The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Treatise · Introduction · Section 2
INTRODUCTION. SECT. II.
THE firſt ſide is divided; for
1. Some of them preſent man to God, in the decree of Reprobation, conſidered and looked upon out of, or above the Fall, and make the Will of God, without any conſideration of ſin in man Originall or Actuall, to be the cauſe of his eternall Rejection, that ſo he might ſhew his abſolute and unlimited power and dominion over him, in appointing to heaven or hell, whom he pleaſed: and this way goe Calvin, Beza, Zanchius, Piſcator, Gomarus.
That way ſeems to charge God very deepely, and to make him the prime and principall cauſe of mens everlaſting ruine, and the author alſo, not only of the firſt ſin that entred into the world, but of all other ſins likewiſe, that are ſucceſſively committed therein, as meanes to bring men by a courſe and colour of juſtice, to thoſe lamentable ends to which he had from eternity appointed them: and ſo by good conſequence, it makes the pure and holy God, to be unholy, and aſcribes unto him, farre greater cruelty, then can be found in the moſt bloudy and barbarous Tyrant in the World. Suetonius in the life of Tiberius (one of the veryeſt Butchers of all the Roman Sueton. Edit. Lugd. 1532. pag. 171.Emperours) reports of him, that having a mind to put the two ſonnes of Germanicus (Diuſus and Nero) to death, Variâ fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia, & concitati perderentur; He uſed cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that ſo he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of juſtice. And a little after he ſaith of the ſame Emperour, that (becauſe it was not lawfull among the Romans to ſtrangle Virgins) he cauſed certain little maides to be deflowred by the Hangman, Ibid. p. 175.that ſo they might afterwards be ſtrangled. This cruelty of Tiberius, exceeded the bounds of humanity, and yet it comes as ſhort of that, which this way laies to the charge of God, as a temporall death comes ſhort of an eternall, and the power of man in drawing men to offend, comes ſhort of that irreſiſtable power, which the Almighty is able to uſe, in the producing of ſin.
Beſides, it takes from men all conſcience of ſin, and makes ſin to be no ſin. We uſe to ſay, Neceſſitas non habet legem, Neceſſity hath no law. Actions in themſelves evill, if an abſolute neceſſity bear ſway in them, are tranſgreſſions of no law, and conſequently are no ſin (for ſin is a tranſgreſſion of the law) and men when they doe them, they have no reaſon to be forry for them. The Tragoedian could ſee this, where he ſaith, Fati iſta culpa eſt, Nemo fit fato nocens, when one evill action is done, the doer is not in fault, but the decree that neceſſitates him to doe it.
It takes away likewiſe from good and evill actions, that defect which they naturally carry with them of Rewards and Puniſhments, as Saint Hierome tells us, Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus, nec ad L. 2. contra Iovin.virtutes nec ad vitia neceſſitate tranimur, alioqui ubi neceſſit as eſt nec damnatio nec corona eſt. Where neceſſity domineers, there is no place for retribution; and therefore none are drawn by the adamantine chains of neceſſity to virtues or vices, but left free to the choyce of their own wills. When Zeno his ſervant was puniſhed by him for a fault that he had done, he told his Maſter out of his own grounds that he was unjuſtly beaten, becauſe he was Fato coactus peccare, conſtrained ſo to doe by his undeclinable deſtiny; and certainly, if malefactors could not chuſe but play their rude prankes, they could not be juſtly puniſhed for them. For all juſt puniſhments ſuppoſe a poſſibility of avoyding thoſe offences, of which they are the puniſhments.
TWISSE. Conſideration.
THis Authors pretence being only to oppoſe that Tenent, which maintaines that the decree of denying grace and glory, and of inflicting damnation doth not preſuppoſe the foreſight of final perſeverance in ſin, you may well marvaile to what purpoſe this comes in about the different condition of man, conſidered by God either as before the Fall, or after the Fall in Adam, it being a queſtion of another nature and meerly Logicall, to wit, about the ordering of Gods decrees of Creation, Permiſſion of the fall of Adam, giving or denying Grace, Salvation or Damnation. The reſolution whereof, depends upon the right diſtinction of theſe decrees, in reference to the end, and to the means tending to that end. For this being Reſolved according to the rules of Divinity, the order between them, muſt conſequently be determined, according to the rules generally received in the Schooles, namely thus, The intention of the end is firſt, then the intention of the means: ſo that if Salvation be the end, and Creation and Permiſſion of Adams Fall and Raiſing therehence by Faith and Repentance to be the means, it muſt be confeſſed, that the decree of Salvation muſt be firſt, then the decree of Creation, permiſſion of ſin, and of raiſing out of ſin. So if the damnation of any be the end that God intends, and creation and permiſſion of ſin, and of finall perſeverance therein be the means; it muſt be acknowledged, that the decree of damnation, was before the decree of creation, &c. But if ſalvation and damnation be no ends intended by God, but means rather, as well as creation, and permiſſion of all to ſin in Adam, together with the raiſing of ſome therehence, and leaving ſome therein, tending to ſome farther end, namely, the Manifeſtation of Gods glory in a certain kind, as the Scripture together with manifeſt reaſon doth juſtify. For God being the ſupreame efficient, muſt neceſſarily be the laſt end. And even there where the word of God doth teſtify, that God created the wicked againſt the day of evill, it doth therewithall give to underſtand, that what is ſignified by, To the day of evill, doth not denote the end of Gods actions (that before being expreſſed to be God himſelfe, God made all things for himſelfe, not for acquiring ought unto himſelfe, for he is ſo perfect, that nothing can be added unto him) but for the manifeſting of his own moſt glorious nature: ſo that if God be pleaſed to manifeſt his glorious beneficence on man in the higheſt degree, and that in the way of mercy mixt with juſtice; this end requires and beſpeaks both creation (no glory at all being manifeſtable without this) and permiſſion of ſin (otherwiſe it could not be manifeſted in the way of mercy) and ſatisfaction for ſin (otherwiſe this mercy could not be mixed with juſtice exactly) and faith and repentance (otherwiſe the good which God intends could not be beſtowed by way of reward) and laſt of all Salvation, under which we comprehend, the higheſt and moſt bleſſed condition that the nature of man, continuing a meere man, is capable of. And herehence we conclude, that in caſe the end is ſuch as hath been ſpecified, and all theſe actions following, congruous means tending to that end, therefore the decree of manifeſting Gods glory, as above ſpecified, is firſt with God, and ſecondly the decree of the means; which means although they are many materially, yet they come all under one formall notion of means tending to a certain end, which according to the ſeverall parts thereof beſpeaks them all; and conſequently they are all to be conſidered, as making up the object of one formall decree, called the decree of the means: and the intention of none of them is before another, but all intended at once, as means tending to that end which is firſt intended. In like manner if God ſhall be pleaſed to intend the manifeſtation of his glory in Man or Angell, in the way of juſtice vindicative, the means neceſſarily required hereunto are, Creation, Permiſſion of ſin, and Damnation unto puniſhment, and all three makes up the object of one formall decree, which is to be called the decree of the means. So that like as God doth not intend the creatures creation, before he intends his damnation, in the ſame reſpect he cannot be ſaid to intend his damnation, before he intends his creation, or the permiſſion of his ſinne.
And this rightly conſidered, ſets an end unto all quarrell about the different conſideration of Man in election and reprobation, which yet is about a Schoole point only, touching the right ſtateing of the end and the means, and the right ordering of Gods decrees concerning them. And doth it not ſet an end alſo, to all aſperſions of cruelty caſt upon the holy providence of God, from the guilt of which kind of blaſphemies, nothing can free them; but confidence in their own way, as if it were the way of truth, and that by convincing evidence of holy Scripture? Whereas it appears how little direction they take from the Word of God throughout, for the ſhaping of their Tenent in this. Yet neither is any ſuch confidence, able to free them from the guilt of ſuch blaſphemies which they utter: well it may free them from the conſcience of it, yet if it doe, that is more than I know. And only to theſe two ends doth this aliene diſcourſe of our different opinions thereabouts tend, as I conceive; namely, to ſhew the difference of our Divines, and to give vent to thoſe aſperſions of blaſphemy on the firſt way, as alſo to make way for a third in part, which comes to be conſidered in the next Section, in the manner how they fall upon the relation of the ſecond way.
Yet Arminius in his Conference with Junius, might have informed him of three opinions concerning the object of Predeſtination, dividing the fruit of theſe into two. The condition of man before the Fall, being conſiderable two waies, either as before the Fall, but after Creation, which they call the Maſſe created, but not yet corrupted; or as not before the Fall only, but before the creation alſo, which we commonly call the Maſſe not yet created, or Mankind not yet created. As touching the moſt harſh way of theſe three, upon examination of Arminius his twenty arguments againſt it, I find nothing worth the ſpeaking of, but meere ſuggeſtion of fleſh and bloud, which yet being duely pondered, doe diſcover moſt ſhamefull nakednes.
His arguments againſt the making of Mankind not yet created, the object of predeſtination, I have propoſed and anſwered in my Vindiciae gratiae Dei, lib. 1. De Praedeſtin. digreſſ. 5. if this Author hath any mind to be doing with them, I ſhall be ready to conſider what he ſaith, as God ſhall give opportunity.
And in Junius you ſhall finde, how he laboureth to reconcile them, but very obſcurely. Piſcator alſo ſets hand to the ſame work, and carryeth himſelfe therein (as his manner is) very clearely, by diſtinguiſhing three acts in Predeſtination. The firſt whereof he will have to preſuppoſe Mankind not created; for it is the decree of creating man to different ends. The ſecond, he will have to preſuppoſe Mankind created, but not corrupted: for it is the decree of permitting Adam to fall, and all Mankind in him. The third and laſt he will have to preſuppoſe Mankind both created and corrupted; for it is the decree of raiſing ſome out of ſin, wherein they are conceived and borne, and leaving ſome therein. As for the Angells it is without queſtion, that election and reprobation divine had courſe concerning them, as well as concerning mankind, and as certain it is, that no corrupt Maſſe could be the object of divine Predeſtination in their election and reprobation.
As for Arminius his ordering of Gods decrees in oppoſition to theſe waies taken by our Divines, that he hath communicated unto us, in the Declaration of his opinion before the States, pag 47. where leaving out the decree of creating mankind in Adam, and the decree of permitting all mankind to fall in Adam, he takes into conſideration only, the divine decrees of ſaving ſinfull man.
1. The firſt whereof is, Whereby he decreed to make his Sonne Chriſt a Mediator, Redeemer, Saviour, Prieſt and King, by his death to aboliſh ſin, by his obedience to obtain Salvation (formerly loſt) and by his power to communicate it. And this decree he ſaith is abſolute.
