The Riches of Gods Love, Part 16 – Part 19

The Riches of Gods Love · Part 16 – Part 19

p. 221IEANES.

DIverſe Heathen Philoſophers I have found cenſured for denying of Gods Preſcience or foreknowledge, as Cicero by Austin lib. 5. De Civ. Dei cap. 9. Seneca by Aureolus 1. diſtin. 38. Aristotle by Vaſquez and others. But that Chriſtian Divines either ancient or moderne, (unleſſe you will appropriate that name unto Socinians) are ſo unanimous in impugning of Gods foreknowledge, is great newes unto me, and not only unto me, but unto all others, I believe, that have read any thing in either ancient, or Moderne Divinity. Hierome in his third book Adverſus Pelagianos, teacheth (as Franciſcus Amicus informes me) that he who takes away Preſcience from God, takes away the Godhead: Eum qui a Deo praeſcientiam tollit, divinitatem tollere. As for Auſtin, whom you quote in the Margent againſt this Preſcience of God; let any one read that place but now quoted. Lib. 5. De Civ. Dei. cap. 9. and he muſt needs confeſſe, that he is a zealous Aſſertor of Gods foreknowledge againſt Cicero, who oppoſeth it in favour of the liberty of mans will. And ſo ſaith Austin. Dum vult facere homines liberos, facit ſacrilegos: multò ſunt autem tolerabiliores (ſaith he) qui vel ſydera fata constituunt, quam iſte, qui tollit praeſcientiam futurorum. Nam & conſiteri eſſe Deum, & negare praeſcium futurorum, apertiſſima inſania eſt. They who make the ſtarres the fates of men, are more tolerable then he, who taketh away the foreknowledge of things to come. For to confeſſe that there is a God, & to deny him to be foreknowing of things future, is a moſt open madnes. And againe in the ſame place. Sed quoquomodo ſe habent tortuoſiſsimae concertationes, & diſputationes Philoſophorum; nos ut confitemur ſummum, & p. 222verum Deum, ita voluntatem, ſummam que poteſtatem ac praeſcientiam ejus confitemur. Afterwards again. Religioſus autē animus utrum que eligit, utrum que confitetur, & fide pietatis utrū que confirmat; that is, both the liberty of the will, & Gods preſcience. Quod verò Cicero negat ordinem omnium cauſarum eſſe certiſsimum, & Dei praeſcientiae notiſſimum, plus eum, quam Stoici, detestamur. Aut enim Deum eſſe negat, &c. Aut ſi eſſe confitetur Deū, quem negat praeſcium futurorum, etiam ſic dicit nihil aliud, quàm ille, dixit inſipiens in corde ſuo, non eſt Deus. Qui enim non est praeſcius omnium futurorum, non eſt uti que Deus. To confeſſe that there is a God, and to deny his foreknowledge, is to ſay with the foole in his heart, that there is no God: For he, who doth not foreknow things to come, is not God. Other teſtimonies you may ſee quoted in Suarez lib. 1. De ſcientià futurorum contingentium abſoluta. cap. 2. Out of other places of Auſtin, as alſo out of Fulgentius, and Anſelme. But I may very well ſpare this labour of citing the Ancients, ſeeing M. Hord, or M. Maſon (I know not well which) tells us that the Fathers did generally make ſinne an object of Gods preſcience, and therefore they maintained, That there was preſcience in God. As for the Schoolemen they in their Commentaries upon Aquinas. Sum. 1. p. Q. 14. Art. 13. And on Lombard lib. 1. diſt. 38. 39. doe generally reſolve, nemine contradicente, (that I know) That Gods foreknowledge of things to come, is a point certaine de fide. And amongſt thoſe that are called Proteſtants, I know none that oppoſe it, ſave the Socinians; againſt whom, in this particular, you may read Stagman Photinianis: diſp. 13. And Johannes Junius in refutat: praelect. Fauſti Socini, cap. 8. 9. 10. 11. The Arminians, however now ſome of them walke in the cloudes, and will not ſpeake out, yet at firſt the Ringleaders did not ſtick to profeſſe, that election was upon foreſight of perſeverance in faith, and reprobation upon foreknowledge of perſeverance in infidelity and impenitency. D. Twiſſe tells us, That Gods foreknowledge of things future, is a point aſſented unto by, and uncontroverted amongſt all Chriſtians; De Scientia Media, p. 245. Extra controverſiam est apud Chriſtianos omnes, futura omnia, quantumvis contingentia, Deo not a fuiſſe, id que ab aeterno; neque mirum, cum nihil poſitivum aut ſit, aut futurum ſit in rerum naturà, cujus productionem non operetur ipſe Deus, idque in genere cauſae efficientis, conſèquentér que cujus productionem non ab aeterno decreverit, quá de re nulla fere inter Chriſtianos hodie, ſaltem eruditiores, viget Controverſia. And hereupon it is that he cenſureth the proofes brought by Suarez for the confirmation of it, to be needleſſe. Pergit Suarez in confirmatione ejus, de quo Chriſtianus nullus dubitat abidem. And againe in his book againſt M. Cotton p. 69. he ſaith, That for men with Cicero to deny, that God foreknowes things to come, is to turne Atheiſt.

