Whether this or that were Plato's or Aristotle's Opinion? What Principle to enform, that it rained yeſterday & is faire to day? Certainly, matters of Fact have not ſuch Idea's implanted in Nature; for then might they by Diſcourſe be known to have been or not to have been, without the help either of Senſe or Information. And if Historicall Knowledge may be acquired without any fore-implanted Idea's of thoſe Truths ſo known; why alſo may not Diſcurſive Truth be alſo Known without a Reminiſcentia, or a Review of Forgotten o… Obſcure Principles?
Next he tells us, That wee may Seem by frequent actings to help the Soule, and ſo to create Acquiſite Habits; whereas indeed it is not ſo, but all Actings are only new Diſcoveries.
But how this can ſtand with his former doctrine of Reminiſcentia, I doe not ſee: For this takes away not only Plato's Reminiſcentia, but all Remembrance whatſoever. If all Actings be new Diſcoveries, How and When can wee be ſaid to Remember?
But is it ſoe? doe Former Actings no way help our Subſequent Acts? I… ſo, how can a Learned Schollar be ſaid to Know more then an Ignorant Peaſant? For the one is as capable of a new diſcovery as the other, i… his former acts make no preparation or fitneſſe for future acts. How comes it to paſſe, that Learned men ſhall apprehend thoſe Truths at the firſt relation, which another cannot without much adoe be brought to conceive? Nay why ſhould an Artiſt be more skilfull in his Trade then another? Why may not an Infant new born plead his cauſe as well as the beſt experienced Lawyer? Certainly, if former acts doe not indeed produce an Habituall Knowledge (but only ſeem to doe) in the one which is not in the other, the one may as well act as the other, for there is the ſame Reaſonable Soule in a Child, which is in him afterwards.
The difference ſurely muſt proceed from hence, That the Former Actings have produced a Facility and Readineſſe for Future Acts: that ſo, what was before more Difficult, becomes now Facile.
Nay more, That which before was utterly Impoſſible, becoms now both Feazi…le and Eaſie. All the moſt refined Wits in the world joyning their acuteſt Diſcoveries, their ſtrongeſt Iudgements together, are not able without the help of Hiſtoricall Relation, ever to know ſuch a thing as the Deſtruction of Troy: Yet when this, or the like, hath been either Seen by our ſelves, or Related to us, it is then eaſie to tell afterwards, what wee have ſeen, what we have heard, without a ſecond view or a new relation. Now if the former Actings, do no… way prepare for a future Act; why might not the Firſt diſcovery have been made by our own light of Reaſon, without an Externall ſupply, from our Senſes, or from Information, as well as the Second?
Philoſophers (ſaith he) affirm this boldly of the Ʋnreaſonable Creature, …teributing it to an Instinct or new Influence▪ Why then may we not conclud… the ſame of Man?
That Philoſophers attribute much to Inſtinct in Unreaſonable Creatures, I grant: But that by an Inſtinct, they meant a new Influence, I was not aware. Certainly Memory hath been accounted one of the Senſus …nt…rni, and ſoe belonging to the Senſitive Soule, and therefore not to be denied to Brutes: And doubtleſſe daily experiments put it out of queſtion, That Brute Creatures make uſe of Memory, and by former acts, are fitted for following acts; not doing all from a new Inſtinct.
I am called in the next place, to ſearch out the difference between Reaſon and Faith. They differ (ſaith he) only in Degrees, not in Nature: For if Soule, Ʋnderſtanding, Habits be all the ſame, then neither doe Reaſon and Faith differ.
I grant that there is the ſame ground, why wee ſhould make Reaſon and Faith the Same; that there is to make the Faculty and the Habit the Same. Reaſon is a Faculty, Faith a Habit: Now a Faculty and a Habit, I have before ſayd not to be res & res, but res & modus. Their Phyſicall Difference therefore (I mean, if you conſider Faith and Reaſon in the ſame man) is but Modall.
