The Grounds of Protestant Religion, Part 3 · Chapter 2

The Grounds of Protestant Religion · Part 3 · Chapter 2

p. 533CHAP. II. Of the use and Authority of General Councils.

The denying the Infallibility of General Councils takes not away their use and Authority. Of the submission due to them by all particular persons. How far external obedience is required in case they err. No violent opposition to be made against them. Rare Inconveniences hinder not the effect of a just power. It cannot rationally be supposed, that such General Councils as are here meant should often or dangerously err. The true notion of a General Council explained. The Freedom requisite in the proceedings of it. The Rule it must judge by. Great difference between external obedience, and internal assent to the Decrees of Councils. This latter unites men in errour, not the former. As great uncertainties supposing General Councils Infallible as not. Not so great certainty requisite for submission as Faith. Whether the Romanists Doctrine of the Infallibility of Councils, or ours, tend more to the Churches peace? St. Austin explained. The Keyes according to him given to the Church. No unremediable inconvenience, supposing a General Councilerr. But errours in Faith are so, supposing them Infallible when they are not. The Church hath power to reverse the Decrees of General Councils. The power of Councils not by Divine Institution. The unreasonableness of making the Infallibility of Councils depend on the Popes confirmation. No consent among the Romanists about the subject of Infallibility, whether in Pope or Council. No evidence from Scripture, Reason, or Antiquity, for the Popes personal Infallibility.

THE first question being thus dispatched, I now come to the second, §. 1.which is, Of what Vse and Authority General Councils are in the Church, supposing them not Infallible? And here again two things are to be examined; first, How far General Councils are to be submitted to. Secondly, Whether our opinion or yours tend more to the peace of the Church; for both these his Lordship handles distinctly, and so shall we. For the first, nothing is more necessary then throughly to understand his Lordships meaning, which he most fully delivers in these words.P. 245. General Councils lawfully called and ordered and lawfully proceeding, are a great and awful representation, and cannot err in matters of Faith, keeping themselves to Gods rule, and not attempting to make a new one of their own; and are with all submission to be observed by every Christian, where Scripture, or evident demonstration, comes not against them. Two things you mainly object against this opinion. 1. That in case such a Council err, it tends only to unite men in errour. 2. Who shall be Judge of all those conditions implyed in the Councils p. 534proceedings? to these two, all that I can find material scattered up and down in your Discourse on this Subject, may be reduced. For the first, we must consider the occasion of his Lordships entrance into this subject concerning General Councils, how far they may err, or not, which he saith, is a question of great consequence in the Church of God. For to say they cannot err, P. 223.leaves the Church not only without remedy against an errour once determin'd; but also without sense that it may need a remedy, and so without care to seek it, which is the misery of the Church of Rome at this day. To say they can err, seems to expose the members of the Church to an uncertainty and wavering in the Faith, to make unquiet Spirits not only to disrespect former Councils of the Church, but also to slight and contemn whatsoever they may now determine. So that, great inconveniencies appearing on both sides, his Lordship endeavours to steer his course so as not to dash on the rocks of either side, by betraying the Churches Faith in asserting their Infallibility, or the Churches peace by acknowledging them fallible. But as he could not see any reason to believe them Infallible, so neither could he see any necessity that the Churches peace should be broken, supposing them not to be so. And the most obvious objection being, If a General Council be fallible, what is to be done in case it should err? For that, he propounds this Expedient, That the determination of a General Council erring was to stand in force, P. 224.and to have external obedience at the least yielded to it, till evidence of Scripture, or a demonstration to the contrary made the errour appear; and untill thereupon another Council of equal authority did reverse it. And he after explains what he means by this external obedience, P. 226.viz. That which consists in silence, patience, and forbearance yielded to it: which he builds on this reason, That Controversies arising in the Church must have some end or they'l tear all in sunder: therefore supposing a General Council should err, and an erring Decree be by the Law it self invalid, I would have it, (saith he) wisely considered again (supposing the Council not to err in Fundamental Verity) whether it be not fit to allow a General Council that honour and priviledge, which all other great Courts have; Namely that there be a declaration of the invalidity of its decrees, P. 227.as well as of the Laws of other Courts, before private men can take liberty to refuse obedience. Therefore he concludes, That this seems most fit and necessary for the peace of Christendom, unless in case the errour be manifest and intolerable, or that the whole Church upon peaceable and just complaint of this errour neglect or refuse to call a Council to examine it: and there come in National and Provincial Councils to reform for themselves. These words contain the full account of his Lordships opinion, which you charge with so many interclashings and inconveniences. The first of which is, That it tends only to oblige all the members of the Church to an Vnity in errour against Scripture and demonstration, P. 242.during their whole lives, or rather to the worlds end; since such an Utopian rectifying Council as the Bishop here fancies, is morally impossible ever to be had; and therefore you call it a strange (not not say an impious) doctrine, advanced without authority of Gods Word, or Antiquity, nay contrary to all solid reason.

This being a charge of the highest nature and manag'd with such unmeasurable confidence,§. 2. we must somewhat further enquire into the grounds of his Lordships opinion, to see whether it be guilty of these crimes or no. There are three things therefore must be cleared in order to his Lordships Vindication. 1. The design of his Discourse. 2. The suppositions he makes as to the proceedings of the Council. 3. The obligation of its decrees supposing that it should err.

p. 5351. The design of his discourse is to be considered; which is to remedy a supposable inconvenience, and to provide for the Churches peace. For the first question in debate was, Whether a General Council might err, or no. In which his Lordship gives sufficient evidence from Scripture, Antiquity, and Reason, that it might. But then here comes an inconvenience to be removed; for his Adversary objects, What are we then nearer to Vnity after a Council hath determin'd, supposing it may err? To this his Lordship suits his Answer: wherein we ought to consider, that the inconvenience objected is, on his Lordships suppositions, one of the rara contingentia; and such a one ought not to destroy a principle of Government in all other cases useful and necessary. For there cannot possibly be any way thought of for peace and Government, but there may be a supposition made of some notable inconvenience; but that not being necessary, nor immediately consequent upon it, but something which may happen and far more probably may not, it ought not to hinder the obtaining of that, which is generally both useful and necessary. To give you a parallel case to this: It is granted on all hands that the civil authority of a Nation is Fallible, and therefore we may suppose it actually to err, and that so far as to bind men by Law to something in it self unlawful. Will you say now, that the intent of civil authority is to bind men necessarily to sin? I hope, you will not: but by this you may easily see the fallacy of your arguing against his Lordship; for it is an Inconvenience indeed supposable, but not at all necessary; if he had said indeed, that General Councils must necessarily err, your Argument had been strong against him; but as it is, it hath no more force against his assertion, then the supposition before made hath against civil authority. For that case may be easily put, that such a Law may pass; but, doth this hinder men from their obligation to duty and submission to a just authority? or, Will you have men presently to renounce obedience, and to repeal such a Law themselves, and not rather in all wayes of duty and reverence to authority make known their just complaints and desire a redress by the hands of Supream authority? And this is all which his Lordship aims at, that in case a General Council should err (which is not easily imaginable upon his suppositions) it tends more to the Churches peace for private men not to oppose the Decrees of it, but to endeavour that another General Council be called to repeal it, and till then to preserve the Churches peace, supposing the errour not manifest or intolerable. In this case then there are two inconveniences put: the one of them is, That when a Council is supposed to err, every particular man may be at liberty to oppose the Decrees of it, and so put the Church into confusion; the other is, That though private men may know it to be an errour, yet they should be patient till the Church by another Council may repeal it: now these two inconveniences being laid together, the question is, Which is the greater? His Lordship with a great deal of reason judges the former to be: because in the latter case it is only a silencing of some less necessary truth for some time; but in the other it is an exposing the Church to the fury of mens turbulent Spirits. But that which shews the unreasonableness of your objection, That this is the way to bind the Church to an union in errour, is, that this doth not necessarily follow from his Lordships opinion, but is only a case supposable: and no rare Inconvenience ought to prejudice a general good: And the peace of the Church in such a case ought to be preferred before private mens satisfaction.

