Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 12
CHAP. XII. Concerning Falſhood in the Soules operations. Whether it ceaſe to Bee, when it c…aſeth to Act Truth.
IN the twelfth Chapter, he comes to another Objection If Actings of Truth, be Truth, (that is, if Rationall Operations be the Soule, the Soules Eſſence) then when the Soule Acteth not Truth, it ceaſeth to Bee: and ſo when it entertaineth or pronounceth a Falſe Poſition, the Soule is no more it ſelfe.
This Objection I conceive to have two branches; For the Soule may ceaſe to act Truth, either by Not acting at all, or by acting Falſly. For whether it act Not, or act Falſly, it ceaſeth to act Truth; and therefore (if acting of Truth be its Eſſence) it ceaſeth to Bee.
His firſt Anſwer may be equally applied to both; That, granting the Soule when it acts upon Falſhood, to be as when it acteth not, and ſo is not; Yet ſhall we advance nothing, till we prove the Succeſſion of Moments to be Reall and not Imaginary. Where he preſuppoſeth, that when it Acteth not, then it Is not; and, though the ſame be granted in a Falſe acting, yet neither That, nor This, will prove of any force, ſince Succeſſion of Moments is onelyonly Imaginary.
The ground of this Reply, I conceive to be this; If there be not any Reall Succeſſion, If there be no prius and poſterius Indeed, but be onelyonly ſuppoſed ſo to be by our Imagination; Then any One Act of the Soule, is able to give it a co-exiſtence to all Eternity: (according to what he affirmed in the former Chapter.) For of this One Act, being Reall, it cannot be affirmed, That it Was but Is not, or it Is but hath not-been; but if it at all Be, it muſt Be alwayes; Becauſe, if Succeſsion be onelyonly Imaginary, then to Be and to Have been is all one; then there was not a time when it Was not, neither will there be a time when it Shall Not be.
But if the Iſſue of the Queſtion depend upon this, Whether Succeſſion be Reall, or Imaginary; I doubt not but this might be ſoon decided.
Therefore Firſt, I ask, Whether there be not the ſame reaſon for Succeſsion in Time, that is for Extenſion in Place? Whether there may be Pars extra Partem, Punctum extra Punctum, though not Momentum extra Momentum; or there be the ſame reaſon of Both, and Both be Imaginary? If there be in Both the ſame reaſon, (which I ſuppoſe he he will affirm;) Then muſt every Being have a Coexiſtence to all Places, as well as a Coexiſtence to all Times; It muſt have an Ʋbiquity as well as a Perpetuity. Then is it in vain to diſpute Whether Chriſts Body be Really preſent in the Sacrament, Whether Peter were ever at Rome, &c. If every Body, every Thing▪ be every where. For if difference of Place be nothing, then that which hath a reall exiſtence in any place, hath a reall exiſtence in all places; becauſe This place and all other places have only an Imaginary Difference, and are indeed all one.
Secondly, If one action give the Soule a Coexiſtence to all …ternity, then what doth the Second and Subſequent Acts produce? do they give it a new Being, a new Eternity?
Anſw. You will ſay (I ſuppoſe) that there is not a Second Act, an Other Act, but all Acts are One Act: And this One act, which appears to our imagination to be Firſt and Second, &c. gives the Soule One Eſſence, One Eternity.
Repl. If ſo, then what is the difference between an Act of Sinning, and a Courſe of Sinning? What is the difference between the Once committing of a ſinful Act, and the Oft Reiterating of it? Between Davids One Act of Adultery, and the laſcivious perſons Constant Practiſe? Why are we exhorted to Ceaſe from evill; if every Act be Eternall, and whatſoever ſucceeds can be but the Same? He that ſtole, let him ſteal no more: To what end ſerves this counſell, if there be no other Act feazible, but what Is already, and That to remain for ever?
Anſw. 2. If you would ſay, That the ſame Act is again Reiterated▪ Rep. I ask, if the Iteration be ſomwhat more then the first Commiſsion? If not, then to commit it Once, and to Iterate it often, is all One: If it be ſomwhat more, then is it either a Reall addition, or Imaginary: If Imaginary, then are we where we were before; If it be Reall, then why may there not be a reall act diſtinct from the former, as well as a reall Commiſsion (of the Same act) diſtinct from the former? Thus you ſee if Time be Nothing, If Succeſſion be only Imaginary; then is it all one to commit Many ſinnes, and to commit One Sinne.