2. The ſecond is, Whereby he decreed to receive into grace ſuch as believe and repent, and thoſe perſevering unto the end, to ſave in Chriſt, for and by Chriſt: but ſuch as believe and repent not, to leave under ſin and wrath, and to damne as aliene from Christ. Where obſerve, 1. This decree of ſaving ſuch as believe and repent, he calleth a decree abſolute, yet this decree paſſeth upon no particular perſons: ſuch a decree is reſerved for the laſt place. 2. God (with him) receives none into grace and favour, unles they believe and repent: Whereby it is manifeſt, that with him faith and repentance are no fruits of Gods grace and favour: for they muſt be performed before they are received into Gods grace and favour.
3. The third is, Where by he decreed ſufficiently and efficaciouſly to adminiſter the means which are neceſſary to faith and repentance. This decree whether he conceives it to be abſolute or no, he doth not ſpecify; nor whether he decreed to adminiſter them unto all, nor by whom, whether by men only, or by men or Angells, nor whether by means he underſtands the Goſpel only, and we have cauſe to doubt thereof. And laſtly, which is moſt obſcure, he doth not explicate what he means, by ſufficient and efficacious adminiſtration. Only he adds, that in this adminiſtration, he carries himſelfe according, 1. To his Wiſdome, which ſhewes what becomes his mercy andſeverity, and 2ly to his Juſtice, whereby he is ready to follow the preſcript of his Wiſdome.
4. The fourth and laſt is, Whereby he decreed to ſave and damne certain particular perſons. Now whereas our Divines generally, what way ſoever they took, had a care out of their Logick and Philoſophy which they had by light of nature, to order the decrees divine, according to the common Rules of Art concerning intentions, as they are found to be either of ſome end, or of ſome means tending to an end, this ſeems to have been no part of Arminius his care. This order of his, I have ranſaked in my Vindiciae. lib. 3. digreſſ. 2. And if this Author think good, he may anſwer thereunto, and doe his beſt to qualify the abſurdities wherewith I charge that order of his.
But as touching the embracers of this firſt way, whoſe names he expreſſeth, he had need to prove it. For divers think otherwiſe of Calvin, and they repreſent their reaſons for it, out of his own words ſuch as theſe, De aeternâ Dei Praedeſtinatione. pag. 970. ſpeaking of Pighius. Auguſtinum ridet (ſaith he) ejus que ſimiles hoc eſt pios emnes, qui deum imaginantur poſtquam univerſalem Generis humani Ruinam in perſonâ Adae praeſciverit, alios ad vitam, alios ad interitum deſtinaſſe, & pag. 710. Cùm de praedeſtinatione ſermo habetur, inde exordiendum eſſe conſtantèr ſemper docui atquè hodiè doceo, jure in more relinqui omnes reprobos, qui in Adam mortui ſunt atquè damnati.
As for Beza, I know full well he maintained, that man not created is the object of Predeſtination, but can this Author repreſent unto us, any place out of Beza, wherein he ſhould affirme, that God doth decree to damne any man but for ſin; or that damnation is the end that God intends in the decree of Predeſtination to death? In his Queſtions and Anſwers he profeſſeth the contrary. pag. 111. Poſtremò non dixi exitium iſtorum (he ſpeaks of Reprobates) eſſe finem deo decernenti propoſitum, ſed gloriam ipſius. Nequè etiam ſimpliciter dixi iſtos eſſe exitio deſtinatos, ſed juſto exitio deſtinatos dixi. And in his Book De aeternâ Dei Praedeſtinatione contrà Sebaſtian. Caſtell: ad argument. Caſtell. 2. pag. 346. Quamobrem etiam illud quoquè probavimus, nos ita loqui non ſolere, & quanquam à Deo ſimpliciter conditum dicamus ad perditionem, ſed idcircò ut ipſius juſta condemnatione Dominus juſtitiam ſuam patefaciat.
As for Zanchy; Peter Baro, that cauſed ſuch perturbation in Cambridge about this very argument, he denyes this to have been the opinion of Zanchy, In ſumma trium de Praedeſtinatione ſententiarum; his words are theſe, Altera ſententia eſt Auguſtini, poſterior etiam Sohnii Heydelbergenſis Theologiae Profeſſoris, & aliorum quorundam Proteſtantium, ut Zanchii, atquè etiam Bellarmini, qui omnes priorem illam improbant, in hoc inter ſe conſentientes, ut ſit praedeſtinatio ab Adami tantum lapſu accipienda.
And as touching Piſcator, he handles the queſtion about the object of Predeſtination in a ſmall Treatiſe, annexed to an anſwer of his to Hemingius, De Univerſali Gratiâ; and inquires whether the obiect thereof be Humanum genus nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or both conditum and corruptum; and his reſolution is, that in the decree of Predeſtination, there is place for all theſe conſiderations, according to three ſeverall acts compriſed therein, which I have formerly mentioned, and ſo drawes into one all three opinious.
As touching Gomarus in the laſt place, I have ſeen little or nothing of his; but when Lubbertus in his Book Ad 99 Errores Conradi Vorſtii pag. 807. had profeſſed, Maſſam conſideratam eſſe a Deo, non ut integram, ſed ut corruptam; and was charged by Voſtius as delivering that which was contrary to the doctrine of Calvin, Beza, and Gomarus, he replies that herein he doth not contradict them, but ſaith he, Illorum dict a quae quibuſdam aſperiuſcula videntur, lenio, & in commodiſſimum ſenſum interpretor.
But be it ſo, that all of them made Humanum genus, not corruptum, no nor integrum, but nondum conditum the object of reprobation. I am of their mind that doe ſo; and was not Dr Whitaker alſo, whom very wiſely this Author conceales? This renowned Profeſſor in the Univerſity of Cambridge, in a Publique exerciſe, his Concio ad Clerum, profeſſeth, what Paul ſpeaks De luto & ſigulo non poſſe melius exponi quàm de Maſſâ incorruptâ: and that Bucer underſtands it thus, Bucerus per Maſſam intelligit primam humani ganeris originem ex quá homo conditus à Deo & fabricatus eſt. And he diſputes at large, that there is no cauſe of reprobation, and that neither ſin actuall, nor ſin originall is the cauſe thereof, and profeſſeth this to be the Opinion of the Church of England. And though now a daies we be upbraided, as if we had learned it of Papiſts and Schoole Divines, this great light of Cambridge, ſpares not to make honourable mention of Schoolemens ſollid diſcourſe on this point, ſaying, Hanc ſententiam Scholaſtici ſi ullam egregiè ſolide que pertractarum praeſerùm qui inſigniores ſanioreſ que habiti ſunt. Lombardus ait, ut praedeſtinationis nulla merita ſunt, ità nec reprobationis. Now the doctrine which he ſaith the Schoolemen handle ſo ſolidly as none more, is the very doctrine which this Author ſeems here to impugne, as when he ſaith, ſome make the will of God without any conſideration of ſin in men, originall, or actuall, to be the cauſe of their eternall Rejection; for Dr Whitaker expreſſeth it thus, His igitur iſto modo explicatis, ſequitur tertiam opinionem ſolummodò & neceſſario veram eſſe, aequè reprobationis ac praedeſtinationis cauſam eſſe dei voluntatem, quandoquidem providentiae divinae munus eſt omnia ad fines iſtos certa ratione certiſ que mediis ordinare. Only as touching the end here mentioned, That ſo he might ſhew his abſolute and unlimited power and dominion over them, in appointing to heaven or hell whom he pleaſeth, that I find not in Dr Whitaker. He ſaith plainly that God predeſtinated unto death, whom he would, and becauſe he would: Deus igitur ad mortem praedestinavit quos voluit, & quia voluit: (which phraſe I willingly confeſſe I like not ſo well) but that the end thereof is to manifeſt his abſolute and unlimited dominion and power, he ſaith not; and Beza in the places before mentioned, referres it to the manifeſtation of Gods juſtice, as the end thereof. And like as he ſaith, certiſſimum eſt damnationem nunquam niſi propter Peccatum infligi; ſo I ſhould think it nothing leſſe certain, that God doth not ordaine any man to be damned, but for ſin, eſpecially coſidering that damnation in the notion thereof, hath an eſſential reference to ſin.
Now ſince I have found ſuch a Champion as Dr Whitaker for the maintenance of this Tenent, have I cauſe to feare the ſharp cenſures of any profeſſors in the Country? Were he alive, I preſume he would be nothing skarred with the imputation of making God, the Prime and Principall cauſe of mens everlaſting ruine; he would I think require a little more learning in the Criminator, then to expreſſe himſelfe ſo crudely. For without all queſtion, God is the prime and principall cauſe, nay the ſole cauſe of mans everlaſting ruine in genere cauſae efficient is, though this excludes not a meritorious cauſe of his own damnation on the creatures part, as Dr Whitaker profeſſeth in the words formerly alleadging, acknowledged, Damnationem infligi propter Peccatum.
And farther I am apt to conceive, and have undertaken to juſtify, and that to the view of the World, that albeit mankind not created, be the only object of predeſtination and reprobation, yet no mans reprobation is made by God, citra conſiderationem Peccati, in as much as I hold that the decrees of creation, permiſſion of ſin, and of finall perſeverance therein, and laſtly of damnation for ſin, are not decrees ſubordinate, but coordinate and ſimultaneous, as being decrees concerning means tending to the ſame end, which is the manifeſtation of Gods glory, in the way of vindicative juſtice.
