The Riches of Gods Love, Part 26 – Part 33
IEANES.
D. Twiſſe is not ſingular herein, diverſe great Schoolemen, Aquinas, Durand, Cajetan, Bannes, Gregory de Valentia, and many others, ſay the ſame of not only Gods command, but all other ſignes of the will of his purpoſe or good pleaſure. The words of ſome few of them, ſhall for the ſatisfaction of the reader be inſerted in the Margent; and the rather, becauſe you in the 16 Section of this Chapter, tell us, that the Schoolemen were the firſt coyners of this diſtinction of Gods will in Voluntatem ſigni, & voluntatem beneplaciti: and how their interpretation thereof, holds intelligence (as you ſpeake) with that ſenſe of D. Twiſſe which you here impugne, the Reader may ſee Vindic. Lib. 1. pag. 173, Dicendum quod in Deo quaedam dicuntur proprie & quaedam ſecundum Metaphoram, cum autem aliquae paſſiones humanae in divinam praedicationem metaphorice aſſumuntur, hoc fit ſecundum ſimilitudinem effectus, unde illud quod eſt ſignum talis paſſionis in nobis, in Deo nomine illius paſſionis Metaphorice ſignificatur; ſicut apud nos irati punire conſueverunt, unde ipſa punitio eſt ſignum irae, & propter hoc ipſa punitio nomine irae ſignificatur, cum Deo attribuitur. Similiter id quod ſolet eſſe in nobis ſignum voluntatis, quando que Metaphorice in Deo voluntas dicitur, ſicut cum aliquis praecipit aliquid, ſignum eſt, quod velit illud fieri; unde praeceptum divinum quando que Metaphorice voluntas Dei dicitur, ſecundum illud Matthaei 6. Fiat voluntas tua, ſicut in coelo & in terra; ſed hoc diſtat inter voluntatem & iram, quia ira de Deo nunquam proprie dicitur, cum in ſuo principali intellectu includat paſſionem, voluntas autem proprie de Deo dicitur, & ideo in Deo diſtinguitur voluntas proprie, & Metaphorice dicta, voluntas enim proprie dicta vocatur voluntas beneplaciti; voluntas autem Metaphorice dicta eſt voluntas ſigni, eo quod ipſum ſignum voluntatis voluntas dicitur. Aq…in. part. 1. Sum. Qu. 19. art. 11. Communiter dicitur quod diſtinctio voluntatis divinae in voluntatem beneplaciti, & in voluntatem ſigni, eſt diſtinctio voluntatis in voluntatem proprie dictam, & Metaphorice, nam voluntas beneplaciti eſt voluntas proprie dicta, vel actus ſuus volendi, quo aliquid fibi placet, ſed voluntas ſigni dicitur Metaphorice voluntas Dei, eo modo quo ſignum nominatur Metaphorice nomine rei, cujus eſt ſignum, ut imago Herculis vocatur Hercules Et h…c poteſt eſſe dupliciter, uno modo ratione ſimilitudinis inter ſignum & ſignatum ut in exemplo jam poſito; alio modo ratione proportionis quaſi arguendo, Quod ficut ſe habent ſignum & ſignatum in uno, ſic ſe habeant in alio; & ſic eſt in propoſito noſtro: Quia enim in nobis ille qui praecipit, vel conſulit aliquid fieri, videtur illud velle: ſimiliter qui prohibet aliquid fieri, videtur velle illud non fieri; qui autem aliquid facit, vult illud fieri, qui vero permittit aliquid fieri cum poſſit impedire, videtur illud velle; ideo in Deo idem ponitur ſcilicet quod praeceptum, conſilium, prohibitio, operatio, & permiſſio ſunt, vel dicuntur voluntas divina propter dictam ſimilitudinem vel magis proportionem. Durand. lib. 1. diſt. 45. Q 3. Haec diviſio divinae voluntatis in voluntatem beneplaciti, & voluntatem ſigni, non eſt univoci in univocata, ſed analogi in analogata. Nam de ſigno divinae voluntatis non dicitur voluntatis nomen niſi Metaphorice, & analogice, propter habitudinem illius ad voluntatem divinam proprie dictam. Quam rem aliis verbis Cajetanus expreſſit in hac quaeſtione. Art. 11. Cum dixit non dividi hic rem aliquam, ſed vocem ipſam, ſeu nomen divinae voluntatis Gregori de Valentia. Tom. 1. Diſp. 1. Q. 19. punct. 2.174.