But it doth not follow from hence, That they differ not in Nature. For though an Habit have not Entitatem Rei, diſtinct from the Faculty; yet it hath Entitatem Modi; ſo that the Habit is not a Faculty, neither is the Faculty an Habit.
To enquire of a Phyſicall Identity, and of a Metaphyſicall or Formall Identity, are quaere's farre diſtinct. The Faith of Peter is Really and Phyſically diſtinct from the Faith of Paul; and yet their Metaphyſicall Formall nature is exactly the Same. Again, all the Modall Beings in the ſame ſubject, though their Eſſence and Nature be never ſo diſtinct (v. g. Duration, Augmentation, Situation &c, in the ſame man) be Really the ſame; (for neither of them, being Modi, have any Entitatem Rei, beſide the Entity of their common Subject, and ſo cannot make a Reall diſtinction, becauſe there is not res & res:) Yet each Modus hath a diſtinct Formall nature of its own: The nature of a Figure, is not the nature of a Habit, though both in the ſame Subject.
But yet, though it doe not follow from that Reall Identity between Res & Modus, that the Nature of Reaſon and the Nature of Faith be the ſame: Yet if he change but the terms, and ſay (in ſtead of Reaſon) that Knowledge and Faith are the ſame in nature, I will not contend: So that he mean Faith as it is an Act or Habit of the Ʋnderstanding, and not of the Will. For ſo, Faith is an Aſſent to a Truth reveiled: & the ſame individuall Aſſent to the ſame Truth, may be both Cognitio Scientiae, and Cognitio Fidei▪ I will inſtance in the Creation of the world: By Faith we know that the worlds were made, and Aſſent to it: And by naturall Demonſtrations it may be proved, that the world was made; and theſe alſo are ſufficient to perſwade aſſent. Now we from both grounds (joyntly) aſſent to this Propoſition, That the world was made. The which Aſſent in reſpect of the one Ground (propter evidentiam rei) is an aſſent of Science or Naturall Knowledge; in regard of the other Ground (Propter authoritatem dicentis) is an aſſent of Faith, or Supernaturall and reveiled Knowledge. The aſſent of Science, and of Faith, differ not in their Form, but in their Efficient.
But if he ſpeak of Saving Faith (quatenus Salvifica) as it doth Save: ſo it is an act of the Will, and not of the Underſtanding; and therefore differs from Knowledge.
But, to conclude this: If we ſpeak of a Phyſicall difference or diſtinction, Then all the Modi that belong to the ſame Thing, can admit of no more then a Modall diſtinction: becauſe having no other Entitatem Rei, but that of the common Subiect, their Entitas Rei muſt be Common; there cannot be Res & Res: the difference muſt be either tanquam Res & Modus, or tanquam Modus & Modus: And here is no conſideration of the Nature of theſe Modi. In distinct Things; The Modi are Really diſtinct and not Modally though theſe Modi be exactly of the ſame nature; as the Roundneſſe of ſeverall Circles; For they not having Entitatem Rei beſides the Entity of their Subjects; their Subjects being really diſtinct, they muſt be really diſtinct alſo.
(Thus in the preſent caſe, The Faith of Peter is really diſtinct from the Faith of Paul: But Faith in Peter from Reaſon in Peter is only Modally diſtinct, tanquam Res & Modus; (viz. If you make Reaſon to be Res, or a Faculty Really diſtinct from the ſoule:) and the Habit of Faith in Peter will be diſtinct from all other Habits in Peter (v. g. from the Habit of Knowledge) tanquam Modus & Modus.)
But if wee ſpeak, not of a Phyſicall, but of a Metaphyſicall Difference; Here it little avails to enquire of their Phyſicall Difference, or Identity. For thoſe things that are really distinct, as two Souls, may yet agree in the ſame Specificall Nature: and thoſe which are not really diſtinct (as ſeverall Modi of the ſame Thing) may have their Formall Specificall differences.
