The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Treatise · Introduction · Section 3
INTRODUCTION. SECT. III.
BEſides it takes from men all conſcience of ſinne, and makes ſinne to be no ſinne; we uſe to ſay, Neceſſitas non habet legem, Neceſſity hath no law, &c. ut eſt in ſuperiori Sectione, uſ que ad finem Sectionis.
TWISSE Conſideration.
THis Motive, as this Author calleth it, hath the firſt place in the 16th reaſon of Arminius; whereby he laboureth to diſprove their opinion, who conceive the object of Predeſtination to be the Maſſe of mankind not created; as appears, in the declaration of his opinion made before the States of Holland, &c. and it is the firſt particular of ſix, mentioned in that ſixteenth reaſon of his. And why ſhould he divide it from the reſt, and not clap them together, into this ranke of motives, to prepare him to the renouncing of that Tenent, which here he impugneth, and adde Arminius his other ninteen reaſons hereunto to the ſame purpoſe; if himſelfe be privy to the cauſe thereof, I am not? But as it lieth I will conſider it. Now it proceedeth upon ſuppoſition, that ſuch a neceſſity of ſinning is brought upon man by this decree, as ſtands in oppoſition unto liberty. Whereunto I anſwere.
1. That this decree in reference to the act of denying grace, brings no neceſſity at all of ſinning upon man; it being only the divine decree of not cureing by the grace of regeneration (that is by the grace of faith and repentance) that naturall infidelity and impenitency wherein every man is borne; all men being conjecti in neceſſitatem peccandi, through the ſinne of Adam, as Corvinus confeſſeth, they being his own words. Now let every ſober man judge, whether to leave that infidelity and impenitency which God findes in a man uncured, be to bring a neceſſity of ſinning upon him.
2. Secondly, we anſwer, that notwithſtanding that neceſſity of ſinning whereupon all are caſt, as Cornivus ſpeaketh, yet there is no ſinne committed by a naturall and carnall man, which is not committed by him freely: The act of lying, the act of blaſpheaming, the act of whoring, the act of drunkenneſſe, gluttony, rayling, and in generall, every ſinfull act being freely committed, by every one by whom it is commited, as is apparent by this, that there is not one of theſe ſinfull acts, but is forborne by divers naturall and carnall men, and therein they doe abſtaine from the committing of it freely. And yet we ſay, that even in abſtaining from theſe acts, they doe not abſtaine from ſinne, for as much as they doe not abſtaine from them in a gracious manner, and all by reaſon of that originall corruption which remaines uncured in them, untill ſuch time as God, who hath mercy on whom he will, is pleaſed to cure it by the grace of regeneration.
3. But becauſe I imagine this Author lets fly at randome, and keeps not himſelfe to the preciſe genius of the Tenent by him impugned, but rather aimeth at our doctrine concerning providence divine, and the decree of God; according whereunto we willing profeſſe with Auſtin that, Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, Enchir. 95. Therefore I anſwere in the third Place, That the neceſſity following upon this will of God, is nothing prejudiciall to the liberty or contingency of ſecond agents in their ſeverall operations. Although I am not ignorant, that now a daies it is the common and glorious courſe of our Adverſaries, very confidently to preſume and preſuppoſe, that upon the will of God, paſſing upon the action of the creature, there followeth a neceſſity, ſtanding in flat oppoſition to the liberty of rationall agents; and no marvail, for ſic factitavit Hercules, Arminius the great Champion of their cauſe, his learning ſerved him to doe ſo before them. As if the contumelious uſages of our Saviour by Herod and Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles and people of Iſrael, were not performed freely, but by meer neceſſity oppoſite to liberty. For it cannot be denied, but that all theſe were gathered together againſt the holy ſonne of God, to doe what Gods hand and Gods counſel had predeſtinated to be done. Acts 4. 28. And in like ſort, they that through diſobedience ſtumbled at the word of God, did not freely diſobey the Word, becauſe Peter profeſſeth of them in expreſſe termes, that Hereunto they were ordained. And after the ſame manner it is to be conceived of the Kings, that gave their Kingdomes to the Beaſt, namely that they did it not freely in as much as the Holy Ghoſt ſaith, that God put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to conſent and give their Kingdome to the Beaſt.
