The Riches of Gods Love, Part 1 · Treatise · Introduction · Section 4 – Part 1
INTRODUCTION. SECT. IV.
THeſe abſurdities following too evidently from the upper Way, Others of the ſame ſide wiling to decline them as rocks and precipices, doe leave that Way, and preſent man to God in his decree of reprobation, lying in the fault and under the guilt of Originall ſinne; and ſay, That God looking upon miſerable mankind lying in Adams ſinne, did decree the greateſt part of them to eternall torments in hell without remedy, for the manifeſtation of his ſevere Juſtice.
But notwithſtanding this difference among themſelves, they agree well enough together. For this little jarre is not (in their judgements) enough to make a breach between them, as we may ſee in the Conference at the Hague, and in the Synod at Dort. In the Conference at the Hague the Contra-Remonſtrants have theſe words. Quoad ſententiarum diverſitatem in hoc argumento, quod Deus hominem reſpexit Collat. Hag. Brand. p. 37.in hoc decreto nondum creätum, vel creätum & lapſum, quia hoc ad fundamentum hujus doctrinae non pertinet libentèr alii alios aequitate Chriſtiana toleramus. After this in the Synod of Dort, they permitted Gomarus to goe the Supralapſarian way; and the Delegates of South Holland were very indifferent which way they took. For theſe are their words, An Deus in eligendo conſideravit homines ut lapſos, an etiam ut nondum lapſos, exiſtimant (viz. the Delegates aforeſaid) non eſſe neceſſarium ut definiatur, modo ſtatuatur Act. Synodal. pag. 3. & 48.Deum in eligendo conſideraſſe omnes homines in pari ſtatu. And to ſay the truth there is no reaſon why they ſhould quarrell about circumſtances, ſeeing they agree in the ſubſtance. For they both ſay.
1. That the moving cauſe of reprobation is the alone will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall, or actuall.
2. That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates, are neceſſary and unavoidable by Gods abſolute decree.
Theſe two things are the maxima gravamina that the other ſide ſtick at. So that theſe two paths meet at laſt in the ſame way. But becauſe this laſt is choſen by the moſt, and lateſt maintainers of the abſolute decree, as the more moderate of the two, and the eaſyer to be defended, I will ſet down the concluſion which I diſlike in their way and words.
God hath abſolutely purpoſed from eternity, of his meer will and pleaſure without any conſideration of actuall continuance in ſinne and unbeliefe, utterly to caſt off from grace and glory, Millions of men conſidered in the fall (even thoſe whom he calls to repentance and ſolvation by the Preaching of the Goſpell) for the manifeſtation of his ſeverity and Juſtice.
That all mankind is involved in the firſt ſinne and the fruits thereof, which are corruption of nature, and the guilt of eternall death, I confidently believe. But that God did abſolutely intend to leave men in that woefull ſtate for ever, and upon this only ſinne, to build a peremptory decree of the unavoidable damnation of the farre greater part of mankind, I cannot yet be perſwaded.
Having thus plainly laid down the poſition, which I deem to be falſe, I come now in the next place to deliver my reaſons againſt it, which are of two ſorts:
1. Such as firſt made me to queſtion the truth of it.
2. Such as doe for the preſent convince me that it cannot be a truth.
TWISSE Conſideration.