Thirdly, if Succeſſion and Difference of Moments be onelyonly Imaginary, if all Duration be Eternall, all Simultaneous; Then what is the difference between the long life of the Aged, and the few days of him that dy…th in his Youth? For the Reall Exiſtence of One as well as the Other is equally Eternall; Since the Length and the Shortneſſe of Time is but Imaginary, all Duration being indeed Simultaneous. Thus the youngeſt Child (if he do but Think ſo) hath lived as long as the moſt Aged.
Again, 4. If Succeſſion and Difference of Time be only imaginary; Then why do I not N…w know, that which I ſhall know To morrow? What hinders but that every man ſhould be praeſcius futuri? I ſhall Know it to Morrow, becauſe I ſhall See it; but why ſhould I not Now both Know it and See it as well as to Morrow, ſince it is Now as really preſent as it will be Then? Why do we diſpute concerning matters of Fact; as whether Peter were at Rome, and the like? Can we not ſee whether he be there or not? For if he were there, then he Is there: ſince Then and Now are all one: And if he Be there, why do not I ſee him there? For I am as really there as he is: For if I be any where, then am I There, ſince There and Here are al one; Time and Place making only an Imaginary (and not Reall) difference.
Anſ. If you ſay, Things that ſeem to be Future, are even Now as really Preſent as they ſhall be Hereafter, but they appear not to be preſent, and therefore are not now Known and Seen, (like Colours in the dark;) But when they ſhall receive a new Luſter, they ſhall both Appear to be, and be Seen to be.
Rep. I reply, If they ſhall appear, then they Doe appear; becauſe Then and Now are all one. Again, If there be Apparet and Apparuit, why not Est and Erit? If there be a prius and poſterius in Appearing why not in Being? Or 3 I ask, whether Appearing and not-Appearing be a Reall or onelyonly Imaginary difference? If a Reall difference, then will there be ſomewhat Reall Then, which is not Now; and conſequently all Reality will not be Simultaneous, there will be ſomewhat Reall afterwards which before was not: If Appearing, be onelyonly Imaginary; what ſhall I have to help my knowledge Then, which I have not Now?
Anſ. 2. If you ſay, Things Future are both now Preſent, & we Know them ſo to be, but do not Seem to know them, or Seem, not to Know them:
Repl. Then I reply as before, If we Shall Seem to know them, we Doe Seem to know them; becauſe Then and Now are all one.
So that if Succeſſion of Time be only Imaginary; Then do we already know, whatſoever we ſhall know, (whereas Christ himſelfe Increaſed in wiſdom, Luk. 2.) And the Fore-Knowledge of things to come, would not be ſuch a foreign, as might diſtinguiſh between the True and Falſe Gods.
And thus (if I miſtake not) I have ſufficiently ſhewed (though much more might have been added) that there is a Reall Succeſſion, a Reall Priority of Duration, and not onelyonly Imaginary. And therefore (notwithſtanding his firſt anſwer) the Soule muſt really ceaſe to Be, when it ceaſeth to Work, or to work Truth; if theſe Workings of truth be the Soules Eſſence: And the ſoule muſt be (during that Ceſſation, or Errour) as truly Non Ens, as before its firſt Production; for the precedent and ſubſequent workings cannot (Then) give it an Exiſtence, as not (Then) being.
His ſecond anſwer, to the Objection propounded in the beginning of this Chapter, toucheth not at all the firſt Branch of it, wherein it is objected, That if particular Actings of Truth, be Truth, or the Soules Eſſence, How is it that the Underſtanding ſhould not ceaſe to Be, when it ceaſeth to Work; (for this in his firſt Anſwer he ſeemed to grant:) But it is applyed to the ſecond Branch of it, viz. That If particular Actings of Truth be Truth, or the Soules Eſſence, then the Soule entertaining a Falſe poſition ſhould be no more it ſelfe. To which he anſwers, By denying that the Soule doth at all act upon Falſhood: and that upon this ground, Becauſe Falſhood is not a Reall Being upon which the Soule can work. For its nature being Privative, and no Reall Being, how can the Soule or Truth work upon Nothing?
I might anſwer here, That it is not requiſite to the Soules Act, that its Object ſhould have a Reall being: (As appears by the Soules apprehending Ens rationis; which Apprehenſion is a poſitive Act, and yet hath no Reall Object.) For the Object of Intellection, is not Reale, but Cognoſcibile. And therefore, That Falſhood wanteth a reall being, is not inough to ſhew, that the Underſtanding cannot work upon it.