p. 536§. 3.But this will further appear, if we consider, secondly, the Suppositions his Lordship makes; for by that we shall see, how rarely incident this case is: for, I hope, the supposing that a General Council may erre, doth not suppose that it must necessarily erre; and granting those things which are supposed by him, it is a rare case that it should erre. For these things are by him supposed. 1. That it must be a Council lawfully called and ordered; and so, not such Councils as that of Trent was, or any like it; wherein the Pope gives only a General Summons, and that it must be called a General Council on that account, how few Bishops soever appear in it, nay, though the far greatest part of the Christian world be excluded from it: but it must be such a Council as may be acknowledged to be General, by the general Consent of the Christian world. For that we would make our Judge in the case; as it was in the four first General Councils. Not that we would stand upon Bishops being actually present from every particular Church, but that such a number be present from the greatest Churches, as may make it not be suspected to be meerly a Faction, packed together for the Interess of some potent Prelate; but that they do so indifferently meet from all parts, that there may be no just ground of suspicion, that they design any thing but the common good of the Christian world. And therefore we acknowledge the first four General Councils to be truly such, in our present sense; neither do we quarrel at them, because so few Bishops were present, who lived out of the Roman Empire; for, supposing the Church at the same freedom from particular Interesses that it was then, and so great a number of Bishops assembled together, we look on it to be so great and awful a Representation, that its determinations ought not to be opposed by any factious or turbulent Spirits. And in case some Bishops be not present from some Churches, whether Eastern or Western, yet if upon the publishing those Decrees, they be universally accepted, that doth, ex post-facto, make the Council truly Occumenical. By this you see, what we mean by a General Council. And, for the calling of it; though we say, it should be by the consent of the chief Patriarchs, yet the right and custom of the ancient Church, clearly carries it, that it ought to be summoned by the authority of Christian Princes: for, nothing can be more evident to such, who will not shut their eyes against the clearest evidence, than that the first General Councils (before the Pope had got the better of the Emperours) were summoned by the Emperours command and authority; and since the division of the Empire into so many Kingdoms and Principalities, the consent of Christian Princes is necessary on the same grounds. Neither ought it only to be a General Council, and lawfully called, but lawfully ordered too, viz. that no Prelate challenge himself such a Presidency not in, but over the Council, that his Instructions must be looked on as the only Chart they must steer their course by; and that nothing be debated, but proponentibus Legatis, as it was at Trent: for these things take away utterly that Freedom which is necessary for a General Council. And therefore his Lordship justly requires, 2. That the Council do proceed lawfully; which it cannot do, if it be over-awed, as the second Ephesine was by Dioscorus and his party; or if practices be used, as at Ariminum: but there must be the greatest freedom in debates, no canvasing for votes, but every one suffered to deliver his judgement, without prejudice or partiality, that those who give their judegements, deliver their reasons before, and not only appear in Pontificalibus, to give their Placet. That the Bishops present, be men of unquestionable abilities, and generally presumed to be well acquainted with the matters to be debated p. 537there: For otherwise nothing would be more easie, than for the more subtil men, under ambiguous expressions, and fair pretences to bring over a great number of the rest to them, who want either judgement or learning enough to discern their designs. And this is supposed to be the case of the Council at Ariminum, where the Occidental Bishops, for want of learning were over-reached by the subtilty of the Arrian party. 3. His Lordship supposes, That this Council keeps it self to Gods Rule, and not attempt to make a new one of their own: For in so doing they commit an errour in the first Concoction, which will be incorrigible afterwards. And this is not only reasonable, but just and necessary, because nothing can be a Rule of Faith, but what is of immediate divine Revelation; and this hath been the practice of the first General Councils, which never owned or proceeded by any other Rule of Faith but this. These things being supposed, May we not justly say, That an erring determination of such a Council so proceeding, is a rare case? Since we believe, that God will not deny to any particular person (who doth sincerely seek it) the knowledge of his truth, much less may we think he will do it to such an awful Representation of the Church, when assembled together purposely for finding out that truth, which may be of so great consequence to the Christian world. For both the truth of Gods promises, the goodness of God to his people, and his peculiar care of his Church, seem highly concerned, that such a Council should not be guilty of any notorious errour.

But, because we deny not, but such a Council is fallible, therefore we grant the case may be put, that such a Council may erre;§. 4. and the Question is, What is to be done then? Whether every particular person may oppose such a determination, or submit till another Council reverse the Decrees of it. His Lordship asserts the latter; and so we come to the effect of such an erring Decree, which was the third thing to be spoken to. As to which, these things must be considered, 1. That he doth not assert, that men are bound to believe the truth of that Decree, but not openly to oppose it. For so he speaks expresly of external obedience, and at least so far as it consists in silence, patience, and forbearance yielded to it. And therefore you are greatly deceived, when with such confidence you assert, That this obliges all the members of the Church to unity in errour; for that is only consequent upon your principle, that the Decrees of General Councils are to be believed by an internal Assent: for this indeed would necessarily oblige them to unity in errour; but the most that is consequent on his Lordships Opinion, is, that in such cases wherein a General Council hath erred, men ought rather to be silent for a time as to some truth, than to break the Churches peace. In the mean time he doth not deny, but that men may be bound to follow their own judgements in the discovery of truth; nay, and they may use all means consistent with the Churches peace, to promote that truth; for he allows that just complaints may be made to the Church for reversing the decrees of the former Council, and this cannot be without discovering the errour of that Council. And I hope this liberty of dissent and just complaint, is sufficient to keep all the members of the Church from being united in Errour. And, I pray Sir, What cause is there now for such hideous out-cryes, that this is such a strange and impious Doctrine, against Scripture, Antiquity, and solid Reason, which appears, for all that I can see, very just and reasonable, taking it in the way which he explains himself in. But, whereas you object, That this will keep men in errour to the worlds end, because such a Council is morally impossible; it is easie to shew p. 538you, that if the rectifying Council be impossible; the General erring Council is equally impossible; therefore there is no danger coming that way neither. And that such General Councils are grown such morally impossible things, we may in a great measure thank your Church for it, which hates as much such a true rectifying Council (as you call it) as the Court of Rome does a thorow Reformation. For, all your design is, to perswade men, that those only are General Councils, which have the Popes Summons, and wherein he rules, and, in effect, does all; and to perswade men to believe the Decrees of such Councils, is the most effectual way in the world to unite men in the belief of errours to the worlds end. For, as long as the Popes Interest can carry it, to be sure, all rectifying Councils, shall be (as you say) Vtopian too; for he will prevent, if possible, their ever appearing in Europe. Therefore all this discourse of his Lordship doth suppose such a state of the Church, as that was in the time of the Nicene Councils, and after; when there might be a liberty of calling such Councils, that in case one errs, another might be summoned to reverse it. But this is not to be expected in faece Romuli, in this state of the Christian world, that there should be such a General Council so called, and so proceeding as he supposes, and therefore there is no such danger of being united in errour, by vertue of its Decrees; but if the state of things would bear such a Council so decreeing, we might as well think it would bear another to reverse it, if need were, and then his Lordships supposition would come to act, that in the interstice of those Councils, private men ought not to oppose the Decrees of the former, but patiently wait till the latter reverse them. But, as things are now in the Christian world, his Lordship doth not suppose that any Council hath such a power to oblige, because it calls it self a General Council; but a truly General Council being, as you say, morally impossible, nothing is left but that the Church reform it self by parts, and wait to give an account of its proceedings therein, till such a General Council as we before described, be assembled in the Christian world. Thus we see, how vain and empty your first Objection is, That from his Lordships opinion, it would follow, that the Church must be united in errour, which is only the direct consequent of your own assertion, that men are bound to believe the Decrees of those you call General Councils to be Infallible.