But againſt this cloud of witneſſes I foreſee that you will take ſanctuary in thoſe two termes, Formally and Properly, though none ſave Atheiſts, and Socinians deny the Preſcience of God; yet notwithſtanding this, it is, ſay you, the conſtant aſſertion both of Ancient and moderne Divinity, That Preſcience or foreknowledge are not Formally or Properly in God. To make this good, you only quote Auſtin in your Margent and Gregory, unto whoſe ſayings alleadged by you, every Schooleman almoſt, that diſſenteth from the Dominicans about the preſence of things in eternity, gives an anſwer, of which if you be ignorant, you muſt needs be a very great ſtranger to Schoole Divinity. You tell us next, that the Learned aſſertors of the Proteſtant cauſe are at perfect agreement with their adverſaries the Schoolemen, and Papiſts in this aſſertion, That preſcience or foreknowledge p. 223are not properly, or formally in God. This is a thing which thoſe, that diſſent from you, would in all likelyhood queſtion, and yet you bring not ſo much as one inſtance out of either Proteſtant or Papiſt to make it good. That there is ſuch a peace and concurrence of judgement about this, between Proteſtants and Papiſts, I never read or heard of before. And if you can prove it by an induction, I will confeſſe my ignorance. If any ſuch unwary paſſages, as you here ſpeake of, have dropt from the pennes of either Proteſtants or Papiſts, I ſuppoſe they are to be qualified, and underſtood in the like manner, that Suarez underſtands, and qualifieth the ſpeech of thoſe, who deny knowledge to be properly and formally Ne in aequivcco laboremus, ſupponendum eſt quid nomine ſcientiae ſignificetur: non enim intelligimus qualitatem aliquam, vel habitum, aut actum propriè factum, ſeu elicitum à potentiâ, ne que etiam cognitionem per diſcurſum comparatam, aut aliam ſimilem imperfectionem includentem: in quâ ſignificatione videntur accepiſſe ſcientiam, qui dixerunt non eſſe proprie in Deo, ſed per Metaphoram vel cauſalitatem illi attribui, id eſt, quia cauſat in nobis ſcientiam. Hos enim non eſt veriſimile intellexiſſe Deum ita carere ſcientiâ, ut ſit prorſus ſtolidus: nam cum faterentur Deum eſſe fontem omnis ſcientiae creatae, non eſt veriſimile credidiſſe Deum eſſe omnino inſcium. Igitur, quia putarunt ſcientiam includere imperfectionem, ideo formaliter & proprie in Deo eſſe negarunt. Illae autem imperfectiones quaſi materiales ſunt, inventae in ſcientia humanâ, vel Angelicâ, non vero pertinent ad rationem formalem ſcientiae, ut ſic, quae hic abſtractiſſimè ſumitur, praeſcindendo à creata, & increata, & ſolum ſignificat claram & evidentem ac perfectam cognitionem, ſeu perceptionem veritatis, ſeu objecti ſcibilis, ſive illa perceptio fiat per qualitarem, ſive per ſubſtantiam, ſive cum effectione, & receptione, ſive abſ que his imperfectionibus. Metaph. Diſp. 30. Sect. 15. num. 2.in God.

They take (ſaith he) knowledge as ſignifying a quality or habit produced by ſome power or knowledge, gained or gotten by way of diſcourſe or inference, or including ſome ſuch like imperfection. In like manner if any either Proteſtants, or Papiſts, have denyed foreknowledge to be properly and formally in God, they are to be underſtood concerning ſuch a foreknowledge, as is found in men, in whom 'tis cloathed with many imperfections, from which 'tis abſtracted, as it is aſcribed unto God. But I ſhall take a more particular and diſtinct notice of theſe two termes Formally and Properly in reference unto the attribution of foreknowledge unto God.

And firſt let us enquire whether foreknowledge can formally be aſcribed unto God.

The terme Formally may be oppoſed unto either Eminently, or Extrinſecall denominations.

Firſt unto Eminently. Perfections are either ſecundum quid, in certo genere, after a ſort, in ſuch a kind, or elſe ſimply ſuch.

The former doe ſo eſſentially imply ſome imperfection, limitation, or compoſition, as that they cannot poſſibly be abſtracted therefrom, and therefore are aſcribed unto God only eminently or vertually.