Yet the Church of Ireland in their Articles ſet forth by as good Authority, as the Articles of the Church of England, Art. 11. having profeſſed that, God from all eternity, did by his unchangeable counſel ordaine whatſoever in time ſhould come to paſſe; to prevent ſuch like objections as this Author faſhioneth, forthwith adde, Yet ſo as thereby no violence is offered to the willes of reaſonable creatures, and neither the liberty nor the contingency of ſecond cauſes is taken away, but eſtabliſhed rather. And Auſtin in his Book De Grat. & Liber. Arbitr. where he ſpeaks as freely of Gods effectuall Providence working in evill, as no where more, in ſo much as our Adverſaries take great exceptions againſt his ſpeeches (ſuch as formerly delivered) and that in expreſſe termes: His main drift notwithſtanding, and ſcope in that Book is to prove, that notwithſtanding the divine operation, in working the motion of the creature as he thinks good, yet is the creature never a whit the leſſe free in its own operation. And indeed where grace is wanting, there is too much will rather then too little, unto that which is evill; according to that he writes alſo elſewhere, Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas ſed contumacia. And if Gods operation prejudiceth not the liberty of the creature, much leſſe the will of God. For though not Epiſt. 28.any thing comes to paſſe unleſſe God willeth it, whether it be good or evill, yet with this difference as Auſtin in the ſame place profeſſeth, He will have that which is good come Enchirid. cap. 95.to paſſe by the effecting of it, but evill only by his permitting of it. Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat vel ipſe faciendo.
But though Auſtin and the Church of Ireland, yea and the Word of God teacheth this; yet the Tragaedian, as this Author ſaith, could ſee the contrary, that is, perceive the evidence of the contrary, which none of theſe ſaw. And is not this a pretty Comaedy, that a Tragaedian and Zeno's ſervant muſt be brought in, and that in a confidentiary ſuppoſition to out face, not Divines only both antient and late, but the very word of God? For it is as clear forſooth, that what comes to paſſe by the will of God, and by the effectuall operation of God, doth not come to paſſe freely; and conſequently, that the doctrine (which maintaines that evill comes to paſſe by the will of God, as the crucifying of Chriſt by the predeſtination of God, or by the operation of God; as the Rent of the ten Tribes from the two, and the hardning of Pharaoh's heart, ſo as not to let Iſrael goe, God profeſſeth to be his work) takes away all conſcience of ſinne? All this I ſay is as cleare (if we believe this Author) as that Seneca's Tragaedies are the Oracles of God. And I pray conſider, muſt it not take away as well all conſcience of righteouſneſſe, whether of faith, or of repentance, or of obedience; unleſſe we deny faith to be the gift of God, repentance to be the gift of God; unles we deny that God is he, Who makes us perfect to every good work, working in us that which is pleaſing in his ſight, that God is he that putteth his own ſpirit in us, and cauſeth Epheſ. 5. 8. 2 Timoth. 2. Acts 11. 18. Heb. 13. 20. Ezech. 30. 28us to walke in his statutes, and to keep his judgements and doe them?