Your next great Objection is, That this Doctrine exposes all to uncertainties; §. 5.for, Who shall be judge, whether it be a lawful Council, and proceeds lawfully? Whether the errours be fundamental and intolerable or no? Whether there be Scripture and demonstration against them or no? For, if every man be judge, P. 242, &c. P. 260, &c.there can be no such submission to any General Council. This is the force of the many words, which, in several places, you spend upon this subject; and therefore I shall consider them together. I answer therefore, 1. In general, if this be so intolerable an inconvenience, it is unavoidable upon your own principles: and therefore it is unreasonable to object that to another, which you cannot quit your self of. For you say, That the Infallibility of General Councils confirmed by the Pope, is the best way to end Controversies; but there is not one term in the main Proposition, but is liable to the same uncertainty which you here object to his Lordship; for, 1. You do not say, that all Councils are Infallible, but only General Councils, Who then shall be judge, whether the Council you would have me believe, be General or no? You do not say, that all must be there to make a General Council, but the Popes General Summons is sufficient: But, Who must be judge, whether that be sufficient or no? You say so; but, I see no p. 539reason for it, Must you be my judge, or I my own? If I may be my own judge, so must every one else, and so every man is left to believe what Councils to be General he please himself. 2. You say, General Councils are Infallible: Who must be judge of that too? Must the Council be infallibly believed in it? But that is the thing in Question. Must the Pope be judge? But no man (you say) is bound to believe him Infallible without the Council. Must the Scripture be judge? But, Who must judge what the sense of the Scripture is? 3. Who must be judge in what sense, and how far the Council is Infallible? Who must judge, how the Council comes to be Infallible in the Conclusion, that was fallible in the use of the means? And when any Controversie arises concerning the meaning of the Decrees of the Council, Who must be judge, which is the Infallible sense of them? for there is but one sense Infallible, though the words may bear many, and unless I know which is the Infallible sense, I am not bound to yield my assent to it. But, Who must decide this? The Council cannot; for that leaves no exposition with the decrees. The Pope cannot; for he is not Infallible without the Council. So that still it falls to every mans private reason, to judge of it. 4. Who must be judge, that the Popes Confirmation is necessary to make the Decrees Infallible? Not the Council without the Pope, not the Pope without the Council; for, you say, We are not bound to believe them Infallible, but as they are together. And together they cannot, for that is the Question, Why not a Council without the Popes Confirmation, as well as with it? and, When did Pope and Council determine, that no Council without the Pope, is Infallible? but the contrary hath been determined by a Council, viz. that a Council is above the Pope, and consequently needs not his Confirmation. So that for all your pretending to end Controversies, you leave men at as great uncertainties as any whatsoever. Being not able to resolve some of the most necessary Questions, in order to the Churches peace, according to your own principles.

2. I answer more particularly, that his Lordships opinion doth not expose near to so great uncertainties as yours doth; upon this reason,§. 6. because you requiring an internal assent to the Decrees of Councils, and Infallible Certainty in all that men believe, must of necessity leave men in the greatest perplexities, where you cannot give them that kind of Certainty on which they may build their Faith; but, his Lordship only requiring external obedience to the Decrees of Councils, a far less degree of Certainty will be sufficient. That is, such a kind of Moral Certainty, as things of that nature are capable of. You ask then, Who shall be judge, whether a Council were lawfully called, and did lawfully proceed or no? I answer, let every man be judge according to the general sense and reason of mankind. If there were sufficient authority for calling them together, according to the known practice of the Church; if there was no plain ground of suspicion of any practises by the power of any particular Prelate; no complaints made of it, either in, or after the Council; if there be no plain evidence that it takes any other Rules for its Decrees, but the Scripture, then we say, They are bound to yield external obedience to them, supposing the Council generally received in the Christian world for a lawful and General Council. If you ask again, How should it be known when errours are manifest and intolerable, and when not? We here appeal to Scripture interpreted by the concurrent sense of the Primitive Church, the common reason of mankind (supposing the Scripture to be the Rule of Faith) the consent of wise and learned men; which certainly will prevent the exorbitances and capricious humours of p. 540any phantastical Spirits, which may cry out, That the most received truths, ever since Christianity was in the world, are intolerable errours. If you are resolved yet further to ask, Who shall be judge what a necessary reason or demonstration is? His Lordship tells you, I think plain enough, from Hooker, what is understood by it, viz. such as being proposed to any man, and understood, the mind cannot chuse but inwardly assent to it. And, Do you require any other judge but a mans own reason in this case? But, you say, Others call their arguments demonstrations; but let them submit to this way of tryal, and they may soon be convinced that they are not. Still you say, They will not be convinced, but will break the peace of the Church, supposing they have sufficient evidence for what they say. But if men will be unreasonable, who can help it? Can you, with telling them Councils are Infallible? I doubt you would hear of more arguments than you could well satisfie against that presently. We appeal then to the common reason of mankind, Whether it be not a far probable way to end Controversies, to perswade men in disputable matters, to yield external obedience to the Decrees of a lawful General Council, than to tell them, they are bound to believe whatever they decree to be infallibly true? And therefore you are very much mistaken,P. 262. when you say, His Lordship declines the main Question, which is, of the necessity of submitting to a living Judge, or a definitive sentence, in case two parties, equal for learning and integrity, both pretend to equal evidence for what they say; for his Lordship doth not deny, but that in such a case the submitting to a definitive sentence, may be a reasonable way to end the Controversie; but then the difference between you lyes in two things. 1. That you would bind men to internal assent to the Decrees of a Council, as being Infallible; but his Lordship saith, They bind to external obedience, as being the Supremest Judicatory can be expected in the Church. 2. You pretend, that Councils called and confirmed by the Pope, are thus Infallible, and our Supreme Judge in matters of Faith; his Lordship justly dedies that, and sayes, That a Free General Council observing the same conditions which the first did, is the only equal and indifferent Judge. So that the Question is not so much, Whether shall be a living Judge? as, Who shall be he? and, How far the definitive Sentence binds? and, What is to be done, in case there cannot be a free and indifferent Judge? for in this case we say, Every Church is bound to regard her own purity and peace, and, in case of corruptions, to proceed to a Reformation of them.