But now the latter doe include no imperfection, or repugnancy with, or oppoſition unto any greater, or equall perfection. And theſe perfections are aſcribed unto God Formally, as you may ſee proved by Suarez Met. Diſp: 30. Sect. 1. num. 8. 9. De perfectionibus ergo ſimpliciter dicendum est, omnes eſſe in Deo formaliter, quia in ſuo formali conceptu nullam imperfectionem, ſed puram perfectionem involvunt, neque inter ſe repugnantiam includunt, unde ſic illas habere, id est, formaliter, melius est, quam aliquà earum carere, & ideo de ratione Entis ſumme perfecti in totâ latitudine Entis est, ut has omnes perfectiones formaliter includat. Adde in his perfectionibus non poſſe cogitari altiorem modum continendi illas, quam formaliter, quia intra ſuam formalem rationem, nec limitationem, nec imperfectionem includunt, neque altior gradus Entis excogitari poteſt, quam ille, ad quem hae formales perfectiones pertinent, qualia ſunt vivere, ſapere & alia hujuſmodi.

p. 224Now foreknowledge is to be ranked amongſt the perfections of this latter ſort; becauſe it may be ſequeſtred or abſtracted from all thoſe imperfections, as it is found in Men or Angells. You think indeed that it will neceſſarily inferre mutability, but that is an imputation from which I will anon eaſily free it. Beſides, a perfection ſimply ſuch, is defined by Anſelme in Monolog. cap. 14. Quae in unoquo que eſt melior ipſa quam non ipſa; that is, as Scotus expounds it in 1. diſt. 8. q. 1. Ad. 1. quolibet ſuo incompoſſibili. Now the light of nature evidenceth that the knowledge of things to come is better, and a more noble attribution then any thing whatſoever is repugnant unto ſuch foreknowledge, and therefore this foreknowledge (in ſuch an abſtract notion as we ſpeake of) may formally be aſcribed unto God.

But now this I would have to be underſtood as Suarez ſpeakes of ſuch Reſpondeo, verum eſſe nullam perfectionem creatam, ſecundum adaequatam rationem quam habet in creaturâ, eſſe in Deo formaliter, ſed eminenter tantum: non eſt enim in Deo ſapientia creata, nam ut ſic eſt accidens, & finita perfectio, & idem eſt de caeteris ſimilibus. Dicitur ergo Deus quaſdam ex his perfectionibus continere formaliter, quia ſecundum eas habet aliquam formalem convenientiam cum creaturâ, ratione cujus illa perfectio ſecundum idem nomen, & eandem rationem, ſeu conceptum formalem attribuitur Deo & creaturae, ſalvâ analogiâ, quae inter Deum & creaturam ſemper intercedit. Quando vero non eſt talis convenientia, nec formalis denominatio, ſed ſola efficacitas divinae virturis, tunc dicimus intercedere convenientiam eminentialem. At que ita in Deo nulla perfectio eſt formaliter niſi vel ſecundum proprium conceptum Dei, vel ſaltem ſecundum conceptum abſtrahentem a Deo, & creaturis. Metaph. Diſp. 30. Sect. 1. num. 12.kind of perfections in generall.

And againe afterwards.Recte, &c. Intelligitur eſſe longe diverſum modum vivendi divinae & creatae ſubſtantiae: & quod de divinis attributis poſitivis ſuperius diximus, in hoc manifeſtillimum eſſe ſecundum modum, quo ſunt in creaturis, non eſſe in Deo formaliter, ſed eminenter. Eſſe autem in Deo formaliter ſecundum modum altiorem, qui omnem imperfectionem creatutarum excludat. Diſp. 30. Sect. 14. num. 7.

They are not in God formally in ſuch a ſenſe, or after ſuch a manner, as they are in the Creatures, but they are in him formally, in a higher way and manner, which excludes all imperfections whatſoever of the Creatures.

Secondly, formall attributions may be oppoſed unto extrinſecall denominations. Now the word foreknowledge, ſignifieth ſomething that agreeth unto God formally, and ſomething that is aſcribed unto him only by extrinſecall denomination.

For the underſtanding of which we muſt obſerve, that it is one and the ſame undivided knowledge, by which God without any the leaſt alteration, underſtands things whileſt future, when preſent, when paſt, and this I affirme to be aſcribed unto God formally, becauſe 'tis in him, and that by way of reall identity with his Eſſence, and all his other attributes.