And this (in effect) he granteth ſoon after. For, it being Objected, that the Soule while it pronounceth a Falſe poſition, doth Really act, (verè agere; He replyes, That there are in this Action two things, a Thinking, and a So-thinking. To think is a poſitive Action, a good Action, But the formalis ratio of So-thinking lyeth in Thinking an Errour, which is Nothing; and ſo a Not-thinking. When (miſtaking) a man catcheth at a ſhadow; In catching he doth truly Act; But to Catch a Shaddow, is to catch nothing; Now to catch nothing, and not to catch; to act nothing, and not to act, is all one. So to Think is Reall, but to Think Amiſſe is Nothing, and all one with Not-thinking.
He grants therefore, that the Soule pronouncing or Underſtanding a Falſe poſition, or thinking Amiſſe, doth really Think, really Act: Now I ask, while it doth really Think, What doth it think? What doth it Act? (or Ʋpon what rather?) Certainly it muſt either be Falſhood▪ or No…hing: (For what elſe it ſhould be, neither doth his Lordſhip ſhew, nor can I imagine) If it Act upon Falſhood▪ the falſe poſition; then may Falſhood be the Object of a Reall act; If it act upon Nothing, then what hinders, but that Falſhood▪ although it be Nothing, may yet be the Object of this Act?
Object. But he will ſay, If the Soule do act upon Falſhood, then muſt it become Falſhood, that is, a Vanity, a Ly, a Nothing: For I conceive (…aith he) the Agent it ſelfe, together with the Subject acted upon (the Object) to be One in the Act.
Anſ…. But this ſuppoſition muſt I deny; For if ſo, Then when the Soule acteth upon God (by Knowing, Loving, &c) then doth it become God: And if ſo, why doth his Lordſhip (at the end of his Preamble) blame thoſe for mounting too high, who, confounding the Creator with the Creature, make her to be God?
But for the better clearing of this whole diſcourſe, concerning Falſhood and Errour in the Souls working; I ſhall deſire you to take notice of a Diſtinction, which all Know, and yet but few Think of, when they have occaſion to uſe it. The non attendency whereof, hath produced much Obſcurity, much Errour, and inextricable perplexities concerning this and the like Subjects. It is, to diſtinguiſh between Verum Metaphyſicum▪ and Verum Logicum; between Bonum Metaphyſicum, and Bonum Morale: To diſtinguiſh, I ſay, Metaphyſicall Truth and Goodneſſe, from Morall and Logicall Goodneſſe and Truth: To diſtinguiſh the Truth of Being from the Truth of a Propoſition; the Goodneſſe of Being, from the Goodneſſe of an Action.
Now this being premiſed, let us examine the truth of ſome Tenents which are allmoſt generally received by all.
1 The nature of Evill, ſay they, is Privative, not Poſitive; Evill is Nothing. And why? Becauſe Ens & Bonum convertuntur, and therefore Malum muſt needs be Non-Ens; now Non-Ens is Nothing.
Be it ſo; Evill is Nothing. But what Evill do they mean? Evill in Metaphyſicks▪ or Evill in Ethicks? Goodneſſe, in Metaphyſicks, is no other th…n Entity, (for none ever acknowledged a greater diſtinction between Ens & Bonum then a diſtinction of Reaſon,) and therefore Malum (in Metaphyſicks) muſt be Non Ens. But will they ſay that Morall Evill is ſo too? If they do, then muſt they ſay alſo, that bonum Morale is convertible with Ens; (otherwiſe their Argument will not hold:) that All Being is Honeſty, or Morall Goodneſſe; and all Morall Goodneſſe is Being or Entity. I ask therefore, whether morall Goodneſſe, or Honeſty, …e the Eſſence, the Entity of a Stone? If not, then is not every Being, Bonum Morale▪ I ask again, Whether Silence be not Morally Good, at ſuch a time as when a man ought to hold his peace? Yet to … Silent, or not to ſpeak, hath no Metaphyſicall goodneſſe, no goodneſſe of Being, for it is a mee… Negation. There may be therefore Morall goodneſſe, where there is no Metaphyſicall goodneſſe, no poſitive Being; and there may be Metaphyſicall goodneſſe, goodneſſe of Being, without Morall goodneſſe or Goodneſſe of Honeſty. Now if Malum Metaphyſicum, a Negation, a Non-Ens, may be Bonum Morale, what ſhall be the Malum Morale oppoſite to this Bonum? ſhall that be alſo a Non-En… If it be, then how can it be contrary to the other? Since that Nothing cannot be oppoſite to Nothing, but Something to Something, or Something to Nothing.
I ſay therefore, that Metaphyſicall Evill, is meerly Privative, as being oppoſite to the Goodneſſe of Being; and it is no other but Non-Entity▪ But Morall Evill is every way as Poſitive as is Morall Good.