Yet what doth Seneca ſpeak of the divine will, or divine operation? Did the Tragaedian under the terme of Fate, denote the divine decree, or the divine adminiſtration of things, which is plentifully revealed to us in the word of God? Auſtin I am ſure thought otherwiſe in more places then one, in Pſalm. 31. on theſe words, Pronunciabo adverſum me, He blames thoſe who when they are found in their ſinnes ſay, Fatum mihi fecit, ſtellae meae fecêrunt, But ſaith he, Quid eſt fatum? Quae ſunt ſtellae? certè iſtae quas in Coelo conſpicimus; & Qui eas fecit? Deus. Quis eas ordinavit? Deus, ergo vides quod voluiſti dicere, Deus fecit ut peccarem: Then he tells of others, who ſaid that Mars facit Homicidam, Venus Adulterum. So that Fatum with them were ſecond cauſes, which we all know in their operations, doe both work by neceſſity of nature, and have no power to maintain the free will of man; and in Pſalm. 91. Quaeris ab illo quid ſit Fatum, & dicit ſtellae malae. Quaeris ab illo, quis fecit ſtellas, quis ordinavit ſtellas; non habet quid tibi reſpondeat niſi Deus. It's true indeed, the Pelagians did object the Stoicall Fate unto Auſtin, as if his doctrine favoured of it; and what doth he anſwer thereunto? Nec ſub nomine gratiae Fatum aſſerimus, quia nullis hominum meritis dicimus Dei gratiam antecedi. Si autem quibuſdam omnipotentis Dei voluntatem placet Fati nomine nuncupari, profanas quidem verborum novitates evitamus, ſed de verbis contendere non amamus.
Yet becauſe we are to give the Devill his right; With what conſcience could this Author profeſſe of this Fatum of the Heathens, that their faith thereof did take away all conſcience of ſinne, ſeeing it did not take away the conſcience of ſinne in her, who is made by the Poet to utter this; as appears in the ſame Author within a few lines after. For there ſhe profeſſeth, that if God the creator of all, ſhould make his wrath break forth againſt her, and ſtrike her with a thunderbolt from heaven, yet this were no ſufficient puniſhment for her ſinnes. Queen Iocaſtas word are theſe.
Non ſi ipſe mundum concitans divum ſator
Coruſca ſaeva teia jaculetur manu
Unquam rependam ſceleribus paenas pares.
Shee juſtifies God and condemnes her ſelfe, notwithſtanding her former words uſed only as it ſeems, to pacify the furious moode of her Sonne and Husband Oaedipus. Will not ſuch one day, riſe up in judgement againſt many Chriſtians, who unleſſe themſelves may be exempted from that providence divine, whereby he moves all things agreeable to their natures, are ſo apt to condemne God of injuſtice, and juſtify themſelves, as needing not to have any conſcience of ſinne? And which is moſt ſtrange, they acknowledge Fate in this caſe to be ſuch, as that it neceſſitated even God himſelfe; as appears by the laſt Chorus.
Fatis agimur, cedite Fatis,
Non ſollicitae poſſunt curae
Mutare rati ſtamina fuſi.
Quicquid patimur mortale Genus,
Quicquid facimus venit ex alto:
Servát que ſua decreta colus
Lacheſis durâ revoluta manu.
Omnia certo tramite vadunt;
Primúſ que dies dedit extremum
Non illa Deo vertiſſe licet,
Quae nexa ſuis currunt cauſis
It cui que ratus prece non ullâ
Mobilis ordo, multis ipſum
Timuiſſe nocet, multi ad fatum
Venere ſuum dum fata timent.
But as I ſaid before, whatſoever they conceived of Fate, and howſoever they faſhioned it, their opinion thereof did not expectorate all conſcience of ſinne in them, or urge them to juſtify or excuſe themſelves in their courſes. For it appears both of Oaedipus and Iocaſta, that they not only condemned themſelves, but became ſelfe executioners of puniſhment upon themſelves for their foule crimes: the one pulling out his own eyes, judging himſelfe unworthy to ſee the light; and the other deſtroying herſelfe. Though whatſoever they or the Poets that ſet them forth conceived of Fate, in this caſe of theirs, it was only the Oracles of the Devills, and his illuſions that abuſed them; God giving them over thereunto, and that no doubt moſt juſtly; when in a wicked curioſity they deſire to know, what ſhall become of them and their children: the Devill gives forth his Oracles as he thinks good, afterwards ſets his witts on work to accompliſh them thereby, to gain the greater credit and reputation to himſelfe, and ſo much the more forcibly holds them in his ſnares.
