The Riches of Gods Love, Part 2 – Part 3
IEANES.
DR Twiſſe doth grant, that Gods permiſſion in a complicate notion, as it takes in other acts of Gods providence, doth inferre the things permitted: And what he ſaith of Gods actuall permiſſion in time, is applyable unto his permiſſive decrees before all time; for as his workings are agreeable unto his effective, ſo his permiſſions are ſuitable unto his permiſsive decrees. But now that he any where affirmeth, that the decrees of God, which are ſimply, purely, and barely permiſsive, See the Second Book of this Treatiſe, from pag. 90. unto pag. 99.or that the bare, ſingle, and ſole permiſsion of God, doe import any neceſsity at all of the perpetration, or coming to paſſe, of what is only ſo decreed, and permitted, I utterly deny. And if you had been ſo well verſed in D. Twiſſe, as it was fit for him, that undertakes a refutation of him, you would never have charged him with that, which he, in a whole digreſsion, profeſſedly impugneth; for which, you may ſee, how he is taxed (though very modeſtly) by M. Rutherford, in a Scholaſticall diſputation of his, De Divinâ providentiâ cap. 8. D. Twiſſe in the third Digreſsion of the ſecond Book of his Vindiciae &c. examineth that propoſition of Perkins: Quod Deus non impedit, ideo evenit, quia Deus non impedit. That which God doth not hinder, doth therefore come to paſſe, becauſe God doth not hinder it, (i.) becauſe he doth permit it: where he not only profeſſeth his diſlike of it, but alſo refutes it. This Section then might very well have been ſpared for in it you fight but with your own ſhadow, and doe not at all oppoſe the opinion of D. Twiſſe, who fully accords with you in this particular; That Gods ſimple and ſole permiſsions, and conſequently his decrees, that are ſimply, purely, and barely permiſsive, are not illative of thoſe things which are only ſo decreed, and permitted.
To cleare this I ſhall give you an abſtract of this Digreſsion.
He examineth the truth of this propoſition. 1. In the matter, or object of an act naturall. 2. In the matter, or object of an act morall, good or bad.
1. Firſt, as concerning naturall actions, he hinteth a diſtinction, between a proper permiſsion of them, and a permiſsion of them improperly ſo called; that is oppoſed unto a naturall, reall, or Phyſicall reſtraint, this unto a morall reſtraint, which is by way of diſſwaſion.
Firſt then if we take permiſſion properly, as it is oppoſed, unto a naturall, reall, and Phyſicall reſtraint, and denoteth a ſuſpenſion thereof, D. Twiſſe is ſo farre from affirming, that they come to paſſe, upon Gods ſingle, ſole, and bare permiſſion, as that he maketh Gods poſitive effection (whether by way of predetermination, or concurrence, he leaves to be diſcuſſed in another place) requiſite unto the exiſtence of them, without which they never can exiſt; for God is the principall and immediate Actio Dei Phyſica ſive naturalis ea eſt, quâ concurrit cum omnibus cauſis ſecundis ad actus ſuos, ſive influendo duntaxat in actus ipſarum, quod placet Arminio, Jeſuitarum veſtigiis inſiſtenti; ſive movendo cauſas ſecundas ad agendum, quod nobis veriſimilius videtur, quemadmodum & inter Pontificios Dominicanis, quae quidem controverſia non eſt hujus loci, ſed ſuo loco repetenda. Hujus concurſus divini ratione, nobis videtur abſurde dici rem aliquam ideo evenire quia Deus non impediat. Omnis enim res, omnis actus, omnis eneitas, ideo fit, quia Deus vult ut fiat, non permittendo ſed efficiendo, id que principaliter. Etenim Deus eſt cauſa principalis, & immediata uniuſcujuſ que entitatis, juxta omnes fere Scholaſticos, Arminio etiam conſentiente, pag. 177. Nec Arminianis, quod ſciam, hactenus reluctantibus. Abſurde autem dicitur, Deum permittere id fieri, quod facit ut fiat, id que principaliter ipſum efficiendo. Ne que hic opus eſt recurrere ad permiſſionem, cum omnes in rebus naturalibus agnoſcant, & amplectantur Dei efficientiam principalem & immediatam. Vind. lib. 2. pag. 131.cauſe of all beings and entities, and therefore of all naturall actions.
