Truth Tried, Treatise 1 · Chapter 7
CHAP. VII. Whether Ʋnity be All in all things, or, the Eſſence of all things.
ANd there we have it firſt propoſed to conſideration, Whether Ʋnity be not in nature ſo glorious, and of that dignity, that it is able to inform a Being, Yea, to be the Eſſentiall Form of all things? It is proſecuted in the ſeverall kinds of Beings. Ʋncreated, and Created, whether Spirituall, Morall, Phyſicall, or Mathematicall. In all theſe, ſaith he, you ſhall find Ʋnity as it were the Form of their Being.
And firſt, Whether Ʋnity be not All in God? (The Humility and Reverence, which his Lordſhip uſeth in propoſing of it, may be a fit pattern for all to imitate, in all approaches to a Deity; Not onelyonly in duties of Worſhip, but even in Scholaſtick Diſcourſes. And ſo neither to be peremptory in affirming, nor raſh in cenſuring: Since the vaſt diſproportion between an infinite Object, and a finite Faculty, ſubjects our Underſtanding both to Ignorance and Errour; Suntque oculit tenebrae per tantum lumen.) There is (ſaith he) but One God; And more there could not be, ſince there cannot be Two Infinites, two Eternities; Neither could this One be otherwiſe, for then were he not Infinite. Ʋnity then being ſo inſeparable, as without which God could not be what he is, May it not be ſaid to be Co-eſſentiall to him? And if of his Eſſence, then is it in him All; for Gods Eſſence is All in God.
The Objection which his Lordſhip moves, viz. That there is the ſame reaſon for all other divine Attributes, they being all Eſſentiall to God, as well as Ʋnity: Will bring the Queſtion to this Iſſue, Whether of theſe Attributes may be ſuppoſed in nature to be Firſt? (For that every of them ſhould be the formalis ratio of a ſimple Eſſence is Impoſſible:) And ſo, whether Infinity, &c. do ariſe from Ʋnity, or Ʋnity from thence?
I ſhould rather ſay, That neither of theſe, or any other divine Attribute, may be ſaid to be formalis ratio, or the Eſſentiall form of the Deity; but ſomewhat elſe, in it ſelfe Simple, and yet comprehending all theſe: Which becauſe we cannot apprehend at One Diſcovery, we are fain to take ſeverall Views of it per inadaequatos conceptus.
But if we muſt needs ſeek for a Seniority in Gods Attributes; I ſuppoſe, I might derive as clear a Pedigree of them from his Infinitneſſe, from his Perfection, from his Abſoluteneſſe or Independency; as can be ſhewed either from his Ʋnity, or from his Verity.
But not to be too extravagant, it ſhall be ſufficient for the preſent to ſh…w, whether his Infiniteneſſe flow from his Ʋnity, or his Ʋnity from his Infiniteneſſe? whether he muſt needs be Infinite, becauſe he is One; or One becauſe he is Infinite?
If we ſay, God muſt needs be One, becauſe he is Infinite; his Lordſhip will not only aſſent, but furniſh us with a Reaſon, Becauſe (ſaith he) there cannot be Two Infinites.
But if otherwiſe we ſay, That God muſt of neceſſity be Infinite, becauſe he is One; It is not ſo eaſily proved, ſince there is but One Sunne, and yet that One Sunne not Infinite. How then can we ſay, That God is Eſſentially Infinite, or That Infiniteneſſe is Eſſentiall to him: If the Formalis ratio, the Eſſentiall Form of Divinity, may conſiſt without Infiniteneſſe? Sed foreign.
To his inſtances in Created Spirituall Beings. That all the Commandements are compriſed in Love, ſhews That there is ſomewhat Generall, that is common to them all; or rather Love (as likewiſe Obedience, and the like) is a Collective word, and an Integrum, whereof all thoſe are Parts: But that Ʋnity is either the Generall form of All the Commandements, or the Particular of Any, it ſhews not. The like may be ſaid of the Saints which agree in the Common nature of Saint ſhip, and do joyntly make up the Body myſticall, whereof Chriſt is Head. Yea of all Creatures, They all agree in the common nature of a Being, and They all make up one Ʋniverſe; yet is not Ʋnity either the Generall of all, or Particular form of any Creature.