But to proceed. This argument or motive is not yet at an end, but like as this doctrine, is pretended to take away all conſcience of ſinne, which is as much as to ſay, all deſert of ſinne on the one ſide; ſo it may be extended to ſhew, how it takes away all conſcience of obedience, and all deſert thereupon, on the other ſide; to wit, in good actions. And indeed were it true, that the doctrine did bereave a man of all free will, it were true, as Hierome ſaith, that where ſuch neceſſity is, nec damnatio, nec Corona eſt But Auſtin hath ſpent an whole Book in proofe of this, namely; that grace conſiſts with freedome of will, unto that which is good; and want of grace together with God's efficacious operation, even in the worſt of things, doth conſiſt alſo with freedome of will unto that which is evill. But that in the ſtate of nature man hath no free will to that which is good, but is a ſervant unto ſin, I know no man that doth or can deny, unleſſe withall he deny Originall ſinne with the Pelagians; like as indeed it is written of Grevincovius that great Arminian, that, Grevincovius negavit peccatum Originale, quod & teſtibus convinci poteſt. And indeed this Authors diſcourſe bears ſtrongly this way, whatſoever Proteſtation in ſhew of words he makes hereafter to the contrary. For it is apparent, that in this place, the face of his diſcourſe ſtands for freedome of will in all, as well unto that which is good, as unto that which is evill. And albeit there is ſo little difference between this and his former motive (touching the conſcience of ſinne) that it ſeems to be added only to make way for this ſentence of Hierome, which yet is nothing to the purpoſe, unleſſe he can prove, that Gods decrees doe bereave men of liberty of their wills: yet very unhappily doth he carry himſelf herein and in farre different manner from Hierom's expreſſion, though he placeth Corona in oppoſition to damnation; one whereof, to wit, damnation, implies the merit of ſinne preceding: but the other, to wit, Corona, no way implies any meritorious nature of obedience precedanious thereunto. But this Author ſticks not to apply a meritorious condition to good actions on the one ſide, as well as to evill actions on the other. And if good actions were as meritorious, and that naturally too, of the crown of righteouſneſſe, as evill actions are of damnation. And withall he will have no more to decree, or work the faith, and repentance, and obedience of one, then he doth the infidelity, and impenitency, and diſobedience of another, leaſt this his will & operation, prove an adamantine chaine, of neceſſity to draw them to faith, and repentance, and obedience, whereas his wiſdome thinks it fit, they ſhould be left to their own choyce, whetherthey will believe and repent, yea or no. For he doth very conſidently preſume, that every man hath power to believe and repent, and doe any good work; which is as good, as in expreſſe termes to profeſſe, that there is no originall ſinne at all; Notwithſtanding ſo many expreſſe teſtimonies of holy writ to the contrary, namely, Iohn 12. of ſome that, They could not believe. Rom. 2. of others that, They could not repent. Rom. 8. of all that are in the fleſh, that, They cannot pleaſe God. 1 Cor. 2. of the natural man that, He neither perceives the things of God nor can know them; of the Iſraelites in the Wilderneſſe, that, God had not given them an heart to perceive, nor eyes to ſee, nor eares to heare unto that day. Deutr. 29. 4. But theſe paſſages of holy Scripture, ſeem to have no place in this Authors conſideration, if ſo be they have in his Creed. This bed is ſomething too ſhort for him to ſtretch himſelfe thereon; and therefore he deſires to change his lodging, and to paſſe from the deſert of good actions, to the deſert of evill actions, which he formerly inſiſted upon, and he tells a ſtory of Zeno's ſervant moſt ſuitable to his Iambick taken out of Seneca, though he quotes the place of neither.