And againe afterwards.Quare ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permiſſio notat ſuſpenſionem actionis naturalis, ſic Deus non verſatur circa eaſdem dum fiunt, ſed poſitivè facit. pag. 132.
Secondly, if we take permiſsion as it is oppoſed unto, and denoteth a ſuſpenſion of, a reſtraint improperly ſo called; a morall restraint by way of diſſwaſion; ſo D. Twiſſe is expreſſe in deniall of any necesſity to be inferred, from ſuch a permisſion of the comming to paſſe, of what is ſo. permitted. Ad actiones naturales quod attinet, quatenus permiſſio not at ſuſpenſionem actionis moralis in ſuadendo aut diſſuadendo poſitae, ſic non ſequitur, quicquid permititur illud fit. Ne que enim quod ſuadetur quocun que modo, & quantumvis efficaciter, neceſſe est, ut fiat, nec quod diſſuadetur quocun que modo quantumvis efficaciter, necesſe est, ut non fiat; Ergo multo minus ex co quod permititur aliquid fieri, vel non fieri, ſequitur neceſsario oportere illud fieri vel non fieri.
Secondly, from naturall actions he proceedes on to morall, and he begineth with good and gracious actions; in which he reſolveth that naturall permisſion, hoc est, non in genere morali ſed Phyſico, can have no place, for (ſaith he) this would ſuppoſe, that the creature can be carryed unto actions truly good, without any ſpeciall ſupply or asſiſtance of Gods ſpirit and grace, which we deny can be in the ſtate of nature entire and pure, how much leſſe is it posſible in the ſtate of nature corrupted: whence alſo (ſaith he) it would follow, that God doth not antecedently worke and cauſe every act truly good, and that by a ſpeciall ſupply, aid, or asſiſtance.
As for Gods permisſion of good actions in genere morali, he referreth to what he hath ſpoken touching the like permisſion of naturall actions, only he addeth, that God allwayes concurreth unto an act truly good by a ſpeciall asſiſtance & that both as a Phyſicall and Morrall agent: wherefore (ſaith he) in this gracious adminiſtration of things there is no place at all for permisſion, as it is oppoſed unto effection or farthering; for God worketh, cauſeth, and promoteth every good worke in his children; although permisſion may have roome there, as it ſimply ſignifieth non-hindrance, for queſtionleſſe God doth not hinder the good workes of his people, which he himſelfe cauſeth and worketh. Thus you ſee, that by D. Twiſſe his opinion, good workes doe not follow upon Gods bare, ſingle, and ſole permisſion, for they cannot be performed without the powerfull operation of Gods holy ſpirit, which worketh in us both the will and the deed.
Laſtly, as touching evill or ſinfull actions, in them divine permiſſion challengeth a proper and peculiar place, both as permiſſion is oppoſed unto efficiency, as alſo unto reſtraint.
Firſt, as 'tis oppoſed unto efficiency, for the obliquity of them being a privation, is not capable of an efficient cauſe.
Secondly, as 'tis oppoſed unto restraint, for God doth not hinder ſinfull actions many times, though it be alwaies in his power.
But now if we ſpeake of the permiſsion of ſinfull actions, in genere morali, or ſuaſorio; ſo all unanimouſly affirme, that God perſwadeth or exhorteth none unto evill: for if God ſhould interpoſe his authority, by commanding, adviſing, or exhorting, whatſoever ſhould be done hereupon, would be lawfully done.