The Morall Virtues are ſaid to be conjoyned or concatenate, becauſe they all proceed from one Fountain, viz. The abſolute Subordination of the Will and Affections to the Underſtanding: which Subordination they call Prudence, (and is of the ſame extent in Morality, that Obedience is in Divinity) whereof all the morall Virtues are but Integrall parts. (But I had rather apply Prudence to the Underſtanding only; as that whereby it is able to judge in all Practicall things, what is fit to be done; And the univerſall Conformity of the Will to this univerſall Rule of Reaſon, I ſhould call Juſtitia Vniverſali…, Univerſall Juſtice.)
And thus I underſtand that Axiom, That morall Virtues are concatenate in Prudence: Becauſe where there is this univerſall Subjection of the Will to Reaſon, there will be an obſervance of it in all particulars. But if the rules of ſome Virtues are obſerved, and not the rules of others; there this obſervance is not a Virtuous action, as not proceeding from the ſubordination of the Will to Reaſon, (which would have as well prevailed in others alſo) but from ſome other Principle.
Now this ſhews perhaps, That the Morall Virtues are Ʋnited in One generall Eſſence: But how appears it, That this Eſſence is Ʋnity?
Phyſicall Beings, as Water-drops (and other Connaturalls, either of the Same, or Concordant Species; as the Loadſtone and Iron) deſire to preſerve their Union and Neighbourhood one with another: But let us conſider the ground; Do they deſire to preſerve their Eſſence that they may be One, that is, United or Joyned together; or do they deſire Ʋnion and Conjunction, that they may preſerve their Eſſence? This latter I ſuppoſe; And therefore a drop of water doth not deſire to Bee, to the end that it may be Conjoyned with the reſt, but deſires to be Conjoyned for its Preſervation, leſt it ſhould ceaſe to be. But how doth this prove its Eſſence to be Ʋnity?
In ſumme, All thoſe inſtances in Nature (which doubtleſſe are very many) whereby it may appear that all things naturally do deſire Ʋnity (or Conjunction rather) either for Conſervation, or for Conſummation of their naturall Perfection; That by Unity their Vigour is encreaſed, quia vi… unita fortior, and the like; will ſhew no more but this, That Unity is a Perfection of Being, not a Principle of Being; or That Things of the like nature conjoyned together are able mutually to help each other in their Conſervation or Operation. But what is there in all this to perſwade us, that Unity is their Eſſence?
As for the Mathematicall Unity of Harmony, Proportion &c. It being only Relative (for they denote but the Relation of one thing to another) can conferre nothing to the conſtitution of an Abſolute Eſſence, as of Sounds, &c.
But how this ſhould any way conferre to the deciding of that queſtion, whether Quantity be diviſibilis in ſemper diviſibilia: ſeems to me a greater myſtery, then this Myſtery that is to be cleared. For as long as Mathematicall Demonstrations ſhall be thought worthy of credit, it ſhall Never be granted, that Continuum conſtat ex indiviſibilibus. And however ſome Naturaliſts, that know little what belongs to the nature of Quantity, make much adoe to the contrary, and therby bewray their groſſe Ignorance in theſe things; Yet I am confident, that not any One Mathematician (deliberately, and in a Mathematicall way) either ever did, or ever will aſſent to them. And I cannot without Indignation (or Pity rather) read ſometimes how fondly and vainly ſome (otherwiſe) able Schollars think to ſhift off Mathematicall Arguments in this and the like caſes; which will not be ſo eaſily baffled by an empty Verball Diſtinction, as ſome of their Idle Fallacies may. And if I make it not evident (to thoſe that are acquainted with Mathematicall terms) that a Continuum conſiſts not of Indiviſible Points, by as certain and infallible Mathematicall Demonſtrations, as That 2. and 2. make 4. I will hereafter turn Sceptick, and affirm confidently That we are ſure of nothing.