§. 6.We now come to the remaining Enquiry, which is, Whether your Doctrine, or ours, tends more to the Churches peace? For clearing of this, his Lordship premises these things by way of Considerations, P. 253.1. That there is n necessity of any such Infallibility in the Church, as was in the Apostles. 2. That what Infallibility or Authority belongs to the Church, P. 254.doth primarily reside in the whole body of the Church, and not in a General Council. 3. That in case a General Council erre, the whole Church hath full Authority to represent her self in another Council, P. 256.and so to redress what was amiss either practised, or concluded. And so upon these principles his Lordship saith, Here is a sufficient remedy for what is amiss, and yet no infringing any lawful Authority in the Church; and yet he grants, as the Church of England doth, that a General Council may erre. P. 257.But he saith, It doth not follow, because the Church may erre, therefore she may not govern. For the Church hath not only a Pastoral Power to teach and direct, but a Praetorian also, to controll and censure too where errours or crimes are against points fundamental, or of great consequence. Thus he represents the advantages which follow upon his opinion, p. 541after which he comes to the disadvantages of yours. But we must first consider, what you have to object against what his Lordship hath here delivered. To the first you say nothing, but that Stapleton and Bellarmin attribute more Infallibility to the Church, than his Lordship doth,P. 266. which is an excellent way to prove the necessity of it, if you had first proved those two Authours Infallible. To the second, your Answer is more large; for his Lordship to confirm what he said, That the power and authority given by Christ, lyes in the whole Church, produces that saying of S. Austin, That S. Peter did not receive the Keyes of the Church, Aug. de Agone Chr…stiano. cap. 30.but as sustaining the person of the Church; from whence he proves against Stapleton, That it is not to be understood finally only for the good of the Church, but that the primary and formal right is in the Church. For he that receives a thing in the person of another, receives it indeed to his good and use, but in his right too. To this you answer from Bellarmin, That there is a twofold representing or bearing the person of another, The one Parabolical, De Pontif. l. 1. c. 12.and by way of meer figure and supposition only; as Agar represented the people of the Jews under bondage of the Law, &c. The other historical and real, viz. when the person representing, has right or relation à parte rei, in and towards the thing represented, by vertue whereof, it bears the person of the thing represented: Now S. Peter, say you, sustained the person of the Church in this latter sense, really and historically, and not parabolically, and in figure, i. e. he received the Keyes as Head of the Church; though that Reception were ordained for the good of the whole Church. But Sir, our enquiry is not, How many waies one may imagine a Representation to be made, but, What kind of Representation that is, which is suitable to S. Austin's meaning? That there may be an Allegorical Representation, no body denies: but I cannot imagine, How it can belong to this place; or, Who ever meant that S. Peter stood here for an Allegory of the Church, and therefore the members of your distinction are not apposite. For those who assert, that S. Peter did sustain the person of the Church, in his Lordships sense, do yet acknowledge that he did it historicè, and not parabolicè, as you speak, i. e. the donation was really made to him; but then the Question is, In what right or capacity it was made to him, Whether in his personal or representative capacity? For, these are the two only proper members of a distinction here. St. Austin saith, not only in that place, but in very many others, that S. Peter did sustain the person of the Church, when Christ said to him, Aug in Psal. 108. in Johan. tr. 124 Serm. 30. de divers. Retract. l. 1. c. 21.Ps 108I will give thee the Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven; Now the Question is, In what sense he sustained the person of the Church? You say, In his own right as Head of the Church; We say, As a publick person representing the Church, not parabolically (for that is no sustaining the person at all) but really and historically. And that S. Austin means, As a publick person, appears by the other expressions in the places cited, that he did universam significare Ecclesiam, signifie the whole Church; and that those things which are spoken of Peter, Non habent illustrem intellectum nisi cum referuntur ad Ecclesiam cujus ille agnoscitur in figurâ gestâsse personam, Have no clear sense, but when they are referred to the Church, whose person he did bear. Can you say this of a King, who receives the Keyes of a Town, whereof he takes possession for himself, though it be for the good of the Kingdom; that he signifies the whole Kingdom in it, and that it cannot have any clear sense, but when it is applied to the Kingdom which he represents? No, this cannot be; for the King takes possession in his own full right, and it is not the possession, but the administration, which is referred properly to the good of the Kingdom. But this might be properly p. 542said of a Duke of Venice, that he takes possession of a Town in the person of the State, and that the proper sense is, that the State took possession, and he only representing it. So that the full right lyes in the body of the State, but he as chief member represents the whole. And this is that which S. Austin means, when he saith, That S. Peter represented the Church, propter primatum, for the Primacy which he had amongst the Apostles, i e. such a Primacy of order, whereby he was fittest to represent the whole Church. For it is impossible to conceive that he should mean that S. Peter should receive this as Head of the Church, when you acknowledge that he was not Head of the Church, till after the Keyes were given him. For, you say, The performance of Christ's Promise, in making him Head of the Church, was not till after his resurrection. But, Will you say, the Church had no power of the Keyes till then; and then only finally too, and not formally? What became then of the power of the Keyes at S. Peters death, if only formally in him, and not in the Church? What becomes of them at the death of every Pope? Will you say, as Bellarmin doth, that Christ takes them, and gives them to his Successour? But he must be sure to wait till the Cardinals agree, To whom he must give them. Nothing then could be further from S. Austin's meaning, than that S. Peter received the Keyes, as Head of the Church, and so, that he represented the Church only finally; whereas his expressions carry it, that he means the formal right of them was conveyed to the Church, and that S. Peter was only a publick person, to receive them in the name of the Church. But, whatever S. Austin's meaning was, the strength of his Lordships assertion doth not stand or fall with that; for there are arguments sufficient besides to prove, that the Authority for governing the Church, was not committed formally to S. Peter, much less to any pretended successour, but that it primarily and formally resides in the whole body of the Church. And, were that the thing to be here disputed, you must not think to take it for granted, that if the Keyes were given personally to S. Peter, by them was meant the Supreme Authority of governing the Church, exclusively of the other Apostles.

To the third Consideration, you answer, That in case a General Council erre,§. 7. P. 267.there can be no redress for errour in Faith; for if one Council may erre, so may another, and a third, and a fourth, &c. This indeed is very suitable to your Doctrine from the beginning, that a man can be certain of nothing but what it is impossible should be otherwise. I hope you are certain your self, you do not erre; but I suppose you do not think it impossible you should: So, although we do not think it impossible, a Council should erre, yet we may be certain it doth not: and, supposing it should, we do not say, It is impossible that a Council should not erre, so that another Council may correct the errour of the former. And doubtless men may be certain of it too; if, as his Lordship saith, plain Scripture, and evident demonstration be brought against the former errour. But these are strange Doctrines, that because a Council may erre, therefore a Council can never afford remedy against inconveniences. For, one great inconvenience is, the breaking the Churches peace: that, is remedied by the Councils Authority; another is, errour in Faith, that may be remedied by another Council: No, say you, for that may erre too; but, Doth it follow that it must erre? or, Is it probable that it should erre? if the former errour be so discovered, and the Council so proceed as his Lordship supposes. For your other difficulty about the calling another General Council, I have answered it already,P. 268. when I shewed, what we meant by a General Council, p. 543and when it was lawfully call'd. When you after add, That the Church never represented her self in another Council but where the former Council was unlawful; and instance in the Councils of Ariminum and Ephesus: you say the same which his Lordship doth, for these Councils were therefore accounted unlawful because erroneous and factious, and he never asserts the necessity of calling a new Council, but in those two cases. But if you would have us account none such, but whom you do, you must excuse us till we see greater reason for it then we do yet: and so likewise for what follows, that the Councils which rectified the errours of those were called by the Popes authority, as that of Trent and others were, which to speak mildly is a gross untruth.