And whereas it is farther urged, that hereby God is made the author of the firſt ſin and of all ſins; As I find by Dr Whitakers diſcourſe in his Cygnaea Concio, that were he alive he would anſwer hereunto, That this Author takes his aime much amiſſe, conſidering, that the effect of Reprobation is not ſin, but the permiſſion of ſin, and Gods means to the end intended by him, to witt, the manifeſtation of his glory in the way of vindicative juſtice, is not ſin, but the Permiſſion of ſin; according to that of Aquinas, alleadged by the foreſaid Doctor thus, Sicut Praedeſtinatio includit voluntatem conferendi gratiam & gloriam, ita Reprobatio includit voluntatem permittendi cadere in culpam & inferendi damnationis poenam pro culpâ. And as I diſcern no unholineſſe in Gods permitting of ſin, ſo neither doe I diſcerne any cruelty therein. But Dr Whitaker well perceived that this courſe of Gods counſells, would ſeem injurious; and therefore after he had propoſed his laſt argument drawn from that of the Apoſtle, Rom. 11. ô altitudo! thus, Vltimò illa Apoſtoli exclamatio, ô altitudo, hanc ſententiam confirmat. Ne que enim tantae altitudinis eſt ut penetrari nequeat, Deum odiſſe homines propter peccatum, etiam antequàm nati ſunt; immò rationi convenientiſſimum eſt ut Deus ferre nequeat, quod eſt naturae ſuae contrarium. But marke wherein the depth the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, conſiſts in his judgement; Ib i demùm infinitum foreign & Abyſſus eſt divinae diſcretionis, quando ſine peccati ratione quidam reprobantur & alii qui nihilo erant amore digniores ad vitam & faelicitatem praedeſtinantur, ut omnis ratio diſcretionis ad ſolam dei voluntatem referatur. And becauſe he knew full well that this myſterious depth of Gods counſell, would ſeem very harſh to carnall affections, as ſavouring of cruell and injurious proceedings, therefore he takes expreſſe notice of it, and that in Auſtins language, ſaying, Iniquum videtur (Auguſtinus ait) ut ſine ullis bonorum malorum que operum meritis unum Deus diligat, odiat que alterum; whence he concludes according to Austin thus, Deus igitur hunc diligit, illumquè odit ſine meritis ullis operum aut bonorum aut malorum. Hoc videri poſſit alicui iniquum, ſed eſt aequiſſimum, quia ſic Deo viſum eſt. Ne que Auguſtinus affirmare veritus eſt, eos Apoſtoli verbum evacuare qui judicium divinae diſcretionis ad opera reducunt praeviſa aut praeterita; and ſo concludes the main point he inſiſts on, thus, Non eſt igitur peccatum originale cauſa aeternae reprobationis, nedum actuale. So that both Auſtin and Dr Whitaker, and all our Divines, knew full well in how harſh an accent this truth ſounds in the eares of men; yet becauſe the word of God doth teſtify this truth unto us, it becomes all Chriſtian hearts to ſubmit, and to acknowledge the equity of it, though we are not able to comprehend the reaſon of it: Though I know full well, ſome are ſo violently carried with the zeale of their own way, that they ſpare not to profeſſe, that they will ſooner deny that there is a God, then yeeld to that which the Contra-Remonſtrants teach; which for ought I know, is no other then this which Dr Whitaker taught and Preached publiquely in the Univerſity of Cambridge, being at that time Profeſſor Regius. And ſeeing we acknowledge the ſeeming harſhnes of it, as well as our Adverſaries, yet becauſe we find it revealed in Gods word, we hold it our duty to embrace it, and therehence conclude that it is aequiſſimum. Doth it become any one to take the courſe this Author takes, and by a Parallel between this courſe of God, and the courſes of Tiberius, as alſo by a ſaying of Zeno's ſervant, to cry it down as iniquiſſimum, and thence to conclude hand over head, that the word of God doth not teach it? Is this a Chriſtian courſe? is this Theologicall? is this Scholaſticall? Yet in my judgement the harſhnes lyeth not here, to wit, in the point of Gods purpoſe to inflict damnation; conſidering that not one of our divines, that I know, doth maintaine that God did ever purpoſe to inflict damnation, but for ſin. Or if there be any harſhnes therein, that is to be found in the kind and degree of puniſhment and everlaſtingneſſe thereof, God holding them everlaſtingly as it were upon the rack and in quick ſence of torment. And yet we maintaine without contradiction amongſt Chriſtians, that it is juſt with God to doe ſo for one act of drunkennes or adultery, or the like unrepented of; which kind of puniſhment, never any Tyrant in the world was known to take, or could take. But the harſhnes in my opinion, is moſt pregnant to bring forth diſtaſt on the other part of reprobation, which is the purpoſe of God to deny grace, this being denied to whom he will, and that of meer pleaſure; for like as he ſhewes mercy on whom he will, ſo the Scripture teſtifies, that he hardens whom he will. And not only Auſtin and Dr Whitaker and our Divines generally doe take notice, how unſavoury this doctrine is in the judgement of fleſh and bloud, eſpecially in comparing it with Gods ordinary courſe of complaining of men for their diſobedience, even of thoſe whom himſelfe hath hardned, but the holy Apoſtle alſo Rom. 9. 19. Thou wilt ſay then, and is it ſo, doth God harden whom he will? Why then doth he yet complaine? For who hath reſiſted his will? Now in this caſe, how doth the Apoſtle ſtop the mouthes of ſuch, but thus; O man, who art thou that diſputeſt with God? ſhall the thing formed, ſay to him that formed it, Why haſt thou made me thus? Hath not the Potter power over the clay, of the ſame lump to make one veſſell unto honour and another unto diſhonour?
But let us come to the conſideration of the Parallel here made between the counſells of Tiberius and the counſells of God. This conſiſts of two parts, according to a double ſtory of Tiberius taken out of Suetonius.
The firſt is his dealing with Druſus and Nero, the two ſonnes of Germanicus, theſe varia fraude induxit ut concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, he uſed cunning contrivances to draw them to reproach him, that ſo he might cover his cruelty in their death, under a pretext of juſtice. What theſe cunning contrivances are, it is ſpecified by Suetonius; but I hope this Author will acknowledge, that it ſtands him upon, to repreſent what thoſe cunning contrivances are, which our doctrine imputes unto God, to draw them to ſinne againſt God. Our Divines commonly teach, that God as he is able to keep any man from ſinne (as he did the Angells that ſtood, when their fellowes became Apoſtates, the cauſe whereof Auſtin reſolves into amplius Adjutorium given by God, either in their creation or after: De Civit. Dei. lib. 12. cap. 9. Iſti aut minorem acceperunt amoris divini gratiam quam illi qui in eadem perſtiterunt, aut ſi utriquè boni aequaliter creati ſunt, iſtis mala voluntate cadentibus, illi amplius adjuti ad eam beatitudinis plenitudinem, unde ſe nunquàm caſuros certiſſimi fierent, pervenerunt,) ſo likewiſe that Gods permiſſion is enough to proſtitute any man unto ſinne. And not our Divines only, but Arminius alſo and others. Arminius Exam. pag. 152. Quoties voluntas permittitur a Deo ut faciat aliquid, neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum, ſecùs permiſſio non fieret. And Pag. 157. thus he defines the permiſſion of ſinne, Permiſſio peccati eſt ſuſpenſio omnium impedimentorum quibus poſitis peccatum non fieret. Now let any ſober man judge, whether herehence it it followeth not neceſſarily neceſſitate conſequenti… & ſuppoſitionis, that ſinne ſhall be, to wit, upon the removing of all thoſe impediments upon the poſition whereof ſinne could not be; conſidering that an impediment of ſinne in this caſe and in Arminius his phraſe is every thing quo poſito peccatum non fuerit. Vorſtius in like manner, in Amicitia duplicatione Pag. 213. Fateor quidem permiſſione jam poſitâ in actu neceſſariò etiam poni rem aliquam permittendam, id que ob neceſſariam talium relatorum ad ſe invicem habitudinem, at que in arguendo mutuam quandam foreign quae ferre non poteſt ut unum ſine altero reipſâ ſit, nedum ut alterum extra ſe quidquam verè agat, altero ne quidem adhuc exiſtente, nedum verè patiente, aut contra. Navarettus in 1. Queſt. 19. Art. 9. §. 2. maintaines, Poſita permiſſione infallibilitèr ſequi quod permittitur. Auſtin himſelfe ſuppoſeth as much where he ſaith, Ad omnipotentiſsimam ſuam bonitatem pertinere, potiùs bona ex malis elicere, quam mala eſſe non ſinere. For hereby he gives to underſtand, that God permits ſinne with a purpoſe to work good out of evill. Now this manifeſtly implies, that upon Gods permiſſion of ſinne, ſinne ſhall exiſt. Nay how can this be avoided, unleſſe we deny that God alone, is he that keepes us from running into ſinne, and maintaine that man can doe this of himſelfe, without that ſpeciall grace of God, whereby he keepes us from ſinne: yet in the Councel of Paleſtine, it was concluded, that Gods grace was required to every act, and Pelagius himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe thereunto, and to anathematize thoſe that denied. Now let us examine what this grace of God is, which is neceſſarily required to every good act, whether God doth not work the will thereunto, according to that, I will cauſe them to walk in my ſtatutes, and keep my judgements and doe them: Ezech. 36. 28. or whether it be only ſuch a Cooperate grace, as ſome now a daies bluſh not to profeſſe as whereby God workes in us, foreign Velle bonum modò Velimus, this I can ſhew under the hand of a zealous Partizan for Arminius. Now I hope there is no ſuch cunning contrivance in the permiſſion of ſinne.
Farther, there are certain occaſions & opportunities offered for the cōmitting of ſin in the courſe of the World: We willingly aſcribe unto God the adminiſtratiō of theſe, and ſo doth Arminius; and that not of Occaſions only, but of Arguments alſo inciting unto ſin, Diſput. Pub. Theſ. 9. De Iuſtitiâ & Efficaciâ providentiae Dei in malo. Num. 6. Efficientia Dei circa peccatum concernit tum actum ipſum tum vitioſitatem ejus. Efficientia quae circa initium conſideratur vel impeditio vel permiſſio eſt; cui addimus adminiſtrationem argumentorum & occaſionum ad peccatum incitantium.