But now this knowledge undergoes ſeverall appellations, which are attributed unto it by extrinſecall denomination, from the various condition of the things known, ſo long as the things themſelves are to come, it is called Fore-knowledge, when they come, co-knowledge, after they are gone and paſt, after-knowledge: D. Twiſſe againſt Jackson pag. 313, 314. I deny not then, but that the formall denomination of foreknowledge is extrinſecall. Gods knowledge is ſo denominated in regard of its preexiſtence unto the thing known: but that which is affirmed of a thing only by way of extrinſecall denomination, may be aſcribed thereunto properly, which brings me unto a ſecond Quaere.

Whether Foreknowledge is, or may be aſcribed unto God properly?

p. 225The learned Aſſertors of the Proteſtant cauſe, you ſay, are at perfect agreement with their adverſaries the Papiſts in this, That preſcience, or foreknowledge, are not formally or properly in God. You will not deny D. Twiſſe to be a learned Proteſtant, and how he diſſents from this aſſertion which you father upon all Proteſtants, you may read in his book againſt Doctor Jackson p. 316. The queſtion only was (ſaith he) whether foreknowledge might be properly attributed unto God, in reſpect of things to come: now I ſee no reaſon (ſaith he) but it may, as well as it is attributed unto man. Amongſt the Papiſts Suarez comes behind few moderne Schoolemen, and whether he thinks foreknowledge not to be properly in God, let his own words informe you. Lib. 1. De Scientia futurorum abſolutè cap. 7. In omni etiam proprietate certiſſimum eſt ſcientiam Dei, ſicut & Deum ipſum, duratione antecedere omnium rerum creatarum exiſtentiam. But Suarez is not herein ſingular. For the Schoolemen generally in their Commentaries upon Aquinas, and Lombard in the places but now quoted, having propounded this Queſtion, An in Deo ſit ſcientia futurorum &c. Reſolve it affirmatively: And as at other times, ſo eſpecially in determinations, and reſolutions of queſtions, that Rule hath place: Analogum per ſe poſitum stat pro famoſiori analogato; if a word have two ſignifications, one proper, another improper or Metaphoricall, and it be put by it ſelfe without any thing to determine, or limit it unto the improper acception thereof, it muſt be taken properly. This to be the meaning of that rule Scheibler inſtructed me, when I was a Puny in Philoſophy. Met. lib. 2. cap. 6. num. 17. Reſpondeo, illam propoſitionem, Analogum per ſe poſitum, hoc eſt, ſine aliquo addito, stat pro famoſiori, valere ſolum de analogo proportionis, hoc eſt, quod de uno praedicatur propriè, de alio impropriè, per ſimilitudinem, vel metaphoram, id poſitum ſine addito ſignificat ſuum principale analogatum, veluti cum de riſu loquor, intelligo eum de riſu hominis, non de riſu prati. Auſtin in lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 9. Cenſures the denyall of Gods foreknowledge as a madneſſe, as a blaſphemous, and Atheiſtical ſpeech &c. And this he would never have done, if he had thought as you, that foreknowledge is not properly in God: For that which is aſcribed unto God only improperly, metaphorically, & by an Anthropopathy, as hands, eyes, eares, repentance, griefe, &c. may without madnes, blaſphemy, or Atheiſme, be denyed of God in propriety of ſpeech.

How have the Schoolemen toyl'd themſelves, and puzled their readers, about the reconciliation of Gods foreknowledge of future Contingents, with the liberty of mans will, and the contingency of things? This was a poynt that Armachanus ſtudied for twenty years ſpace **Twiſſe de Scientia Media. pag. 402. 403.. Now had thoſe men been ſo well read in ancient and Moderne Divinity as you, they would have eaſed themſelves of this labour. For you aſſure us, that it is the conſtant aſſertion both of ancient and Moderne Divinity, that preſcience or foreknowledge are not properly in God. That this was reputed in the daies of Jeffery Chawcer, a difficult, nice, and controverted matter, which no one but an Austin or a Bradwardine could throughly diſcuſſe, or bolt unto the branne, appears by the verſes of the ſaid Chawcer, related by S^r Henry Savill, in his Epiſtle prefixed to Bradwardine, which I ſhall here inſert.

But what that God afore wote, must needs bee,

After the opinion of Certain Clerkis.

Witneſſe of him that any Clerke is,

That in Schoole is great altercation

In this matter, and great diſputation,

p. 226And hath been of an hundred thouſand men.

But I ne cannot boult it to the bren,

As can the holy Doctor S. Auſtin,

Or Boece, or the Biſhop Bradwardin.

Whether that Gods worthy foreweting

Sraineth me needly to doe a thing,

(Needly clepe I ſimple neceſſity)

Or if the free choyce be granted me

To doe the ſame thing, or doe it nought,

Though God forewot it or it was wrought.

Or if his weting ſtraineth never a dele

But by neceſsite conditionele.

I will not have to done of ſuch matere.