But though God himſelfe doth not exhort or perſwade unto ſinne, yet he gives way many times, and that juſtly, unto the temptations of Satan, and his inſtruments; nay, he himſelfe by his providence, layes before men outward objects and occaſions, ſuitable unto their inward corruptions; as a goodly Babyloniſh garment, two hundred ſheckles of ſilver, and a wedge of Gold of fifty ſheckles weight, before the covetous eyes of Achan: beautifull and naked Bathſheba before the luſtfull eyes of David. Next he ſuffereth thoſe corruptions, that is, either he doth not cure them by his renewing grace, or he doth not bridle them by his reſtraining grace, but lets them have their full ſwinge, without check or controll: In his children he doth not actuate and rouze their graces, but lets them lye as it were in a deep ſleepe, &c. Beſides, he concurreth unto thoſe motions of the ſoule, (as touching the entity of them) unto which men are ſtirred, by view of objects, that are agreeable unto either their unſubdued or unbridled luſts. From the complication of all theſe, a particular obduration, and ſinfull action followeth, ſo that you take in alſo, the concourſe of God, ſo farre as concernes the ſubſtance, or matter of ſuch a ſinfull action. Now from this variety of providences going before a ſinfull action, D. Twiſſe drawes this following concluſion. Ex quib us manifestum videtur, ex ſolâ permiſſione nequaquam conſequi, quod fiat aliquid; & proinde etiam minus verum videtur illud Perkinſei, Quicquid Deus non impedit; ideo fit, quia Deus non impedit. From which it ſeems manifeſt, that it in no waies followeth, that a thing cometh to paſſe upon Gods ſole permiſsion, and therefore that of Perkins ſeemes not to be true, whatſoever God doth not hinder therefore cometh to paſſe, becauſe God doth not hinder it.
In the next place he bringeth in, and anſwereth objections.
Firſt, This is the opinion not only of Perkins but of Piſcator alſo.
Secondly, our adverſaries (by name Vorſtius and Arminius) grant it, and their conceſsion ſhould be embraced, as making much for the defence of our opinion.
Thirdly, there is a reaſon, which at the firſt bluſh ſeems convincing, unto which not only Vorſtius, but alſo Piſcator yeeldeth, and 'tis drawn from the nature of Relatives: For, ſeeing permiſsion and the thing permitted are Relatives, it ſeems neceſſary, that they exiſt together: upon ſuppoſall then of the permiſsion of the coming to paſſe of ſuch a thing it ſeems neceſſary, that that which is ſo permitted, doe come to paſſe. Unto theſe he diſpatcheth an anſwer ſeverally, in the ſame order as they were propounded.
Firſt, as for our Divines, he acknowledgeth, that they have ſo thought, but truth is to be preferred before any teſtimony; Amicus Socrates, Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas: For 'tis but reaſon that we ſhould have regard unto, and care of, only truth, that ſo we may (with the Apoſtle) ſay, we can doe nothing againſt the truth, but for the truth.
Secondly, he ſheweth, how that for the exiſtence of a thing, Piſcator doth not acquieſce in Gods ſole permiſsion, but flyeth unto Gods government, and that ſo powerfull, as that it bowes, bends, and turnes the Veruntamen & hoc etiam advertendum eſt; cum contra Piſcatorem in hunc modum diſputaret Vorſtius, Permiſſio in eo, cui permiſſio fit, nihil omnino novl per ſe cauſat aut efficit, ſed tantum vires & facultates ſemel illi datas, ab alienâ laeſione tutas praeſtat, & liberum iſtarum exercitium eidem relinquit: imo nihil prorſus extra ipſum permittentem efficit, niſi quod actionem hujus impedientem cohibet, aut potius retinet, & quaſi ſuſpendit. Eſt enim ipſa per ſe tantum decretum non impediendi: hoc eſt, for is non agendi. Quomodo autem is, qui non agit, eo ipſo quod non agit, aliquid extra ſe cauſet, vel alteri neceſſitatem agendi offerat? Aut quomodo is qui neceſſitatem hanc alteri offert, eo ipſo nihil agere, ſed alterius tantum actionem permittere, ſive non impedire, ſine contradictione dici poſſit? Videas jam quomodo ad iſta Vorſtiana reſpondeat Piſcator, in marginalibus ſuis annotationibus. At ego (inquit) non dico quod Deus tantùm permittat ea quae permittit: Sed dico quod illa ipſa etiam gubernat; Reſponſ. ad Amic. Collat. Vorſtii p. 231. Idem p. 131. Explicat quid ſibi velit, cum ait, Deum gubernate. Denotant (inquit) illa effectionem quandam Dei quoad peccara, ſed non denotant effectionem talem, quâ Deus ipſe efficiat peccata, quatenus habent rationem peccatorum, …en quatenus ſunt peccata; ſed denotant gubernationem Dei, quâ ut Creator voluntates humanas flectit quocun que voluerit. Ex his manifeſtum eſt, Piſcatorem ſol… permiſſione Dei minime acquieviſſe, ad hoc ut aliquid conſequentèr fieri dicatur, ſed ad gubernationem Dei confugiſſe; & ejuſmodi gubernationem qua voluntates humanas flectit quocun que voluerit.wills of men whither he pleaſeth.
