The Riches of Gods Love, Part 20 – Part 21
IEANES.
SEverall anſwers unto this trite and bafled argument you may read in Schoolemen commenting in primam partem ſummae. Q. 14. Art. 15. I will not trouble you with the rehearſall of them, but ſhall only propound that which I take to be moſt plaine and obvious unto even an ordinary capacity. We muſt diſtinguiſh betwixt Gods knowledge conſidered in it ſelfe, and the extrinſecall denominations thereof. Gods knowledge in it ſelfe is not changed by any variation of its objects, which are one while future, and then preſent, and anon after paſt and gone, but 'tis one and the ſame knowledge without any the leaſt alteration (ex parte Dei cognoſcentis) by which he knowes things whiles future, when preſent, when paſt; for he knowes and ſees them in eſſe volito pro certo aut tali tempore, as decreed to exiſtant ſuch a time. And to know a thing as decreed to exiſt at ſuch a time, is to know that it ſhall be future untill that time come; that it ſhall be preſent as ſoone as that time comes, and as long as it laſts; that it ſhall be paſt as ſoone as that time is gone and ceaſeth to be: Quare licet alitèr at que alitèr cognoſcat res futuras & praeſentes ex parte rerum cognitarum, non tamen aliter at que aliter ex parte cognoſcentis. Nam videre aliquid apud Deum in eſſe volito pro certo tempore, eſt & videre illud futurum eſſe, donec tempus illud advenerit, & praeſens eſſe cum primum advenerit, & praeteritum eſſe ſimulatque tempus illud elapſum fuerit. D. Twiſſe De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 389. And againe, pag. 26. Praeſertim cum ſub notione iſta, eſſe voliti pro certo tempore, caeterae notiones quales ſunt eſſe praeſens, eſſe praeteritum, eſſe futurum, mirabiliter uniantur, & amiciſsime conſpirent; quippe cum eſſe volitum apud Deum pro certo tempore ſit & eſſe futurum, donec illud tempus advenerit; & eſſe praeſens ſimulatque advenerit & quamdin duraverit; & denique eſſe praeteritum, quam primum tempus illud eſſe deſierit. So then you ſee theſe various conſiderations of the objects of Gods knowledge in regard of futurition, preſence, preterition, are admirably united in eſſe volito pro certo tempore, and therefore can be no prejudice unto the immutability of his knowledge; whence it is become a proverbe in Schoole Divinity, that God non aliter novit facta, quam ſtenda. But though Gods knowledge be in it ſelfe immutable, notwithſtanding the ſucceſſion that is in the coexiſtence of objects with it, as a rock in a river, ſtands unmoveable, notwithſtanding the ſucceſſion in the waters that glide by it, yet this is no hinderance, but that there may be and is a change in the extrinſecall denominations of Gods knowledge from the variation of the objects thereof; ſo long as theſe objects are to come, Gods knowledge of them is termed foreknowledge; when they actually exiſt, then it looſeth the denomination of foreknowledge, and may be called co-knowledge; and ſo when they are paſt and ceaſe to be, it may be called after-knowledge. Now a change of theſe extrinſecall denominations doe not import any change in Gods knowledge in it ſelfe, becauſe as Vaſquez tells us, Vera mutatio non accidit niſi per veram receptionem, aut amiſſionem formae realis in ipſa re exiſtentis. A reall change is by a true and reall either receipt, or loſſe of a reall forme exiſting in a thing it ſelfe.
Mr GOODWIN.
THirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the creature univocally and formally the ſame with any thing which is in God. The reaſon is, becauſe then there muſt either be ſomewhat finite in God, or ſomewhat infinite in the creature: both which are impoſſible. But if preſcience or foreknowledge (being properly and formally in the creature) ſhall be properly and formally alſo in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in the Creature univocally and formally the ſame, with ſomewhat which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no foreknowledge, properly ſo called, in God.