Had you lived in thoſe times, you could eaſily have put an end to all this great altercation; provided that they would have received that which you take here for a principle, that fore-knowledge is not properly in God. For if this be ſo, then all diſputation concerning the reconciling of Gods fore-knowledge with liberty and contingency is frivolous, and to no purpoſe.

What anxious diſputes have been amongſt the Schoolemen for many hundred yeares continuance touching the manner or the ground of Gods foreknowing future contingents? Bonaventure maintained that God did foreknow future contingents by the Idea's of them in his mind. Aquinas made the ground of Gods foreknowing them to be their preſence or existence in eternity. Scotus his opinion was, that God foreknows them by ſeeing the determination of his own will touching their coming to paſſe. Other grounds of Gods foreknowledge of future contingents are aſſigned by others, which you may find mentioned almoſt in every Schooleman. Bellarm. l. 4. de grat: & libero Arbitrio, and before him Occam and Ariminenſis were of an opinion, that the way, or manner of Gods foreknowing future contingents, is a poynt that is incomprehenſible, & unexpreſſible in this life. Were you called to be an Umpier between theſe great Schoolemen in this thorny, and knotty Queſtion, you, inſtead of unlooſing or untying this Gordian knot, would like another Alexander have cut it in pieces, and have told them that they diſputed like a company of Buzzards concerning the ground or manner of that which may in propriety of ſpeech be denied of God. Your opinion you ſee doth not ſo fully accord with ancient and Moderne Divinity, as you pretend, & how diſſonant it is from the truth will ſoon be manifeſted, by bringing it unto the rule of Theologicall truth, the Scriptures, in which the infallible prediction of things to come, doe clearly and abundantly witneſſe, that foreknowledge is properly in God: for prediction preſuppoſeth preſcience, it being utterly impoſſible to foretell infallibly what one doth not foreknow certainly. Hereupon it was that Tertullian ſaid Deum, quot fecit Prophet as, tot habere teſtes praeſcientiae ſuae lib. 2. contra Marcion. c. 5. That God hath ſo many witneſſes of his preſcience, as he hath made Prophets. This infallible prediction of things to come is ſo proper & peculiar unto God, as that thereby he diſtinguiſheth himſelfe from all falſe Gods. Eſay 41. 21, 22, 23. Produce your cauſe, ſaith the Lord (unto the Idolls of the Gentiles) bring forth your strong reaſons ſaith the King of Jacob; let them bring forth & ſhew us what ſhall happen. Let thē ſhew the former things what they he, that we may conſider them, and know the latter end of them or declare us things for to …ome: ſhew the things that are to come hereafter, that we may know that yee p. 227are Gods. He that is God can ſhew the things that are to come hereafter, and therefore he foreknowes them; for that cannot be foretold, which is not foreknown. And that without a Metaphor, or any other Trope.

From Scripture goe we to naturall reaſon, and that will prove, that foreknowledge agrees properly unto God. Arguments of this ſort may be drawn, Firſt from the nature of foreknowledge. Secondly from ſeverall attributes of God. Thirdly from his actuall providence or efficiency.

Firſt, from the nature of foreknowledge. Foreknowledge is a knowledge of things before their exiſtence. And in God there is a knowledge of things before their exiſtence. Thou understandest (ſaith David) my thoughts a farre off. Pſal. 139. 2. This argument you may find in D. Twiſſe againſt Jackson. p. 314. Till things doe coexiſt with God, his knowledge of them, ſaith he, is foreknowledge of them, as well as ours. For it is before them, and only before them; for it is neither with them, nor after them. Not with them, for then they ſhould coexiſt with God, and that from all eternity, which is moſt untrue; for if they did coexiſt with God, then they did exiſt, and that from all eternity, which is moſt untrue. much leſſe is it after them, for if ſo, then their coexiſtence with God were paſt: but we ſuppoſe it to be to come. And impoſſible it is that the ſame things ſhould at once be both paſt, and alſo to come. You have it alſo in Suarez in the place before quoted. In omni etiam proprietate certiſſimum eſt ſcientiam Dei, ſicut & Deum ipſum duratione antecedere omnium rerum creat arum existentiam. It is moſt certain that the knowledge of God, as well as God himſelfe, doth properly or in all propriety of ſpeech antecede in duration the exiſtence of all created things whatſoever, and therefore it is properly foreknowledge. Unto Suarez who is no enemy unto Arminianiſme, I ſhall adde D. Jackson a profeſſed Arminian arguing after the like manner in his Treatiſe of the Divine eſſence and Attributes Sect. 2. Cap. 8. p. 105. If God (ſaith he) as all grant, be before all worlds, his knowledge being coeternall to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Auſtin himſelfe grants a ſcientia a ſcience, or knowledge in God moſt infallible, of all things that have been, are, or ſhall be, before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the World it ſelfe, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet preſent, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or fore-decree them. And ſeeing God from eternity hath both known, and decreed the things that then were not, he is ſaid; to have foreknown and fore-decreed them.