For what is the nature of Morall Good, or Evill? is it not, a Conformity, or a Difformity to a Morall Precept? Then the Goodneſſe or Evill of it is not in the Being of the Action, but in the ſo Being; It lies not in the Poſitive or Abſolute Entity of the Action, but in the Relative nature. Morall Goodneſſe therefore, and Morall Evill, have not an Abſolute Eſſence, but a Relative; An Agreeing, or Diſagreeing; a Likeneſſe, or Unlikeneſſe, to its Rule. Now if Likeneſſe be a Reall Relation; why may not Ʋnlikeneſſe be alſo a relation Reall? If Simile be Reall, why not Diſſimile? If the One be Poſitive, why not the Other?
Object. They will ſay perhaps, That the nature of Morall Evill, is not a Difformity but a non-Conformity, to its Rule; not to be (poſitively) Ʋnlike, but only Not to be Like.
Anſw. If ſo, then not to be is a Sinne; for not to Bee, includes not to be Like, or not to be Obedient. If the bleſſed Angels had never been Created, they had been eo ipſo Sinfull: For if they had never Been, they muſt of neceſſity Not be Obedient; (though not Diſobedient;) For how can they be Obedient, if not at all Being?
A Stone muſt then be Sinfull, when it doth not-underſtand the Nature of God, as a man doth and ought to do; For though it be not Diſobedient to the precept of Knowledge, (becauſe this precept was not made to a Stone but to Man,) Yet you cannot ſay that it is Obedient, and therfore muſt of neceſſity be not-Ob…dient, or not-be Obedient; wherefore if a bare not-obedience, or a not conformity to the command be a Sinne, then doth a Stone Sinne. Scire Deum is morally Good, and therefore (if morall Evill be only an Abſence of Good) ſince there is not in a Stone this Scire Deum, how can it be but that a Stone muſt ſinne?
God commanded Moſes to go down into Egipt, &c. and Aaron to offer Sacrifice: Doe I Sinne therefore when I doe not-obey this command made to them? How is it poſſible that I can obey the command for Moſes his Journey, or Aaron's ſacrificing; for My going is not Moſes his going, nor is my ſacrificing, Aaron's Sacrificing; Yet doe I not ſinne in not-obeying.
When Moſes made the Brazen Serpent, he did not (in that) obey the precept of going into Egipt, (for to go into Egipt, and to make the Serpent, is not the ſame,) Yet was it not Sinfull to make the Brazen Serpent, though it were-not an Obedience to that Command, for neither was it a Diſobedience; for that Precept, did neither injoyn nor forbid it.
Thus every Action, though never ſo Good, will be a Sinne; For there is in the moſt perfect Act, a not-Obeying of many precepts, (yea of all precepts, except that which injoyns this Action,) though there be not perhaps a Diſobedience of any.
The nature of Sinne therefore, or Morall Evill, is not barely a Not-Obeying▪ but a Diſobeying; It is not a Not-Conformity, but a Difformity, a Croſſing or Thwarting of ſome Command. Therefore the Stone ſins not, becauſe there is no Diſobedience in its not-Knowing, becauſe it was not Commanded; Moſes his making the brazen Serpent, was not a Breach of his former Injunction, although not an Obeying of it; for in his Commiſſion to go into Egipt, his making the brazen Serpent was neither Forbidden nor Commanded. The Act of one Morall Virtue, is not an offence againſt the reſt; for it is no Breach of their Rules, though it be not an Obſervance of them: It is Praeter, but not Contra.
Anſ. 2. But if I ſhould ſay on the contrary, That the nature of Morall Good, were not a Conformity, or poſitive Likeneſſe; but only a not-Difformity, a not-Diſagreeing, or not croſſing its Rule; Might not this be ſaid with as good probability as the other? You would think it ſtrange perhaps, that Evill ſhould be Poſitive, and Good Negative: But (if I m…ſtake not) there is more truth in this, then is in the other. For a bare not-agreeing doth not make an action Sinfull, but a not-diſagreeing d…th make it Lawfull, and ſo Morally Good; For where there is no Law, there is no Sinne. If I walk for my refreſhing in one part of the Garden to day, and in another to morrow; or in that other to day, & in this to morrow; I ſinne not in either: Not becauſe I have a Command to walk in this firſt, or in the other part firſt: But becauſe neither is Forbidden, therefore is neither Ʋnlawfull. I ask therfore, whether the Lawfullneſſe of this Action, in walking firſt in this part of the garden and not in the other part, doe depend upon its Conformity to ſome Rule, or its not-diſagreeing from any? Now, what is the Lawfullneſſe of an Action, but its Morall Goodneſſe?