Again, though it be granted that Naturall Knowledge (attained by by the uſe of Reaſon, without a ſupernaturall Revelation) be of the ſame Nature with Faith; Yet doth it not preſently follow, That their difference is Graduall, and the one but a greater Degree of the ſame Light: For Skill in Muſick and Skill in Metalls or Mineralls, are both Naturall Habits; yet the Skill of a Muſician, and the Skill of a Chymiſt are not the Same (though of the ſame nature;) neither yet is their difference Graduall; For the one is not the way to attain the other and the other a Perfection of that former. And moreover a man may be skilfull in either of them without a knowledge of the other, whereas a Greater Degree of Knowledge in the ſame Kind cannot be without the Leſſer.
That which follows, concerning Falling from Grace, and the Freedome of the Will, (as alſo what proceeds, How farre we do acti agere, that is, How farre, and In what manner, the Firſt cauſe doth concurre with the Second in its Operations) require a larger diſcourſe for the deciding of them, then to be toucht at in tranſitu, and by the way. I ſhall therefore ſay onelyonly this (and ſo paſſe them over;) Liberty and Servitude are oppoſit; and both are Relative terms. He that is Free from the Dominion of one Maſter, may be a Servant, a Slave, to another. Thus the Will, though it be Free from any Naturall Neceſſity, either from within, or without; ſo that it be neither determined by an inward Principle, as meer Naturall Agents are; neither can have either Compulſion, or Neceſſity, impoſed upon it by the command of another Creature: Yet is it not Free from the Command and Power of God, by whoſe Abſolute Decree it is determined. We muſt not ſo farre affect to be Liberi, that we become Sacrilegi; we muſt not vindicate our Liberty by committing Sacriledge, exempting our ſelves from being under the Power of a Deity.
If I were now to examine the nature of Freedome, wherein it conſiſts: I might perhaps place it in a Spontaneity, that it acts without reluctancy, Sponte agit: Were it not that even Naturall Agents (as a Stone falling) have ſuch a free action, without Conſtraint, without Reluctancie.
Or it might be placed perhaps in a Reflection upon its own Act; whereby it doth not onelyonly Agere, yea and Sponte (or volens) agere, without a Nolition, a Renitentia; But alſo Vult agere: Whereas a Naturall agent, though perhaps Sponte or Volens agit, yet you cannot ſay Vult agere, becauſe there is not a Reflection whereby it Willeth its Action. That which hinders me from placing it in this, is, Becauſe I allow not any reflex act of Willing in God, beſides that direct act of Working, who is yet a moſt Free Agent. For (beſide other reaſons, that if need were, might be produced) it ſtands not with Gods Simplicity, to admit diſtinct acts in God, whereof one ſhould be the Object of another. Now what ſtrength there is in this, to hinder the placing of Freedome in this Reflex act, I propoſe to be conſidered, rather then Affirm.
But I rather place the nature of the Wills Liberty, in a Freedome from Servitude, that it is not under the command of any Creature, or a Naturall Determination of its own. And therfore though it be free from ſuch ſervitude as a Naturall agent, or ſuch as may be Forced, is ſubject to; yet it is not free from Gods Command; Nor (perhaps) from the dictate of Reaſon neither, Or, if it be, yet is not this its Freedome, but its Weakneſſe.
And this is not far diſtant from the received opinion, which makes it conſiſt in Indifferentiâ. For the Will can agere vel non agere notwithſtanding anything to the contrary from the Creature; but it cannot agere vel non agere notwithſtanding the Decree of God; and therfore is not Free from that Determination. And whereas other things are from God determined mediante cauſa ſecundâ, the Will is Immediately determined a cauſa primâ.
And therefore what he cites out of Rutterfort, That granting all things to be under an abſolute Decree, it is fond to aske, Whether the Free Creature remain indifferent to doe or not to doe; I willingly aſſent unto. But you muſt conſider withall, that This Freedome neither the Angels have, nor had Adam in his Innocencie.