As for the conceſſions of Arminius and Vorstius, ſeeing they are erroneous, a patronage of our opinio… drawn from them is not to be valued ſo much, as to be built upon. Verum tanti non est hujuſmodi patrocinium, ut errone is quantumvis propitiis innitamur aſſertionibus.
As for the reaſon, that is of no force or ſtrength, for we may as well conclude, that becauſe God did from eternall will or decree to create the World, therefore the World from eternall was created; or becauſe God from eternall foreknew that the World ſhould be, therefore the World did exiſt from eternall: for there is no leſſe relation, between the willing of a thing, and the thing willed; the decree of a thing, and the thing decreed; the foreknowledge of a thing, and the thing foreknowne; than there is, between the permiſſion of a thing, and the thing permitted. And there is between them as a relation, ſo alſo a reciprocation: whereupon it followeth, that if God willeth or decreeth a thing, it is willed or decreed; if he foreknowes a thing, it is foreknown; if he permits a thing it is permitted: but as it doth not follow, a thing is willed or decreed, therefore 'tis actually exiſtent; a thing is foreknown, therefore it is; In like manner it doth not follow, a thing is permitted, therefore it is actually: and indeed if Gods meere permiſſion did inferre the exiſtence of a thing upon this ground, becauſe permiſſion and the thing permitted are relatives, it would hold as well concerning the permiſsion of man, as God; But 'tis manifeſt, that it followeth not upon mans permiſsion, that whatſoever he permitteth, cometh to paſſe.
But it may be objected, it is neceſſary that whatſoever is willed by God, doe at ſome time or other, come to paſſe, therefore we may ſay the ſame of what is permitted by God.
He denyeth the conſequence, and he giveth this reaſon for his denyall, becauſe Gods permiſsion is not ſo effectuall unto the exiſtence of a thing, as his volition; and yet he acknowledgeth, that this kind of conſequence is true in naturall cauſes, but this is not in regard only of permiſſion, but from the determination of a naturall cauſe to worke, unleſſe it be hindered: as concerning rationall and free agents, this conſequence, a thing is permitted to come to paſſe, therefore it doth come to paſſe, is of no Ad rationem vero quod attinet, eam nullius eſſe pretii conſtanter affirmamus. Nam pari rationis efficacia concludi poſſet, quia Deus voluit ab aeterno, ſive decrevit mundum creare, ergo mundus ab aeterno creatus eſt, vel quia Deus ab aeterno mundum futurum praeſcivit, ergo mundus ab aeterno extitic. Etenim relatio nihilo minus intercedit inter volitionem & rem volitam; decretum & rem decretam; praeſcientiam & rem praeſcitam, quam inter permiſſionem & rem permiſſam; Unde quamvis ſequatur, Deus voluit mundum ab aeterno, ergo ab aeterno mundus eſt volitus; Deus ſcivit mundum ab aeterno, ergo mundus ab aeterno eſt ſcitus; Deus permiſit aut permittit actum fieri, ergo actus eſt aut fuit permiſſus. Attamen inde nequaquam ſequetur; ergo quod volitum eſt, exiſtebat, quum primum volitum erat; aut quod permiſſum eſt, exiſtebat, quum primum permiſſum eſt. Dices, atqui quod volitum eſt a Deo, neceſſe eſt ut aliquando ſit; ergo & quod permiſſum, ſimiliter neceſſe erit, ut ſit. Imo, inquam, nequaquam