Yet there is a greater power of provocation unto ſin then all theſe, & that is by the practiſes of Satan, who goeth about like a roaring Lyon ſeeking whō he may devoure. How coms he to have ſuch liberty? Hath not God power to bind Satan for a thouſand years and more if it pleaſe him? The Devills ſometime beſought our Saviour, that he would not ſend them into the deep; ſurely they acknowledged thereby his power to ſend them thither; yet he did not, though he was not ignorant, that their going about was like ſo many roaring lyons, to devoure the ſoules of men by provoking unto ſin. As for thoſe that Tiberius ſet about Druſus and Nero to provoke them, what were they comparable to the Devill and his Angells for the practiſing of provoking courſes? But Tiberius bid his ſervants to provoke Druſus and Nero and not to ſpare: but can any ſay truely that we maintaine that God bids the Devill to provoke this Author, or any ſuch Arminian ſpirit to make ſuch parallels as theſe? Yet 1 Kings 22. we read when a wicked ſpirit offers his ſervice to God to intice Ahab that he might goe and fall at Ramoth-Gilead, & that by becoming a lying ſpirit in the mouth of all his Prophets, the Lord not only accepts it, ſaying, Goe forth and doe ſo; but alſo tells him, thou ſhalt entice him, and ſhalt alſo prevaile. That was a great deale more then was in the power of Tiberius, or his inſtigators, or the Devills themſelves. And did not Ahab deſerve as much at the hands of God? And why might not this Author and his fellowes, have deſerved ſo much at the hands of God, as to have a lying ſpirit put in the mouthes of them, on whom they depend for reſolution in poynts of Divinity, and that they prevaile with them alſo? And why may not he alſo be thus given over to illuſions to believe lies? Nay, what doe we talk of deſert in this? Did not the Devill provoke Eve and Adam to ſin againſt God in Paradiſe? Could not God have kept the Devill off? Why did he not? Cur non interceſſit & circumſcriptorem colubrum cohibuit? to ſpeak in Tertullians phraſe. Doth it not manifeſtly appeare, that it was Gods will to have them tempted, to have them provoked unto ſin? & why not? Is it lawfull for a man to lay a bait of gold and ſilver in his ſervants way to try his fidelity, and whether ſuch a provocation will make a breach upon his honeſty; and ſhall not ſuch a courſe be lawfull unto God? for this nothing hinders their liberty of tranſgreſſing. And to ſerve God while we are not tempted to ſin againſt him, is a poor commendation: If thou faint in the day of adverſity thy ſtrength is ſmall, ſaith Solomon. Iob. 1. 11. Prov. 24. 10.Stretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and ſee if he will not blaſpheme thee to thy face; as much as to ſay, Let but Iob be in this manner provoked, and ſee whether he will not blaſpheame. What is the Lords anſwere? Lo, all that he hath is in thine hand, only upon himſelfe ſhalt thou not ſtretch out thine hand. Hereupon Satan goes to his work. One meſſenger comes and brings tydings, ſaying, The Oxen were plowing, and the Aſſes feeding in their places, and the Sabeans came violently and took them, yea, they have ſlaine thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee: Upon the neck of him comes another, ſaying, The fire of God is fallen from heaven, & hath burnt up thy ſheep and thy ſervants, and devoured them, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. Upon the back of him comes a third ſaying, The Caldeans ſet out three bands, and fell upon the Camells and have taken them and ſlain thy ſervants with the edge of the ſword, & I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. After all theſe coms a fourth, ſaying, Thy ſonnes and thy daughters were eating and drinking wine in their eldest brothers houſe, and behold there came a great wind from beyond the wilderneſſe, and ſmote the fowre corners of the houſe which fell upon thy children & they are dead, and I only am eſcaped alone to tell thee. Here are provocations enough, and can it be denied, but that God would have Iob's uprightneſſe thus to be tried? And hath not God power thus to try any other nothing ſo upright as Iob (whatſoever be the conſequents thereof) unto tranſgreſſion, though it be even to the curſing of their King and their God? as Iſ. 8. 21. He that is afflicted and famiſhed, ſhall goe to and fro in it, and when he ſhall be hungry he ſhall even fret himſelfe and curſe his King and his gods and ſhall look upward: and Revelations 16. 21. There fell a great haile like talents out of heaven upon the men, and men blaſpheamed God becauſe of the Plague of the haile, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. Yet Job continued in his uprightneſſe, his wicked Wife perceived it, though ſhee her ſelfe was enraged, and betrayed the corruption of her heart within, but he was no more effectually brought thereby to ſin againſt God, then Joſeph was by the temptation of his wanton Miſtris: though David fell fowlly and ſhamefully, provoked thereunto by the ſight of Bathſheba, and did not God by his providence bring him to the ſight of Bathſheba, as he brought Shimei and David after this together, as Arminius and his complices confeſſe, when Shimei railed on him? A great provocation to ſo great a Perſon as David, if not to bid, yet at leaſt to ſuffer Abiſhai to cut off that doggs head, as he called him; yet David would not ſuffer him, and why? Let David himſelfe anſwer; The Lord, ſaith he, hath bidden him to curſe David. It may be the Lord will render unto me good, for his curſing this day. He fell not foule upon God, though acknowledging his juſt providence herein. And to make a Parallele between the courſes of God, and the courſes of Tiberius that monſter of men, in taking a courſe with Druſus and Nero to provoke them to the reproaching of him, that he might deſtroy them: Thus David was not corrupted with the provocations of his Subject, as Druſus and Nero were by a fellow Subject to convitiate their Prince. Neither did he fare the worſe for this, but no doubt found cauſe to bleſſe God for his grace, in reſtraining him from breaking forth into any intemperancy of tongue or ſpirit, like as formerly he bleſſed God for the good counſel of Abigal, whereby he was reſtrained from ſhedding bloud, and that his own hand did not ſave him. And if it be not lawfull for us to provoke another unto ſin, will it follow forthwith, that it is not lawfull for God to provoke? One is provoked by proſperity to corrupt his waies, another by adverſity is provoked to break forth into impatience and blaſphemy? What then? ſhall not God be acknowledged to be the Author both of proſperity and adverſity? Nay, what doth the Lord long before profeſſe what ſhould be his providence towards the Jewes? and that in this very kind of provoking them. Deutron. 32. 21. They have moved me to jealouſy with that which is not good, they have provoked me to anger with their vanities: and I will move them to jealouſy with thoſe that are no people, I will provoke them to anger with a fooliſh Nation.
But let us conſider more diſtinctly, what this act of provocation is, and wherein it conſiſts, that we may be the better able to judge in what caſe we may ſafely attribute it unto God, and in what caſe not, that ſo we may neither aſcribe that unto him which doth not become him, nor deny that unto him which doth become him, both theſe courſes being equally blaſphemous, and ſo reputed among Schoole Divines.
Now Provocation in the moſt uſuall phraſe of Scripture is by way of exaſperation, and it is an incitation unto wrath; and never otherwiſe taken when man is ſaid to provoke God. And in the ſame ſenſe it is delivered in the particular fact of Tiberius here mentioned. But when a reſemblance is here made between the particular courſe of Tiberius and the courſes of God, Gods provocation of man is not to wrath only, but meant of incitation to any kind of ſin, whether it be by way of exaſperation, or by way of alluring and enticing, according to the ſeverall paſſions and affections of man, which are apt to be moved ſeverall waies to ſin, amongſt which the paſſion anger is but one. And as it is ſaid of the wrath of man, that it workes not the righteouſneſſe of God; ſo it is verified of every other inordinate affection. In the 1 Chron. 24. 1. it is ſaid that Satan provoked David to number Iſrael. That was not by way of exaſperation and moving in him the paſſion of anger, by the working upon ſome other paſſion, whether pride or curioſity: and therefore though it be rendred by the word, Provoked, yet in the Originall the word uſed ſignifieth properly to tempt. But conſider we provocation according to the propriety thereof in the firſt place, by way of exaſperation.
Now conſider, I pray, whether the Miniſters of Tiberius did more exaſperate Druſus and Nero, then God exaſperated Ionah. Ionah. 4. 7. For having prepared a Gourd and made it to come up over Ionah, that it might he a ſhaddow over his head, and deliver him from his griefe; & Ionah being exceeding glad of the Gourd, God prepared a worme when the morning roſe the next day and it ſmote the Gourd that it withered. And God proceeded farther then this. For when the Sun did ariſe, God prepared alſo a fervent eaſt wind, and the Sun heat upon the head of Ionah, that he fainted and wiſhed in his heart to dye, and ſaid it is better for me to dye then to live. And not only ſo, but juſtified himſelfe in this his impatience. For when the Lord ſaid unto him, doeſt thou well to be angry for the Gourd? Ionah ſtoutly anſwered, I doe well to be angry to the death. It's true, Ionah brake not forth into blaſphemies againſt God, as it ſeems Druſus and Nero did againſt Tiberius. Ionah was better brought up under the wings of God then ſo. Gods grace preſerved him from ſuch exceſſe, but that the Miniſters Tiberius ſet about them, did more provoke them by exaſperating courſes, then God did in like manner provoke Ionah, it doth not appeare: but had Ionah hereupon broken forth into blaſphemies, had Ionah's ſinne been excuſable or Gods courſe blameable? Revel. 16. 21. we read of a great hayle that fell upon the men like Talents out of heaven, and men blaſpheamed God becauſe of the plague of the hayle, for the plague thereof was exceeding great. And Iſai 8. 21. The Lord prophecyeth, that, He that is afflicted and famiſhed, ſhall goe to and fro, and when he ſhall be hungry, he ſhall even fret himſelfe, and curſe his King and his Gods and look upward. ſuch plagues are the work of God, for there is no evill in the citty but the Lord hath done it. Amos 3. But let them look unto it, that thereupon take occaſion to blaſpheme. And Tentatio probationis was never yet that I know denyed unto God, to try whether they will blaſpheme God or no. To this end Satan deſired to have an hand on Job, yet not ſo much to try whether he would blaſpheme or no, but being confident he ſhould bring him to blaſpheme. Job. 1. 11. ſtretch out now thine hand and touch all that he hath, and he will curſe thee to thy face. The Lord gave him leave, and Job acknowledgeth the Lords hand in all that Satan did, ſaying, The Lord gave and the Lord takes away, yet in all this Job ſinned not nor charged God fooliſhly. Satan deſires yet farther liberty, ſaying skin for skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life. But put forth thy hand now and touch his bone, and his fleſh, and he will curſe thee to thy face. And the Lord ſaid unto Satan, Behold he is in thy hand, but ſave his life. So went Satan forth from the preſence of the Lord, and ſmote Job with ſore boyles from the ſole of his foot unto his crowne, and he took him a potſhard to ſcrape himſelfe withall, and he ſate down among the aſhes, Then ſaid his Wife unto him, Doeſt thou yet continue in thy integrity? Curſe God and dye. She manifeſted the inward corruption of her irreligious heart. Job might have brought her to a forme of godlines by his pious courſes in his family, but litle power of godlineſſe doth appeare upon her. For as Solomon ſaith, If thou faint in the day of adverſity thy ſtrength is ſmall. It ſeems her heart was ſowred with Atheiſme, thinking the world was governed by chance, rather then by divine providence, and conſequently it was all one, whether a man did bleſſe God, or curſe God, and a madneſſe to make a conſcience of walking in integrity, and that in Iobs caſe at this time, whether he did bleſſe God he muſt dye, or whether he did curſe God he could but dye, and better it was for him thus impoveriſhed, thus afflicted, to dye then to live; as for the powers of the world to come, it ſeems ſhe never had but a taſt of them, and that taſt never produced any true faith in her concerning them. Here was a ſore temptation, the very gates of hell playing upon him with their greateſt Ordinance to batter (if it were poſſible) his ſhield of faith. But what is Iobs anſwer. Thou ſpeakeſt as one of the fooliſh women ſpeaketh. What ſhall we receive good at the hand of God and ſhall we not receive evill? In all this did not Iob ſin with his lips. The worke of Satan in the impoveriſhing of Iobs eſtate, and afflicting his perſon, cannot be denied to be Gods work. As for the work of his wife, why might not that be the work of God, as well as the work of Satan? For did not Satan ſin in all this? As our Saviour ſaith that he was a murtherer from the beginning, and as St Peter ſaith, The devill goes about like a roring Lyon ſeeking whom he may devoure; ſo who can make doubt but theſe courſes practiſed againſt Iob, were fruits of his murthering and devouring diſpoſition? And all ſides now a daies confeſſe, that the act of the moſt flagitious ſin committed by man or Angell, is the work of God in the way of a principall efficient cauſe, as well as it is the work of the creature. And as for the ſinfulneſſe of the act, either of the Devill or his Wife, that was not it which did or could hurt Iob: but the works wrought by Satan, the temptation atheiſticall propoſed by his Wife, this was the greateſt danger in the conſideration thereof to corrupt his ſoule, for that is it alone that workes upon the will to incline it. And as for their ſinning herein, that proceeded from the want of Gods feare, according to that of Abraham. Geneſ. 