HEre breaks out the main reaſon, that moved this Author to repreſent the different opinions of our Divines about the object of Predeſtination, that ſo a way might be opened unto him at pleaſure, to charge the former opinion with what he thought good; and as for the proofe of his criminations, he might the better eaſe himſelfe of the burthen thereof, by ſhewing the diſſent of other Devines of the ſame profeſſion from the former in this particular, making choyce rather to ſhape the object of Predeſtination and reprobation, under the notion of mankind, lying in the maſſe corrupt by the fall of Adam. For ſurely it is to be preſuppoſed, that they did not diſſent from their former friends without ſome reaſon, and this Author makes bold to inſinuate, that theſe abſurdities mentioned by him were the reaſons: As when he ſaith, Theſe abſurdities following too evidently from the upper way; Others of the ſame ſide willing to decline them, as rocks and precipices doe leave that way. But that theſe were the motives whereby they were induced to decline the former opinion, and to embrace the latter, he proves not, nor ſo much as adventureth upon the proofe thereof, but leaves unto his credulous reader to ſupply that by his forwardneſſe, to take it upon truſt; as if this diſcourſer by his morall carriage, might winne the opinion of ſo much worthineſſe, as to be a man with whom you may well play at Put-finger in the darke, quicum in tenebris mices. And yet Arminius might have taught him, that there is a middle opinion between theſe; namely, of thoſe who make the object of predeſtination the maſſe of mankind created, but not yet corrupted. And he puts this opinion upon Junius, and appeals to his Theſes, as giving evident teſtimony thereunto. Now there is no ſhew or colour of reaſon, why, to avoyd the abſurdities premiſed by this Author, any man ſhould decline the firſt way, and embrace the ſecond, which is the way of Junius. And this I conceive to be the main reaſon, why this ſecond way is altogether diſſembled by this Author, or by the ſpirit that guided him. For albeit it was for this advantage (who hankes after every ſorry conſideration to ſerve his turne in the way of motive, learning to repreſent the multiplicity of opinions hereabouts amongſt our Divines:) yet it being a matter of greater moment, to gain the juſtification of his abſurdities charged upon the firſt way, from the mouthes or practice of our Divines, at leaſt in appearance: and ſome colour hereof he findes by declining the firſt way and falling upon the third; but no colour at all by declining the firſt way and falling upon the ſecond. Therefore he thought it a part of his wiſdome altogether to diſſemble the ſecond, and to repreſent the opinion of thoſe Divines who decline the firſt (yea and ſecond too) and fall upon the third. But ſuppoſe Iunius had preferred the third way and not the ſecond, Had he done it out of a deſire to decline the abſurdities here mentioned? It is apparent by that his conference with Arminius (which yet he ſet not forth, but the Arminian party after his death) that he maintaines all theſe conſiderations to have their place in Predeſtination, and therefore makes Hominem communiter conſideratum the object of predeſtination, which as it is a notion abſtract from all the three ſpeciall notions of nondum conditum, or conditum, but nondum corruptum, or deni que corruptum, ſo it is indifferently applyable unto them all. And indeed Piſcator reſolves the queſtion about the object of Predeſtination, namely, that as Predeſtination includes the decree of creating men unto different ends, ſo the object muſt neceſſarily be mankind not yet created; as it includes the decree of permitting all to fall in Adam, ſo the object (as he thinkes) muſt be mankind created, but not yet corrupted; and laſtly as it includes the decree of chuſing ſome out of that corrupt maſſe, and refuſing others or leaving them in it. ſo the object of his judgement muſt be mankind both created and corrupted. And Arminius himſelfe profeſſeth, that the twenty reaſons wherewith he diſputeth againſt the firſt way, may alſo be accommodated againſt the other waies. And albeit the followers of the ſecond and third way doe think that they can better maintain their Tenent, and free it from the abſurdities wherewith the other waies are charged; yet it followeth not herehence, that therefore they did juſtify them, the contrary whereunto appears in the particular of Iunius, as before I mentioned. Moulin indeed diſputes againſt the firſt, but doth he, to decline that, ſubſiſt in the third, as touching the making of the corrupt Maſſe the object of reprobation? it is apparent he doth not. But as reprobation denotes Gods decree of damnation, he premiſeth thereunto, the foreſight of finall impenitency. Of this opinion of his, this Author takes no notice. Yet is Moulin ſound throughout in the doctrine of election; wherein if this Author did concurre with him, we ſhould nothing trouble our ſelves to take him off from his concurrence with Moulin in that particular of reprobation. And wee of the firſt way are willing to profeſſe, that God neither damnes nor decrees to damne any man, but for ſinne and finall perſeverance therein; nor ſo only, but in plain termes to pronounce, that in no moment of nature doth Gods intention of damnation precede the conſideration of ſinne, and final impenitency; though we doe not make the conſideration of ſinne to precede the intention of damnation, as Moulin doth. And to my underſtanding, other reaſons there are, which caſt Divines upon the third way, then the declining of theſe abſurdities mentioned by this Author; as namely, that the very notions of election and