ſequitur. Ne que enim par eſt utrobi que ratio, ſed valde diſpar; quod & cuilibet manifeſtum eſt. ne que enim permiſſio tam efficax eſt ad exiſtentiam rei, quam volitio. Nec tamen diffiteor hoc genus conſequentiae procedere in cauſis naturalibus, ſed non ex ſolâ vi permiſſionis, ſed ex determinatione cauſae naturalis ad agendum niſi impediatur. De cauſis vero rationalibus & libere agentibus, nunquam obtinet hoc genus conſequentiae, permittitur aliquid fieri, ergo fit. At, inquies, ſunt relata; & relata ſunt ſimul naturâ. Agnoſco eſſe relata, & quatenus ſunt relata converti ad conſequentiam. Poſitâ ergo permiſſione rei, neceſſe eſt ut res ſit permiſſa; perinde at que poſitâ volitione rei neceſſe eſt, ut res ſit volita; item poſitâ praeſcientia rei, neceſſe eſt ut res ſit praeſcita. Sed quemadmodum non ſequitur, res eſt volita, ergo eſt; aut res eſt praeſcita, ergo eſt; perinde etiam non ſequitur, res eſt permiſſa, ergo eſt. Quemadmodum nec ſola praeſcientia, aut volitio rei ſufficit ad hoc, ut res exiſtat; ita etiam ne que ſola permiſſio rei ſufficit ad hoc, ut res extra cauſas ſuas conſtituatur. Haec tamen ratio, fateor, impoſuit Piſcatori, pag. 231. Ad Amic. Collat. Vorſtii. Ubi ſic diſſerit; ubi autem permiſſio eſt, ibi etiam eſt factum quod permittitur. Quomodo enim dici poteſt permitti illud, quod non fit? Certe pari ratione dici poteſt, permitti illud quod non fit; quemadmodum dici poteſt, volitum eſſe quod tamen non fit; licet ad exiſtentiam rei, multo efficacior ſit volitio, quam permiſſio. Imo quomodo non dici poſſit, permitti aliquid quamvis non fiat, cùm permittere nihil aliud ſit, quam ne que facere ut aliquid fiat, ne que ne fiat impedire. Pergit Piſcator, quippe, inquiens, haec ſunt relata, & proinde ſimul natura. Quum igitur Deus decrevit permittere peccata, neceſſe eſt ut illa fiant. At jam oſtendimus, ex eo quod relata ſint, hoc tantum ſequi, poſitâ pern iſſione, rem eſſe permiſſam; ſic & poſitâ volitione rei, ſequitur rem eſſe volitam; & poſitâ praeſcientiâ rei, ſequitur rem eſſe praeſcitam; at hinc minime ſequitur propterea rem actualem aliquam exiſtentiam ſortiri: ita etiam, licet poſitâ permiſſione, res merito dicatur eſſe permiſſa, at hinc non ſequitur propterea rem eſſe ſimpliciter, & extra cauſas ſuas actualiter conſtitui; Quod ſi haec conſecutio legitima eſſet, quod contendit Piſcator, non modo ex permiſſione Dei, ſequeretur rem e veſtigio exiſtere; ſed & ex quavis cujuſvis hominis permiſſione; atqui manifeſtum eſt (nec Piſcator credo reſiſteret) ex hominis permiſſione nequaquam ſequi, quicquid permititur fieri, mox exiſtere.force at all.
The laſt and principall objection is concerning the permisſion of ſinne in particular; without grace ſinne cannot be avoyded, and the permisſion of ſinne ſtands in the denyall of grace: it is cleare therefore that upon the permisſion of ſinne, ſinne neceſſarily enſueth.
Firſt, he anſwereth, this in no-wiſe followeth from the nature of permiſsion in generall (as ſome Divines, have thought) but from a peculiar manner of Gods permiſsion, ſtanding in a conſtant denyall of grace without which ſinne can be ſhunned by none.
Secondly he diſtinguiſheth of a twofold conſideration of ſinne, indefinite or definite, and that either in regard of ſorts and kinds, or elſe particular actions.