And therefore, when Divines tell us, that by the Fall we have loſt our Liberty, or Freedome of Will, in Spirituall things, which yet we retain in Morall and Civill Actions; I deſire that they would more punctually ſet down, What the Liberty is, which we retain in Naturall things, but want in Spirituall; What Liberty that is, which the Angels have, and Man once had, but hath now loſt: And not ſpeak of ſuch a Liberty as neither Man or Angel ever had, nor is it poſſible for any Creature to have; Nay not for God himſelfe, For God having once decreed, cannot with his Truth revoke it, nor is indifferent to execute it or not; But, as They ſay of Jupiter, which make Him to be the Author of their Stoicall unavoidable Fate (underſtanding it cum grano ſalis) He once Commanded, and ever after Obeyed.
There follows in the next place, an Objection, How it comes to paſſe, if Faith and Knowledge be One, that ſome who have more Knowledge have leſſe Faith.
I need not recite his Lordſhips Anſwer, I will only propoſe my own. If there be meant a Phyſicall Identity, whereby two Modi of the ſame Thing doe ſubſiſt by the ſubſiſtence of their common Subject, it is not hard to determine: For two Modifications of the ſame Thing may yet be independent of each other: And therefore it is not requiſite they ſhould be both in the ſame meaſure, or degree.
2. If by Knowledge be meant an aſſent to Naturall truths, and by Faith, an aſſent to Supernaturall truths; neither is here any difficulty: For the Knowledge of one thing is not inconſiſtent with the Ignorance of another thing.
3. …f Knowledge and Faith be conſidered in relation to the ſame Object, Spirituall truths, or Saving truth, and Faith be taken for an Intellectuall aſſent to them: Then is it not true, that there is in any (if you ſpeak adid…m▪ more Knowledge and leſſe Faith; what any Knows to be Thus, he cannot Beleeve to be Otherwiſe. For the Underſtanding is not a Free faculty, that it can either Accept or Reject a reveiled Truth.
4. If by Faith be meant, not an Aſſent in the Ʋnderstanding to the Truth Known, but a Conſent in the Will, an imbracing of it (which is the Iuſtifying act of Faith:) Neither is this difficulty much greater then the former▪ For the too too frequent ſinnes, even in Gods children, againſt light, makes it over manifeſt, That the Action of the Will doth not always follow the Knowledge of the Underſtanding.
And yet if this too cleare experience be not able to prove it, but that you ſtill lay all the blame upon the Underſtanding, as not being cleare enough in its Apprehenſions, or not ſufficiently Peremptory in its Dictates; and ſo excuſe the Will of all Remiſſeneſſe: I demand then, what diſability there is in the Will of Man ſince the fall more then in the confirmed Angels and Saints in Heaven? I cannot think but that the Image of God, by the Fall, is defaced in the Will as well as in the Underſtanding; and yet if the Will doe never diſobey the Light of Reaſon, which is its ſole (immediate) Guide, I ſee not wherein this diſability doth appear.
I grant that the Will doth always Follow the Underſtanding, that is, it never goes before it, or without it; it goes never but where the Underſtanding hath led the way, in diſcovering ſome Good, (more or leſſe,) ſomething Deſirable. For the Will is Caeca potentia▪ and Knows of nothing deſirable, but what the Underſtanding diſcovers. And Knowing nothing, can Deſire nothing; Ignoti nulla Cupido.
But yet I grant not that Propoſition in this ſenſe, The will Allwayes follows the Underſtanding; that is, It never ſtays behind. For to Omit what the Underſtanding commands, requires not a diſcovery of ſome other Good, but only an Impotency, a Backwardneſſe, or Remiſneſſe to doe its Duty. To goe without direction, requires a Poſitive Cauſe, becauſe it is a Poſitive Act; But Not to goe when it is directed, may proceed from a Negative Cauſe (Negatio Cauſae,) becauſe it is a Negative Act, or a Not-doing. A lame man doth not runne, when he knows, that he ought to runne; yet here is no need of a Poſitive Cauſe to ſtay him, but his Impotency (a Negative cauſe) ſufficeth.
