The Riches of Gods Love, Part 34 – Part 37
IEANES.
FIrſt, untill you can find a Major and Minor unto your former concluſion, this which is inferr'd therehence is preſumed and not proved.
2. You here make Willeth and Injoyneth all one, concerning the unreaſonableneſſe of which, I have ſpoken already.
3. I wonder what you meane in talking of an act of will in God, whereby he injoyneth faith and repentance, The injunction or precept of faith and repentance, is an act without God, not in him, and belongs unto his will, not formally, but effectively.
4. Your mentioning of an act of will in God, hath occaſioned mee to thinke of ſome thing, which for clearing of mine own meaning, and avoyding of miſtakes, I ſhall communicate unto the Reader: And it is carefully to put a diſtinction betwixt theſe two expreſſions, To be properly the will of God, and To be properly an act of the will of God.
That Gods decrees are properly the will of God, may be demonſtrated out of moſt Schoolemen; that they are properly acts of Gods will I deny, and that for two reaſons.
1. If Gods decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is aſcribed unto God, not as a power diſtinct from the act, but as an act not elicite but ſubſisting: And here I ſhall give you the words and reaſons of Suarez, then whom there are few Moderne Schoolemen more rationall. He having proved that the will is not in God per modum potentiae ſecundum rem, ſed per modum actus ultimi & puri, he propounds the doubt ſecundum rationem, & modum concipiendi noſtrum, wherein heare his reſolution. In hoc eodem modo loquendum eſt, quo de intellectu & ſcientià locuti ſumus, quod ſcilicet ex parte rei conceptae, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non poteſt concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi poteſt quod ſit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non ſecundum rem, ſed ſecundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptae involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere ſecundum rationem, non eſt agere, ſed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, ſcilicet virtutem amandi ſe, ut ſic, quam praeſcindimus ab actuali amore, ſicut de actu primo & ſecundo in ſcientia diximus.
But here I deſire to be underſtood, as Franciſcus Amicus explicates himſelfe touching this particular Curſ. Theol. Tom. 1. Diſp. 14. Sect. 1. Dupliciter conſiderari potest potentia vitalis; uno modo, ut dicit diſtinctionem ab actu; ſecundo, ut importat poſitivam perfectionem percipiendi aut tendendi ad objectum; primo modo involvit imperfectionem Deo repugnantem; ſecundo modo perfectionem Deo convenientem. Quare concedo in Deo eſſe voluntatem, ſecundum poſitivum conceptum potentiae; Nego autem eſſe potentiam, ſecundum imperfectionem distinctionis ab actu ſecundo, quam potentia ut ſic per ſe importat. The power of willing may be conſidered two manner of waies; Firſt, as it implyeth diſtinction from its act; and ſo it involveth imperfection repugnant unto God, Secondly, as it importeth a poſitive perfection of tendency towards its object or thing willed, and ſo it may be attributed unto God.
2. If Gods decrees were properly acts of Gods will, then they ſhould be properly Elicite acts, but they are not properly elicite acts, but ſubſisting. …nunciantur fateor (ſaith our Author) tanquam actus a Deo eliciti, & ſic dici poſſunt per anthropopathiam, quemadmodum & paſſiones humanae attribuuntur Deo. At eruditi probe norunt omnia decreta Dei eſſe unicum duntaxat actum volendi in Deo, qui quidem actus volendi non differt realiter ab ipſa voluntate Dei, quae quidem voluntas Dei non differt realiter ab ipſo Deo, qui est actus ſimpliciſſimus. Vind. lib. 2. p. 2. p. 101. But I returne from this digreſſion unto M. Goodwin.
M. GOODWIN.
THerefore if there be any ſecret, or revealed will of God, whereby he willeth the deſtruction of any man, at the ſame time when he willeth the ſalvation of all men, (be it with what kind of will ſoever) theſe two wills muſt needs enterfeere and contradict one the other.
IEANES.
THis you gather from what you have not at all proved, but only pretended to have proved, viz. that the precept or injunction of faith and repentance, is properly the will of God. And for the contrary I have brought undeniable proofes, and therefore though there be any ſecret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the deſtruction of any man, at the ſame time, when he willeth or enjoyneth his faith and repentance, thoſe two wills doe not as you ſay enterfeere or contradict one the other. For unto contradiction it is required, that all the termes muſt be taken in the ſame ſenſe and ſignification; now this condition is not here obſerved: For that he willeth the deſtruction of any man, is with a will in proper ſpeech, that he willeth the faith and repentance of all men, unto whom the Goſpell is preached, is with a will improperly ſo called, viz, his commandement.
Mr GOODWIN.
NOr will that diſtinction of the late mentioned Author, ſalve a conſistency between them, wherein he diſtinguiſheth betwixt the decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth may be repugnant to, or inconſistent with the thing that he commandeth, though the decree it ſelfe cannot be repugnant to the command.aRem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare poſſe dicimus, decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare poſſe non dicimus. Tuiſſe … ſup.