The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1
Mr GOODWIN p. 25. 26. c. 2. §. 20.
IT is indeed the judgement of ſome Learned men, that the purpoſe or intent of God to permit, or ſuffer ſuch, or ſuch a thing to be done, or ſuch Dr Twiſſe.or ſuch an accident to come to paſſe, ſuppoſeth a neceſſity (at least a ſyllogisticall or conſequentiall neceſſity) of the coming of it to paſſe. But that the truth lieth on the other ſide of the way, appears by the light of this conſideration. If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth, to permit to come to paſſe in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree, neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be, (or at least ten thouſand things more than ever ſhall be) must be, yea, and this neceſſarily. For (doubtleſſe God hath decreed, and intendeth, to leave naturall cauſes, generally, to their naturall and proper operations, and productions; yea and voluntary cauſes alſo, under a power, and at liberty to act ten thouſand things more, then ever they will doe, or ſhall doe. For example; God intendeth, and hath decreed, to permit, that fire ſhall burne, what combustible matter ſoever it ſhall take hold of, or that ſhall be cast into it, that one ſparke of it falling into a barrell of dried Gunpowder, ſhould ſuddainly fire it, &c. But it doth not follow from hence, that therefore every thing that is combustible in the world, ſhall be burnt with fire; or that every barrell of dry Gun-powder ſhall be blown up with ſparkes of fire falling into them. So (in the instance formerly mentioned) God had decreed to permit the Lords of Keilah to deliver up David into Sauls hand, in caſe he had stayed in their Citty, till Sauls coming to demand him: this is evident from 1 Sam. 23. 12.the Text. But it did not follow from this permiſſive decree of God, that therefore theſe Lords must neceſſarily deliuer up David into Sauls hand: for we know they did it not. So likewiſe, God hath decreed to permit any man to destroy the life of another whom he meets with (I meane, in reſpect of a naturall power to doe the execution) but it followeth not from hence, that therefore every man muſt neceſſarily murther, or deſtroy the life of his Brother, that cometh in his way. So that evident it is, that no decree of God whatſoeuer, which is ſimply and purely permiſsive, doth import any neceſsity at all of the perpetration, or coming to paſſe, of the thing ſo decreed. God permitted Adam to eate of every tree in the garden of Eden (the tree of knowledge Gen. 2. 16, 17of good and evill only excepted) & therefore certainly had decreed, or intended this permiſſion: yet was not Adam any waies neceſsitated by any vertue or influence of this decree upon him, to eate of every of theſe trees; nor is it in the leaſt degree credible, that ever he did eate of every of them, nor yet of any one of them, but only that, which was prohibited unto him, his ejection out of this garden following ſo ſuddainly after this patent, or permiſsion granted unto him. The reaſon why no decree of God, that is purely and barely permiſſive, either induceth or ſuppoſeth any neceſsity of the coming to paſſe, of what is only ſo decreed, is this. Firſt, becauſe no ſuch decree doth any waies intereſſe God to any manner of interpoſall, either by his wiſdome, power, or providence in what kind ſoever, towards the effecting or bringing to paſse of what is ſo decreed. So that ſuch events, which are no otherwiſe decreed by God, then thus, are in the ſame poſture of contingency, in the ſame poſsibility of being, or not being, wherein they would have been, had there been no ſuch decree at all concerning them. Secondly, neither doth any ſuch decree in God, ſuppoſe a futurity of ſuch a concurrence of cauſes ſimply requiſite and neceſſary for the bringing of things, ſo decreed, to paſſe, which will actually bring them to paſſe. Though God hath decreed, that a ſparke, or coale of fire falling, i. e. in caſe it ſhall fall into a barrell of Gun-powder, ſhall fire it, yet it doth not follow from hence, that he hath decreed, that any ſuch ſparke or coale, ſhall fall into it, without which notwithſtanding the effect decreed, viz. the firing of this powder, will not come to paſſe. Or if he ſaid, that God hath decreed that ſuch a ſparke, or coale, ſhall fall into the ſaid barrell of powder, now is not the decree barely permiſsive, but operative and aſſertive, and ſuch which engageth the decreer to interpoſe effectually for the bringing of the thing decreed to paſſe. But ſuch decrees as this, in matters of that nature we deny to be in God.