Anſ. 3 Yet Thirdly, I affirm not the nature of morall Good or Evill to be Negative, but both equally Poſitive; If by Good, you underſtand, That which Ought to be, not, That which May be. And therefore I make three ſorts of Morall Beings; Bonum, Malum, Indifferens▪ Good, which muſt be done; Indifferent, which may be done; Evill, which may-not be done. The firſt, Commanded; the laſt, Forbidden; the other, of a midle nature, neither Commanded, nor Forbidden; which being Indifferent, is often called Good, but never Evill. The firſt conſiſts, in a Conformity to its Rule; the laſt, in a Difformity; the other in a bare notdiſagreeing. The firſt and laſt are of a Poſitive nature; the other of a Negative. (And yet ſometimes this Poſitiveneſſe, whether in Good or Evill, is rather Poſitivum Logicum (the Praedicat of a Poſitive or Affirmative Propoſition,) then Poſitivum Reale. For an Omiſſion, Negatio act…s, may be Good or Evill: which having in it ſelfe no reall Being, cannot be the Subject of a reall Relation.)
Yet doth not this contradict their Opinion who affirm, That non datur actio Indifferens in individuo. For by Good and Evill, they mean Licitum & Illicitum, Lawfull and Unlawfull; including under the name of Good, or Lawfull, not only that which Ought to be done, but whatſoever May be done; as when (in civill matters) we ſay, it is Lawfull for me to give ſuch a portion of my Eſtate to ſuch a Man, not becauſe the Law of the Kingdom Injoins me ſo to doe; but becauſe it doth not Inhibite me. And thus Licitum will be a Negative term, and Illicitum a Poſitive, (though by the Grammaticall Notation it might ſeem contrary;) for Illicitum affirms, that there is a Law to the Contrary; Licitum denies only that there is ſuch a Law to Forbid it, but whether there be any to Command it, it affirms not.
And thus much concerning the nature of Evill. (Wherein if I may ſeem prolix, it being but a Digreſſion in this place: Yet becauſe I was called to it in the former chapter, where his Lordſhip gave me occaſion to handle it; I thought it more fit to referre the diſcuſſing of it to this place, where I meet with more queſtions of the like nature.)
2. Now, as it is in Good and Evil, ſo alſo in Truth and Falſhood. Falſhood, ſaith he, is a Vanity, a Lye, a Nothing And why ſo? Becauſe Ens & Verum convertuntur, and therefore Falſum muſt be non-Ens.
To this I ſay, as to the former; Truth of Being, or Metaphyſicall Truth, is Poſitive, and of the ſame extent or latitude with Entity, or Being. And this Truth I have formerly ſaid to be Cognoſcibility, making Verum in this Metaphyſicall acceptation to be all one with Intelligibile.
I affirm alſo, that Ens & Verum (or Intelligibile) convertuntur. And (conſequently) according to the manner of Being, muſt be the manner of Intellection. That which hath a reall Being (as Ens Reale) may be Known to Be; that which hath an apparent, or ſuppoſed Being, may be Suppoſed to Be.
I affirm likewiſe, that Falſhood in this ſenſe cannot be underſtood, or that the Soule cannot act upon (Metaphyſicall) Falſhood: For how can that be Known, which is not Cognoſcible; or Underſtood, which is not Intelligible?
But, When I affirm, that Verum and Ens are Convertible; I reſtrain it not to Reall Entity; For there may be Eſſe Cognitum, where there is not Eſſe Reale: But I proportion its Cognoſcibility to its Being; and therefore if it have not a Reall Being, but only Imaginary; it may be Suppoſed, but cannot be Known, to be.
Neither yet doe I So proportion the reality of Intellection, to the reality of the Object, as if when there is no Reall Object, there could be no Reall Act: For it is Cognoſcibile that is convertible with Ens, and hath its reality proportionable to the reality of Being; not Cognoſ…itivum. The Underſtanding, whether it Know to be, or Suppoſe to be, doth yet Really Act; And his Lordſhip alſo granteth, that when the Underſtanding doth act Amiſſe, it doth yet Really Act; The Opining, or Thinking, (ſaith he) is a good Act. But where the Object is not Reall, there the foreign Cognoſc…, cannot be Reall; for how can a reall Relation be founded in a Non-Entity? Yet the foreign Cognoſcere is Reall; for the Reality of …t, depends not upon the reality of the Object, but upon the reality of the Act. That therefore which is ſo underſtood, is the Suppoſed Object of a Reall Act.