If a Line conſiſt of Indiviſible points, each Point is ſuppoſed to be Minimum poſſibile, by thoſe that doe maintain it; (or elſe how are they Indiviſible.) Then muſt all Points be Equall; (for if they be Unequall, they cannot all be minima.) Then no Two Lines can poſſibly be foreign, or Incommenſurable; (for if all Lines doe conſiſt of Points whereof each is equall to other, then are all lines whatſoever meaſurable by this common meaſure of a Point; qu… aliquoties applicata, & hanc & illam commenſurabit. Contrary to what hath been often demonſtrated Mathematically, That ſome Lines are abſolutely Incommenſurable with ſome other, admitting of no common meaſure, (as for Example, the Diameter and the Latus of a Quadrate, (whoſe Proportion therfore cannot be expreſſed by Rationall Numbers. Now that two Contradictory Propoſitions ſhould be true by Mathematicall Demonſtration, is utterly impoſſible.
Thouſands of the like Demonſtrations might be brought to prove it; As, that from hence, All Angles may be demonſtrated to be Equall; The ſame Line, to be Shorter, to be Longer then it ſelfe, to be equall to two or more conjoyned, and yet to be ſhorter then either; Yea, all Lines to be equall, All Circles of the ſame bigneſſe, The Equinoctiall Circle to be no bigger then a Ciphar, All Motions to be of the ſame ſwiftneſſe, All Bodies of the ſame weight, and of the ſame bigneſſe: And yet in the meane time All theſe to be unequall, in Length, Weight, Swiftneſſe, &c. And infinite the like abſurdities; as might be ſhewed, if this were the Queſtion I had in hand. Take an inſtance or two.
Let two Circles be deſcribed upon the ſame Center, of what greatneſſe you pleaſe; Let a Thread be faſtned at the common Center, and ſo extended that it cut the Circumference of both Circles; Thus extended, the one end being faſtned at the Center, let the other end be moved round: Now while this Thread paſſeth over one Point in the Greater Circle, I demand how much it paſſeth over in the Leſſer? Leſſe then a Point it cannot be, becauſe ex hypotheſi, a Point is Minimum poſsibile; For every Point therefore that it paſſeth over in the Greater Circle, it paſſeth over a Point anſwerable in the Leſſer Circle; There be therefore as many points in the Leſſer as are in the Greater Circle; and theſe Points being all Equall, becauſe every one is Minimum poſsibile, the Leſſer Circle muſt needs be equall to the Greater Circle, becauſe it conſiſts of as many Points; and by the ſame reaſon, All Circles Equall.
Now the Thread thus moving, move it never ſo Slowly, it paſſeth over a Point in a Moment; and move it never ſo Swiftly, it paſſeth but a Point in a Moment: And therefore all Motions are alike Swift, as paſſing over equall diſtances in equall time.
Again, Let two Lines concurring in the ſame Point make an Angle, (of what greatneſſe you pleaſe;) their Two next Points, joyning upon this common Point of concurrence, will terminate a Baſis of Two Points, (not more, for then the Subtendent would be equall to both the Crura.) The two Third points will terminate a Line ſomewhat longer then the other, and therefore at leaſt of Three points; and ſo on, for every point added to the Crura, (be the angle greater or leſſe) you muſt adde one point to the length of the Baſis, ſubtendent to that angle (and more then One it cannot be, for then the increaſe of the Baſis will be equall to the encreaſe of both the Crura:) Whence it will come to paſſe That all Angles (at an equall diſtance from the point of concurrence) will have their Subtendents equall (the Baſis or Subtendent being thus meaſured by the length of the Crura, or lines containing the angle…) Wherefore themſelves alſo muſt be equall.
Now alſo it is ſufficiently apparent to a Mathematician, that upon all liues whatſoever, you may erect (as from a Baſis) lines of the ſame length containing an Angle; and therefore (both the Angle and the Baſis being meaſured onelyonly by the length of the Crura) not onelyonly all Angles may be equall, but alſo all Lines, (as being Subtendents to equall angles at the ſame diſtance.) I need not adde more demonſtrations to ſhew the Impoſſibility of that Opinion which makes every Continuum to conſiſt ex indiviſibilibus.