20. 10. I ſaid ſurely the feare of God is not in this place, therefore they will ſlay me for my Wives ſake. And albeit God engageth himſelfe towards ſome, for the putting of his feare in their hearts, that they ſhall never depart away from him. Ierim. 36. 40. yet he hath not engaged himſelfe thus farre towards all. For the Apoſtle plainly profeſſeth, that, He hath mercy on whom he will, and whom he will he hardneth Rom. 9. 18. and hardning we know is denying the feare of God, either as touching the habituall infuſion thereof, or as touching the actuall excitation thereof after it is infuſed. Yet I deny not but obduration and excaecation are ſometimes promiſcuouſly uſed, the one for the other, becauſe of the ſtrict conjunction that is betwixt them. And as touching the particular act of Convitiation, Auſtin ſpares not to profeſſe, that even when it is committed by man, it is brought forth by God out of his ſecret providence lib. 9. Confeſſ. cap. 8. Quid egiſti Deus meus? unde curaſti? unde ſanaſti? nonne protuliſti durum & acutum ex alterâ animâ convitium tanquam medicinale ferrum ex occultis proviſionibus tuis & uno ictu putredinem illam praecidiſti? And whereas Bellarmine endeavoureth to blaſt the evidence of this place giving teſtimony unto Gods ſecret providence in evill, I have endeavoured to ſhew the vanity of his diſcourſe in my Vind. Grat. Dei lib. 2. Crim. 3. digreſſ. 2. cap. 13. And in what congruity can it be ſaid, that God bid Shimei to curſe David, but that in the ſame analogy of faith, it may be ſaid, that God bid Iobes Wife in this manner to tempt him? And which of the two was the greateſt provocation, Tiberius his Miniſters Provocation of Druſus and Nero; or Shimei's provocation of David rayling on him to his face, the Subject blaſpheaming his Prince? undoubtedly the provocation was nothing inferior, only here was the difference; Tiberius gave ſuch commandment to his Miniſters ſo to provoke Druſus and Nero, God gave no ſuch commandement (in proper ſpeech) unto Shimei, but rather commanded the contrary in his law, Thou ſhalt not ſpeak evill of the ruler of thy people. But Gods ſecret providence, whereby he makes uſe of all his creatures in what condition ſoever he finds them, even of Devills and wicked men, to ſerve his turne by them, either in the way of judgement, or in the way of mercy, and ſometimes for triall of the faith and patience of his children, is in Scripture phraſe called Gods bidding or commanding. And indeed it is farre more effectuall then his commandment. And Auſtin by pregnant paſſages of holy Scripture convicted of this truth, ſpareth not to profeſſe as much in theſe words, His & talibus teſtimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum eſt, ſatis quantum exiſtimo manifeſtatur operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocunquè voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti que ſuo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem justo. De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. cap. 21. And touching this particular caſe of Shimei, inquiring about the interpretation of it, ſee I pray, how he reſolves concerning it. Quomodo dixerit dominus huic homini maledicere David, Quis ſapiens & intelliget. Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Ideò dictum eſt, dixit ei dominus. Nam ſi jubenti obtemper aſſet Deo, laudandus potius quam puniendus eſſet, ſicut ex hoc peccato poſteà novimus eſſe punitum. And he proceeds farther to ſhew the reaſon of this divine providence. Nec cauſa tacita eſt, cur ei Deus juſto modo dixerit maledicere David, hoc eſt, De Grat. & lib. arbit. cap. 20.Cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miſerit vel dimiſerit ut videat (inquit) dominus humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro maledictio ejus in die iſto. And hereupon concludes. Ecce quomodo probatur Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at que adjumentum bonorum. Sic uſus eſt Iuda tradente Chriſtum. Sic uſus eſt Iudaeis crucifigentibus Chriſtum, & quanta inde bona praeſtitit populis credituris? Qui & ipſo utitur diabolo peſſimo, ſed optimè ad excercendam & probandam fidem & pietatem bonorum non ſibi, quia omnia ſcit antequam fiant, ſed nobis quibus erat neceſſarium, ut eo modo ageretur nobiſcum.
But let us proceed to provocations unto other ſins, not in the way of exaſperation, but in the way of allurements. Achan was a covetous perſon, at the ſacking of Jericho, it was his hap to light among the ſpoyle, upon a goodly Babyloniſh garment, and two hundred ſhekells of ſilver, and a wedge of gold of fifty ſhekells waight. Was not ſo faire a prey, a ſore temptation to a covetous perſon? How was Demoſthenes taken with a rich bowle that was ſhewed him by Harpalus, but there was great danger in it, I confeſſe, yet if deſire of prey doth ſometimes overrun the ſent, may it not as well overcome the feare of danger, eſpecially conſidering the opportunity of ſecrecy to convey it cloſely into his Tent and hide it there? I ſaw, ſaith he, and I coveted them and took them, and behold they lye hid in the earth in the midſt of my Tent, and the ſilver under it. Now can it be denied, but that God by his providence brought him into this temptation, and conſequently into this provocation, for to tempt is to provoke 1 Chron. 21. 1. And is it not juſt with God, to bring any man into ſuch temptations of what kind, or in what degree ſoever (ſeeing no temptation or provocation in this kind or degree, bereaves a man of the liberty of his will) If not, what meant our Saviour to teach his Diſciples, and in them us, to pray unto God that He will not lead us into temptation? And what cauſe hath Achan to complaine of this temptation? We do not read he did; was it not the condition of many others as well as himſelfe? Was this prey that he ceazed on, the only ſpoyle of that great Citty? Were there no Babyloniſh garments but that one, no more ſilver or wedges of gold, but that Achan lighted on? Yet they refrained, ſome out of the feare of God, that reſtrained them in a gracious manner, and kept them from ſinning againſt him: others though not out out of a feare of God, yet out of the feare of puniſhment, were moved to beware how they tranſgreſſed. For albeit, Libertas ſine gratia non eſt libertas, ſed contumacia, as * Auſtin Epiſt: 28.writes, yet feare of puniſhment oftimes reſtraines from committing capitall crimes, though this reſtraint be not gracious; and conſiderations of leſſe force then theſe doe prevaile many times with carnall men, both to abſtain from evill, and to doe that which is good, though not in a gracious manner. As we read in the Goſpell of a wicked Judge, that neither feared God nor reverenced man, yet he would doe the Widdow juſtice to eaſe himſelfe of her importunate ſollicitations where with ſhe moleſted him.
Come we to provocations unto ſinne of another nature, in ſatisfying the concupiſcence of the fleſh. David ariſing out of his bed at eventide, and walking upon the roof of the Kings Pallace, from the roofe he ſaw a Woman waſhing her ſelfe: and the Woman was very beautifull to look upon: we know what followed hereupon. Now was it not God that lead him into this temptation, into this provocation? Surely if this were not juſt with God, it were in vaine for us to pray, that God will not lead us into temptation; for we need not feare any ſuch temptation, which cannot befall us without violation of Gods juſtice in the courſe of his providence. Paul the Apoſtle, leaſt he ſhould be exalted out of meaſure, through the abundance of revelations (made unto him, which were very dangerous to puff a man up, and make him ſwell in the conceit of his own worthineſſe being admitted into the ſecrets of God) was ſometimes exerciſed with a thorne in the fleſh, the meſſenger of Satan ſent to buffet him. But the feare of God was alive in him, and ſtirred up his faith to pray unto God three times that it might depart from him: and the Lord made him a gracious anſwer, not as yet to deliver him, but to ſupport him in this conflict, and give him the victory over it. For the Lord ſaid unto him, my grace is ſufficient for thee, for my power is made perfect in thy weakneſſe. This anſwer put heart into Paul; Therefore, ſaith he, will I very gladly rejoyce rather in mine infirmities that the power of Chriſt may dwell in me. Mark I pray, Rahter, in mine infirmities. He would not blame God for thus exerciſing him, but rather rejoyce to be thus exerciſed, for as much as this ſame ſhould doe him no harme; for by vertue of Chriſts power dwelling in him he ſhould have the victory. Secondly, it ſhould doe him good in preſerving him from being exalted out of meaſure through the abundance of revelations. Therefore, ſaith he, I take pleaſure in infirmities, in reproaches, in neceſſities, in perſecutions, in anguiſhes for Chriſts ſake; for when I am weak then am I ſtrong. And had not Joſeph as good cauſe to conceive that it was the will of God, that he by the unchaſt motions of his wanton Miſtris, ſhould be provoked unto unclean courſes, as David had to perſwade himſelfe, that it was Gods will by the rayling of Shimei he ſhould be provoked unto revenge; that ſo by the power of his grace, ſtrengthning them againſt ſuch provocations, they might come forth of their ſeverall temptations, as gold out of fire, more bright more reſplendent then before? Ioſeph was a faire perſon and well favoured Geneſ. 39. 6. Now this was a ſore provocation to a luſtfull eye. Beauty is ſaid to be of a dangerous nature, as that which makes a man either Praedonem alienae caſtitatis or Praedam ſuae. But Joſeph had a gracious and a chaſt heart, his beauty gave him no encouragement to prey upon others chaſtity, but being a congruous baite to the luſtfull appetite of his Miſtris, it was in danger to expoſe his own chaſtity to be preyed upon. And as Auſtin ſaid of Gods providence concerning Shimei, ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malam in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Who ſeeth not, that the like may be ſaid of Gods dealing with Ioſeph's Miſtris? and that without all aſperſion of unholineſſe unto God. For if he gives Men or Women over unto their luſts, what will be the iſſue but uncleanneſſe: Rom. 1. 24, 26. When God gave them up to vile affections, what followed but this? even their Women did change their naturall uſe into that which was againſt nature, verſ. 27. and likewiſe alſo the Men left their naturall uſe of the Women, and burned in their luſt one toward another; and Man with Man wrought filthineſſe, and received in themſelves ſuch recompence of their errour as was meet. Here we have a ſtrange courſe of Gods providence in puniſhing ſin with ſin. For theſe Gentiles in defiling themſelves one with another, in a moſt unnaturall and abominable manner, are ſaid to receive ſuch recompence for their errour as was meet. In few words, what is meant by provocation unto any ſin? Is it to doe that whereupon man may take juſt cauſe or occaſion to doe that which he doth without blame? like as the Corinthians provoked Paul, as a foole to loaſt himſelfe, as himſelfe expreſſeth it, for he adds, ye have compelled me. But this cannot be affirmed of Tiberius his miniſters in provoking Druſus and Nero. For no provocation could be ſufficient to make them unblameable in convitiating their Prince, much leſſe can it be ſaid, that God provokes any man in this manner: neither doe I think that any of our adverſaries (as malevolent as they are) dares impute any ſuch crimination unto us, as if wee attributed any ſuch diſcourſe unto providence divine. What then is it to provoke unto ſin? Is it to doe ſomewhat upon the conſideration whereof, mens paſſions being moved, they cannot but ſin. But this in like ſort is equally as untrue, as the former, even of thoſe provocations which were made upon Druſus and Nero by the practiſes of Tiberius. Or is it the doing of ſomewhat, whereupon occaſion is taken to ſinne, to blaſpheme? this hath no colour of truth in it. For even man without all tranſgreſſion may doe many things, whereupon occaſion is taken of doing evill, and therefore we diſtinguiſh of Scandalum datum & Acceptum. Nay, though man knowes offence will be taken upon the doing of ſome things, yet if the doing thereof be commanded by God, he muſt doe them, what occaſion ſoever is thereby taken to offend. Indeed if they are things indifferent, I muſt abſtaine from the doing of them, in caſe I know offence will be taken thereat, and that thereby I ſhall lay a ſtumbling block in the way of my Brother. For Paul profeſſeth that if meat would offend his Brother, he would never eat meat rather then offend his Brother. But no ſuch obligation lies upon God. For he knoweth full well how ſome will abuſe his mercies, others grow worſe and worſe by his judgements, breaking forth into blaſphemy thereupon: yet no wiſe man will ſay that God is the more unholy in the ſhewing of mercy, and in the execution of judgement. He profeſſeth in plain termes, that to them who feare him he will be a ſanctuary, but as a ſtumbling block, and as a rock to fall upon to both the houſes of Iſrael, and as a ſnare, and as a net, to both the Inhabitants of Ieruſalem, Iſai. 8. 14.
