The Riches of Gods Love, Part 22 – Part 25
IEANES.
THe Minor of this Argument reduced into forme, which you place firſt, will be denied by the Scotiſts; The Major which you put in the ſecond place, will be denied generally by the Thomiſts.
As for the Minor of this Argument put in the firſt place, There is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the ſame with any thing which is in God. This the Scotiſts deny, as you may ſee in Scotus himſelfe lib. 1. Diſtinct. 3. Q. 1. Diſtinct. 8. Q. 3. Rada part. 1. Controver. 21. Faber Faventinus Philoſoph. Natural. Theorem. 95. And they bring ſuch ſubtill reaſons as you will confeſſe, when you reade them, to be worthy of an anſwer. As for your reaſon, they are not within Gun-ſhot of it. For theſe attributes which they affirme to be in the Creature univocally the ſame with thoſe in God, are to be underſtood quoad communes non proprias rationes, quoad conceptum convenientiae non diſcrepantiae, In ſuch a notion and conſideration as is abſtracted from finite and infinite, and ſo more generall then either God or the creature. Conceptus communis (ſaith Scotus) eſt ex ſe formaliter neuter reſpectu eorum quibus est communis: But the objective conceipt of theſe attributes, which denominate God and the creature, is common unto God and the creature, and therefore formally neither finite nor infinite, but abſtracting from both. But perhaps my dulneſſe cannot pierce into the depth of this argument. You may doe well for my conviction to improve it unto the utmoſt, and yet, if I be not miſtaken, the uttermoſt that you can prove thereby is, that which will not be denyed unto you by the Scotiſts, to wit, that nothing, no not Fns, of all predicates one of the moſt abſtract and tranſcendentall, can be affirmed of God and the creature univocally, in regard of a phyſicall univocation. Rada part. 1. Controv. 21. Art. 1. pag. 328. 333. and that theſe attributes which denominate God and the creature are predicated equivocally; if we ſpeake of a *Whereas our Author p. 125. Of the firſt book of this Treatiſe affirmeth, that every thing in common attributed to God and man, is much more equivocall then the word Canis attributed to a Starre, to a Fiſh, to a foure-footed creature on the earth, if he be to be underſtood in regard not of this Phyſicall, but of a Logicall equivocation. I muſt needs confeſſe, that I diſſent from him for reaſons that I ſhall preſently ſpecify.Phyſicall equivocation, it is manifeſt.
Firſt, becauſe the objective conceipt of them, as denominating both God and the Creature is one and the ſame, only by the abſtraction of the underſtanding, and not Phyſically or a parte rei. This you have yeelded unto by Scotus in anſwer unto the objection of Henricus, that Primo diverſa in nullo conveniunt, ſed Deus est primò diverſus a quacun que creatura &c. Unto this Scotus anſwers lib. 1. distinct. 8. Q. 3. Deus & Creatura non ſunt primò diverſa in conceptibus; tamen ſunt primò diverſa in realitate, quia in nullà realitate conveniunt. Et quomodo eſſe poſſit conceptus communis ſine convenientiâ in re vel in realitate, in ſequenti dicetur. Deus & Creatura (ſaith Rada a famous Scotiſt) ſunt primò diverſa ſubjectivè, quia ſcilicet in nulla realitate per differentias contrahibili conveniunt, ſed non ſunt primò diverſa objectivè & quoad intellectum, ſicut nec decem praedicamenta, quia Ens de eis praedicatur in quid. part. 1. controver. 21. Art. 2. pag. 214.
Secondly, Phyſically and a parte rei, there is a greater diſtance between God and the creature, then there is between any creatures; for 'tis an infinite diſtance. This is all which is proved by that reaſon of Bannes in 1. par. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. That all created perfections in compariſon of uncreated, are but painted and umbratick, the beſt of created beings in compariſon of God are but ſhadowes and pictures, Eſay 40. 17. All nations before him are as nothing, and they are counted to him leſſe then nothing. Omnis perfectio creata comparatione ad increatam perfectionem, eſt quaſi depicta & umbratica, Ergo &c.