And thus farre do I admit that diſtinction of Libertas Contrarietatis, and Libertas Contradictionis, though in that way in which it is ordinarily made uſe of, I doe wholly reject it. There is not in the Will an Indifferency to chooſe Good or to chooſe Evill; neither yet to Chooſe good, or Reject good (velle & nolle;) both which they call Libertas Contrietatis. For the Underſtanding doth not ſhew any Amiableneſſe or Lovelyneſſe in Evill; nor any Odiouſneſſe in Good (quatenus ſic;) and therefore the Will cannot Deſire Evill, nor Reject Good (Nolle, or Ʋelle non.) For Bonitas is Objectum formale Appetitûs; and Malum is the formall Object of Nolition. Now the Soule cannot velle quatenus bonum, that in which no Good is apprehended; nor nolle quatenus malum (that is, velle ut non ſit) that wherein it apprehends no Evill. But for the other kinde of Indifferency, (which they call Libertas Contradictionis,) to Will good, or Not Will it; to Nill Evill, or Not to Nill it; This I acknowledge to be in the Will. For that by reaſon of its Imbecillity, it is not ſo ready to execute its Functions as it ought to be.
But yet I do not conceive the Liberty of the Will to conſiſt in this; Or, that this is any Perfection to the Will, To be able to Suſpend its Act, notwithſtanding the Underſtandings direction to the contrary. (For this the Angells Confirmed cannot doe, nor the Saints Glorified; for if their Will could act contrary to their Underſtanding, then could they Sinne; And yet theſe Agents are no leſſe Free, then Man is: Yea God, who is the moſt abſolutely-Free Agent, yet cannot Will or Decree that which is contrary to his Sapience, (intellectus divinus;) his Will never thwarts his Wiſdome.) But I conceive it to be an Imperfection or Weakneſſe in mans Will; which, Before the Fall, was not ſo Stable, but that it might Fall; and is Now become ſo Weak, that it is Ʋnable to Staud.
The common Opinion is, That, If the Will cannot diſobey the Iudgement of the Underſtanding, then is it not a Free faculty but all its actions are determined by the Underſtanding, while It dictates, that this or that is to be done or omitted; and ſo Freedome ſhould be placed in the Ʋnderſtanding and not in the Will. I may adde, (to help their cauſe forward) that there may ſeem to be no Freedome at all: For the Will is determined by the dictate of the Ʋnderstanding, and therefore in it is no freedom, no Election; and the Ʋnderſtanding (by generall conſent) is not Free, to judge this or that as it pleaſeth, but muſt aſſent or diſſent according to its Light: ſo that Here will be no Freedom neither. For this reaſon they ſay, That the Will is not neceſſitated to follow the dictate of Reaſon; but when the Underſtanding hath declared what it can, it is yet in the power of the Will to Chooſe.
But then, leaſt they ſhould fall upon another rock, viz. That, if the Will may reject the Underſtandings advice; then may it deſire that which the Underſtanding affirms to be Evill; contrary to that Principle, That Good is the only Object of Deſire: To avoid that danger, they have found out this diſtinction of Libertas Contrarietatis and libertas Contradictionis, which they apply thus; The Will hath power indeed to diſobey that which the Underſtanding propoundeth: But yet not ſo, as if, of two Objects, whereof the Underſtanding Allows of one, and Diſallows of the other, it were free notwithſtanding to imbrace Either; But when an Object is commended by the Underſtanding, though the Will cannot Elect its Contrary, yet it may not-elect this, it may chooſe whether or no it will Imbrace it. And thus they think the whole matter is ſalved.