As for the laſt clauſe of this odious Parallel, concerning the end of Tiberius his courſe in this, namely that ſo he might cover his cruelty in their death under pretext of juſtice. Undoubtedly I ſhould think the putting of them to death was juſt in caſe they did convitiate their Prince whatſoever their provocations were. For hereby they deſerved death, yea everlaſting death and damnation. His ſin was in cauſing them to be provoked hereunto, and ſo alſo it might be in the manner of their execution. For it is written of him that fame necavit, he famiſhed them. I know Tiberius was cruell enough, but by the ſtory it ſeems, that policy, wicked policy moved him unto this; firſt to intend their deaths becauſe he ſaw the affections of the people towards them, belike for Germanicus his ſake, a worthy man according to thoſe times. For when he found that in the beginning of the yeare, vowes were made on their behalfe, to wit, for their preſervation he dealt with the Senate, that ſuch rewards ought not to be tendred, but towards ſuch who were of experience and of ripeneſſe of age: and that hereupon the inward character of his affection towards them being diſcovered, he laid them open to every mans criminations, varia que fraude inductos ut & concitarentur ad convitia & concitati perderentur, accuſavit per literas, amariſſimè congeſtis etiam probris, & judicatos hoſtes fame necavit. And anon after, the ſame Author diſcovers the reaſon of all this, to wit, that ſeeing Germanicus was but his adopted Sonne, and one Druſus by name was his naturall ſonne, and his own ſonne Druſus being dead, leaving a ſonne Tiberius behind him, he deſired to make him as his naturall ſonne his ſucceſſor in the Empire. Aelium Sejanum ad ſummam potentiam non tàm benevolentia provexer at quàm ut eſſet cujus miniſterio ac fraudibus liberos Germanici circumveniret: Nepotem que ſuum ex Druſo filium naturalem ad ſucceſſionem Imperii confirmaret. Sure we are God hath no need of any ſuch politique courſes; neither hath he need of any pretext of juſtice to take a mans life from him. It is confeſſed now of all hands, that God can annihilate the holieſt Angel by power abſolute. And if it be in the power of God to keep any man from ſin, as I think no wiſe man will deny, ſurely it is in his power to refuſe to keep any reaſonable creature from ſin. For certainly though Adam were created in innocence, yet he preſerv'd him not in innocency, but left him to himſelfe, having expoſed him to Satans temptations. The Angells had no Satan to tempt them; God preſerved the elect Angells from ſinning, and how? let Auſtin ſpeak in this particular; either by giving them majorem amoris divini menſuram in their creation then their fellowes; or by giving them amplius adjutorium after their creation. And in particular concerning Adam, the ſame Author profeſſeth that God gave him, Poſſe ſi voluit, but he gave him not, Velle quod potuit. And dares any man deny that it is in the power of God by the deniall of his efficacious grace, to make way for the entring of ſin into the World, and that wonderfull work of the incarnation of the ſonne of God, and the redemption of the World by him; as alſo for the manifeſtation of his own glory, both in the way mercy by the pardoning of ſin, and in the way of juſtice by the puniſhing of ſin. Let Arminius be heard in this, Who confeſſeth that God in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome and power, hath not only ſufficient impediments of ſin, but efficacious alſo, by the uſe whereof, ſinne would certainly and infallibly be hindered. His words are theſe, Praeter illa ſufficientia, impedimenta etiam efficacia habet in ſuo ſapientiae & potentiae theſauro, quibus productis certô & infallibiliter peccatum impediretur. Exam p. 157.Which if it be true, certainly it was as true, as touching the hindering of the ſinne of Adam, as of hindering any mans ſinne elſe from the time of Adams fall. And as certain it is that God would not make uſe of any of theſe impediments, though it is apparent theſe impediments Arminius ſpeakes of, are of ſuch a nature as whereby ſinne would be hindered without any prejudice to the freedome of mans will, as appears by all his inſtances following of this kind, ſhewing how God did efficaciouſly hinder the ſinnes of many. And indeed it is evident in reaſon and ſuch as cannot be denied, unleſſe a man will ſay, that whatſoever courſe had been taken by God to preſerve him from ſinne, without prejudice to the freedome of his will, yet nevertheleſſe he would have ſinned: which is in ſo high a degree abſurd, as manifeſtly to contradict the very light of nature. For ſeeing Adam in the ſtate of innocency was naturally indifferent, as well to ſtand, as to fall; and morally more inclined to ſtand then to fall; (for as much as God had made him good) even in reſpect of this indifferency it cannot be ſaid, that upon every occaſion or temptation unto ſin, he would have yeelded thereunto. For ſuch a condition is not an indifferent condition. Nay Philoſophers ackowledge that of three ſorts of contingents, one ſort is of ſuch which they call, Contingentia aequalitèr, that is, ſuch as fall out as often one way as another. And what Zabarel. lib. 1. Poſt. Analyt. 182.are theſe? ſurely all ſuch and none but ſuch as are ſubject to a mans free will. And even of Eſau borne in ſin (ſo was not Adam) Auſtin thinks it ſtrange, that any man ſhould deny, but that there was a courſe to have called him as effectually, as he called Lib. 1. ad Simpli. queſt. 2.Jacob, had he been pleaſed to have uſed it. Now hereby it manifeſtly appears, that God hath no need of any provoking courſes, exaſperating courſes to draw them unto ſinne, let him but withold thoſe efficacious impediments of ſin, which are in the ſtorehouſe of his wiſdome and power, as Arminius acknowledgeth, and ſinne hereupon ſhall enter. For the permiſſion of ſinne (by Arminius his diſtinction of it) is the ſuſpenſion of that efficiency whereupon it would be avoided. And if it were a ſafe courſe to Exam. p. 157. & 166.judge of what becometh God by that which becometh man, we ſhould conclude even of permiſſion of ſin, that like as it becometh not us to permit ſinne if it lieth in our power to hinder it, in the ſame manner it becometh not God to permit any ſinne, ſeeing it lyeth in his power to hinder it. Sed judicia ejus (ſaith Auſtin) multa abyſſus. Nos certè, ſi eos in quos nobis poteſtas eſt ante oculos noſtros perpetrare ſcelera permittamus, rei cum ipſis Contr. Iulian. Pelag. l. 5. cap. 4.erimus: quàm verò innumerabilia ille permittit fieri ante oculos ſuos, quae uti que ſi voluiſſet nulla ratione permitteret. In the 2 Kings 2. 26, 27. we read of a deſperate courſe of the King of Moab, that finding the battail to be ſore againſt him, firſt tryed with 700 men to break through to the King of Edom, but when he could not, he took his eldeſt ſonne that ſhould have raigned in his ſteed, and offered him for a burnt offering upon the wall; the ſight of which barbarous part of his ſtrook griefe into the hearts of the children of Iſrael, ſo that they departed from him, and returned into their country. What, therefore ſhall we condemne God, for ſending Abraham to ſacrifice his ſonne, his only ſonne, his ſonne Iſaac? In the 16 Iudg. we read a ſtrange ſtory of Sampſon whoſe faith is commended Hebr. 11. For there we read how he dyes, his heart flaming with deſire of revenge, and yet with great devotion prayes unto God to aſſiſt him, that he might be avenged of the Philiſtins for his two eyes. O Lord God I pray thee think upon mee, O God I beſeech thee ſtrengthen me at this time only, that I may be at once avenged of the Philiſtins for my two eyes. And again, Let me looſe my life with the Philistins: & he bowed himſelfe with all his might, and the houſe fell upon the Princes, and upon the people that were therein; ſo that the men that he ſlew at his death, were more then they which he had ſlaine in his life. For both the houſe it ſelfe was full, and upon the roofe of it there were about 3000 men and women. Here is a ſtrange maſſacre wrought by Sampſon an Iſraelite upon the Philiſtins, at that time when the Iſraelites were in ſubjection to the Philiſtins who were their Lords, as ſometimes Pharaoh was. For the men of Judah admoniſhed him when they came up to the rock Etam to bind Sampſon. Knoweſt thou not (ſay they) that the Philiſtins are rulers over us? Wherefore then haſt thou done thus unto us? to wit, in taking ſuch courſes as might well provoke the Philiſtins to root out the Iſraelites. Yet nevertheleſſe he comes ſparkling with zeale to deſtroy many thouſands of them, yea the Princes with the reſt, and well pleas'd to deſtroy himſelfe with them, to be avenged of them for his two eyes. And how could this be done by him without ſome ſpeciall & propheticall inſtigation & animation received from the ſpirit of God, we know not. And who doubts, but that God animating him hereunto, all this was lawfull? which without Gods warrant, could be no leſſe then abominable & moſt damnable ſins. Yet undoubtedly God did not animate Herod, & Pontius Pilate, together with the Gentiles, and people of Iſrael to do what they did againſt our Saviour, but rather left them to be ordered by his Law, wherein ſuch things are prohibited. And nevertheleſſe the Apoſtles in their pious meditation with one voyce profeſſe, that, All theſe were gathered together againſt the holy Son of God, to doe thoſe things which Gods hand, and Gods councell had predeſtinated to be done: and why the like is not to be acknowledged of the moſt barbarous facts committed by Tiberius, or any other monſter of nature, I know no reaſon. And as touching ſhamefull courſes, no leſſe abominable in the kind of acts flagitious, as theſe here mentioned of Tiberius were, in the kind of acts facinorous; The Apoſtle profeſſeth both that God gave them up to vile affections, and to the luſts of their own hearts, to the committing of ſuch abominations, and alſo that herein they received ſuch recompence of their errour as was meet; and the errour which God avenged in this manner what was it, but ſuch wherein Tiberius was as deep, as thoſe whom the Apoſtle ſpeaks of, namely, in changing the glory of the incorruptible God, to the ſimilitude of the image of a corruptible man, and of birds, and of four footed beaſts, and of creeping things. And they were but foreign into which God delivered up Tiberius, and to ſuch God delivered up them of whom the Apoſtle ſpeaks; and his actions as well as theirs, were equally the fruits of foreign, into which God gave them up, that ſo they might receive that recompence of their errour as was meet.