The major of your Syllogiſme put into forme, and placed in the ſecond place, to wit, (If preſcience or foreknowledge being properly and formally in the creature, ſhould be properly and formally alſo in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in the creature univocally & formally the ſame with ſomewhat that is in God) will generally be denied by Thomiſts, who will acquaint you with a middle kind of predication, betwixt equivocall and univocall, to wit, analogicall, according unto which they affirme thoſe attributes to be predicated, which denominate both God and the creature. In 1. part. Thom. Q. 13. Art. 5. They inſtance in Ens, which is properly and formally predicated of God and the creature, and yet neither univocally nor equivocally but analogically, analogià quae eſt per attributionem intrinſecam, and not only analogia proportionis, as laughter is affirmed of a man and a green or flouriſhing meadow; nor yet only analogia attributionis quae fit per extrinſecam denominationem, as when health is predicated of a ſenſitive creature in the firſt place, as the ſubject in which it is ſeated, and of meats, drinkes, medicaments, urines, ſecondarily, in reference unto, and by extrinſecall denomination from that health which is in a ſenſitive creature, unto which they are referred either as cauſes or tokens of it: ſee Suarez, Scheibler, Moriſanus, Logic: Mexic.
To make this matter more plaine, I ſhall diſtinguiſh of a twofold acception of Univocall; one Logicall, the other Metaphyſicall.
Firſt Logicall, in which 'tis adequately oppoſed unto equivocall, and ſo every predicate is univocall, that is, not purely, & meerly equivocall, which imparts only its name, and not any common ſignification thereof. Predicates thus Univocall, are ſaid to be Logically univocall, becauſe this kind of univocation is ſufficient as to Logicall ends and purpoſes, as for the framing a contradiction, and to be the middle terme in a demonſtration.
Secondly, there is a Metaphyſicall acception of Univocall, in which 'tis inadequately oppoſed unto Equivocall, that is, partly unto Equivocall, and partly unto Analogicall. An Equivocall predicate only imparts its name, and not any common ſignification thereof. An Analogicall predicate imparts both its name and ſignification unto the things of which it is predicated, but unequally, in regard of that inequality, which is of eſſentiall dependency, ſecundum prius & posterius, as they ſay; ſo Ens is predicated of ſubſtance, and Accident; analogically of ſubſtance in the firſt place, and primarily, as its principall analogate; of Accident in the ſecond place, with attribution, order, or reference unto, and dependance upon ſubſtance.
Theſe things thus premiſed, I lay downe theſe two concluſions, againſt which whatſoever you object I ſhall be ready to anſwer.
The firſt concluſion, Diverſe attributes, which denominate God, and the Creature, are predicated of them univocally in a Logicall acception of Univocall, as it is adequately oppoſed unto Equivocall; that is, they are not predicated of God, and the Creature, meerely and purely Equivocally.
For firſt, not only the bare words, but a common and abſtracted ſignification of them is found both in God and the Creature, I might inſtance in Ens, ſubſtance, goodneſſe, wiſdome, juſtice, &c.
Secondly, becauſe otherwiſe nothing can be known, or demonſtrated of God by, or from the creatures, but ſtill there would be the fallacy of equivocation, Ex cognitione unius aequivocati nihil poteſt cognoſci alterius: And this is as well againſt the Philoſopher, who proveth many things demonſtratively of God; as againſt the Apoſtle Rom. 1. 20. ſaying, The inviſible things of him from the creation of the World are clearely ſeen, being underſtood by the things that are made, even his eternall power, and Godhead, ſo that they are without excuſe. This is a reaſon given by Aquinas. p. 1. q. 13. art. 5. Nomina quae dicuntur de Deo & creaturis, non dicuntur purè aequivocè ut aliqui dixerunt. Quia ſecundum hoc ex creaturis nil poſſit cognoſci de Deo, nec demonſtrari, ſed ſemper incideret fallacia aequivocationis, & hoc eſt tam contra Philoſophum 8. Phyſ. 12. Metaph. qui multa demonſtrative de Deo probat, quam etiam contra Apostolum dicentem. Roman. 1. Inviſibilia Dei, per ea quae facta ſunt, intellect a conſpiciuntur.