reprobation, the one being conceived to be an act of mercy, the other an act of juſtice, doe preſuppoſe ſinne. And whereas Arminius in his conference with Iunius, produceth five reaſons againſt the firſt way, no leſſe then foure of them proceed on this manner; The firſt thus, Praedeſtinatio eſt voluntas Dei de illuſtrandâ ſuâ gloriâ per miſericordiā & juſtitiā: At illa voluntas locum non habet in nondum condito ceu condendo. The third thus, Praedeſtinatio eſt pars providentiae adminiſtrantis & gubernātis humanū genus; ergò poſterior naturâ actu creationis vel propoſito creandi. Si poſterior actu creationis vel propoſitio creandi hominē, jam homo praedeſtinationis objectum non est conſideratus, ut nondū conditus. His 4th argument is this, Predeſtinatio eſt praeparatio ſupernaturalium bonorū; ergo praecedit communicatio naturaliū, & proptereà creatio in naturâ ſive actu, ſive in decreto Dei. His laſt reaſon is of the ſame nature thus, Illuſtratio ſapientiae Dei per creationē prior eſt illuſtratione ſapientiae Dei quae eſt adminiſtratio praedeſtinationis, 1 Cor. 1. 21. Ergo creatio prior eſt praedeſtinatione. To all which reaſons of his, I have anſwered in my Vindic. Grat. Dei. lib. 1. part. 1. De Praedeſtin. digreſſ. 5. in ſeverall chapters. Only the ſecond argument of Arminius inſiſteth upon Gods ordination of mans fall. And to be freed from the trouble of anſwering this argument, is the only thing that I know we gain, by leaving the firſt and ſecond way, and embarking our ſelves in the third. But how freed? ſurely only ſo farre, as that the doctrine of election and reprobation, ſuppoſing Adams fall, doth not engage us to inquire into divine providence concerning Adams fall. But nevertheleſſe it cannot be denied, but that had not God permitted Adam to fall, he had never fallen. And we that take the firſt way, acknowledge no other Providence divine concerning the ingreſſe of ſinne, as ſinne, into the world, but in the way of permiſſion. Sinne as ſinne admitting no cauſe efficient, but deficient only. And it is utterly impoſſible, that God, either in doing what he doth, or in forbearing to doe what he doth not, ſhould in any culpable, or juſtly blameable manner be deficient. And if it be farther demanded, whether upon Gods permiſſion it followeth, Auguſt. de Civit. Dei. l. 12. c. 7.that ſinne ſhall be committed by the creature; We readily profeſſe it doth. This Vorſtius acknowledgeth a favorite of the Arminians. Nay doth not Arminius himſelf deliver it expreſly, where he ſaith, That when God permitteth the willing of ought, Neceſſe eſt ut nullo argumentorum genere perſuadeatur ad nolendum? This he delivers without all qualification of the neceſſity mentioned, which we doe not. And this alſo Navarettus a Papiſt profeſſeth, and though he be a Dominican, yet I know no Jeſuite that oppoſeth him in this. And if any man inferre herehence, that then God determining to permit ſinne, did determine that ſinne ſhould enter into the World. We willingly grant that God did ſo ordaine namely, that ſinne ſhould come to paſſe by his permiſſion. Non aliquid fit (ſaith Auſtin) niſi Omnipotens fieri velit, vel ſinendo ut fiat, vel ipſe Lib. 2. de Amiſſ. grat. & ſtatis peccati. c. 14.faciendo. And Bellarmine profeſſeth, that, Bonum eſt mala fieri Deo permittente: ſo that herein God doth not will evill, but that which is good in the acknowledgement of Bellarmine; and that in the heat of his oppoſition againſt our Divines in this particular. And Arminius is expreſſe in ſaying, Voluit Deus Achabum menſuram ſcelerum implere. And what is this but, Peccata peccatis cumulare? And though the Jeſuits and Arminians doe Exam. p. 162.with all their force reſiſt, yet it evidently followes from the notion of efficacious grace embraced by the one, and by the notion of an efficacious impediment of ſinne, dictated by Arminius himſelfe. For efficacious grace with the Jeſuites, conſiſts in the congruity thereof, and the congruity thereof conſiſts in this, that God foreſeeth that upon the confeſſion thereof ſinne will be avoided. Now what is the reaſon why God grants ſuch a grace, whereupon he ſeeth ſin will not be avoided; and denies ſuch a grace, upon the granting whereof, he knowes full well that ſinne would be avoided; but becauſe his pleaſure is, that ſinne ſhall be committed by his permiſſion, and not be avoyded, although he hath given them grace ſufficient to avoid it, as they ſay, and it was moſt true of Adam in the ſtate of innocency. In like ſort doth Arminius diſtinguiſh of, Peceati impedimentum ſufficiens & efficax, Efficacious hinderance of ſinne, is that whereby God ſeeth ſinne will be avoided; ſufficient is only that whereby a man may avoid it if he will. But withall he confeſſeth, that God in the Promptuary of his wiſdome, hath not only ſuch impediments as are ſufficient to the avoiding of any ſinne, but ſuch alſo, as whereby any ſinne would indeed be avoided, were he pleaſed Armin. Exam. p. 157.to grant them. But yet as often as he thinks good to permit ſinne, he doth not grant ſuch impediments. And is not this a manifeſt evidence, that it is Gods will, that ſinne ſhall come to paſſe (to wit, as often as it doth come to paſſe) by his permiſſion? But ſuppoſe all our Divines that embrace the third way, doe imagine the abſurdities here ſpoken of, to be juſtly chargeable upon the firſt way. Yet as he thinks them in an errour, while they conceive they can with eaſe avoid theſe abſurdities by their third way, let him be pleaſed to conceive, they may as well be in an errour, in thinking them juſtly chargeable upon the firſt way; and conſequently their opinion is nothing ſufficient to juſtify, that they are unremoveable by them that embrace the firſt way.