You urge from his Lordships granting, That the Church hath a Praetorian power to controul and censure too, where errours or crimes are against points Fundamental or of great consequence; that therefore he and all Protestants are justly censured by the Roman Church for opposing those Doctrines which are with her Fundamental and of great consequence. But still there is no difference with you between the Roman Church and the Catholick; between Papal Councils, and Free and General; between what she judges Fundamental, and what all are bound to judge so. If you prove then, that we are bound to rely only on the judgement of your Church, your consequence is good; but otherwise it is tyed with a rope of sand, and therefore we do not fear the lashes of it. And the same fault runs through your subsequent discourse,P. 269. in which you suppose the Church Infallible in all she propounds, which you know is constantly denyed, and hath been at large disproved in our first Part. For, the ground of your resolution of Faith being removed, I see the Fabrick of your Church falls down with it. For take but away your pretence of Infallibility, and your confounding the Catholick and Roman Church; all the rest moulders, as not being able to stand without them. But that is still your way, if any thing be said of the Catholick Church, we must presently understand it of yours; so that it cannot be said in any sense that the Church is without spot or wrinkle, but by you it must be understood presently of the Doctrine of the Roman Catholick Church universally received as a matter of Faith: Ibid.but till you prove not only your two former assertions, but that St. Austin understood those words ever in that sense, your vindication of that place in him concerning it, will appear utterly impertinent to your purpose. And his Lordships assertion may still stand good, That the Church on earth is not any freer from wrinkles in Doctrine and Discipline, then she is from spots in life and Conversation.

Having thus vindicated his Lordships way from the objections you raised against it,§. 8. we must now consider how well you vindicate your own from the unreasonableness he charges it with, in several particulars. 1. That if we suppose a General Council Infallible, and it prove not so, P. 258.but that an errour in Faith be concluded; the same erring opinion, which makes it think it self Infallible, makes the errour of it irrevocable, and so leaves the Church without remedy. To this you Answer,P. 269. Grant false antecedents and false premises enow, and what absurdities will not be consequent, and fill up the conclusion? But you clearly mistake the present business; which is not, Whether Councils be Infallible or no? but, Whether opinion be lyable to greater Inconveniencies, that which asserts that they may, or that they cannot, err? Will you have your supposition of the Infallibility of Councils taken for a first principle, or a thing as true as the Scriptures? So you p. 544would seem indeed, by the supposing the Scriptures not to be Gods Word, which you subjoyn as the parallel, P. 270.to the supposing General Councils fallible. But will you say the one is as evident and built on as good reason, and as much agreed on among Christians, as the other is? I suppose, you will not: and therefore it was very absurd & unreasonable to say, Supposing the Word of God were not so, errours would be irrevocable, as if General Councils were supposed Infallible and proved not so. But this is a Question you grant to be disputable among Christians, and will you not give us leave to make a supposition that it may prove not so? You must consider, we are now enquiring into the conveniencies of these two opinions, and in that case it is necessary to make such suppositions: And let any reasonable man judge what opinion can be more pernicious to the Church then yours is, supposing it not to be true: for then it will be necessary for men to assent to the grossest errours, as the most Divine and Infallible truths: and there can be no remedy imagin'd for the redress of them. If then the Inconvenience of admitting it be so great, men had need look well to the grounds on which it is built. And I cannot see any reason men can have to admit any Infallible proponent in matters of Faith to the Church, but on as great and as clear evidence, as the Prophets and Apostles had, that they were sent from God. For the danger may be as great to believe that to be Infallible which is not, as not to believe that to be Infallible which is: for the believing an errour to be a Divine truth, may be as dangerous to the souls of men, as the not believing something which is really revealed by God. But to be sure, those who see no reason to believe a General Council to be Infallible, cannot be obliged to assent to errours propounded by it; but such who believe it Infallible must what ever the errours be, swallow them down, without questioning the truth of them. And it argues how conscious you are of the falseness of your principles, that you are so loath to have them examined, or so much as a supposition made that they should not prove true: Whereas truth alwayes invites men to the most accurate search into it. We see the Apostles bid men search, whether the things they spake were true or no; and those are most commended who did it most, and I hope men were as much bound to believe them Infallible as General Councils. But we see how unreasonable you are, you would obtrude such things upon mens Faith, which must lead them into unavoidable errours if false, and yet not allow men the liberty of examination, whether they be true or no. But such proceedings are so far from advancing your cause, that nothing can more prejudice it among rational and inquisitive men.

His Lordship for the clearing this, proceeds to an Instance of an errour defined by one of your General Councils, P. 259.viz. Communion in one kind; but that we shall reserve the discussion of, to the ensuing Chapter; which is purposely allotted for the discovery of those errours which have been defined by such as you call General Councils. Therefore I proceed.