It is certain then, that Continuum non Conſtat ex Indiviſibilibus: But, how this doctrine of Ʋnity ſerves either to confirm the truth, or to clear the doubts; I ſee not.
But to return. His Lordſhip hath been copious to ſhew ſome Ʋnion, …ome Relation, of One thing to, or with Another, in the ſeverall kinds of Being. From whence he is ready to infer, That the Eſſence of all things is One, that it is Ʋnity. But be it granted, That there be divers particular Species under the ſame Genericall nature; (as when all particular acts of duty are compriſed in One generall name of Love, or Obedience:) Be it ſo, That many Effects may proceed from the ſame Cauſe; (as all virtuous acts from the ſubordination of the Will to Reaſon:) That there be many Combinations of Beings or Perſons, Naturall, Voluntary▪ O…conomicall, Politicall, Logicall, &c. whence may ariſe One Aggregatum, One Praedicament, one City, or Kingdome, one World: Be there S…pernaturall or Spirituall Societies, One Church, Paroch…all, Nationall, O…cumenicall, Viſible, Inviſible, one myſticall Body: Be there alſo in Lines, Bodies, Sounds, &c. (beſides their Abſolute Affections, Length, Bigneſſe, Lowdneſſe, &c.) ſome mutuall Relations of Proportion, Harmony, Diſcord, &c. Be there in Phyſicall Bodies, a deſire of Union or Conjunction in One to another; Yet will not this prove, That all things have One Nature, One Eſſence; much leſſe, That this Eſſence is Ʋnity. If Iron deſire Union, (or conjunction rather) with the Loadſtone, doth this prove their Specificall Eſſence to be One? Or (if it doe) doth it pro…e▪ that this One Eſſence is Ʋnity? And ſo of the reſt.
All that can ariſe from hence, is, That God hath ſo ordered the ſeverall Natures of particular Creatures, as that his Wiſdome doth not only appear in their Abſolute and Simple natures; but hath alſo put Relative or Reſpective natures in them, whereby his Wiſdome may appear in their mutuall Oppoſitions, Conjunctions, Similitude, Diſſimilitude, Sympathy, Antipathy, Help, and Hinderance of one thing to another; whereby not onelyonly Every thing (Severally) in its Abſolute nature doth ſet forth Gods glory, but alſo All things (joyntly) doe foreign, and work together in their reſpective Relations, as well for the good of thoſe that love God, as for their mutuall advancing of Gods glory. All which may be, though neither Ʋnity, nor any One ſpecificall Being, be the formalis ratio, the eſſentiall form of all things; but each ſpecies have a ſeverall kind of Being.
For my own judgement; I am as confident, that Ʋnity is Nothing; as his Lordſhip is, That it is All things. 'Tis a meer rationall, nominall Notion, that hath no more Reality in it, then Darkneſſe, then non eſſe. Yea, to be One, is a pure Negative Propoſition; and what Reality you can allow to a Negation, ſo much you may allow to Ʋnity.
It is true, Ʋnus, as it is oppoſed to Nullus, is Affirmative, and is the ſame with Aliquis, or Nonnullus: But if it ſignifie the ſame with Ʋnicus, and be oppoſed to Multitude, (according as we now take it,) it is a meer Negation, and no more.
Which to make clear, obſerve but this Syllogiſme, [Whatſoever is in England, is in Europe; But in England there is Rex Ʋnicus, One only King; Therfore in Europe there is Rex Ʋnicus; but One King.] Where you ſhall find no fault in the Syllogiſme, ſave that the Minor is Negative in the firſt figure. Whence it is apparent, That Ʋnity, as it is oppoſed to Multitude, is a meer Negative term.
There is One Sunne; but is this Ʋnity Eſſentiall to it? Whether another Sunne be, or be not; it nothing concerns the Eſſence of this Sun, but onelyonly grounds an externall Relation, which is yet but Relati… rationis.
Was not the Eſſence of Adam the Same, and he Equally a Man, before the production of Eve, while he was Ʋnicus; and after both the Production of Eve, and the Generation of ſonnes and daughters, when he ceaſed to be Ʋnicus, there being more beſide him? Was there any Detraction, or Addition of Eſſence, or any Reality, that concerned Adams perſon, at ſuch time as his children were born? or would there have been afterwards, if all except Adam had been ſwept away?