It is true there is no cauſe of breach either of Unity or Amity between our Divines upon this difference, as I ſhewed in my digreſſions De Praedeſtinatione Digreſſ. 1. ſeeing neither of them derogate either from the prerogative of Gods grace, or of his ſoveraignty over his creatures, to give grace to whom he will, and to deny it to whom he will, and conſequently, to make whom he will veſſels of mercy, and whom he will veſſells of wrath; but equally they ſtand for the divine prerogative in each. And as for the ordering of Gods decrees of creation, permiſſion of the fall of Adam, giving grace of faith and repentance unto ſome, and denying it to others, and finally ſaving ſome and damning others, whereupon only ariſe the different opinions, as touching the object of predeſtination and reprobation, it is meerly Apex Logicus, a poynt of Logick. And were it not a meer madneſſe, to make a breach of unity or charity in the Church of God, meerely upon a poynt of Logick? Thus have I juſtified the improbability and utter unlikelihood, that ever any ſchiſme will be made in the Church of God, upon theſe nice and meer Logicall differences, in my Vindic. Grat. Dei, which this Author is acquainted with as appears by a paſſage that hereafter he repreſenteth therehence, and that farther into the Book then theſe my digreſſions are upon the point of predeſtination, but is content to take no notice thereof, leaſt it might hinder the courſe of his Scene, whereunto it is fit he ſhould be ſerviceable. And as for the two Articles here mentioned, wherein they are ſaid unanimouſly to agree, and which he calls maxima gravamina. It is true they doe agree herein, but it may be in a farre other ſenſe, then he is willing ſhould be taken notice of. For as for the firſt,
1. That the moving cauſe of reprobation, is the alone will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall or actuall.
1. This is true in proportion to election, that like as no good work of man is the moving cauſe of election, but only the will of God; ſo no ſinne or evill work of man is the cauſe of reprobation, but only the will of God.
1. That ſo it is of election, the Apoſtle both
1. Saith, Election is not of Workes but of him that calleth.
2. And proveth thus, Before Eſau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid, The Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger; therefore Election is not of Workes (that is of good workes) but of him that calleth.
2. That ſo it is of reprobation, I prove by the ſame argument of the Apoſtle, thus, Before Eſau and Iacob were borne, or had done good or evill, it was ſaid the Elder ſhall ſerve the Younger; therefore reprobation ſtands not of workes (that is of evill workes) but of the meer pleaſure of God.
1. And like as this is farther evident by Gods courſe of calling in the point of Election, as the Apoſtle intimateth, for as much as God calleth effectually whom he will in beſtowing faith and repentance upon them. For as the Apoſtle afterwards profeſſeth, He hath mercy on whom he will.
2. So it is as evident in the point of reprobation, in as much as God refuſeth to call whom he will, by denying faith and repentance unto them, as afterwards the ſame Apoſtle profeſſeth, ſaying, that God hardneth whom he will.
2. And this doctrine we doe explicate by diſtinguiſhing that which our Adverſaries deſire to confound, leaſt their cheating carriage ſhould be diſcovered, as formerly I have ſhewed.