2. His Lordship saith, Your opinion is yet more unreasonable, because no Body-collective, §. 9.whensoever it assembled it self, did ever give more power to the representing body of it, then a binding power upon it self and all particulars; nor ever did it give this power otherwise, P. 260.then with this reservation in nature, that it would call again, and reform, and, if need were, abrogate any Law, or ordinance upon just cause made evident that the representing Body had failed in trust, or truth. And this power no Body-collective, ecclesiastical or civil, can p. 545put out of it self, or give away to a Parliament, or Council, or call it what you will that represents it. To this again you Answer,P. 272. This is only to suppose and take for granted, that a General Council hath no Authority, but what is meerly delegate from the Church Vniversal which it represents. I grant, this is supposed in it, and this is all which the nature of a representative body doth imply; if you say, there is more then that, you are bound to prove it. Yes, say you, We maintain its Authority to be of Divine Institution, and when lawfully assembled to act by Divine right, and not meerly by deputation and consent of the Church. But if all the proof you have for it, be only that which you refer us to in the precedent Chapter, the palpable weakness of it for any such purpose hath been there fully laid open. His Lordship saith, That the power which a Council hath to order, P. 261.settle and define differences arising concerning Faith, it hath not by any Immediate Institution from Christ, but it was prudently taken up by the Church from the Apostles example. So that to hold Councils to this end, is apparent Apostolical Tradition written: but the power which Councils have, is from the whole Catholick Church, whose members they are, and the Churches power from God. You say, True it is, the calling such assemblies was taken up, and hath for its pattern the example of the Apostles, Act. 15. yet surely there is little doubt to be made, but the Apostles had both direction and precept too, for doing it so often as just occasion required, from Christ himself. The whole force of which Answer lyes in those well placed words, Surely there is little doubt to be made; for as to any thing of reason, you never offer at it. Just such another of Bellarmins Sine dubio's comes after; Though a General Council be the Church representative, and do not meet, or assemble together hic & nunc, but by order and deputation from man; yet it follows not, but the power and authority by which they act when they are met may be from God, as doubtless it is. Can any man have the face to question, Whether the Authority of General Councils be of Divine Institution or no, when you say, Yes surely, there is no doubt to be made of it, doubtless it is? We do not question, as you would seem to imply afterwards, Whether the people or the Pastours have right to send to General Councils, but what ground you have to assert, that General Councils are an immediate Divine Institution. But I must needs say, I never saw any thing affirmed oftener, and offered to be proved less, then that is here: and yet as though you had done it invincibly you triumphantly proceed; General Councils then, are a principal and necessary part of that Ecclesiastical Hierarchy which Christ instituted for the Government of his Church, and not an humane Expedient only, P. 273.taken up by the Church her self meerly upon prudential considerations, as the Bishop will needs conceive. It strangely puzzles me to find out any thing that Particle then relates to; and after all my search can find nothing, but surely, without doubt, and doubtless. I pray Sir, think not so meanly of us, that we should take these for Arguments or Demonstrations: Deal fairly with us, and if we fall by the force of reason, we yield our selves up to you. But you are very much deceived, if you think these things are taken for proofs with us: we can easily discern the weakness of your cause through the most confident affirmations. If you had brought any Law of Christ, appointing that General Councils should be in the Church, any Apostolical precept, prescribing or giving directions concerning them, you had done something; but, not so much as to offer at a proof, and yet conclude it as confidently as if it were impossible to resist the force of your Demonstrations, is an evidence, that either you know your cause to be weak, or suppose us to be so. Much p. 546such another discourse is that which follows, wherein you pretend to give a reason, Why what is defined by one Council in point of Doctrine cannot be reversed by another. P. 273.Which is, because the true Christian Faith is ex natura rei unchangeable, that it admits not of yea and nay, but only yea; that it is alwayes the same, that it must stand without alteration for ever, nay that it is to be invariable and admit no change. All these expressions we have in one Paragraph, and, for all that I see, are the greatest strength of it. But what is it you mean by all this? Do you think we could not understand what you meant by the unchangeableness of Christian Faith, without so many diversified expressions of it? And what follows now from all this? That one Council cannot repeal the Decrees of another? How so? was not the Faith of Christ as unchangeable in the time of the Arrian Councils, as it is now? and yet then one Council repealed the Decrees of others, in point of Doctrine; and yet by that nothing was derogated from the Institution or honour of Christ, by such a reversing those Decrees. Though the Faith, i. e. The Doctrine of Christ, be alwayes the same, Doth it thence follow; then men shall alwayes believe all this unalterable Doctrine? If so, how came Arrianism to overspread the Church? How came six hundred Bishops at the Council of Ariminum to be deceived in a Doctrine of Faith, by your own confession? It is therefore a profound mistake, to infer from the fallibility of General Councils the alteration of the Faith of Christ. The Faith of Christ is founded on a surer bottom then the Decrees of Councils, though all men are lyars God is true, and Christ the same yesterday, to day, and for ever. But of this more afterwards.

You would seem to argue more pertinently in the following pages against his Lordships opinion:§. 10. for you say, He sayes and unsayes the same; and what he seems to attribute to General Councils in one proposition, P. 274, 275.he takes away in another. That which his Lordship sayes, is, That the definitions of a General Council are binding to all particulars, P. 261.and it self; but yet so, that they cannot bind the whole Church from calling again, and in the after-calls upon just cause to order, and, if need be, to abrogate former acts. And after adds, And because the whole Church can meet no other way, the Council shall remain the Supream, external, living, temporary, Ecclesiastical Judge of all Controversies. Only the whole Church, and she alone, hath power when Scripture or Demonstration is found, and peaceably tendered to her, to represent her self again in a new Council, and in it to order what was amiss. Now we must consider what we find contradictious and repugnant to themselves in these words: Three things, if I mistake not, the main of this charge may be reduced to, 1. That men should be bound to that which Scripture and Demonstration be against; But this is very easily answered, for his Lordship doth not say, Men are bound to believe it, but not so to oppose it as to break the peace of the Church by it. 2. That another Council cannot be call'd without opposition to the other: this his Lordship prevented, by supposing that the just reasons against the decrees of the former Council ought to be peaceably tendred to the Church; but no boisterous opposition to be made against it. 3. To what purpose should another Council be call'd, if the whole Church be satisfied that there is Scripture and Demonstration against the decrees of the former? But, 1. His Lordship supposes there may Scripture and Demonstration be, where the whole Church is not satisfied; and therefore there may be necessity of calling another Council. 2. That the Council may free all those who may suppose themselves still bound not to oppose the former errour. 3. That no erroneous p. 547Decree of a Council, may remain unrepealed in the Church: that so no erroneous person may challenge such a Decree of a Council, as a ground for his opposition to the Doctrine of the Church. And where now lyes any such appearance of contradiction in his Lordships words?