Some of them profeſſe in terminis, that the will of ſigne or ſignification, is called the will of God only improperly, and metaphorically by way of ſimilitude or proportion, and therefore the diſtribution of Gods will into a will of ſigne and will of purpoſe or good pleaſure is not reall, but only verball, diviſio vocis; from whom they doe not diſſent, who ſay that 'tis diviſio Analogi in analogata. For as Scheibler a Lutheran, and of your opinion for the maine in theſe controverſies, obſerveth, that they are to be underſtood of ſuch an analogy which is by extrinſecall reference and denomination. Intelligunt enim eam analogiam, quae eſt per extrinſecam habitudinem & denominationem. Voluntas enim ſigni vocatur voluntas extrinſeca denominatione, in quantum ſcilicet ſignificat beneplacitum divinum, quod abſolute eſt voluntas Dei, ad eum modum quo multa dicuntur ſana, per habitudinem ad ſantitatem animalis, quae primo talis eſt: Metaph. lib. 2. cap. 3. tit. 15. art. 4. punct. 2. n. 535.
For the will of ſigne is called will by extrinſecall denomination, as it ſignifieth Gods good pleaſure or decree (which abſolutely is the will of God) after the ſame manner that many things are ſaid to be healthy or wholſome, in regard of reference unto the health of a ſenſitive creature, unto whom health is in the firſt place properly and intrinſecally attributed.
Unto theſe ſuffrages of the Schoolemen, I ſhall adde reaſons drawn from three attributes of Gods will properly ſo called; It is internall, eternall, irreſiſtible, and Gods precept or injunction is externall, temporary, and reſiſtible.
1. Gods will properly ſo called is internall in God, really undiſtinguiſhed from his Eſſence, whereas Gods precepts or injunctions, are externall without him, really diſtinguiſhed from him.
2. The proper will of God was from eternall, the commands of God are given in time.
From the Eternity of Gods will, I ſhall alſo draw this following Argument.
The will of God properly ſo called is uncapable of interruption, reiteration, and multiplication, for in eternity there is a moſt abſolute and perfect unity and indiviſibility without any ſucceſſion of parts, but now the Commands of God may be very often reiterated and multiplied, precept upon precept, precept upon precept, line upon line, line upon line. Eſay 28. 10. Oh Jeruſalem, Jeruſalem, how often would I have gathered thy children together. Math. 23. 37.
3. The will of God properly ſo called is irreſiſtible, Who hath reſiſted his will. Rom. 9. 19. Whatſoever the Lord pleaſed that did he in heaven and in earth, in the Sea and all deepe places. Pſal. 135. 6. The Counſell of the Lord muſt ſtand and cannot be withſtood. By all the powers of the World and darkneſſe my counſell (ſaith the Lord) ſhall stand, and I will doe all my pleaſure Eſay 46. 10. But now Gods precepts and prohibitions are every day violated, broken and reſiſted by wicked men.
Unto theſe reaſons I might adde your own confeſſion, I confeſſe (ſay you) that no ſignification whatſoever, whether of what a man willeth or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be ſaid Praelatus enim religioſus quando que praecipit ſubdito aliquid grave, volens eum per praeceptum ligare, & tamen nec vult, nec intendit, quod res quam praecipit fiat; unde cum ſubditus parat ſe ad exequendum praeceptum, Praelatus revocat; ita quod Praeceptur eſt directe ſignum voluntatis praecipientis quod velit obligari ſubditum ad exequ…ndum praeceptum, ſed non eſt directe ſignum quod velit rem praeceptam impleri; talia enim praecepta ſunt vel ad ſumendum experimentum de obedientia ſubditi, vel ad oſtendendum pluribus obedientiam unius quaſi pro exemplo.to be the will of the ſignifier.
But now I ſubjoyne, Gods precept or injunction is only a ſigne of his will, and therefore however it be uſually termed in Scripture the will of God Mat. 6. 10. Mat. 7. 21. Rom. 12. 2. 1 Theſſ. 4. 3. It is to be underſtood only improperly and Tropically; and that firſt Metaphorically, 2. Metonymically.
Firſt Metaphorically, and by an Anthrop…pathy, when God commands a thing, he carryeth himſelfe as men doe, when they purpoſe, will, deſire, and determine that ſuch a thing ſhould come to paſſe; for amongſt men uſually their commands are manifeſtations and declarations of their purpoſes and deſires; I ſay uſually, becauſe ſometimes ſuperiors injoyne ſome things to inferiors only for tryall, and, upon their readineſſe to obey, recall and revoke ſuch commands. How Gods commandements and other ſignes of his will, are the will of God Metaphorically, Aquinas illuſtrates in the place but now quoted; ſeeing paſſions are aſcribed unto God only Metaphorically, hence the ſignes of ſuch paſſions in us, when aſcribed unto God, are called by the names of the paſſions themſelves. Puniſhment is with us a ſigne of Anger, and therefore Gods puniſhments are termed his wrath or anger; ſo our commands are ſignes uſually of our wills, of our deſires, and intentions, and therefore the commands of God are termed in Scripture the will of God.