For Predeſtination and Reprobation, may be conſidered either quoad Praedeſtinantis & Reprobantis actum; or quoad Praedeſtinationis & Reprobationis terminum, as much as to ſay, quoad res praedeſtinatione & reprobatione praeparatas, that is, either as touching the act of Predeſtination and Reprobation, or as touching the things decreed by Predeſtination or Reprobation. Now as touching the act of Predeſtination never any man (ſaith Aquinas) was ſo mad as to ſay that the merits of man are the cauſe of predeſtination. And why ſo? Becauſe the act of predeſtination is the act of Gods will, and formerly (ſaith he) I have ſhewed, that there can be no cauſe of the will of God, as touching the act of God willing, but only as touching the things willed by God. Now apply this to reprobation. For is not reprobation as touching the act of God reprobating, the very act alſo of Gods will? This cannot be denied: and herehence it followes, that like as there can be no cauſe of Gods will, as touching the act of God willing, ſo there can be no cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating. And like as it was a mad thing in Aquinas his judgement to ſay, that merits were the cauſe of predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating; ſo it is no leſſe madneſſe in his judgement, to maintain that either ſinne originall or actuall, can be the meritorious cauſe of reprobation, as touching the act of God reprobating.
And what are the reaſons hereof in School-divinity? Why ſurely theſe. 1. Predeſtination and Reprobation are eternall, but good workes and evill workes of the creature are temporall; but impoſſible it is, that a thing temporall, can be the cauſe of that which is eternall. 2. The act of Predeſtination and Reprobation is the act of Gods will, and the act of Gods will, like as the act of his knowledge, is the very eſſence of God even God himſelfe; and therefore to introduce a cauſe of Gods will, is to bring in a cauſe of God himſelfe. 3. If works or faith foreſeen be any moving cauſe of Divine election, then either they are ſo of their own nature, or by the meer conſtitution of God. Not of their own nature, as it is apparent; therefore by the conſtitution of God: but this cannot ſtand neither. For if by the conſtitution of God, then it would follow, that God did conſtitute, that upon foreſight of mans faith he would elect him, that is, ordaine him to ſalvation. And what I pray is to conſtitute? Is it any other then to ordaine? And herehence it followeth, God did ordaine that upon foreſight of mans faith, he would ordaine him unto ſalvation: Whereby the eternall ordination of God, is made the object of his eternall ordination; whereas it is well known, and generally received, that nothing, but that which is temporall, can be the object of divine ordination which is eternall. In like ſort I diſpute of reprobation: if ſinne be the cauſe thereof, then either of its own nature it is the cauſe thereof, or by the ordinance of God: Not of its own nature as all are ready to confeſſe: if you ſay by the ordinance of God, then it follows God did ordaine, that upon the foreſight of mans ſinne, he would ordaine him unto damnation. For reprobation is Gods ordaining a man unto damnation, as touching one part of the things decreed thereby; which we come to conſider in the next place, and that both in election and in reprobation, having hitherto conſidered them as touching the act of God electing or reprobating, and ſhewed that thus they can have no cauſe.
But as touching the things decreed, thereby they may have a cauſe as Aquinas profeſſeth and we profeſſe with him. As for example to begin with election.
The things decreed or deſtinated to a man in election are two, Grace and Glory. Now both theſe may have a cauſe: For both Grace is the cauſe of glory; and Chriſts merits are the cauſe both of grace and glory. But let grace be rightly underſtood. For in the confuſe notion of grace many are apt to lurke, thereby to ſhut their eyes againſt the evidence of truth. For no marvail if men be in love with their own errours; and in proportion to the love of errour, ſuch is their hatred of Divine truth oppoſite thereunto. Now by grace, we underſtand the grace of regeneration, whereby that naturall corruption of mind and will (commonly called blindneſſe of mind and hardneſſe of heart) which we all bring into the world with us through originall ſin, is in part cured. More diſtinctly we call this grace, the grace of faith and repentance, whereby our naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured. Now this grace we ſay God beſtowes on whom he will, finding all equall in infidelity and impenitency. For ſo the Apoſtle tells us, that, God hath mercy on whom he will. And as God beſtowes it on Rom. 9. 18.whom he will, not finding any cauſe in man any way moving him, either in its own nature, or by divine conſtitution, moving him to beſtow this grace on any. So the Apoſtle 2 Timoth. 1. 9. God hath ſaved us, and called us with an holy calling, not according to our workes, but according to his own purpoſe and grace. And indeed we being all found dead in ſinne, what could be found in one to move God to beſtow the life of faith and repentance upon him, more then upon another? And if any ſuch thing were found in man moving God hereunto, then ſhould grace be beſtowed according unto works, that is in the Fathers phraiſe (as Bellarmine acknowledgeth) according unto merits; which was condemned 1200 years agoe, in the Synod of Paleſtine: and Pelagius himſelfe was driven to ſubſcribe unto it, otherwiſe they had condemned him alſo.