But now Logicall Truth, the Truth of a Propoſition, which is oppoſed to Falſhood, …o Errour, hath nothing to do with the Reality either of the Object or of the Act; For a True Propoſition may be framed concerning an Imaginary Object (as when we affirm a Chimaera to be Ens Rationis, or only Imaginary▪) And an Act Metaphyſically True (a Reall act) may be Logically Falſe.
Logicall Truth and Falſhood (like as Morall Good and Evill) have not an Abſolute Being, but Relative. They conſiſt not in the Being or Not-Being of the Act; (For when the Underſtanding doth act Falſly it doth verè Agere, though not agere Verè; it is verè Actus, though not Verus Actus:) but in the Agreeing, or Diſagreeing with the Object. For when the Intellect doth Underſtand, it frames an Idea, a picture, or repreſentation of the Thing underſtood▪ which Picture, or Idea, is a Reall Picture, (it hath the Truth of Being) whether it have the Truth of Repreſentation or not; that is, whether it be Like or Unlike, whether it Agree or Diſagree, with the copy or object which it repreſents. A Picture in a Painters Shop is truly a Picture, it hath reall Colours and Lineaments; But perhaps it is a Falſe Picture, it repreſents not that Viſage by which it was drawn. When the Underſtanding conceives an Ens rationis, the Idea or Conceptus is not this Imaginary Being, (for this Conception is as Reall as the Conception of a Reall Ens,) But the ſuppoſed Object of this Conception; there being indeed no ſuch thing as this Conceptus doth repreſent. When a Painter deſcribes in a Table ſome Antick Shapes or ſtrange Chimaera's; his Deſcription, his Draught, is not a Fiction, but as Reall as the true Pourtraicture of a living Man: But that which by this deſcription is repreſented, that is the Fiction, there being no ſuch Antick Forms, no ſuch Chimaera's, as he expreſſeth. When the Underſtanding draws a Reall Picture, a reall Idea or Conceptus, without a Copy, without a Pattern; it is Ens rationis: When, indeavouring to imitate a Copy, to repreſent the nature of things, the Truth of Being; it yet miſſeth of it, not making its Picture agreeable to its Pattern; this is a Falſe Apprehenſion. And this is the difference between Ens rationis, and Error Intellectûs: Both in the mean time being reall Acts.
The Logicall Truth and Falſhood of a Conception or Propoſition, are but Relations of Likeneſſe or Unlikeneſſe, Conformity or Difformity, in the Act to its Object; and are both founded in the Reality of the Action, or its Truth of Being: And are both equally Reall, equally Poſitive▪ For Falſhood is not a meer not-Conformity, or not-expreſſing of things exiſtent; But a Difformity, a Croſſing or Thwarting of them. For elſe, when a man ceaſeth to Think or Speak of this or that Truth, he there by Erres, and Lyes: For when he Thinks not at all, he cannot think Conformably; when he Speaks not at all, he cannot ſpeak Conformally, either to the Exiſtence of Things, or to his own Opinion of them. Yea every Propoſition, every Thought will have ſo many Falſhoods in it, as there be other Truths which it doth not expreſſe: For if the not-expreſſing of a Truth, be Falſhood: then to affirm that the Sunne ſhines, is a Falſhood, becauſe it doth not expreſſe the Fires hea…, or the Charcoals burning: And thus that propoſition which expreſſeth not every Truth, is a Falſe Propoſition; yea contains Infinite Falſhoods, oppoſite to the Infinit number of True Propoſitions poſſible.
Object. If you ſay (to avoid this) that it is not the not-expreſſing of One Truth, the not-conformity to One Exiſtence, that makes a Propoſition Falſe; but the not-expreſſing of Any Truth: whereas the Conformity to, and the Expreſſing of any Truth, makes the Propoſition or Conception True:
Anſ. I anſwer firſt, that this is contrary to the generall Propoſition, which affirms, that Perfectio oritur ex Integris, Imperfectio verò ex Particulari defectu: Which is applyed to ſeverall kinds of Imperfection; That Action is Good, whoſe every Circumſtance is rightly ordered; That Propoſition True▪ whoſe every Branch doth agree with the Thing, &c. Wheras One Bad circumſtance, One falſe branch makes the Action bad, the Propoſition Falſe. The contrary to which muſt have been affirmed, if the expreſſing of One Truth, make the Propoſition True; and the concurrent not-expreſſing, or not-Conformity to All Truths be requiſite to make it Falſe.
2. Again, If there be requiſite a not-expreſſing of Any Truth to make it Falſe; then muſt this (and the like propoſitions) be True, if I affirm Virgil & Homer to be Greek Poets, If I affirm a Stone to be a Reaſonable Creature: For it expreſſeth One Truth, viz▪ that it is a Creature although it be not Reaſonable, (as likewiſe the One was a Gre…k Poet, though not the other:) and the not-expreſſing of a further Truth, doth not hinder its expreſſing of This. Then muſt that Action be Good whoſe One Circumſtance is Good; If the Intention be right, though the Formality of the Action be never ſo unlawfull, yet will not the Act be Blamable.