Secondly, Arguments proving foreknowledge to be properly in God may be taken from Gods Attributes; from his infinite perfection, from his infinite happineſſe, or bleſſedneſſe, from his unchangeableneſſe.

Firſt, from his infinite perfection: He is of all beings the beſt, and moſt perfect, Deus optimus maximus was a title that the ancient Romans by the light of nature gave him. Nothing then can ſo much as be imagined to be better then God. But 'tis better to know things to come, then to be ignorant of them, And therefore we muſt either deny that there is a God, or elſe aſcribe unto him the knowledge of things to come. This is Doctor Twiſſe his argument De ſcientiâ media pag. 246. Verum, ſi Deus is ſit, quo nihil melius excogitari poteſt, & melius ſit cognoſcere futura, & quicquid co gnoſcibile est, quam ignorare; videtur hinc ſequi, aut Deum prorſus negandum eſſe, aut ſcientiam futurorum contingentium ei tribuendam.

p. 228Secondly, from his infinite bleſſedneſſe or happineſſe, which is ſuch as that he hath all things deſireable. But if he ſhould not have knowne things to come he ſhould be without a perfection, deſireable by every intelligent or rationall nature. This was Bradwardines argument; Si Deus quaedam vera neſciret, poſſet deſiderare & velle ſcire illa; omnis enim rationalis natura naturaliter ſcire deſiderat, quare & cum per partem proximam habeat voluntatem univerſaliter efficacem, poſſet illa ſcire & non novitèr; quia tunc non ſemper eſſet actualiſſimus, ſcientiſsimus, perfectiſſimus, beatiſſimus, & immutailis penitus, contra tertiam partem & ſextam: neceſſario ergo aeternalitèr omnia vera novit.

Thirdly, from his unchangeableneſſe, which is affirmable of all his other Attributes, and conſequently of his knowledge. But now his knowledge if it were not of things whileſt they were to come, it would by actuall exiſtence of them be enlarged, and ſo changed. This argument is urged by Durand, Cumel, Rada, Suarez, and others. God knowes thing whiles preſent, for otherwiſe he ſhould be ignorant of that which men and Angells know, therefore he knew them whiles future, otherwiſe by the preſence of them, ſomething de novo ſhould accrue unto Gods knowledge, which cannot be without a change.Conſtat (ſaith Durand) quod Deus cognoſcit contingens dum eſt praeſens, putà Socratem currere. alioquin ego cognoſcerem illud quod Deus ignoraret: ſi ergo non cognoſcebat hoc prius quando fuit futurum, ſequeretur quod aliquid accreviſſet ſuae ſcientiae quod eſt impoſſibile. In 1. lib. Diſtinct. 38. Q. 3.

Suarez alſo argueth to the ſame purpoſe.Piaeterea declaratur hoc modo; quia vel Deus ſcit haec contingentia, quando ponuntar in eſſe, vel non: Hoc poſterius nemo dicit, quia angelus, vel homo hoc cognoſcit, ſaltem quando ſunt praſentia: Ergo multo magis Deus: ſi autem nunc illa cognoſcit, Ergo & antea, quia ſcientia Dei augeri non poteſt, Ita ut aliquid novum ſub illam cadat, tum propter immutabilitatem, tum eriam quia panlatim diſcere, quocun que modo ſiat, magna imperfectio eſt; Confirmatur, quia ſi Deus in tempore aliquid de novo inciperet velle, imperfectionem in illo indicaret: Ergo multò magis … aliquid de novo ſcire inciperet. Lib. 1. De Scientia…turorum contingentium abſoluta. cap. 2.

The laſt ſort of arguments which I ſhall mention, are drawn from Gods actuall providence or efficiency. God is the cauſe of all things, of him (ſaith the Apoſtle) are all things, Rom. 11. 36. Now he is the cauſe of all things by his knowledge, and by his will.