But as touching the conferring of glory, God doth not beſtow this on whom he will, finding men equall without any moving cauſe thereunto, even in man; For though there be no moving cauſe hereunto in man of its own nature, yet there is to be found, a moving cauſe in man by conſtitution divine, whereby God is as it were moved to beſtow ſolvation on ſome, and not on others. For God hath made a gracious promiſe, that whoſoever beleeveth and repenteth, and continueth in faith and repentance unto death ſhall be ſaved, and whoſoever beleeveth not and repenteth not ſhall be damned. So then though men are equall in originall ſinne, and in naturall corruption, and God beſtowes faith and repentance on whom of them he will, curing their corruption in whom he will: yet when, he comes to the conferring of glory, men are not found equall in morall condition; and accordingly God cannot be ſaid on like manner, to beſtow glory & ſolvation on whō he will; For he hath tyed himſelfe by his own conſtitution to beſtow ſolvation on none, but ſuch as dye in theſtate of grace. Yet, I confes, ſome ſay that God beſtows ſolvation on whom he will, in as much as he is the author of their faith & repentance, & beſtows theſe graces on whō he will, yet certainly there is a different manner in the uſe of this phraiſe of beſtowing this or that on whom he will. For when God beſtowes faith and repentance, he findes them on whom he will beſtow it, no better then others: But when he comes to the beſtowing of glory he findes them, on whom he beſtowes that, farre better them others.
Now we come to the things decreed in reprobation, and theſe are two.
1. The denyall of the grace of regeneration, that is, of the grace of faith and repentance, whereby mans naturall infidelity and impenitency is cured.
2. The denyall of glory, and the inflicting of damnation. The firſt of theſe, to wit, the denyall of grace mentioned, is made to whom he will. And it muſt needs be ſo, in eaſe God gives this grace to whom he will. And the Apoſtle profeſſeth, that as God hath mercy on whom he will, ſo he hardneth whom he will. And as God denies this grace to whom he will, ſo did he decree to deny it to whom he will: Yet there is a difference conſiderable: For albeit God hardneth whom he will, by denying unto them the grace of faith and repentance; yet notwithſtanding, like as it is juſt with God to inflict damnation upon them, for that ſinne whether originall or actuall, wherein he findes them, when the miniſtry of the word is afforded them: ſo likewiſe it cannot be denied to be iuſt with God, to leave their infidelity and impenitency wherein he finds them uncured. But yet becauſe God hath not made any ſuch conſtitution, namely, that whoſoever is found in infidelity and impenitency, ſhall be ſo left and abandoned by him: therefore he is properly ſaid, as to cure it in whom he will, ſo to leave it uncured in whom he will, finding them all equall in originall ſinne, and conſequently lying equally in this their naturall infidelity and impenitencv. So wee may iuſtly ſay, there is no cauſe at all in man of this difference, to wit, why God cures infidelity & impenitency in one and not in another, but it is the meer pleaſure of God that is the cauſe of this difference. And if any liſt to contend hereabouts, we ſhall be willing to entertaine him, and conferre our ſtrength of argumentation on this point.
2. But as touching the denyall of glory and inflicting of damnation, which is the ſecond thing decreed in reprobation, there is alwaies found a cauſe motive, yea and meritorious hereof, to wit, both of the denyall of the one & inflicting of the other: And God doth not proceed herein according to the meer pleaſure of his will, & that by reaſon of his own conſtitution, having ordained that whoſoever continueth finally in infidelity, in profane courſes, and impenitency ſhall be damned. And albeit on the other ſide it may be ſaid in ſome ſence (as formerly I have ſhewed) that God ſaves whom he will, in as much as he is the author of faith, which he beſtowes on whom he will; yet in no congruous ſence can he be ſaid to damne whom he will, for as much as he is not the author of ſinne, as he is the author of faith. For every good thing he workes, but ſinne and the evill thereof he only permits, not cauſeth it. And laſtly, as God doth not damne whom he will, but thoſe only whom he finds finally to have perſevered in ſinne without repentance: ſo neither did he decree to damne, or reprobate to damnation whom he will, but only thoſe who ſhould be found finally to perſevere in ſinne without repentance.