3. The last thing his Lordship chargeth your way with unreasonableness in, is, That you do not only make the definition of a General Council, §. 11.but the sentence of the Pope Infallible; nay, more Infallible than it. For, P. 262.any General Council may erre with you, if the Pope confirm it not. So belike this Infallibility rests not in the representative body, the Council, nor in the whole body the Church, but in your Head of the Church, the Pope of Rome. And if this be so, To what end such a trouble for a General Council? or, Where in are we neerer to unity, if the Pope confirm it not? To this you answer, 1. That a General Council is not held by you to be Infallible at all, unless it involve the Pope, P. 276.or his Confirmation; and so there is but one Infallibility, viz. of the Pope presiding in, and confirming of the votes of a General Council. 2. You confess there are two different Opinions among you; the first and more common is, that the Pope, even without a General Council, is Infallible in his definitions of Faith, when he teaches the whole Church; the second is, that he is not Infallible in his definitions, save only where he defines in, and with, a General Council. Now the Bishop (you say) takes no notice of the second Opinion, but only of the first, as though that were the Opinion of all Catholick Doctors. But, for your part, you will not meddle much with any matters of private Opinion or dispute, and therefore you will briefly pass over what his Lordship saith further, and only correct some mistakes of his. But whereas you pretend it only necessary to believe, that Pope and Council together are Infallible, for this all Catholicks are agreed in; but, whether the Pope be Infallible without a Council or no, you leave it as matter of dispute. I shall manifest, how great a cheat you put upon the world by this Assertion, in these two things, 1. That there is no such agreement among your selves in this common principle, as you pretend. 2. That from the making the Popes Confirmation necessary to the Infallibility of the Council, you must make the Pope Infallible without a Council. 1. Whereas you pretend such a consent among all Catholicks in this common principle, That Pope and Council are Infallible together, it is evident that there is no such thing. For, 1. Some among you have asserted, that the representative body of the Church is not at all the subject of Infallibility, but the diffusive. For Occham contends at large, That the priviledge of Infallibility, Occham Dialog. p. 1. l. 5. cap. 25, 29, 31. Cameracensis quaest. Vesp. art. 3. ad liter. O. & P. Cusan. Concord. Cathol. l. 2. c. 3. Antonin. Summ. Summarum. p. 3. Tit. 23. c. 2. sect. 6. Panormitan. decret. p. 1. l. 1. Tit: de elect. cap. significasti. Clemangis disput. de Concil. Gener. Mirandula. de fide & ordine credend. Theorem. 4. &c.belongs only to the whole Militant Church; and neither to the Pope, nor General Council, nor body of the Clergy. And so likewise doth Petrus de Alliaco, Cusanus, Antoninus of Florence, Panormitan, Nicolaus de Clemangis, Franciscus Mirandula, and others, whose words you may find at large in some of your Writers, and therefore I forbear repeating them. 2. Some assert, that Councils are no further Infallible, than they adhere to Vniversal Tradition; and you cannot be ignorant, who they are at this day among you, who assert this doctrine. 3. Some further say, That Councils are in themselves Infallible, and therefore must be so, whether the Pope confirm them or no. And this opinion, however now you say, it be not so common as the other, yet it is certain, that before the Council of Lateran under Leo 10. it was much the more common opinion, as appears by the Councils of Constance and Basil. And, that there is an irreconcilable difference between the Authours p. 548of this Opinion, and those who make the Popes Confirmation necessary to the Infallibility of a General Council, I shall prove out of Bellarmin himself, from the state of the Question, and the Arguments he urges against it.Bellarmin. de Concil. l. 2. c. 13. Bellarmin tells us, The first occasion of this Controversie, was about the deposition of Popes, viz. whether the Pope might against his consent be judged, condemned, and deposed by the Council: and therefore, saith he, They are mistaken, who think the Question is, Whether the Council with the Pope be greater than the Pope without a Council? for, it cannot be conceived he should give consent to his own deposition. And this he proves from the Council at Basil, who defined their Council to be above the Pope, at that time, when neither the Pope, nor his Legats were present. And this Council of Basil in their Synodal Epistle, declare a General Council, as representing the Vniversal Church, to be Infallible, when at the same time they assert, That Popes have fallen into Heresie. Now, Can any one possibly imagine, these men should believe the Popes Confirmation to be necessary to the Councils Infallibility, who suppose the Pope may be an Heretick at the same time, in which a Council may be Infallible? And when they assert it to belong to the Council only to pronounce, Whether the Pope be guilty of Heresie or no? Those therefore who contend for the Councils Authority above the Pope, do not at all look at the Popes Confirmation, as necessary to make the Decrees Infallible; though some of them may, to make them Canonical. For there lyes one of your fallacies; because they look on the Pope as Ministerial Head of the Church, therefore to make Canons to be valid, they may judge it in most cases necessary that the Pope confirm the Decrees; but yet, they do not suppose this Confirmation doth at all make them Infallible; but, whether the Pope had confirmed them or no, they had been Infallible however. So that you cannot say, That it is a principle of Faith among you, that Pope and Council together are Infallible; for those of this opinion make it a principle of Faith, that the Council in it self is Infallible, and consequently,De Concil. l. 2. c. 14. whether it be confirmed by the Pope or no. And therefore Bellarmin saith, Their opinion is, That in case the Pope be dead, deposed, or refuseth to come to the Council, the Council is not at all the less perfect, but that it hath full power to make definitions in matters of Faith. And when he comes to urge against this Opinion,C. 16. one of his arguments is, that from hence it follows, That the Council would not at all need the Popes Confirmation; and another, That Councils without the Pope may erre in Decrees of Faith; for which he instanceth in the Councils of Sirmium, Milan, Ariminum, Ephesus, &c. Neither, saith he, can it be answered, that these Councils erred, because they were unlawful Councils; for the most of them wanted nothing but the Popes consent, and the second Ephesine Council was just such another as that of Basil. From which disputation of Bellarmin, it is both clear, that those who make Councils above the Pope, do not judge the Popes Confirmation necessary; and those who judge it necessary, do not suppose the Council Infallible without it. So that you are either deceived your self, or would deceive others, when you would make them believe that there is but one Infallibility asserted by you, whereas nothing can be more evident, than that two distinct subjects of Infallibility are asserted in your Church, some placing it in the Council without the Pope, and others in the Pope, and not in the Council, and neither of them absolutely and formally in the Pope and Council together.