This Anſwer may ſeem plauſible, and hath paſt for current: But yet (with their leaves) the Wound, though perhaps skinned over, is not ſo eaſily Healed. For if they may not admit the Liberty of Contrariety: they may not (in my judgement) admit the Other. For when the Underſtanding commends an Object to the Will, as that which Ought to be Deſired, here are two oppoſite terms, to Imbrace, or not Imbrate; (agere, ſuſpendere:) The Underſtanding ſaith, Agendum eſt, it Ought to be Imbraced; The Will chooſeth rather not to Imbrace it, but to Suſpend its Act. The Underſtanding adviſeth One extream; the Will chooſeth the Other extream. The Underſtanding ſaith, It is Good to Act, and (conſequently) it is Ill to Omit, to ſuſpend; the Will notwithſtanding chooſeth to Suſpend (which the Underſtanding affirms to be Evill,) rather then to Act, which the Underſtanding commends as Good. Thus that libertas Contradictionis, appears upon triall to include alſo a liberty of Contrariety: and if it may Not-chooſe the term commended, then it may chooſe the term Forbidden, yea it muſt chooſe it, where the terms are Contradictory without a Medium.
All that can be ſaid to help it, will be this; Willing and Suſpending are indeed Oppoſite Terms; and therefore when the Underſtanding adviſeth to Will, if the Will do [Velle] ſuſpendere, it chooſeth the term Oppoſite, and (conſequently) that which is propoſed as Evill; But (they may ſay perhaps) the Will doth only Suſpendere, and not Velle ſuſpendere; and ſo this Suſpending is not an Object of Choice, but only the Abſence or Negation of an Act; and therefore though it doe ire in contrarias partes, yet it doth not contrariam partem Eligere, it doth not Chooſe, or Elect, the Oppoſite term, becauſe there is no poſitive Act of Election or Willing exerciſed about it.
And this anſwer I confeſſe may ſeem to weaken the Objection immediatly foregoing; for thus the Will is not made to Chooſe an Oppoſ…te term; But then let them conſider, how this Anſwer will ſtand with their Opinion: They tell us firſt that the Freedom of the Will is manifeſted in Suſpending when the Underſtanding commands to Act; and yet when it doth Suſpend, they ſay this Suſpenſion is not an object of Choice or Election; and (conſequently) there is no Liberty exerciſed.
If they think thus to evade, in ſaying, That this Liberty is exerciſed, not in Suſpe…ding when it might Act, becauſe There is no Election, & therefore no Freedom exerciſed; But in Acting, when as it might have Suſpended. I anſwer, That neither will this ſerve the turn. For as Suſpenſion is not Objectum Volitionis, an Object of Choice; ſo neither is Acting an Object of choice. And as we ſay not Volo Suſpendere, or Volo Non-velle, ſo neither do we ſay volo Velle: For by the ſame reaſon that any may ſay Volo Velle, he may ſay alſo volo non Velle. So that Willing can no more be ſaid to be an object of Choice, then Suſpending.
Their Libertas Contradictionis therefore muſt either be alſo ibertas Contrarietatis, and ſo by themſelves rejected: or elſe it will be no exerciſe, no manifeſtation, of Liberty, and therefore uſeleſſe for their purpoſe.
I admit (as I ſaid before) the diſtinction in this ſenſe; That the Will, though it cannot Elect a Contrary object, ye… it may Not-Elect This. And thus there is no Action (of Choice or Deſire) in the Will, but tending to ſome Good that the Underſtanding propoſeth; For what is not Known cannot be Deſired: But yet there may be a negligent Omiſſion or Suſpenſion, when it ought to Act Which I do not account …o be the Liberty, or Perfection of the Will, (for Angells &c. have it not,) but an Imperfection and Weakneſſe. Neither do I ſay, that the Will doth Voluntarily Suſpend, or Velle ſuſpendere, without direction, (for that were a Poſitive Act;) but (either by Negligence, or Weakneſſe,) doth Not-Will. For which there is no… requiſite a Poſitive cauſe, but a Negative, or the Want of a Cauſe.