Well, Zeno's ſervant, he ſaith, when he was puniſhed by his Maſter for a fault that he had done, told his Maſter out of his own grounds, that he was unjuſtly beaten, becauſe he was, Fato coactus peccare: and hereupon making his reckoning without his hoſte, concludes that, Certainly if Malefactors could not chuſe but play their rude prankes, they could not be juſtly puniſhed for them: Wherein he tells us what the ſervant ſaid; but what the Maſter anſwered, thereof he ſaith juſt nothing. Nay doth he truly relate what the Servant ſaid? Nothing leſſe, but ſhapes it, as he thinks good, that making his own bed, he may lye thereon more ſoftly. If we may believe Diogenes Laertius who reports the ſtory, the Servants anſwer was not Fato coactus ſum peccare, but Fatale mihi erat furari. For he took his ſer… laying the theefe, & though the ſervant took advantage from his Maſters do… of Fate, to frame an Apology for himſelfe, yet would not Zeno permit him to … thereby any priviledge from ſtripes. For, ſervum in furto deprehenſum verberavit. A manifeſt evidence that even in his opinion, the deſtiny he maintained was no juſt excuſe for ſinne. And to meet him in his own plea, when he ſaid. Fatale mihi erat furari, & caedi inquit: this was the anſwer he made to his ſervant, which anſwer of his this Author either conceales, or was not privy to his own ignorance. And indeed Chryſippus the Stoick, though an eager maintainer of Fate Stoicall, yet denyed not the liberty of mens wills, as appears in Cicero de Fato, though in his opinion this doctrine of theirs did cohere. And Plutarch likewiſe in his book De Fato profeſſeth as much. Fatum omnia continet, ſicut etiam videtur, ne que tamen proptereà omnia neceſſariò eveniunt, ſed unumquod que ſuo naturae modo. Neither did Zeno conceive hereby all place to be taken away for perſwaſion, as appears by his anſwer to Crates, when he took him by the cloake to draw him away from Stilpo, ſaying, O Crates, commodiſſimè auribus Philoſophum teneas. Cum igitur perſuaſeris, tum illum trahe. Nam ſi per vim egeris, corpus quidem apud te, ſed animus apud Stilponem erit. Neither were any Philoſophers more ſtudious of Morality then the Stoicks, They wrote De Bonis & Malis, de Affectibus, de Virtute, de Fine, de que primâ aeſtimatione, & de Actibus ac de Officiis, de Adhortationibus & dehortationibus, as Diogenes writes in the life of Zeno. And Auſtin de Civit. Dei cap. 9. profeſſeth of the Stoicks, that, though Omnia Fato fieri contenderent, yet, Non omnia neceſſitate fieri dicerent. And more then this, whereas the Stoicks were ſo jealous of maintaining the liberty of mens wills, that they denyed them of all other things to be ſubject to neceſſity. Auſtin profeſſeth that their feare, of ſubjecting the wills of men unto neceſſity, in this reſpect was a cauſeleſſe feare. Ibid. cap. 10. Unde nec illa neceſſitas formidanda eſt, quam formidando Stoici laboraverunt, cauſas rerum ita diſtinguere ut quaſdam ſubtraherent neceſſitati, quaſdam ſubderent; at que in his quas eſſe ſub neceſſitate noluerunt, poſuerunt etiam noſtras voluntates, ne videlicet non eſſent liberae, ſi ſubderentur neceſſitati. And then proceeds to ſhew, that there is a certain neceſſity nothing prejudiciall to the will, albeit the will be acknowledged in ſubjection thereunto. And that neceſſity he deſcribes to be this, as when we ſay, that, Neceſſe eſt ut ita ſit aliquid vel ita fiat; his words are theſe; Si autem illa definitur eſſe neceſsitas, ſecundum quam dicimus neceſſe eſt, ut ita ſit aliquid, vel ita fiat, neſcio cur eam timemus ne nobis libertatem auferat voluntatis. Herein Auſtin profeſſeth to goe beyond the Stoicks, in acknowledging a neceſſity whereunto the will of man is ſubject, and that without detriment to the liberty thereof. Yet in my judgement, it would better become a Chriſtian Divine, to informe both himſelfe and others out of the Word of God, and reſt thereon for the diſcovery of the nature of Providence and Predeſtination divine, then to goe a forraging among Poets and Stoicks, for the juſtification of his own, in point of Chriſtian faith, and for the redargution of the way of his Oppoſites.