Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 13
CHAP. XIII. The Conſequents of this Aſſertion, that All things are one Truth. Whether uſefull in Practicalls.
I Have now done with his Lordſhips Theſis layd downe in the full extent in the ſeverall branches of it. The Chapters enſuing are but a declaration of the Conſequents, the Ʋſefullneſſe of this Poſition. Which, ſaith he, if we conſider, viz. That all things are but one Emanation from divine power; It would make our lives more cheerfull, more Chriſtian, both in the Practicall and Theoreticall part.
That all things are but one Emanation, if he ſpeak of unum per aggregationem, I grant; and ſo I ſuppoſe will all elſe. God alone hath his Being of Himſelfe, and gives Being to all his Creatures: foreign. And whatſoever Being they have, it is only a communication of that Being which he hath in him ſelfe. But that the Parts of this One Aggregatum are not Really diſtinct from each other; hath not yet been ſo clearly proved as to convince mee.
His Arguments, if they prove any thing, will prove, That God cannot produce Creatures really diſtinct. For if it be enough to prove, All things that now are to be really the ſame, Becauſe the Fountain of them all is God; the thing Communicated, their own Eſſence; and the Recipient, Themſelves; (becauſe the Eſſence produced, receiveth of God foreign Eſſe:) Then is it impoſſible for God to produce any thing that ſhall not be the ſame with theſe: For whatſoever can be poſſibly produced, If God be the Author of it, Then muſt Hee be the Fountain, and It ſelfe the Recipient, receiving from God foreign Eſſe.
This being premiſed, I ask, Whether this One Emanation which his Lordſhip ſeeks to eſtabliſh, be Really diſtinct from God or no? If not, then muſt not his Lordſhip blame thoſe that confound the Creator with th… Creature, making It to be God. But if this one Emanation be diſtinct Really, If this Fountain have ſent forth One Stream really diſtinct from it ſelfe, What hinders but that it may ſend forth More Streams? Hath God (like Iſaack) but One Bleſſing? Or Can he produce more but Will not? If he Can; then is it Poſſible that Two Emanations, Two Creatures, may be really diſtinct, though receiving their Eſſence from the ſame Fountain. And if Any Creatures may be poſſibly diſtinct from other, Why not Theſe Creatures that now are? there being no more to be alledged for their Ʋnity, then for the Unity of all Poſſible. Gods foreign, his Power alſo, and the Emanation of it, is So Uniform, as that it is equivalent to an Infinite Variety.
He proceeds to this purpoſe. In the Practick part of our Lives (ſaith he) If we knew that all things were One, with what Cheerfullneſſe, what Courage, ſhould we undertake any Action, any Difficulty; Knowing The distinction of Miſery and Happyneſſe, to have no Being but in the Brain; That Miſery is Nothing, and cannot hurt us, That every thing is Good, and Good to mee, Becauſe I and It are Beings and ſo Good, And theſe two Goods falling under no other difference but of Degrees, Good and Good muſt needs agree, that which is Good is Good to Mee: Yea how void of Envy at anothers good, and of thoughts of Revenging Injuries; Since I have a Propriety, a Poſſeſſion of that which is Anothers, hee and I being One; Injuries are Nothing and cannot hurt; Good things, though anothers, doe ſerve me.
That all things are one; That the difference between Happineſſe and Miſery is only in the Brain; That Miſery, That Injuries, are Nothing and▪ cannot hurt; That whatſoever is Good muſt be Good to Mee; and (which is the ground of it) That Good and Good, Ens & Ens, admit of no difference but of Degrees: I have allready denied. I will only adde, That by this diſcourſe you prove the Devills as happy as the bleſſed Angels: And if it be a Good Conſequent of this Poſition. That it will make us no… be afraid of Miſery and Danger: I am ſure it is as Bad a Conſequent, That it will make us not afraid of Sinning. The Devills are Beings, and therefore Good; Every thing that is, is Good, and Good to them, For both They and It being Good, and admitting of no difference but of Degrees, Good and Good cannot but agree, and ſo, be Good to them: The Happineſſe of the bleſſed Angells doth ſerve Them, ſince (as his Lordſhip ſpeaks) it is not onelyonly foreign, but foreign, They have a Propriety in it: Their own Miſery and Torment is nothing, and cannot hurt them; And (which is the onelyonly difference which you can imagine) if they Think otherwiſe (I uſe ſtill his Lordſhips expreſſion) this muſt be a Lye, and cannot hurt. And if this be Hell; who will be afraid to Sinne?
My judgement cannot aſſent to make the Torments of the damned, onelyonly Imaginary; To make Hell a Fanſie. Yea to affirm, That it is Good to ſinne, Becauſe the Act of ſinning is a Reall Good; and its Evill, only Imaginary, a Lye, and cannot hurt.