Nay when two Drops of Water are ſeparated, or conjoyned, is there any Eſſentiall or Reall Mutation in either?
Surely, if Ʋnity may come, and goe, without any Reall Alteration; then is Ʋnity ſo farre from being Eſſentiall to all things, that it is not ſo much as Reall.
Object▪ You will ſay; But God is indeed One, Ʋnus et Ʋnicus; and not onelyonly ſuppoſed to be One: Therefore his Unity muſt needs be Reall, and not Imaginary.
Anſw. I grant it; But what then? muſt therefore Unity be Poſitive or Reall? The Ayr, in the night time, is indeed Dark, and not onelyonly …poſed to be Dark; Will you therefore infer that Darkneſſe hath a Reall, a Poſitive Being, and is not a privation of Light? When the Moon is eclipſed, it doth Really and Indeed want the Illumination of the Sun-beams, and is not onelyonly ſuppoſed to want them; but you will not, I ſuppoſe, ſay that this Want of Light, hath a Reall Eſſence. So here▪ God is indeed One, and not only imagined ſo to be, yet hath not Ʋnity …ny Entity or Poſitive Being in it.
There is Negatio Realis, and Negatio Rationis; a Reall abſence and a Suppoſed abſence. Of the one you may truly frame a Negative Propoſition▪ of the other you cannot; there may be indeed in the Underſtanding concerning thi…, Negatio actus, (which is all one with Abſtraction) but not actus negationis, actus negativus. When the Ayr, in the Night time, is Dark; there is a Reall Abſence of Light: when, in the Day time, I conceive of the Ayr according to its Eſſence, or according to ſome other Qualities, not at all regarding its being Light; this is Negatio Rationis, or negatio Abſtractionis, there is only a ſuppoſed Abſence of Light, but indeed a (reall) Preſence.
Yea, ipſum Non-eſſe, is a Reall Praedication though it be not a reall Praedicate (Like as Mendacium eſſe Falſum, is a Truth:) Therefore when I ſay, Centaurus non eſt; I do not Forge this Propoſition, or ſuppoſe a non-entity in a Centaure where indeed there is none, but I affirm that non-entity to be, which is; for a Centaure, Is non-ens, and not only Suppoſed to be Non-ens. And of Negations, or Privations, That is onelyonly Negatio Rationis, when by Abstraction Things are ſuppoſed to be ſeparate, which are indeed conjoyned: Other Negations though they have not realiter Eſſe, yet they have realiter Non-eſſe; their non-entity is not Imaginary. (I ſpeak of Negatio Phyſica, not Negatio Logica; for a Logicall Negation, that is, a Negative Enunciation, is as Reall as an Affirmation.) A ſuppoſed Being is Ens rationis, and a ſuppoſed Abſence is Negatio rationis.
Negations and Privations are Non-Entia, and not Entia Rationis; for they have not in themſelves ſo much as Eſſe Cognitum, which is requiſite to Ens Rationis; And when as ſometimes a Negation is ſaid to be Ens Rationis▪ it is not to be underſtood of its internall Entity, for ſo Darkneſſe in it ſelfe doth not include eſſe cognitum, but when the Underſtanding conſiders of a Negation, and ſo makes it Objectum Cognitionis, then of a Non-ens it becomes Ens Rationis. But then (I ſay) it is …trationis, not Negatio rationis.
Yet all this hinders not but that Ʋnity, and all other Negations, may have a kind of Reality, as it is oppoſed to a Fiction. And therfore the Ayr … really Dark, God is really Ʋnicus, and not onelyonly ſuppoſed ſo to be: And yet Darkneſſe and Unity are not in themſelves Reall, but Negative term▪
I purpoſely paſſe over ſeverall particulars, (as well in this Chapter, as in others) which his Lordſhip lights upon by the way; to avoid tediouſneſſe: and look principally at thoſe things, to which his Lordſhips aim doth eſpecially tend.