I come to the ſecond inſtance here made of Tiberius his cruelty, which he compares to thoſe courſes, which we out of holy Scripture have learned, to be attributed unto God himſelfe. Now this hath long agoe been objected by Bertius, in his Preface to the Conference of Arminius with Iunius; I ſay objected by him unto Piſcator, & thereunto Piſcator alſo hath anſwered long agoe. And whereas Bertius hath replyed and allowed Piſcator a year for putting in his anſwer thereunto, whereof had he failed, he would interpret it as a confeſſion of his inſufficiency, to make good the cauſe maintained by him. Piſcator anſwers, that he had no need of ſo long a time as he preſcribed him, for after he had read over his book, in the ſpace of two or three daies he addreſſed himſelfe to an anſwer thereunto, and within a month finiſhed it. Now if the Author of this diſcourſe were ignorant hereof, his ignorance might excuſe him, if otherwiſe he might have, with more credit, occupied himſelfe in the anſwering, at the leaſt, of ſome chief particulars, whereupon Piſcator ſtands, for the juſtifying of his doctrine delivered by him, not of his own brain, but according to the word of God, then hand over head, to hold up the crimination without taking notice of the dilution thereof, many years a goe propoſed and ſet forth to the judgement of the world. But I am content to take into conſideration, how Scholaſtically and judiciouſly he carrieth himſelfe in this crimination, as well as in the former: and the rather, becauſe it may be that this odious cōpariſon he makes more account of (for the preparation of his Auditors to entertain that which followes with the more propitious affectiō) then he doth of the ſtrength of ought that follows, whatſoever he doth or may pretēd to the cōtrary to the point thē.
Tiberius commanded the Virgins to be defloured, that they might be ſtrangled. Now is there any carriage of God taught by us like unto this? If God were diſpoſed to ſtrangle any, certainly he hath no need to have thē defloured firſt. For it is now a daies confeſſed even by Arminius himſelfe, that God can lawfully annihilate the holieſt creature that lives, and that without all reſpect to ſin, or the vitiation of them. And annihilation I think is much more then ſtrangulation; this cauſing only a diſſolution between the body and ſoule, but annihilation, ſetting an utter end to body & ſoule by turning them both into nothing. And farther, had Tiberius only permitted the deflouring of them, whē he might have hindered it, though this were a foule part in him, yet I hope no Chriſtian will ſay, it is a foule part in God, to permit any act never ſo flagitious, or facinorous when he is able to hinder it; eſpecially when he may hinder it without any prejudice to the liberty of mans will: and that this is in Gods power Arminius acknowledgeth and ſuppoſeth at large in his Examen and Treatiſe there De Permiſsione. But Tiberius commanded the Hangman to defloure them. But is this our doctrine, that God commanded the raviſhing of any, the murthering of any, or any other ſin whatſoever? Do we not all teach rather, that God forbids it, and that under penalty of everlaſting death? yet it is true, the word of God expreſſely profeſſeth out of the mouth of David, that God bad Shimei to curſe David, and that he bid the evill ſpirit to ſeduce Ahab, that he might goe up to Ramoth-Gilead, and that not to be ſtrangled I confeſſe, but, which was nothing better to him, that he might fall, and be ſlain there. But this is a figurative ſpeech, and ſignifies not properly any command of God, but rather denotes the ſecret operation of Gods providence in the hearts of men, even of wicked men; for thoſe as well as Devills, God knows how to make uſe of, to ſerve his own turne. And Auſtin profeſſeth, Deum operari in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. c. 21.voluntates quocun que voluerit, ſive ad bona, pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum judicio uti que ſuo, aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto: And, touching the particular of Shimei, writes thus, ejus voluntatem proprio ſuo vitio malam, in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto, & occulto inclinavit. As for Tiberius his cauſing the little maides to be defloured, that might be done without their ſinne, they might be raviſhed, and in that caſe, that might be their ſorrow but not their ſin. And as for the hangmans fault, in this, he was not excuſable by Tiberius his cauſing him to defloure them; For Tiberius his cauſation herein extended no farther then to command them. And I hope it was no juſt excuſe for the people of Iſrael in their Idolatrous courſes, that therein they did but keep the ſtatutes of Omri, and all the manner of the houſe of Ahab, Mic. 6. Yet neither doth God command any man to doe that which his Law forbids, or to ſin againſt him. And farther we acknowledge with Auſtin, that ſin hath no efficient cauſe, but deficient. And it is enough with God to expoſe any man to ſin, by not working him to that which is good; it being his office to work us to every thing that is pleaſing in his ſight. Heb. 13. 20. to cauſe us to walk in his ſtatutes, and judgements, and to doe them, Ezech. 36. 28. yea, to keep us from preſumptious ſins, and that they get not the dominion over us. Pſal. 19. 14. yea, to deliver us from every evill work, 2 Timoth. 4. 18.
But perhaps ſome may ſay; Our doctrine is that God willeth ſin to be committed for which men may and ſhall be puniſhed; like as Tiberius would the Virgins ſhould be defloured, that they might be ſtrangled.
And I anſwer, that Arminius himſelfe profeſſeth that, Deus voluit Achabum menſuram ſcelerum ſuorum implere, God would have Ahab fill up the meaſure of his ſinne, that he might be condignely puniſhed. And why may we not ſay as well, that God would have Tiberius to fill up the meaſure of his ſinnes? And yet like as Tiberius would have the Virgins to be defloured that they might be ſtrangled; ſo Ahab would have Naboth accuſed of blaſphemy, that he might be condemned for it, and ſo put to death and ſtoned; and all theſe things were done under colour of Religion. Yet Arminius in reference to theſe very courſes, ſpares not to profeſſe, that God would have Ahab to fill up the meaſure of his ſinnes, yet doth not Bertius upbraid him for defaming God, with imputing cruelty unto him. Againe, the ſame Arminius profeſſeth that in their ignominious handling of Chriſt, God would have the Jewes, progredi quouſ que progreſſi ſunt, proceed ſo farre as they did proceed. And was it not Gods will in like manner, that the Gentiles ſhould proceed as farre as they did in the ſame buſineſſe? Now we know full well by the ſtory Evangelical, how farre they went in their miſchievous courſes againſt the Son of God. For Judas betrayed him, and the high Prieſts both hired Judas hereunto, and ſuborned falſe witneſſes againſt him; and both the Herodians and Souldiers mocked him, and the people urged Pilate to crucify him, and to diſmiſſe …, and Pilate yeelded to the peoples deſire, took order to have him firſt ſcourged, then crucified. And if it may be truely and piouſly ſaid, that in theſe ignominious uſages of the Son of God, they went as farre as God would have them to goe; why may it not, with as great truth and piety be avouched, that Tiberius alſo in theſe his barbarous courſes, went as farre as God would have him? Neither doth Arminius give himſelfe to qualify the harſhneſſe of theſe his affirmations. We ſay that whatſoever comes to paſſe, it is Gods will it ſhould come to paſſe, as Auſtin expreſly profeſſeth, Enchir. cap. 95. Nec aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, and the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profeſſe the ſame. But withall we explicate it as Auſtin dothin the words following, by adding the different manner, how they ſhall come to paſſe by the will of God, according to the different condition of things that come to paſſe, namely good or evill; thus, Vult fieri, but how? vel ſinendo ut fiat (to wit in caſe they are evill) vel ipſe faciendo (to wit, in caſe they are good. So then good things God will have come to paſſe by his effection, evill things only by his permiſſion. And Bellarmine oppoſing our Divines to the uttermoſt of his power in this particular, being convicted in conſcience by the evidence of truth is driven to confeſſe; Bonum eſſe ut malum fiat Deo permittente, It is good that evill ſhould come to paſſe by Gods permiſſion, or Gods permitting it. Tiberius willed that the Virgins ſhould be defloured and impiouſly he willed it. God willed that Davids Concubines ſhould be defloured, and holily he willed it; neither is he delighted with impurity. For the Scripture attributes this unto God, I will give thy Wives unto thy Neighbour, and he ſhall lye with them in the ſight of all Iſrael and before the ſunne. And this conſtupration of Davids Concubines ſerved for the chaſtiſing of David, as Arminius profeſſeth, Inſerviit caſtigando Davidi; & omnes paenae habent Deum authorem, All puniſhments have God for their author; they are the words of the ſame Arminius. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius to cauſe the Virgins to be defloured and ſtrangled But what Chriſtian dares to impute impiety or cruelty unto God for cauſing the Children of the Sodomites, ſome in their Mothers wombe, ſome hanging upon their Mothers breaſts, to be conſumed with fire and brimſtone. It was impiety and cruelty in Tiberius, to will the deflouring of thoſe Virgins, that they might be ſtrangled. But Arminius thought it neither impiety nor cruelty for God to will, that Ahab ſhould fill up the meaſure of his ſinne, that ſo he might accumulate unto himſelfe wrath in the day of wrath; for if he had I preſume, he would not have aſcribed any ſuch will unto God, as he doth in expreſſe termes. Although he well knew the vaſt difference between the power of man, and the power of God in executing vengeance; the ones power extending only to the execution of vengeance temporall, but Gods power extends to the execution of vengeance eternall. Now I find a ſtory immediatly following this very ſtory alleadged by this Author out of Suetonius expreſſing the cruelty of Tiberius in a farther degree, as not contented with the death of them whom he would deſtroy, and therefore he would keep them alive to torment them: Mori volentibus vis adhibita vivendi, when they deſired to dye, he cauſed them to live by force; Nam mortem adeò leve ſupplicium putabat ut cum audiſſet unum è reis anticipaſſe eam, exclamaverit Carnutius me evaſit, For he accounted death ſo light a puniſhment that when he heard one of the condemned perſons to have anticipated it, he cryed out Carnutius hath eſcaped me; for that was the condemned perſons name. And when he took notice of them that were inward, when one deſired to ſuffer betimes, he anſwered him, Nondum tecum in gratiam redii. I doe not as yet beare theſe ſo much good will. Now, why may not ſome Atheiſticall perſon track the ſteps of this Author, and in this particular exaggerate the hainouſneſſe of Gods holy courſes as ſavouring of cruelty beyond all example, beyond the cruelty of Tiberius, becauſe he holds delinquent creatures upon the rack of eternall torment in hell fire? For certain vindicative courſes in Tiberius inferior unto theſe are accounted abominable, cruell, and impious; how much more (if this Authors argumentation be of force) thoſe courſes which the word of God hath informed us to be the courſes divine, infinitely beyond the courſes of Tiberius in the way of ſeverity and rigour? As for the power of God in producing ſinne, we acknowledge none. Above 1200 years agoe it was delivered by Auſtin, that ſinne hath no efficient cauſe, but deficient only. But when the creature ſinneth, he ſinneth in doing that he ought not to doe; or in doing what he doth, not in that manner he ought to doe; or in not doing what he ought to doe, or not in what manner he ought to doe it; not one of all which is incident unto God. All efficiency both divine and humane is found only about the act ſubſtrate unto ſinne; and all ſides now a daies acknowledge, that God is the author thereof as well as man by an effective concourſe, though difference there is about the manner of the concourſe: and particularly theſe; Arminius will have Gods concourſe to an evill act, to be every way as much as his concourſe to a good, and that he concurres to the working of a good act, no more then to the working of an evill act. Which we utterly deny, requiring a double concourſe to every good act that is not ſupernaturall, as touching the ſubſtance of the act; One to the producing of the ſubſtance of the act, another to the producing the goodneſſe thereof, that is, the gracious manner of performing it: For even a naturall man may abſtaine from lying, ſtealing, whoring, blaſpheaming; but no naturall man can abſtaine from theſe in a gracious manner, that is, out of the love of God and that ſuch a love as is, Amor Dei uſ que ad contemptum ſui, the love of God to the contempt of himſelfe: For this manner of performing it is ſupernaturall.