Firſt, he grants, that upon the permiſsion of ſinne, that is, the denyall of grace, ſinne followeth indefinitely, and in generall; ſo that as long as God with-holds his grace, a man ſinnes, either in doing what is forbidden, or elſe in doing what is commanded in a wrong way or manner. He alſo ſinnes in omitting what is commanded, or in abſtaining from what is forbidden in an unholy, and ungratious way or manner. And this he exemplifieth both in the unregenerate and regenerate.
Firſt, whiles God denies to, or withholds from, an unregenerate man, his habituall grace, or grace of regeneration; whileſt he ſuffereth his ſpirituall diſeaſes to goe uncured, his corruptions unſubdued, and unmortified, ſo long he cannot but ſinne in all his rationall and deliberate, both actions and omiſsions.
Firſt, all his actions are ſinnes of commiſſion, either a doing of what is forbidden, or a ſinfull performance of what is commanded, not out of right principles, nor for the due and requiſite end.
Secondly all his omiſſions are ſinfull, for they are either of what is injoyned, or elſe if they be of what is prohibited, they are not ſanctified, proceeding from the love of God, and directed unto the glory of God above all.
Next as for the regenerate, if God deny unto, or withhold from them, never ſo little a while, his actuall grace, the actuall ſupply, and aſſiſtance of his ſpirit, they ſinne in whatſoever they performe, or forbeare; And indeed it is no wonder, that upon Gods ſuſpending the aide of his actuall grace, the regenerate breake out into ſinne, in whom there is a fleſh alwaies luſting againſt the ſpirit, whoſe graces are imperfect, and corruptions naturall, and therefore active, upon removall of impediments; For ſinne in Adam followed upon the ſole ſuſpenſion of actuall aſſiſtance to will that good, unto which he had an habituall fitneſſe; and yet in him propenſion unto good was perfect, without any mixture of inclination unto evill.
Secondly, he denyeth, that upon the bare permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne followeth definitely, either for ſorts and kinds, or particular actions. But here firſt, he implyeth an exception of generall, and comprehenſive ſinnes, that either lye at the root of, or are concomitant unto every ſinne, as inordinate ſelfe-love &c. Fortè dici potest, ex carentià justitiae originalis, ſequi neceſſario, ut creatura feratur in amorem ſui inordinatè, adeo ut quicquid operatur, illud faciat propter ſe, non autem propter Deum.
Secondly he deſireth, chiefly to be underſtood concerning the imperate or externall actions of ſin, and ſuch actions of the will, as are of efficacy, purpoſes, reſolutions, &c. For upon Gods permiſſion, that is, not curing, or healing, not ſubduing of particular ſinfull habits. v. g. Covetouſneſſe, luxury, there doe neceſſarily follow ſuch ſinfull actions of the will, as are ſtiled uſually to be of complacency, that doe, quoad ſpecificationem, for their ſort and kind, anſwer ſuch habits, to wit, velleities, deſires, wouldings, and wiſhings, likeings, approbations, &c. A covetous man whileſt under the reigne of covetouſneſſe, cannot but love, like, and covet after things which he judgeth to be gainfull; a luxurious voluptuary cannot but love, approve, and long after things which he knoweth to be pleaſant and delightfull unto his ſenſes. Omnino videtur Deum non poſſe impedire, ne avarus velit & concupiſcat ea, quae videntur utilia; vel libidinoſus ea, quae titillant tanquam jucunda: nam velle & concupiſcere, nihil aliud eſt, quam deſiderare; at avarus quà avarus neceſſario talia deſiderat & concupiſcit, aliàs non eſſet avarus, & libidinoſus quà libidinoſus talia deſiderat, aliâs minime dicendus eſſet libidinoſus. Lib. 2. part. 2. pag. 15. For habits work ad modum naturae neceſſarily. A covetous perſon, as covetous, neceſſarily deſireth and coveteth things profitable; a luſtfull or uncleane perſon neceſſarily deſireth ſuch objects and actions as are uncleane, &c. And yet of theſe too, we cannot ſay that they follow meerely upon his permiſſion, ſecluding his concourſe.