You will ſay, If this be ſo, then will there be only a ſinfull Omiſſion … the Will, and not a ſinfull Commiſsion: For Sinne of Commiſſion (doing or Willing that which ought not) is Poſitive, and therefore cannot proceed from the Will, when the Underſtanding dictates to the contrary. Whereas the Will doth as often fail in Chooſing a wrong object, which the Underſtanding acknowledgeth to be Evill; as in Not Chooſing a Good Object.
I anſwer, it is true, the Will doth often chooſe what it ought not: And yet I affirm, that the Wills Errour is onelyonly Negative and not Poſitive; It is Omiſſive only, in not-obeying ſome directions of the Underſtanding. I ſhall make it cleer by an Inſtance. Pleaſure and Vertue may be Competitors, and Rivalls (as it were) both courting the Will; (As in an Act Pleaſant, but Sinnefull.) The Underſtanding propoſeth Pleaſure as quid bonum, 'tis Good, 'tis Deſirable; It propoſeth Vertue as quid melius, 'Tis Better, 'tis more deſirable. Now the Will perhaps follows the firſt direction; it imbraceth Pleaſure as being Good, and ſo Deſirable; (for Bonum Jucundum is Deſirable as well as Bonum Honeſtum:) But the ſecond Precept, or Direction rather, whereby Vertue is propoſed as Better, and therefore ſhould countermand the form…, this it hears not, it follows not.
If you ſay, the Underſtanding doth indeed diſcover ſome Good (though a leſſe Good) in the Object; yet this is not to be accounted the Underſtandings Practicall Direction (dictamen:) But, that the Underſtanding having examined the Good and the Evill that is in every Act, and comparing them together; upon this Compariſon, as it obſerves the Good or Evill to be more, ſo it preſcribes, to Doe, or Not to Doe, H… age, or Hoc non age: And if the Will doe Act, when the Underſtanding Forbids, it muſt be ſaid to perform a Poſitive Act without direction.
I anſwer▪ I admit not the Underſtandings dictate to be Imperative, but onelyonly Declarative: It onelyonly informs, This is Good, This is Evill; but Commands not, Doe this, or Omit it. But the Will upon propoſall of Good, Embraceth it; upon propoſall of Evill, it Rejects it: Yet not ſo, but that, by Negligence, it may Not-embrace Good, and notreject Evill. And thus the propoſall of Pleaſure, as Good; is as truely declarative as the other; and this the Will follows: But a further declaration, whereby it declares, that although Pleaſure be Good, yet it is Evill to embrace this Good, becauſe there is a greater Evill annexed; This direction, by omiſſion, it imbraceth not. And this I conceive to be the true nature of the Acts of the Will and Underſtanding.
If you would have the Will and the Underſtanding to be the Same, (and therefore think theſe diſtinctions ſuperfluous,) underſtand by the Intellect, Anima Intelligens; by the Will, Anima Volens, or Anima quatenus Volens, and then you are pleaſed.
And thus you ſee, How there may be more Knowledge (even of Spirituall and Saving Truths) and yet l…ſſe Faith: Becauſe there may be …n Aſſe…t, a Beleeving, in the Underſtanding, (which is Knowledge, or Hiſtoricall Faith;) without a Fiduciall Trust, a Reliance, and reſting upon it; which is the Juſtifying Faith, or the Juſtifying Act of Faith. foreign yea, foreign, without foreign.
5. But if you ſpeak of a Knowledge peculiar to Gods children, wherof others partake not; Such a Knowledge of God wherby no man knows him but he that hath him; That Knowledge which is Life everlaſting: This Knowledge, and Faith, always go together; the more there is of One, the more alſo of the Other. A Speculative Knowledge, whereby we aſſent to the Truth reveiled, is found even in the Devils, and that in as large and ample meaſure (I ſuppoſe) as in the Saints on Earth: For I cannot be perſwaded, but the Devils (foreign) being Knowing Spirits, doe Know and Aſſent to the Truth of every Propoſition that a Child of God knows. But there is an Experimentall Knowledge diſtinct from the former, Knowledge of another nature, whereby we Know, what we know, in another Manner: We do not only Know that it is ſo, but we Taſt and See it to be ſo.