This is all that the Scotiſts can prove by their arguments, which they bring to prove the Univocation of Ens, as predicated of God and the creature; and this they fully and ſtrongly prove. And indeed if the matter be well looked into, the contention here between the Thomiſts and the Scotiſts, is a meere ſtrife of words, de modo loquendi.
The ſecond concluſion, No attribute whatſoever denominating God and the creature, is predicated of them univocally, as Univocall is oppoſed unto Analogicall: for thoſe attibutes which doe agree unto God moſt properly, are predicated of God, & the creature unequally, in poynt of eſſential order; of God primarily, & independently, of the creature ſecondarily, & dependently, with relation unto God. In God they are by his Eſſence, in the creatures but by participation. This I might exemplify by inſtancing in that which is under debate, infallible knowledge of things to come, that are contingent, is affirmed of God chiefly, & in the firſt place; of the creature only dependently upon, & derivedly frō God: whereupon an infallible, underived, & independent foreknowledge of future contingents is incommunicable unto any creature. Iames 4. 14. You know not, ſaith Iames, what ſhall be on the morrow.
Before I take my leave of this ſection, I ſhall deſire you, that whereas I affirme, that what words are attributable unto God properly, dicuntur de Deo prius quam de creaturis, you would be pleaſed to underſtand it in regard of the things, or perfections ſignified by thoſe words, and not barely in regard of their impoſition. This limitation Aquinas puts unto the Queſtion. p. 1. Q. 13. art. 6. Nomina, quae proprie de Deo praedicantur, quantum ad rem ſignificatam per prius dicuntur de Deo, quàm de creaturis, quia a Deo hujuſmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant; ſed quantum ad impoſitionem nominis per prius a nobis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoſcimus, unde & modum fignificandi habent.
Mr GOODWIN pag. 29, 30. cap. 3. Sect. 3.
IF it be objected, that this argument lieth as ſtrong against the propriety of knowledge, as of foreknowledge in God; in as much as foreknowledge is every whit as Properly and Formally in the Creature, as knowledge; I anſwer
True it is, there is no knowledge neither in God, according to the preciſe and formall notion of Knowledge, or in ſuch a ſenſe, wherein it is found in men. And this the first and last of the three reaſons mentioned doe infallibly demonſtrate. Knowledge in the creature is a principle or habit, really and eſſentially distinct from the ſubject, or ſoule, wherein it reſideth: yea and is capable of augmentation and diminution therein, and of ſeparation from its Whereas that which is called knowledge in God, neither differs really or eſſentially from his nature, or from himſelfe, but is really one and the ſame thing with him (as will farther appeare in the following Chapter) nor is it either capable of growth, or of decay, or of ſeparation. Only in this reſpect, knowledge of the two, is more properly attributable unto God, then foreknowledge, viz. becauſe foreknowledge in the proper notion, or formall conception of it, includes or ſuppoſeth a liableneſſe to a change or expiration (viz. upon the comming to paſſe of the thing foreknown; which muſt of neceſſity come to paſſe in time) whereas knowledge imports nothing, but what may be permanent and perpetuall, and ſo is (of the two) more appropriable unto him, who changeth not.
IEANES.
HEre you plainly flinch from that which is likely to be controverted between us: for you have not ſo much as the ſhadow of an argument to prove, that knowledge is not in God, according to the preciſe and formall notion of knowledge: but you ſpend a whole Section in the proofe of that, wherein you are ſure to meet with no adverſary at all, viz. that there is no knowledge in God in ſuch a ſenſe, wherein it is found in men; why Sir, the conceſſion of this will no waies advantage you, or prejudice us: 'tis the firſt part of your diſjunctive propoſition that calls for proofe, in which, why you are ſo ſilent, I cannot gueſſe, unleſſe it be, that you are conſcious of the falſehood of it, & therefore dar'd not to propound it Categorically, but only diſjunctively; & the truth of diſjunctive propoſitions is ſalved, if but one part of thē be true. So thē perhaps you thought, how ever the World went you would be ſafe and ſecure, as having two ſtrings unto your bow. I will ſay no more of this, but that it is very unlike M. Goodwin, thus to decline the combate, and runne unto the maintenance of a fort, where you could not reaſonably expect ſo much as one aſſaylant. If you be pleaſed to returne into the field againe, and come up roundly to a charge, I meane a proofe of that which you have not yet ſo much as offered, or pretended to prove, viz. That there is no knowledge in God according to the preciſe and formall notion of knowledge, I ſhall be willing and ready to encounter you, and I doe hope that by Gods aſſiſtance I ſhall be able to ſtand the ſhock of all your Argumentation.