Firſt by his knowledge, and that practicall, which is reſembled unto that of an Artificer, who hath a foreknowledge of what artificiall workes he reſolves upon; for he hath ſamplers and patterns of them in his Cognitio divini intellectus (ſaith A…uin …) cōparatur ad res alias, ſicut cognitio artificis ad artificiata, cum per ſuam ſcientiam fit cauſa rerum. Artiſex autem ſuae artis cognitione etiam ea quae nondum ſunt artificiara cognoſcir, …orm… enim artis ex ejus ſcientiá efiluunt in exteriorem materiam ad artificiatorum conſtiturionem: unde nihil prohibet in ſcientia artificis eſſe formas quae nondum exterius prodierunt: ſic igitur nihil prohibet, Deum, corum quae non ſunt, notitiam habere. lib. 1. contra gentes cap. 66. Deus eſt cauſa omnium rerum & futurorum contingentium, & liberorum (ſaith Cumel) in primam partem Summ. Q. 14. Art. 13. Diſp. 1. Per ſuam ſcientiam practicam, ergo prius ſcit & cognoſcit futura couringentia & libera quam producantur & fiant; ſicut artiſex prius haber ideam artificiati & cognoſcit rem producendam & e…iciendam, quam efficiat & producat poſ…ea ad extra in tempore; igitur Deus qui artifex eſt univerſorum futurorum contingentium prius cognoſcit futura contingentia, quam illa in tempore fiant.mind.

Rada propounds this argument very briefely.Deus omnia operatur ad extra, ut artifex verò rem, antequam illam efficiat, praecognoſcit: aliter enim irrationabiliter operabitur. Parte prima. Controv. xxx. pag. 487.

Secondly, the will of God is the cauſe of all things, as is demonſtrated by Bradwardine and by Aquinas and ſuch as Comment upon him, in prim. part. Q. 19. Art. 4. Now the will of God is unchangeable from within p. 229and irreſiſtible from without, and therefore in it all things future may be certainly and infallibly foreknowne. Bradwardine (from Eſay. 46. 10. Declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, ſaying, my Counſell ſhall ſtand) inferres the infallibility of Gods prediction from the firmeneſſe, immutability, and unreſiſtibleneſſe of his will. The Prophet ſignifies, ſaith he, that he can therefore declare the things that are not done, becauſe his Counſell ſhall ſtand, and he will doe all his pleaſure: Quaſi velit innuere, quod per hoc annuntiet, vei annuntiare poſsit ab exordio noviſſimum, quia omne ſuum conſilium & volunt as immutabiliter stabit, & ſiet. De cauſa Dei. lib. 1. cap. 218. pag. 224. This argument Cumel inforceth by compariſon with mans foreknowledge of things in their cauſes. A Mathematician can foreknow an Eclipſe of the Sunne or Moone in its cauſe, and therefore much more can God foreknow all future contingents in the determination of his own will.Effectus poteſt evidenter cognoſci antequam in tempore producatur in ſua cauſâ, ſicut Eclipſis evidenter cognoſcitur in ſua cauſâ, antequam ſit, a Mathematico, & ab Aſtrologo: ſed Deus per ſeipſum & per propriam voluntatem eſt cauſa omnium Entium contingentium, & liberorum, & praedefinit illa futura contingentia & libera. Ergo Deus per ſeipſum & per propriam ſcientiam, quam habet, cognoſcit futura contingentia & libera.

As for the teſtimonies you bring in the Margent, they and diverſe others are alleadged generally by the Dominicans, to prove the exiſtence of things in Eternity, and it is very ſtrange unto me that you take no notice of the common anſwers that are uſually given unto them. The place out of Gregory is miſquoted, but that might be an eſcape of the Printer; in my booke it is, Moral. lib. 20. cap. 25. And a little after he gives the reaſon why preſcience is not properly in God. Praeſcire dicitur qui unamquamque rem, antequam veniat, videt: Et id quod futurum est, priuſquam praeſens fiat, praevide…: Deus ergo quomodo est praeſcius dum nulla niſi quae futura ſunt, praeſciantur? Et ſcim… quia Deo futurum nihil eſt, ante cujus oculos praeterita nulla ſunt: praeſentia non tranſeunt, futura non veni, uni: Quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus proſpectu praeſto eſt: Et omne quod praeſensest, ſcire poteſt potius quam praeſcire. The ground upon which both Auſtin and Gregory deny foreknowledge to be in God is, becauſe nothing is future but all things are preſent unto God.

Unto all theſe and diverſe other Teſtimonies which occurre in the Dominicans, I ſhall rehearſe the anſwers of ſeverall men.

Firſt, Rada, Par. prim. controv. trigeſ. Art. 2. pag. 493. Adomnes authoritaies unica ſolutione ſit ſatis. Dico enim quod non intelligunt ſancti, omnia eſſe Deo ſecundum rem praeſentia ſed ſecundum eſſe objectivum & cognitum: omnia enim in ſeipſo videt & intu…tur.