Logicall Falſhood therfore is as poſitive, as Logicall Truth; the one conſiſting in a poſitive Conformity, the other in a poſitive Difformity to the Things. Yea, of the two, the nature of Truth is rather Negative, thē the nature of Falſhood; For a not-conformity makes not a Propoſition Falſe; but the not-difformity makes it True. For that is a True propoſition that is not Oppoſite to Any Truth▪ though it do not Expreſſe All Truths.
Neither can there be a Medium between Truth and Falſhood, as there is between Good and Evill; For though there may be an Indifferent Action, which is neither Good (poſitively) nor Evill; yet is there not an Indifferent Propoſition which is neither True nor Falſe. Truth and Falſhood in Propoſitions, are oppoſed as Lawfulneſſe and Ʋnlawfulneſſe in Actions, (whereof Lawfulneſſe, as I have ſaid, is Negative;) rather then as Good and Evill, Laudabile & Vituperabile.
Yet if we deſire a Medium, I can ſhew you one; But then it muſt not be Actus, but Negatio Actûs. And that is, in Abstraction; when the Underſtanding conceives of one Thing, without conſidering of another▪ for then it doth neither Affirm, nor Deny, and ſo that Conception is (thus farre) neither True nor Falſe; as likewiſe the Propoſition expreſſing this Thought. When I conceive of the Ayr, not regarding whether it be Light or Dark; of a Man not conſidering whether he be Learned or Ignorant: This Abſtracting, or conſidering the Ayr without conſidering Light in it; conſidering Aristotle to have been a Man, not conſidering withall that he was Learned; is neither True nor Falſe: According to that, Abſtrahentis non eſt Mendacium: wheras if I affirm the Ayr (in the day time) to be without Light, or Ariſtotle without Learning; the propoſition is Falſe.
Falſhood and Truth therefore being Relations, equally Reall, equally Poſitive▪ the Underſtanding may be ſaid as well to Act Falſhood, as to act Truth, while it produceth that Abſolute Act, in which theſe Relations are founded. Otherwiſe▪ what will be the difference between Ignorance and Errour, between Silence and a Lye?
3. There is yet another Queſtion, to which by his Lor…. I am invited; The ſame (ſaith he) may be ſaid of Pain; which he conceiveth cannot act upon the Soule, nor the Soule upon it; becauſe it is but a bare Privation. And therefore ſubſcribes to the Opinion of Dr. TWISSE, (whom if Anagrams may be credited, you may ſtile WISEST;) that it is better to be in perpetuall Pain, then not to be at all; Becauſe if Pain be a bare Privation, then is Any Being more deſirable, then for fear of a Privation (a Nothing) to become no Being. His ground you may eaſily perceive; Becauſe if Miſery be but a Privation of Happineſſe; then is it better to have the Goodneſſe of Being, without the Goodneſſe of Happineſſe, then to want both the one and the other.
But I cannot with his Lordſhip (ſaving always the deſerved reſpect due to that Reverend Divine) ſubſcribe to the Opinion of Dr. Twiſſe in this particular. For (beſide that thus Paena Damni, and paena Senſus will be all One) I conceive Pain to be as reall as Pleaſure. Motion hath been accounted by all (if I miſtake not) to be Poſitive, and Reſt (quies) to be only Privative, Negatio Motûs. Now in my Opinion, Eaſe, and Pain or Torment, are oppoſite in the ſame manner that Rest and Motion. And ſo I conceive Pain or Torment (whether you ſpeak of dolor Corporis, or dolor Animi; the Griefe of mind, or bodily Pain) to be Reall; the Negation whereof is called Eaſe; and its Contrary, Pleaſure or Delight.
Neither doth it at all trouble me, that Ens & Bonum convertuntur; that all reall Entity, hath a reall Goodneſſe, or the goodneſſe of Being: For nothing hinders but that Bonum Metaphyſicum, may be Malum Phyſicum▪ that which is Reall may notwithſtanding be Inconvenient; that which is, in ſe Bonum, may not-be Bonum huic, whether you ſpeak of bonum Jucundum or bonum Ʋtile.