MR GOODWIN pag. 105, 106. Cap. 6. Sect. 14.
IT is the ſence of one of the greateſt Patrons of the adverſe cauſe, that the precept, or injunction of God, is not properly the will of God; *Mandatum Dei non eſt voluntas Dei proprie dicta; quia illo non tam ſignificet quid ipſe vult fieri, quam quid noſtri officii ſit facere. D. Twiſſe. Vindiciae Gratiae &c. p. 171.becauſe (ſaith he) he doth not hereby ſo much ſignify what himſelfe willeth to be done, as what is our duty to doe. I confeſſe that no ſignification whatſoever, whether of what a man willeth, or decreeth to be done, or of what is the duty of another to doe, can properly be ſaid to be the will of the ſignifier: but yet that will, wherewith, or out of which, God willeth or commandeth us to doe, that which is our duty to doe, is as properly his will, as that whereby he willeth, or decreeth things to be done. My will, or deſire, that my Child ſhould obey me, or, that he ſhould proſper in the world, is as properly my will, as that, whereby I will or purpoſe, to ſhew the reſpects of a father unto him in providing for him; being as proper, naturall, and direct an act of that principle or faculty of willing within m…, whereby I will the latter, as that act it ſelfe of this faculty, wherein I will the latter, is. For the Principle or faculty within me of willing, how numerous or different ſoever the acts of willing, which I exert by vertue of this faculty, may be, is but one and the ſame. And this faculty being naturall, there can be no ſuch difference between the acts proceeding from it, which ſhould make ſome to be more proper, and others leſſe; though ſome may be better, and others worſe, But this difference can have no place in the acts of the will of God. Therefore if the precept, or preceptive will of God, be not properly his will; neither can any other will of his, or any other act of his will, be properly ſuch. If ſo, then that will of God, or act of will in God, whereby he willeth or injoyneth faith and repentance, and conſequently, ſalvation, unto all men, is as properly his will as that whereby he willeth the ſalvation of any man. Therefore if there be any ſecret or unrevealed will in God, whereby he willeth the deſtruction of any man, at the ſame time when he willeth the ſalvation of All men, (be it with what kind of will ſoever) theſe two wills must needs enter-feare, and contradict the one the other. Nor will that diſtinction of the late mentioned Author ſalve a conſistency between them, wherein he diſtinguiſheth, between the Decree of God, and the thing decreed by him; affirming, that the thing which God decreeth, may be repugnant to, or inconſiſtent with, the thing which he commandeth; though the decree it ſelfe cannot be repugnant to the Command aRem a Deo decretam cum re a Deo mandata, pugnare poſſe dicimus; decretum vero Dei cum mandato pugnare poſſe non dicimus. Twiſſe ubi ſupra. The vanity of this distinction cleerely appeareth upon this common ground, viz. that Acts are differenced and diſtinguiſhed by their Objects. Therefore if the object of Gods decreeing will, or the thing decreed by him, be contrary to the thing preceptively willed, or commanded by him, unpoſsible it is but that the two acts of his will, by the one of which he is ſuppoſed to will the one, and by the other, the other, ſhould digladiate, and one fight against the other. Therefore certainly there is no ſuch paire, or combination of wills in God, as the diſtinction of voluntas ſigni, and beneplaciti (as applyed in the question in hand) doth ſuppoſe. It is unpoſsible that I ſhould inwardly and ſeriouſly will, or deſire, the death of my Child, and yet at the ſame time ſeriouſly alſo will and injoyne the Phyſitian to doe the beſt to recover him.