The Riches of Gods Love, Part 38 – Part 41
IEANES
THis is not barely affirmed, but ſtrongly proved by D. Twiſſe, and of his proofes you take no notice, but only object againſt what he ſaith: This if it be a laudable, is a very eaſy, and compendious way of handling a controverſy, for it would ſave a man the labour of that, which hath ſtill been accounted the moſt difficult taske in Polemicall Writers, to wit, ſolution of Arguments; but I ſhall acquaint the Reader with what you conceale, and I doe not doubt, but upon repreſentation thereof, he will acquit the Doctor, and his diſtinction, from that vanity which you lay to his charge. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare poſſe dicimus; interea decretum Dei cum mandato pugnare poſſe non dicimus; uirumque demonstramus. Rem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata pugnare poſſe, ſic oftendimus; ſacrificatio Iſaaci & non-ſacrificatic Iſaici pugnant inter ſe, ſunt enim termini contradicentes. At harum altera fuit a Deo mandata Abrahamo, uti docet Scriptura, ſimulque eodem tempore non-ſacrificatio fuit à Deo decreta, ut colligitur ex eventu. Nam Deus eam efficaciter impedivit, ne fieret. Quare res a Deo mandata, pugnare poteſt cum re a Deo decreta. Rurſus, dimiſſio populi Iſraelitici ex Aegypto, & non-dimiſsio pugnant inter ſe, ſunt enim ſibi invicem contradicentes: at altera, nempe dimiſſio, fuit a Deo mandata Pharaoni; altera, puta non-dimiſſio, fuit a Deo eodem tempore decreta. Nam & mandavit Pharaoni per Moſem & Aaronem ut populum dimitteret; ſimul etiam ſignificavit, ſe obduraturum cor Pharaonis, ut non dimitteret; ergo res a Deo mandata, pugnare poteſt cum re à Deo decreta.
That things commanded and decreed by God, may be contradictory, the Doctor proveth by undenyable inſtances. The ſacrificing of Iſaack, and the not ſacrificing of Iſaack, are termes contradictory; but the ſacrificing of Iſaack was the object of Gods command to Abraham. Gen. 22. 2. The not ſacrificing of Iſaack was the object of Gods decree, as appears by the event. v. 11. 12. Therefore the object of Gods commandement, and the object of his decree, may be contradictory. Againe, the letting of Iſraell goe out of Aegypt, and the not letting of Iſraell goe out of Aegypt are termes contradictory; but the letting of Iſraell goe was commanded unto Pharaoh, his not letting of Iſraell goe was decreed and determined by God. Exod. 7. 2, 3. and 10. 1, 2. God told Moſes that he would harden Pharaohs heart, that he ſhould not let Iſraell goe. Therefore a thing commanded by God, and a thing decreed by God, may be contradictory. Concerning the firſt of theſe inſtances, you ſay ſomething pag. 451, 452. But there is nothing argumentative in what you ſay, but may receive an anſwer from your own rule of interpreting Scripture. pag. 92. 99. 108. 109. In the next place the Doctor proves, that the commandements and the decrees of God are not repugnant. Nec tamen decretum pugnare cum mandato, ſic probamus. Mandato ſignificat Deus quid ſit noſtri officii, ut a nobis fieri debeat; decretum vero divinum nihil aliud eſt, quam propoſitum divinum de aliquo, ut vel fiat, vel impediatur ne fiat, idque efficaciter. Mandatum docet quid ipſe probaturus ſit, ſi modo ab homine fiat, quid improbaturus ſi non fiat: decretum ſtatuit quid ipſe facturus ſit, aut impediturus, ne ſit. Iſta autem non pugnant; tui eſt officii ut hoc facias, ſed non est mei propoſiti per gratiam efficere ut facias. Pari ratione poteſt Deus mandare alicui fidem, & reſipiſcentiam, & interea apud ſe statuere, quod non credat, aut reſipiſcat, negando ſcilicet gratiam efficacem, qua ſola fieri poteſt ut credat aut reſipiſcat.
God by his command ſignifieth, and ſheweth what is our duty, what ought to be done, or left undone by us; Gods decree is nothing elſe, but his purpoſe that things ſhall come to paſſe, or not come to paſſe; the command teacheth, what God will approve or diſapprove; his decree determineth, what he himſelfe will doe or hinder, &c. Now theſe are no waies repugnant. It is thy duty to doe this, but it is not Gods purpoſe to give thee grace for the doing of it: Thou art bound or obliged to doe this, but yet thou ſhalt never actually doe it: faith and repentance are thy duty, and yet thy faith and thy repentance ſhall never actually exiſt, or come to paſſe. By this that the Doctor hath ſaid it is plaine, that there is no oppoſition between Gods command to all that heare the Goſpell, believe, and repent, and his purpoſe of denying faith and repentance unto many, nay moſt of them. And thus you ſee what the Doctor hath to ſay for himſelfe, let us next heare what you can ſay againſt him.
Mr GOODWIN.
THe vanity of this diſtinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary unto the thing preceptively willed or commanded by him, impoſſible it is, but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is ſuppoſed to will the one, and by the other the other, ſhould digladiate and one fight against the other.
IEANES.
FIrſt, here againe you perplexe the diſputation with talking of two acts of Gods will, but ſuppoſing that by one of them you meane Gods decree which is in him, and by the other his commandement which is without him, performed uſually by the Miniſtry of the creature, and therefore not his will properly ſo called, I utterly deny the conſequence of your argument, and how juſt and reaſonable this my denyall thereof is, will appeare, if you pleaſe to reduce your Enthymeme into a Categoricall Syllogiſme, for then you will find the proofe of its conſequence to depend on this, That whatſoever acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, doe digladiate and one fight againſt the other; and this is a propoſition ſo groſſely falſe, as that I am very confident you cannot back it with ſo much as one, either teſtimony or reaſon. That acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, is a common and received rule; but that all acts are oppoſite, whoſe objects are repugnant, is an aſſertion that as yet I never ſo much as read or heard of in any either Philoſopher or Divine; and 'tis this alone will ſerve your turne to conclude a digladiation or repugnancy between the Decree and the Command of God from the oppoſition that D. Twiſſe admitteth to be between the things Decreed and the things Commanded.
2. If we take oppoſition and repugnancy as the Ramiſts, who divide it into diſparation and contrariety, we may ſafely ſay, that Gods decree and his commandement are things oppoſite, for they are diſparate; but this will no wiſe prejudice D. Twiſſe, who ſpeakes in the language of the followers of Ariſtotle, neither will it any waies advantage you, for the oppoſition or repugnancy that is between things diſparate is only as touching an eſſentiall predication one of another, we cannot ſay that Grammar is Logick, or that temperance in a man is fortitude, and ſo we cannot ſay that Gods decree is his commandement, or his commandement is his decree: not of a denominative or concretive predication of the ſame ſubject: the ſame man may be valiant, and temperate, a Grammarian and a Logician. See Scheibler Top. cap. 14. n. 7. & cap. 15. n. 19.
MR GOODWIN.
IT is impoſſible that I ſhould inwardly and ſeriouſly will or deſire the death of my Child, and yet at the ſame time ſeriouſly alſo will and injoyne the Phyſitian to doe his beſt to recover him.