Goodneſſe of Being (Metaphyſicall goodneſſe) is but a common Subject capable either of (Phyſicall) Good or Evill; (like as the ſame Reall Action may be Morally Good or Evill.) And according as the Phyſicall Good, or Evill (annexed to Being Metaphyſically Good) doth exceed, ſo is that Being Deſirable, or not Deſirable. Otherwiſe, How could it be better for that man (which betrayed our Saviour) that he had never been born?
I urge not the judgement of Senſe in this particular; becauſe his Lordſhip appeals from Senſe to Reaſon: I ſhall therefore examine what Reaſon can alledge, why credit ſhould not be given to the judgement of Senſe. For, …having a Judgement confeſſed in the Court of Senſe; I muſt ſuppoſe▪ it to be in force, till ſuch time as I ſee it revoked by Reaſon: And when Reaſon hath reverſed it, I will grant the former Sentence to be Voyd.
Object. You will ſay Being, though Miſerable, hath ſome Goodneſſe: whereas Not-Being hath none: and therefore Being, though with Miſery, is more deſirable.
Anſ. I reply, Miſery hath much Evill, not-Being hath none: Therfore Miſery is more to be Shunned then not to Be.
But if this ſatisfie not; I deſire to know whether there be not the ſame ſtrength of Reaſon in This Argument, that is in Theirs. viz: A Sinfull Act hath in it the Goodneſſe of Being; and its Sinfullneſſe i… only a Privation of further Goodneſſe, the goodneſſe of Conformity to Gods Law. Therefore, it is better to Sinne then not to Act; to commit a Sinne then not to commit it: For if I Sinne, I produce …ome Good; becauſe it is a reall Action, and ſo hath the Goodneſſe of Being; But in notacting, not-committing, I produce no Goodneſſe at all. Therefore it is better to Sinne, then not to Sinne: becauſe Acting, though Sinfull, hath Some good, but Not-acting hath None.
Now if this Argument do not hold good to prove it Better to Sinne (be the Sinne as great as can be poſſible) then not to Act, not to Sinne: Then muſt I needs think that their Argument, being exactly in the ſame form, is of as little force, to prove Miſery (though never ſo great) to be better then not-Being.
But let us heare his Lordſhip plead at Reaſons Barre, for the revoking that Sentence which hath paſt in the Court of Senſe. Reaſon telleth us (ſaith he) that Paine must be Somthing, or Nothing: If Nothing, then it is but a Privation; …f Something, then muſt it be Good or Evill; If Good, it cannot hurt us; If Evill, it is either a Nominall Evill, or Reall▪ If Named an Evill and is not, it will not be diſputed; but if it be a Reall Evill, then is it Nothing▪ for Evill is only a Privation of Good.
I anſwer to this diſcourſe; That Paine is Somthing, It is Evill, It is a Reall Evill, (Malum Phyſicum.) And this Reall Evill is alſo Poſi…ve, and not a bare Privation of Good: For I conceive not a Stone to be in Pain, though it have not Pleaſure, (bonum Jucundum;) nor to be Greived, though it do not Rejoyce.
There is one great rubbe that yet remains againſt what I have ſaid, concerning theſe three laſt mentioned Queſtions; which I have referred to the End, that ſo once mentioning might ſuffice, without particular repetition in the diſcuſſing of each Queſtion. And it is this.
If Falſhood and Evill, whether Morall or Phyſicall, have a Being, (if it be Reall) then muſt we with the Manichees make two Sources of Being; or elſe God muſt be the Author of it, which none will affirm.
For anſwer to this, I intend not ex profeſſo to handle at large that queſtion, Whether, and In what Senſe, God may be called the Author of Sinne, of Evill, of Falſhood. For, if I durſt to encounter that difficulty, which hath troubled able Divines; yet would it be too tedious to inſert here, eſpecially when I have allready tranſgreſt with over much prolixity. Only thus.
All Relations, you know, have their Originall, not from any peculiar Act whereby they are produced, diſtinct from that Act by which is produced that in which they are grounded; But ariſe and flow from that Abſolute Being, upon which they depend, per nudam Reſulta…tiam, by a Reſultation from it, without a new intermediate Act. The Father doth not by One act beget his Sonne, and by Another act (He, or his Sonne) produce Filiation: But the terminirelationis being once produced, the Relation doth unavoidably follow: Two white things being produced, it is impoſſible (etiam per divinam potentiam) but that they muſt (in this) be Like.
Now Falſhood and Truth, Good and Evill, being (as I have ſaid) Relations; and conſequently having no other Production, but their Reſultance from their Foundation; I leave it to others to judge, How farre God doth concurre with the operation of the Creature in producing that Act, which is Good or Evill, True or Falſe; and How farre the Efficient of this Act may be affirmed the Cauſe of that Relation which doth reſult from it.