Theſe limitations premiſed; let us returne to conſider what he denyeth, to wit, that upon the bare permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne doth not follow definitely for ſorts or kinds, or particular actions. Sine gratiâ (ſaith he) abstineri potest a peccato definite quo ad certam ſpeciem, vel etiam in individuo conſideratam. There is no particular ſinne, eſpecially of commiſsion, but may be abſtained from without grace: And therefore upon the meere and bare denyall or with-holding of grace, this or that particular ſinne doth not follow.
For firſt, thoſe that are deſtitute of habituall grace, the grace of regeneration, may yet be free from diverſe particular ſinfull habits. v. g. Covetouſneſſe, Luxury, &c.
Secondly, in thoſe that have ſuch particular ſinfull habits; thoſe habits are not actuated, eſpecially by outward actions, upon Gods bare and ſingle permiſſion, his ſole denyall of grace. This he proves by reaſon and Scripture.
Firſt by reaſon, becauſe the ſubject of an actuall ſinne of commiſsion, is a naturall act, and unto the performance of a naturall act, Gods bare permiſſion is not ſufficient, Malum (quod dicitur) ſemper habitat in alieno fundo; & peccatum omne quod in commiſſione verſatur, ſemper habet actum aliquém naturalem ſubstratum; adeo ut ejuſmodi peccatum aliquod nunquam exeat in actum ex ſolâ negatione gratiae, niſi etiam aliqua alia rerum adminiſtratio ſiat, ſecundum quam actus aliquis naturalis patretur, quae ſit propria materia ta lis deformitatis.
Secondly by Scripture, in which Gods wonderfull providence working and proſtituting men unto ſinne, is never ſet forth unto us, by a ſole and ſingle permiſsion: But he is ſaid, ſometimes to give men up unto vile affections, unto a reprobate mind, unto ſtrong deluſions, to ſend an evill ſpirit between men, to put a lying ſpirit in their mouthes, to mingle a perverſe ſpirit in them, &c. He told David, that he would take away his concubines, and give them unto his Sonne Abſolon; He told Jeroboam, that he would rent the Kingdome out of the hands of Solomon, and give ten tribes unto Jeroboam, which was done by their defection, and revolt from the houſe of Judah. Now they who think that all theſe things might be diſpatched, and accompliſhed by Gods ſole and ſingle permiſsion, take I confeſſe (ſaith he) a ſhort cut, but they ſend away the Reader, that is deſirous to find out the truth, empty and voyd of all ſatisfaction. Upon this he concludes, that as often as any thing comes to paſſe according to Gods permiſſion, ſo often Gods permiſſion is not ſolitary or ſingle, but hath another government of things, another adminiſtration of divine providence, accompanying it; which he explaineth at large touching ſinne: unto the performance of this or that particular ſinfull action, there are required a leading into temptation, an affording of objects, occaſions, and opportunities, a letting looſe of Satan, the concourſe of God by way of previous motion unto the matter, or ſubject of the action, a removeall of all impediments, whether holy and gratious, or elſe but meerely naturall. The explanation of all which, you may there ſee at large in this digreſsion.
Out of this he inferreth a diſtinction of permiſsion, into efficacious and unefficacious, and concludes that the permiſsion of ſinne is not ſo much efficacious of it ſelfe, as in regard of that either obduration, or excecation, or both, concerning either temporall, or ſpirituall good things, with which it is conioyned. Hinc constare poterit permiſsionem peccati particularis commodè dividendam eſſe, in permiſsionem efficacem & inefficacem, & permiſsionem efficacem non tam ex ſeſe efficacem eſſe, quam proratione ejus, cum quâ ſemper conjuncta eſt, obdurationis, excaecationis, aut utriuſ que , ſive quoad bona ſpiritualia, ſiue quoad bona temporalia.
But I ſhall trouble neither the Reader, nor you, with tranſcribing any more out of this digreſſion. And indeed this is enough to ſatisfy him, and convince you, that you have wronged D. Twiſse, in pinning upon him ſuch an opinion, which he oppoſeth with farre greater ſtrength of argument, then you your ſelfe. This is ſufficient to anſwer this whole ſection; But I ſhall examine whatſoever is conſiderable in it.