Secondly, Suarez gives the ſame anſwer, but he explaines himſelfe more fully: The Fathers (ſaith he) ſpeake by way of exaggeration to declare the perfection and exactneſſe of that knowledge which God hath of things to come, for he knowes them ſo diſtinctly, and accurately, with all their circumſtances, as if they did exiſt actually preſent. This knowledge of them therefore is not ſo much abſtractive as intuitive, not Parres per quandam exaggerationem locuti ſunt ut declararent perfectionem ſcientiae, quam Deus habet de futuris; nam illa tam clare & diſtinctè cum omnibus circumſtantiis intuetur, ac ſi pra ſentia actu jam exiſterent: ideoq, ſcientia illa non eſt abſtractiva, ſed propriiſſima intuitio. Ad hoc ergo ſignificandum dixerunt illam non tam eſſe dicendam praeſcientiam, quam ſcientiam. Nam more humano loquendo, quae praſciuntur, non ita clarè & diſtinctè cognoſcuntur. Nam Aſtrologus qui praeſcit ſuturam eſſe Eclipſin, non apprchendit & cognoſcit illum effectum diſtincte prout in re futurns eſt cum omnibus conditionibus & circumſtantiis eius: & ideo non habet de illo ſcientiam intuitivam, ſed abſtractivam. At vero Deus ram diſtincte intuetur futurum antequam ſit, ſicut quando eſt, tam que veram ſcientiam intuitivam illius habet. Quocirca in eo ſenſu in quo illi patres voluerunt illam ſcientiam propriè appellare praeſcientiam; Illa particula Prae non ſolum excludit realem exiſtentiam, ſed etiam praeſentiam objectivam exactam, & omnimodam …ffectus tie cogniti.ſo much preſcience as ſcience.

p. 230Thirdly, D. Twiſse De ſcientia media pag. 390. gives the ſame anſwer that Bradwardine did unto the like ſaying out of Boetius and Anſelme above 200 yeares agoe, to wit, That all things are preſent unto God in eſſe volito as decreed by him, ſunt ei praeſentia, id eſt per ſuam inſuperabilem & immutabilem voluntatem, praeſentialiter determinata, & decreta certitudinaliter ut fiant futura. And this you may ſee how he cleares both out of Auſtin, and Gregory.

Fourthly, Becanus gives another anſwer which I take to be the more ſatisfying: And 'tis, that the ſcope of both Auſtin, and Gregory is to ſhew, That there is not ſuch a preſcience or fore knowledge in God, as there is in us, viz imperfect, and conjecturall. &c.Reſpondeo, ſcopus Auguſtini eſt oſtendere non eſſe talem praeſcientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis eſt. Nos enim imperfecte, & quaſi per coniecturas praeſcimus futura: at praeſentia clare & perfecte cognoſcimus. Deus autem tam perfecte cognoſcit futura, quam praſentia. Hic patet diſcrimen inter nos & Deum. 1. Quia noſtra cognitio perficitur ex praeſentia rerum: non autem Dei cognitio. 2. Quia res futurae ſunt Deo praeſentes per praeſentiam perfectam nobis per imperfectam 3. Quia nos eandem rem bis cognoſcimus: ſemel imperfecte, quando futura eſt, & ſemel perfecte, quando praeſens eſt. At Deus ſemel tantum, quia cognitio Dei eſt aeque, perfecta, ſive res futura, ſive praeſens ſit. Nec aliud vult Gregorius; uter que negat praeſcientiam in Deo, qualis in nobis eſt. Sum. Theolog. Seolaſt. part. 1. Tom. 1. cap. 10. queſt. 10.

From your Teſtimonies I come to the examination of your Reaſons.

M^r GOODWIN.

NOR is it any wonder at all, that there ſhould be peace, and a concurrence of judgement about ſuch a poynt as this, even between thoſe who have many Irons of co…ention otherwiſe in the fire, conſidering how obvious and neere at hand the truth herein is. For 1. if foreknowledge were properly and formally in God, then might Predeſtination, Election, Reprobation, and many other things, be properly and formally in him alſo; in as much as theſe are in the Letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reaſon given for a difference. But unpoſſible it is, that there ſhould be any plurality of things whatſoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite ſimplicity of his Nature and being, with open mouth gainſaying it:

IEANES.

YOur Argument with open mouth gainſayeth that which no body will affirme, but is mute in the proofe of that which only will be called for, to wit, That whatſoever is properly and formally aſcribed unto God, is really diſtinguiſhed from Gods Eſſence, and his other attributes. If you think I doe you any wrong by this cenſure, reduce your Argument unto Categoricall Syllogiſmes, and make the beſt of it you can.

p. 231Mr GOODWIN.

SEcondly, if foreknowledge were properly or formally in God, there ſhould be ſomewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that which is ſuppoſed to be ſuch a foreknowledge in him to day, by the morrow, ſuppoſe the thing or event foreknown, ſhould in the interim actually come to paſſe, muſt needs ceaſe, and be changed, in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are preſent, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the propriety of it) being res futura, ſomewhat that is to come.