Now let us apply this to the Article we have in hand, which is this; The moving cauſe of reprobation is the only will of God, and not the ſinne of man originall or actuall: and for the explication hereof, according to that which hath been formerly delivered, We ſay that reprobation doth ſignify, either a purpoſe of denying grace, as above mentioned, or a purpoſe of inflicting damnation. And each may be conſidered, either as touching the act of Gods decree, or as touching the things decreed. We ſhew how the Article holds or holds not, being differently accommodated.
1. As touching the things decreed,
1. As touching the deniall of grace, We ſay, That God decreed of his meere good pleaſure to deny unto ſome the grace of faith and repentance, for the curing of that naturall infidelity and impenitency which is found in all, without any motive cauſe hereunto found in one more then in another.
2. As touching the inflicting of Damnation, We ſay, That God decreed to inflict damnation on ſome, not of his meer pleaſure, but meerly for their finall perſeverance in ſinne without repentance.
2. As touching the very act of Gods decree, We ſay, Nothing in man could be the cauſe hereof, but the meer pleaſure of God, as Aquinas profeſſeth it a mad thing to deviſe in man a cauſe of divine predeſtination, as touching the act of God predeſtinating, & as I have ſhewed, becauſe both are eternall and the act of Gods will, which is God himſelfe: and withall to deviſe a cauſe hereof, is to caſt our ſelves upon an unavoydable abſurdity, as namely to ſay, That God did ordaine that upon the foreſight of this or that in men, he would ordaine ſome of them to ſolvation, and others unto damnation. And indeed the harſhneſſe of the Tenent, conſiſts chiefly in confounding theſe different conſiderations, whereby a colour is caſt, as if we maintained that God did decree to damne men of his meere pleaſure and not for ſin.
2. As touching the ſecond which is this, That the finall impenitency and damnation of reprobates are neceſſary, and unavoydable by Gods abſolute decree. Here as it were to make weight, impenitency and damnation are clapt together, as unavoydable by Gods abſolute decree; whereas it is without all queſtion, that ſuppoſing impenitency to be finall, damnation is unavoydable by the Law of God, as who hath ordained, that whoſoever dies in impenitency ſhall be damned. And as for impenitency, doth this Author, or any Arminian deny it to be a fruit of that originall corruption wherein all are borne? I perſwade my ſelfe they doe not. Corvinus profeſſeth of all, That by the ſinne of Adam, they are, conjecti in neceſſitatem peccandi. Then againe doth he maintaine Defenſ. Armin. pag. 394.that any is able to cure this but God. It ſeems he doth not by that which followeth, where he ſignifieth that God (in his opinion) did not abſolutely intend to leave men to that woefull eſtate wherein they were borne. What then? Will he have God bound to cure it in all? If ſo, then certainly he doth cure it in all. For it were impoſſible God ſhould not doe that, whereunto he is obliged in the way of juſtice. But nothing more manifeſt, then that God doth not cure it in all: therefore certainly he is not bound to cure it in all. But I imagine he conceives that God is ready to cure it in all, and it is mans fault that he doth not cure it in any. As much as to ſay, if man would doe ſomewhat which he may doe, then God would give him repentance. Here is good ſtuffe towards; and undoubtedly, this is the criticall point as touching the nature of efficacious grace. Yet this I know full well, how carefull the greateſt Rabbies amongſt the Arminians are to decline. And will it not manifeſtly follow herehence, that the grace of repentance is given ſecundum merita, according to ſome good work of man that went before? Which was condemned in the Synode of Paleſtine above 1200 years agoe; Nay what will you ſay, if their doctrine hereabouts in the iſſue thereof comes to this, namely that God doth work in man, foreign Velle credere; modo Velit, foreign Velle reſipiſcere, modò Velit, as I can ſhew it under the hand of one? and I have cauſe to ſuſpect that it comes alſo from another manner of hand, then his, with whom I have had to deale with. And in this caſe it ſhall not be true that God ſhews mercy on whom he will, in giving faith and repentance, but rather he ſhall ſhew mercy on whom man will. And like as when a queſtion is made, why ſuch a man is rewarded by the Magiſtrate, no wiſe man will anſwer becauſe it is the pleaſure of the Magiſtrate ſo to reward him, but rather repreſent the cauſe on mans part, why he was reward: ſo if God ſhews mercy in giving repentance according to ſome preparation found in one man, rather then in another, it ſhall not be ſaid, that God hath mercy on whom he will, but rather the reaſon on mans part is to be repreſented, why God doth give him repentance. Yet theſe Petitions he calls maxima gravamina on the part of Reprobation.