Secondly, as touching the matter of divine concourſe, to the ſubſtance of any naturall act. We ſay God moves the will to the doing of it, as it becomes the firſt cauſe to move the ſecond, but how? agreeable to the nature of it, that is, like as he moves naturall agents to doe that which they doe, neceſſarily; ſo he moves all rationall agents to doe that which they doe, contingently and freely. What is the Arminian tenent to the contrary, namely this, that God workes in man foreign Velle modo velit, as abſurd an aſſertion as ever any man breathed. It is true, many times our Divines in ſpeaking of the ſecret providence of God in evill, doe expreſſe themſelves in phraſes of a very harſh accent in the judgement of fleſh and blood, but herein they doe nothing exceed ſobriety, forasmuch as uſually they contemper themſelves to Scripture phraſe rather within the compaſſe thereof, then beyond it. Yet Blaſphemy is uſually imputed unto them without all feare or wit; not conſidering, that herein they impute blaſphemy to the language of the Holy Ghoſt. As for example.
What an horrible ſinne is it for Kings and Princes to imploy their power and authority, not for the ſupporting of the Kingdome of Chriſt, by whom Kings reigne, but for the ſupporting and eſtabliſhing of the kingdome of Antichriſt, as in the Martyrdome of Gods Saints, delivered over to the ſecular power, to that end, and that by cenſures Eccleſiaſticall? Now if we ſhould ſay that it is God that works thus in the hearts of Kings, thus to imploy their power for the ſupporting of Antichriſt, we ſhould be cenſured for blaſphemers. Yet the Holy Ghoſt ſpares not to profeſſe, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfill his will, and to agree and give their Kingdome to the Beaſt, untill the words of God be fulfilled.
In like ſort, from the firſt Preaching of the Goſpell unto this day, many there have been, and at this day are, who are diſobedient unto it, and ſtumble at it either in the whole or in part. If we ſhould ſay that they who thus diſobey, and ſtumble at the word of God, are ordained thereunto, ſuch as this Author and his Complices, are ready to cry out upon us as Blaſpheamers, and to profeſſe that they will rather deny that there is a God, then hold with the Contra-Remonſtrants. Yet S. Peter budgeth not 1 Pet. 2. 8.to profeſſe, that Chriſt is a ſtone of ſtumbling and a rock of offence, even to them which stumble at the word of God, being diſobedient, whereunto alſo they were ordained.
When we profeſſe that not any thing in the world comes to paſſe but Deo volente, God willing it, We are cenſured as Blaſphemers, in profeſſing that God doth will that which is evill, and ſinne; yet not only the Articles of Ireland, Artic. 11. profeſſe as much, and Auſtin Enchir. 95. Non aliquid fit niſi Omnipotens fieri velit: but the Apoſtles with one voyce (as touching the contumelious uſages of the Sonne of God, both by Jewes and Gentiles, Herod and Pilate) in their picus meditation poured forth before the face of God, profeſſe, that, Both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and People of Iſrael, were gathered together againſt the holy Sonne of God, to doe that which Gods hand and Gods councell had before determined to be done.
In like ſort, when we ſpeak of Gods giving men over to illuſions to believe lies, others to vile affections, and to uncleanneſſe through the luſts of their own hearts, to diſhonour their own bodies between themſelves, which conſiſted in this, that, The Women did change their naturall uſe into that which is againſt nature; and likewiſe the men, leaving the naturall uſe of the Women, burned in their luſts one towards another, men with men working that which is unſeemely, and receiving in themſelves the recompence of their errour which was meet: and obſerve herehence, that it is juſt with God to puniſh ſinne with ſinne. And as it hath been obſerved before us, from the daies of Auſtin, who when Iulian the Pelagian ſaid, this was done, deſerendo, replies, taking him at his word, who could not but profeſſe that God doth thus, the Scripture expreſly teſtifying as much; and touching the manner mentioned by him, addeth, whether God doth this, deſerendo, or alio modo ſive explicabili, ſive inexplicabili, it matters not. An Arminian ſpirit ſpares not to joyne himſelfe with Iulian the Pelagian in affronting Auſtin thus diſcourſing out of the word of God, and to profeſſe, that that doctrine of Gods puniſhing ſinne with ſinne is a common errour; whereas the Apoſtle profeſſeth in expreſſe termes, that, Herein they received ſuch recompence of their errour as was meet: and what is recompence here but puniſhment? and wherein conſiſted it, but in defiling themſelves contrary to nature, as the Scripture plainly teſtifies, ſaying, Men with men working that which is unſeemely, and receiving in themſelves ſuch recompence of their errour, as was meet. And Arminius ſpares not to profeſſe, that, Omnis paena Deum authorem habet. Wherein yet we concurre not with Arminius. Wee deny that Omnis paena habet Deum authorem. It is true that Paena poſitiva, not of all puniſhment that conſiſts in privation, ſuch as ſinne is; For Malum, as Auſtin long agoe pronounced, non habet cauſam efficientem but deficientem. Yet we confeſſe that God could keep any man from any ſinne, but if he will not, this is not ſufficient to make him the author of it. It is only a culpable defect that makes one the author of ſinne; that is, when he failes of doing that which he ought to doe. But God is bound to none to preſerve him from ſinne, any otherwiſe then his own free will doth bind him; for he hath mercy on whom he will: and ſo alſo on the other ſide, He hardneth whom he will.
Yet I have given no inſtances in any paſſages of the Old Teſtament, which give plentifull teſtimony of Gods ſecret providence of evill; the evidence whereof did wring from Auſtin this confeſſion. Contra Iulian. Pelag. lib. 5. cap. 3. Et multa alia commemorare poſſemus, in quibus aliquando appareat occulto judicio Dei fieri perverſitatem cordis ut non audiatur quod verum dicitur, & inde peccetur, & ſi… ipſum peccatum praecedentis paena peccati. Nam credere mendacio & non credere veritati uti que peccatum eſt. Venit tamen ab eâ caecitate cordis, quae occulto judicio Dei, ſed tamen juſto, etiam paena peccati monſtratur. And in his Book De Grat & lib. arbitr. cap. 20. inquiring how it is ſaid that the Lord bid Shimei to curſe David; Quomodo dixit Dominus huic homini maledicere David? Quis ſapiens & intelligit? How did God bid this man curſe David? Who is wiſe and he ſhall understand? Non enim jubendo dixit, ubi obedientia laudaretur, ſed quod ejus voluntatem proprio vitio ſuo malum in hoc peccatum judicio ſuo juſto & occulto inclinavit. Ideo dictum eſt, dixit ei dominus. Nam ſi jubenti obtemperaſſet Deo, laudandus potius quàm puniendus eſſet, ſicut ex hoc peccato poſtea novimus eſſe punitum. Neither ſaith he, is the cauſe concealed, why God thus dealt with Shimei, Hoc eſt cor ejus malum in hoc peccatum miſerit vel dimiſerit (I expreſſe it rather in Auſtins words then mine own, becauſe the adverſaries of Gods truth, think it enough to paſſe the cenſure of blaſphemy upon ought that we deliver herein.) Now the cauſe was, Ut videat Dominus, inquit, humilitatem meam & retribuat mihi bona pro delicto ejus in die iſto, That God may ſee my humility ſaith David, and recompence me good for his curſing this day. Ecce quomodo probatur (thus Auſtin goes on) Deum uti cordibus etiam malorum ad laudem at que adjumentum honorum. Thus, (ſaith he) he uſed Iudas betraying Chriſt, thus he uſed the Iewes crucifying Chriſt: and how great good things did he thereby procure to all that ſhould at any time believe? Who alſo uſeth the Devill himſelfe, though moſt wicked, yet he uſeth him optimè moſt holily, for the exerciſing and proving of the faith and Piety of the righteous, not to himſelfe who knowes all things before they come to paſſe, but to us, who had need that after ſuch manner God ſhould proceed with us. The adding hereunto, how God wrought in the heart of Abſalom to confound the counſell of Achitophel, he breaks forth into this exclamation in the beginning of the next chapter. Who would not tremble at the conſideration of theſe judgements divine, whereby God workes even in the hearts of wicked men what he will, yet rendring unto them according to their deſerts. Then making mention of Rehoboam his deſpiſing the counſell of the Antients, as alſo that 2 Chron. 1. how God ſtirred up the ſpirit of the Philiſtins and Arabians againſt Ioram, and they came up upon the land of Judah and laid it waſt. Here, ſaith Auſtin, it is manifeſt that God doth raiſe up enemies to lay ſuch countries waſt, whom he judgeth worthy of ſuch puniſhments. But yet, ſaith he, will you ſay they came not up by their own will, or did they ſo come up by their own will, as to make that untrue which the Scripture ſaith, namely, that God ſtirred them up? Nay rather both are true, for both they came up by their own will, and yet God ſtirred up their ſpirits to come; which alſo, ſaith he, may be delivered in this manner, namely, that both God ſtirred up their ſpirit, and alſo they came up by their own will. Agit enim Omnipotens in cordibus hominum etiam motum voluntatis eorum: For the Almighty doth worke in the hearts of men, the very motion of their will, that he may work by them that which he thinks good to work by them, even he who knoweth not how to work any thing unjuſtly. Unto theſe he addeth variety of other teſtimonies all drawn out of the Word, and concludes, His & talibus teſtimoniis divinorum eloquiorum quae omnia commemorare nimis longum eſt, quantum exiſtimo minifeſtetur, Operari Deum in cordibus hominum ad inclinandas eorum voluntates quocun que voluerit ſive ad bona pro ſuâ miſericordiâ, ſive ad mala pro meritis eorum, judicio uti que ſuo aliquando aperto, aliquando occulto, ſemper autem juſto.