A Blind man Knows perhaps that the Sun ſhines, but he doth not S… it: I Know that at Midnight the Sunne ſhines to our Antipodes, but I doe not See it ſhine to them: I Know that at ſuch a time there is ſuch an I …lipſe viſible to ſuch a part of the World, yet doe I not See the Eclipſe. The Confectioner that provides a Banquet Knows that this or that diſh is Sweet, but they only Tast the Sweetneſſe that eat of it. A wicked man may Know that God is good, (as a blind man knows that the Sun ſhines, by the report of others; or as an Aſtronomer knows of an Eclipſe before it come, by Calculation, or rationall Diſcourſe and Illation;) …ut he S…es it no…, he Tasts it not. Now we read of foreign, H…b. 5. 14. ſom that have their Senſes exerciſed to diſcern of good and evill; there is foreign, Phil. 1. 9. a kind of ſpirituall Senſe, whereby we do foreign, ſuper…a S…pere, Reliſh thoſe things that are above.
And where there is this ſpirituall Taſt, this Experimentall Knowledge; there muſt needs be Faith alſo▪ For Truths thus cleerly, and Senſibly (as it wer…) rev…iled to the Soul, it ſeems no… to be in the power of the Will to reject: No more then it is in the power of the Eare not to be pleaſed with harmonious Muſick; or in the power of the Palat, not to be delighted with the Sweetneſſe of a Taſt.
And thus I ſuppoſe it may appear, How far, and From what Ground there may be Knowledge without Faith.
That God is all mercy and ſweetneſſe to the Divels, is no Article of my faith, Thoſe miſerable creatures, ſaith he, cannot conſent to it. No more can I: And yet I deny not, that Mercy and Juſtice are One thing in God. Gods Simple Eſſence is the ſame with both; yet are not They ſo properly the ſame with each other. The Torment of the Devils proceeds from that Divine Eſſence which is Love; (as likewiſe the Mercies of Gods Children proceed from that Divine Eſſence which is Justice: for the Juſtice of God is equally himſelfe as is his Love:) Yet may we not ſay, the Torments of thoſe are an effect of Love, no more then that the Mercies of theſe are the effects of Anger; yet Both are the effects of that Simple Eſſence, which is Both. It is a far different thing therefore, to ſay, A Loving God doth notwithſtanding Puniſh; and to ſay, A Loving God doth therefore Puniſh: Puniſhment and Revenge are ſufficiently conſiſtent with Love; but not the immediate effects of Love. Thus we ſay, Muſicus Aedificat; yet not his skill in Muſick, but his skill in Architecture, is exerciſed in Building.
The Love of God (as likewiſe his Anger, Juſtice, Power, &c.) is (I confeſſe) the Divine Eſſence; we allow no Accidents in God at all: quicquid est in Deo, eſt Deus. But I ask, Whether he think this Attribute Love (and ſo of the reſt) to be an Adequate expreſſion of that whole Eſſence? If ſo, then is it all one to ſay, God Loves his Children, and, God is Angry with his children, or God Hates them: If not, then is it only inadaequatus conceptus, and there remains ſomewhat to be expreſſed by other Attributes, which is not expreſſed in this. The Attributes of God therefore (as likewiſe it is in other inadaequati conceptus) may be all affirmed of the ſame Simple Eſſence; but not (Mutually) of each other: And the Effects of each may be ſaid to be the Effects of the ſame Eſſence; but not (Promiſcuouſly) of every Attribute: (unleſſe we take them Materialiter, not Formaliter:) And conſequently, the ruine (of the damned) is not (as he affirms) an effect of infinite ſweetneſſe (though of that (Eſſence) which i…, Infinite Sweetneſſe;) nor is God, (in this) mercifull to them.
Again, What we Know, we are, (ſaith he:) I aſſume; Sed deum ſcimus, Ergo Dii ſumus.