And will he not give us leave to propoſe in proportion hereunto, our maxima gravamina, as touching their opinion in point of election? namely. 1. That it is not the meer pleaſure of God, but the faith and repentance of a man foreſeen, that is the moving cauſe of divine election. 2. And that every man hath power to believe and repent, and no man hath more cauſe to be thankfull unto God; for giving him any more grace to believe and repent (in the way of grace preventing) then he gives to reprobates. I ſpeak of reprobate men, but for ought I yet know to the contrary, I may as well deliver it of the reprobate Angells. And as touching that which they call grace ſubſequent, which is only Gods concurrence, ſeeing God affords that to any ſinfull act, they may thank themſelves, rather then God for that, like as for Gods concurrence unto any act of ſinne. Theſe doctrines are no gravamina to the tender conſciences of our Adverſaries.
The doctrine oppoſite to this which here he diſlikes muſt needs be this, God hath not abſolutely purpoſed from eternity of his meer will and pleaſure, but upon conſideration of actuall continuance in ſinne and unbeliefe, to caſt off men from grace and glory. Now this actuall continuance in unbeliefe I preſume muſt be finall; and upon the conſideration hereof, God caſts them off from grace: but I pray from what grace? ſurely from the grace of faith; otherwiſe it ſtands not in any contradiction to our Tenent. So that their doctrine in the iſſue comes to this, Whom God foreſees that they will not believe unto death, he decrees that they ſhall not believe unto death: and applied unto repentance, thus; Whom God foreſees that they will not repent unto death, he decreeth that they ſhall not repent unto death. This is the ſober and ſavoury doctrine of theſe impugners of the grace of God: and yet they perceive not what a ſpirit of giddineſſe poſſeſſeth them in this.
It is without queſtion (I think) that God leaves many in that woefull eſtate which here is called corruption of nature (no more, without any ſpecification wherein it conſiſts) the guilt whereof is eternall death; and ſeeing that if he ſo leaves them, it cannot be denied, but that God intended ſo to leave them. All the queſtion is, Whether God did abſolutely intend to leave them. Now had this Author, as he profeſſeth his diſlike of Gods abſolue intention hereof, ſo dealt clearly, and ſhewed how he did intend ſo to leave ſome, as namely upon what condition, or upon foreſight whereof, and withall given ſome proofe of his aſſertion, his ingenuity had been commendable. Yet we ſay, that God did not at all intend to leave men in this ſtate. For the terme, men in this place being indefinite, it is capable of truth either way. And this Author defines not whether he ſpeaks of ſome or of all. We willingly grant, he doth not leave his elect in that woefull ſtate, but brings them out of it by faith and repentance; which are expreſſely called the gifts of God, in holy Scripture. But as for Reprobates, I doe not find he gives either faith or repentance unto them. And Auſtin lib. 5. contra Julian. Pelag. cap. 4. ſpeaking of the Non praedeſtinati: Illorum neminem (ſaith he) adducit Deus ad ſalubrem ſpiritualem que paenitentiam, quâ homo reconciliatur Deo in Chriſto, ſive illis ampliorem patientiam, ſive non imparem praebeat: and if not unto repentance, then certainly neither doth he bring any of them unto faith. Then againe, it were worth the knowing of this Author, whether any Infants of Turkes and Saracens departing this life in their infancy, are left in this woefull eſtate. If none are left but all are ſaved, is it not a pretty guilt of eternall death, for which not any ſuffers? And you may gueſſe by this whether this Authors Pretence of acknowledgement of naturall corruption be not only from the teeth outward: If any heathen Infants dying in their infancy, are left in this wofull eſtate, and ſuffer eternall death for that naturall corruption, let this Author anſwer, whether God intended to leave them in this woefull eſtate abſolutely or no. For I profeſſe willingly, I cannot imagine how God ſhould intend this concerning ſuch Infants and not abſolutely, ſeeing before they come to the uſe of reaſon, there is no place for Divine foreſight of any thing in them, to put a difference between ſome and others.
II. The Diſcourſe it ſelfe, conſiſting of
1. Motives inducing,
2. Arguments convincing.