The propoſition you charge upon D. Twiſse is this, That the purpoſe or intent of God, to permit, or ſuffer ſuch or ſuch a thing to be done, or ſuch or ſuch an accident to come to paſse, ſuppoſeth a neceſſity (at least a ſyllogisticall or conſequentiall neceſſity) of the coming of it to paſse.
He that is acquainted with the workes of D. Twiſſe, knoweth, that this propoſition is to be underſtood. 1. Concerning only the permiſſion of evill. 2. Concerning not only Gods act, the permiſſion of evill, but alſo the being of evill by Gods permiſſion. 3. Concerning not a ſingle, ſole, and bare permiſſion, but an efficacious permiſſion, that hath ſeverall acts of Gods providence accompanying it.
Firſt, it is to be underſtood only concerning the permiſſion of evill, and that as touching the Formall, the pravity or obliquity of it, which being a privation is uncapable of being an object of an effective decree. This I might cleare from moſt of thoſe places, wherein this diſtinction between an effective and permiſſive decree is propounded; but I ſhall ſpare to name them at this preſent, and content my ſelfe, with the alleadging of one place, where he expreſſely puts this limitation upon the propoſition we ſpeake of, De Scientiâ Mediâ. pag. 133. col. 2. Non pauci ſunt, non modo ex nostris, ſed & ex Theologis nobis oppoſitis, tam Pontificiis, quam Arminianis, qui putant, infallibitèr futurum eſſe, quicquid &c. Deus permittere decreverit, hoc est autem, duntaxat in genere mali. Nam quae fiunt bona, ea fieri decrevit Deus non tam ipſo permittente, quam faciente, in quocun que genere bona fuerint, ſive in genere boni moralis, ſive naturalis ſive ſupernaturalis; ſumma, ſive in genere entis bonum fuit, ſive in genere moris. And by this it is apparent, that your inſtance in Gods decree to permit fire to burne combuſtible matter, is altogether impertinent, for that is quid bonum in genere entis.
Secondly, he makes Gods permiſſive decree to be, not only concerning Gods act, the permiſsion of evill, but alſo the being of evill by his permisſion; ſo that not only the permiſsion of evill is the object of his will, but the being of it alſo. Sententia Perkinſei nostrorum que Theologorum est, lapſum Adami eveniſſe voluntate Dei tranſeunte, non duntaxat in ſuam permiſſionem, ſed etiam in rem permiſſam, hoc est, Deum voluiſſe, ut Adamus laberetur, ipſo permittente. Vindic. l. 2. part. 1. pag. 127. What he ſpeaks of Gods will, to permit Adams fall, may be accommodated to his permiſsive will or decree, of any other ſinne.
Laſtly, that he ſpeakes of not a bare, but efficacious permiſsion, ſo termed, not Formally, but by way of concomitancy, the Digreſsion which I have abbreviated is a proofe of undeniable evidence; And I am ſo confident of your ingenuity, as that I doubt not, but you will acknowledge as much: and therefore your objection, which runnes only concerning a decree that is ſimply, barely, and purely permiſſive, is nothing at all to the purpoſe.
Well then, take this propoſition, (the purpoſe or intend of God, to permit or ſuffer, ſuch or ſuch a thing to be done, inferreth a neceſſity of the coming of it to paſſe) in the ſenſe and meaning of D. Twiſse, to wit, concerning an efficacious permiſsion of evill; and if you can accommodate your objection unto it, I will confeſſe that you can work a miracle in Logick.
MR GOODWIN.
BUt that the truth lyeth on the other ſide of the way, appears by the light of this conſideration, If whatſoever God hath decreed, or intendeth to permit to come to paſſe, in any caſe, upon any termes, or any ſuppoſition whatſoever, ſhould by vertue of ſuch an intention or decree neceſſarily come to paſſe, then all things poſſible to be; or at least, ten thouſand things more, than ever ſhall be, must be, yea and this neceſſarily,