But I think with D. Ames, that the commandements of God are termed the will of God, not only Metaphorically, but alſo Metonymically, becauſe they are ſignes of a proper will of God. Media illa (ſaith Ames) per quae voluntas ista r…elatur, recte vocantur voluntas ſigni, non tantum Metaphorice, quia ſolent inter homines indicare quid velint: ſed etiam Metonymice, quia ſunt vel effecta, vel adjuncta, propriam Dei voluntatem ex parte indicantia. Medul. lib. 1. c. 7. 53. And this alſo is obſerved by D. Twiſſe, in his conſideration of the Doctrine of the Synod of Dort and Arles reduced to the practice, p. 54. Now we ſay, even Gods commandement notes the will of God alſo in proper ſpeech, to wit, what ſhall be our duty to doe; for undoubtedly whatſoever God commands us, it is his will in proper ſpeech, that it ſhall be our duty to doe it. However then, it is the ſence of D. Twiſſe, that the commandement of God cannot properly be ſaid to be his will, yet he doth not deny that it ſignifieth or betokeneth the will of God properly ſo called, in which regard it is termed the revealed will of God, becauſe it revealeth Gods will: all the Queſtion is, what will of God it revealeth or ſignifieth. D. Twiſſe (you ſee) roundly expreſſeth himſelfe, that it ſignifieth, or revealeth Gods will of obligation, what he will oblige and bind men unto; what he will have to be their duty: but it doth not at all ſignify the will of Gods purpoſe concerning what ſhall come to paſſe actually; it doth not ſignify Gods will of operation or permiſſion, i. e. it doth not reveale what good God hath decreed to worke, what evill he hath decreed to ſuffer or permit in all thoſe to whom his commands are given; briefly, it ſignifieth or revealeth mans duty, and Gods will of obliging unto it. Mic. 6. 8. He hath ſhewed thee O man what is good, and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to doe justly, and to love mercy, and to walke humbly with thy God. Obad. 12. 13. 14. It doth not reveale the event or iſſue of things what ſhall actually be, by Gods working or permitting providence; This you have aſſerted by Durand an ancient Schooleman, Praeceptum (ſaith he) non ſemper indicat voluntatem praecipientis, qua praecipiens velit rem praeceptam fieri, ſed illam qua praecipiens vult obligare illum, cui praecipit, ad faciendum quod praecipitur, & hoc & ſemper. And a little before in the ſame place, Praeceptum non eſt directè & ſemper ſignum quod praecipiens velit rem praeceptam fieri, ſed ſolum quod velit ſubditum obligare ad faciendum illud quod praecipitur, & hoc clarum est in praeceptis divinis, per quae Deus vult ſimpliciter nos obligare, ſed non vult ſimpliciter rem praeceptam fieri, alioquin ſemper fieret. Lib. 1. diſt. 47. Qu. 3. Gods command unto Pharaoh, that he ſhould let Iſrael goe, ſignified only his duty, that he was bound to let Iſrael goe, not the event, that he ſhould actually conſent unto their departure. Gods command of Cain, Judas, &c. to believe, and repent, did not ſignify that God did will the actuall exiſtence of their faith and repentance, but only that it was his purpoſe to bind them to faith and repentance as a duty. And thus you have a confirmation and cleere explication of D. Twiſſe his meaning, againſt which your diſcourſe in this Section, if it were reduced unto Syllogiſmes, would not conclude with the leaſt ſhew of probability.
Mr GOODWIN.
BUt yet that will wherewith, or out of which God willeth or commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done.
IEANES.
FIrſt, here you make to will and to command termes equivalent or Synonimous (as you doe afterwards to will and to injoyne) which is very unreaſonable, for 'tis the very thing in queſtion, and D. Twiſſe affirmeth, that to command is to will only improperly, and therefore equivocally. For you then to uſe to Will and Command, as words of the ſame import and ſignification, before you have proved them to be ſo, ſerves for nothing but to breed confuſion, diſtract the Reader, and diſturbe the courſe of Diſputation.
Secondly, I confeſſe that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the ſame will really, diſtinguiſhed only ratione ratiocinat…, by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your ſubtilty in the following part of this Section, ſhould object, that acts are differenced, and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to doe that which is our duty to doe, be really diſtinguiſhed from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, unpoſſible it is, but that theſe two wills of his, ſhould be alſo really diſtinguiſhed, I ſhall for anſwer referre them unto Ferrarienſis upon Aquinas contra gentes lib. 1. c. 77. Adverte quod ex ista probatione (viz.) (that actus ſecundum objecta diſtinguntur) vult habere, S. Tho. quod diſtinguibile proportionatum objecto est actus; & ideo ſi plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quaecunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde ſenſus illius propoſitionis eſt, quod actus est id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit. The ſence of this propoſition, Acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their objects, is, that if many, or different objects doe inferre any plurality or diſtinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or diſtinction of objects doth alwaies argue a plurality or diſtinction of acts.
3. But thirdly, this conceſſion will not in the leaſt degree advantage you; for the inference that you make afterwards, That if the precept of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his be properly ſuch; for no rationall and Scholaſticall Divine will deny Gods decree, of things to be done, to be properly his will; and I have made it good, that Gods commandement is not properly his will, and you bring nothing like an argument to prove the contrary: but in the next place, you illuſtrate this by a compariſon from the acts of willing, proceeding from the principle, or faculty within man of willing, let us heare what you ſay.
Mr GOODWIN.
Mr will or deſire that my Child ſhould obey me, or that he ſhould proſper in the World, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpoſe to ſhew the reſpects of a Father unto him in providing for him: being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within me, whereby I will the latter, as that act it ſelfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different ſoever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the ſame. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no ſuch difference between the acts proceeding from it, which ſhould make ſome to be more proper and others leſſe, though ſome may be better, and others worſe, but this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God.
IEANES.
FOr anſwer, I ſhall diſtinguiſh betwixt the Flicite acts of the will, which proceed from the will, as their only and immediate principle, and ſuch acts of the will as are only imperate, that is, performed at the beck and command of the will, but proceeding immediately from other faculties v. g. the underſtanding, loco-motive faculty, the parts and members of the body, &c. as walking, ſpeaking, writing, and the like. Now I confeſſe there can be no ſuch difference between the elicite acts of mens wills, which ſhould make ſome to be more proper, and others leſſe: But yet notwithſtanding this I affirme, that the imperate acts of mens wills, ſuch as their injunctions, and precepts, whether by tongue, penne, or otherwiſe (to give an inſtance pertinent to the buſineſſe in hand) are not called properly acts of their wills; and this I ſhall not dictate, but confirme by theſe three following arguments.
Firſt, every act of the will properly ſo called, is voluntary, intrinſecally, and of it ſelfe, but now theſe imperate acts of the will are voluntary only extrinſecally, by denomination from an act of the will moveing, ſtirring up, and applying the power or faculty from which they proceed unto operation.
2. Thoſe acts which proceed from other faculties, diſtinguiſhed really from the will, are not properly acts of the will, or acts of willing (as you phraſe it) but theſe imperate acts of the will proceed from other faculties really diſtinguiſhed from the will, and therefore cannot properly be ſaid to be acts of the will, and of theſe faculties too.
3. The acts of the will, are not properly objects of acts of the will. The act of willing is not properly a thing willed, a decree is not decreed. Actus (ſaith Suarez) qui per ſeipſum eſt intrinſece voluntarius, non comparatur ut proprium objectum, vel effectus ad illum actum, quo eſt voluntarius, quia eſt voluntarius ſeipſo, & non eſt proprie objectum vel effectus ſui ipſius: habet ergo aliud objectum in quod directe tendat, & est effectus potentiae, a qua elicitur, & ſolum per quandam virtualem reflectionem, quam in ſe includit, est voluntarius: unde dici ſolet volitus per modum actus, non per modum objecti. Met. Diſp. 19. Sect. 5. n. 17. But theſe imperate actions of the will are properly objects of the will, and things willed, and therefore cannot in ſtrictneſſe and propriety of ſpeech be ſaid to be acts of the will.
M. GOODWIN.
THerefore if the precept or preceptive will of God be not properly his will, neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will be properly ſuch.
IEANES.
I Have ſearched for the premiſes out of which you inferre this concluſion, and I muſt needs profeſſe unto you, that I can find none: it is poſſible the fault may be in the dulneſſe of my underſtanding, and you ſhall find me willing and ready to confeſſe as much, if you will put your argument into Moode and Figure for me, and conclude this propoſition out of any thing you have delivered in the former part of this Section.
Mr GOODWIN.
IF ſo, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or injoyneth faith and repentance, and conſequently ſalvation unto all men, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth the ſalvation of any man.