2. I shall therefore more fully shew, That those who make the Popes Confirmation necessary, §. 12.do really place the Infallibility in the Pope, and not in the p. 549Council; and that from these things, 1. Because they in terms assert, That though nothing be wanting to a Council, but the Popes Confirmation, it may erre, if the Pope confirm it not. And this we produced Bellarmins assertion for already, giving that as the only reason, why those Councils did erre, which wanted nothing but that. Nay, he elsewhere asserts, Not only that General Councils may erre, though the Pope confirm them not, L 2. de Concil. c. 11.but although the Popes Legats be present, and consent with the Council, yet if they do not follow the certain instruction of the Pope, the Council may erre. And, Can any one then possibly conceive, that the Infallibility lyes any where but in the Pope? 2. You assert, That all the Power and Infallibility which is in the Church, is formally in the Pope, and only finally in the Church, because it is for the good of the Church; this I suppose you have not forgot, since you told us, that S. Peter sustained the person of the Church historicè,P. 266. and not parabolicè, and that the fulness of all Ecclesiastical Power was in him as Head of the Church: If this be true, as there you assert it confidently, whatever you pretend here, you are bound to defend, that all the Infallibility in the Council comes wholly from the Pope; for I know you will not place Infallibility in one, and the fulness of Ecclesiastical Power in another. 3. Because the main ground of the reprobating Councils lyes in the Popes dissent. So that Councils which in all other particulars are accounted lawful and general, yet if any thing passed displeasing in them to the Pope, so far they are reprobated; as the proceedings of the Council of Chalcedon, Constance, and Basil, in reference to the Popes, do sufficiently testifie. For, although they were the same persons, acting with equal freedom in those, as in other things, yet when they came to touch any thing of the Popes Interess, then, because the Pope doth not consent, so far they were not Infallible. By which it is plain, that, though the Council stands for a shew and blind to the world, all the Infallibility lyes wholly in the Pope. And by this means, to be sure, the Pope shall never receive any hurt by General Councils; for if he pleases, the Council shall either be approved or rejected, or partly approved, and partly rejected; or neither approved, nor rejected; for of all these sorts Bellarmin tells us Councils are: which in short is, The Councils which make for the Popes turn, are Infallible, but none other. And therefore Bellarmin, very consonantly to his principles, sayes expresly,De Pontif. Rom l. 4. c. 3. Totam firmitatem Conciliorum legitimorum esse à Pontifice, non partim à Pontifice, partim à Concilio; The whole strength of lawful Councils depends wholly on the Pope, and not partly on the Pope, and partly on the Council. And if their firmness doth, their Infallibility must do so too. This is not a meer private opinion of his, but that which doth necessarily follow, from the making the Popes Confirmation necessary to the Infallibility of General Councils. Although therefore you would fain put off this as a matter of dispute among your selves; yet it can be no matter of dispute any more, than, Whether the Decrees of Councils, as confirmed by the Pope, be Infallible or no? And therefore all that his Lordship objects, falls upon all such who assert this: Whereof the first which you mention is,Ibid. That then the Council is called but only in effect, to hear the Pope give his Sentence in more state. To which you answer, That the Objection hath the same force against the Council called in the Apostles time, viz. that it was done; only to hear S. Peter pronounce his Sentence in more state. Neither had it been any more, if the Infallibility of the Council had only depended on S. Peter's Sentence: but I hope you will not deny the rest of the Apostles to have been as Infallible as S. Peter was. But you answer, 2. That the Pope being to use all means morally requisite to find p. 550out the truth; the Council is called really to help and assist the Pope; and the advice of the Council is a necessary Medium to his Holiness, whereby to make a full inspection into the matters he is to define. But all this only confirms what his Lordship saith, That it is for his giving Sentence in more state; for the Council is only a subservient means, and contributes nothing at all to the Infallibility of the Sentence. But, you say, They are a necessary Medium. 1. Then the Pope cannot define any matter of Faith without a General Council. Which, all who assert that Opinion, utterly deny; for, they say, The Pope may define matters of Faith without a General Council; and Bellarmin saith,De Rom Pont. l. 4. c. 3. That the state of the Church, without General Councils (which was for three hundred years) might have continued so to the worlds end; and therefore it was necessary there should be a living Judge, whose Infallibility should not depend upon any Council: And elsewhere he sayes, That if seven Heresies have been condemned by seven General Councils; more than a hundred have been condemned without, De Concil. l. 1. c. 10.by the Pope and Provincial Councils. 2. Though the Pope must use all moral means, yet, Why must a General Council be that necessary Medium? Why may not a Provincial, or lesser Council serve turn? And so Bellarmin tells you, it would; he saith, indeed some kind of Council is necessary, Ibid c. 11.magnum aut parvum, unum vel plura, prou…t ipse judicaverit, great or little, more or less, as the Pope shall judge fitting; so that still a General Council is but a piece of state, for all moral means might be used without one. 3. What use are these moral means for? to enable him to pass a right judgement, or no? If they be, then the Pope is bound to pronounce according to the Decree of the Council, and so it will not be in his power, not to confirm it; if not, What do these moral means signifie? No more, then the Crucifix Pope Innocent shewed to Monsieur de Saint-Amour; Before which, he told him, he kneeled down to take at the feet thereof his resolution, Journal of Mr de Saint Amour. part 3. chap. 4 p 78.according to the inspiration given to him by the Holy Spirt, whose assistance was promised to him, and could not fail him. We see, the Pope understood his Infallibility better, than to make use of such moral means as Councils are; he knew his Infallibility came not that way, and therefore he took the more likely course to receive his Inspiration from Heaven, by taking his resolution at the feet of a Crucifix. And this he called, his Council in matters of Faith: And yet, if we believe him, he did as much want all moral means for finding out the truth, as another; since he so ingenuously confessed at another audience, That he was old, and had never studied Divinity. Journal. part 3. ch. 12 p 120But, What need he to do it, that could so easily be inspired, by kneeling at the feet of a Crucifix? Your Doctrine then would not be very well taken at Rome, that General Councils are a necessary Medium to his Holiness, in order to the definition of matters of Faith. No more would your following Distinction in vindication of Stapleton, P. 277.That though the Pope acquires no new power, or certainty of judgement by the presence of a General Council, and there is something thereby, which conduceth to the due exercise of that power: So that it must be an usurpation or undue exercise of power, for the Pope to offer to define without a General Council. I know not what liberty you have to write these things among us; but if you were at Rome, you durst not venture to do it. Your saying, that Bellarmin only sayes, That the firmness of a Council in regard of us, depends wholly on the Popes Confirmation, argues, you had very little to say: For, What firmness hath a Council at all in this dispute, but in regard of us; since you look on men as obliged to believe the Decrees of it Infallible? And, if the Decrees had any Infallibility from the Council, that might make them p. 551firm in regard of us, as well as the Pope. But you object to your self, That if the Pope be Infallible without the Council, and the Council subject to errour without the Pope, it must needs follow, that all the Infallibility of General Councils proceeds from the Pope only; not partly from the Pope, and partly from the Council. To which you answer,Ibid. That the assertors of that Opinion (of whom you must be one, if you know what you say) may say, that Christ hath made two promises to his Church, the one to assist her Soveraign Head and Pastor to make him Infallible, another to assist General Councils to make them so. But, What need this latter, if the former be well proved? For if the Head be Infallible by vertue of a promise from Christ, he must be Infallible, whether in Council, or out of it. And therefore it is a ridiculous shift to say, The Pope hath one promise to make him Infallible in a General Council; ano-to make him so out of it. But I commend you, that since you thought one would not hold, you would have two strings for the Popes Infallibility. And it is but adding a third promise to the Church in general, and then your threefold cord may be surely Infallible.

You give many Reasons (but none so convincing as Experience) Why the Popes should not be Impeccable; and, if you search Scripture, Antiquity,§. 13. P. 278.and Reason, you may find as much, why he should not be Infallible. For that of the necessity of one, and not the other for the Church, is of your own devising, it having been sufficiently proved, that the certainty of Faith doth not at all depend upon the Popes, or your Churches, or Councils Infallibility. And it seems still very strange to all who know the doctrine and promises of Christianity, and that the promotion of Holiness is the great design of it, and that Faith signifies nothing without Obedience, and that the Spirit of God is a Spirit of Holiness, as well as Truth, that you dare challenge such an assistance of the Divine Spirit, as may make your Popes Infallible, who have led lives quite contrary to the Gospel of Christ. Nay, such lives, as his Lordship saith, as no Epicurean Monster, P. 263.storied out to the world, hath out-gone them in sensuality, or other gross impiety, if their own historians be true.

Your vindication of Pope Liberius his submitting his judgement to Athanasius, because the Pope had passed no definition ex Cathedrâ in the business, Ibid.hath no strength at all, unless you first prove, that the Popes definitions ex Cathedrâ, were held Infallible, then which none would ever believe that read the passage, which his Lordship cites out of Liberius his Epistle to Athanasius. For, as he saith, The Pope complemented exceeding low, that would submit his unerring judgement, to be commanded by Athanasius, who he well knew could erre. P. 264.Whether S. Ambrose in his Epistle meddles with any doctrinal definitions, or only with some difficulties which that year happened about the observation of Easter, (the fourteenth of the first month falling on the Lords day) is not very material to our purpose. But that it was something else besides Astronomical definitions (which I know what S. Ambrose's excellency was in) might easily appear, if you had read the Epistle. Ambros. l. 10. ep. 83.So that you might have spared your large account of the Paschal Letters sent by the Bishops of Alexandria about the keeping of Easter (which are no great novelties to such, who are at all acquainted with Antiquity) and given us a fuller account, why in such a matter of dispute about the right of the day to be kept that year, the Roman Bishops should not rather have stood to the Popes definition, than write to S. Ambrose, if it had been then taken for granted, that the Pope was Infallible. But I might as well have passed by this testimony of S. Ambrose, as you do that of Lyra, which p. 552is so express for the Erring and Apostatizing of several Popes, that you thought the best Answer to it, were to let it alone. However you come off with the story of Peter Lombard (which is not of that consequence to require any further examination of the truth of it) I am sure you are hard put to it,P. 280. in the case of Honorius; when you deny, that Honorius did really maintain the Monothelites Heresie, and excuse the Councils, Sentence, by saying, it was only in case of mis-information. Since it manifestly appears by the sixth Synod, action. 13. that they condemned his Epistle written to Sergius, as containing heretical and pernicious Doctrine in it. And in the seventh Synod he is reckoned up with Arrius, Macedonius, Eutyches, Dioscorus, and the rest of condemned Hereticks, among whom he is likewise reckoned by Leo 2. in his Epistle to Constantine. Action. 8. Synod. 6. Canus. l. 6. cap. ult.Which evidence is so great, that Canus wonders at those who would offer to vindicate him. And, in the mean time, you provide excellent moral means for the Pope to judge of matters of Faith by, in General Councils, if they may be guilty of so gross mis-information, as you suppose here in the case of Honorius; and not one barely, but three successively, the sixth, seventh, and eighth, and the whole Church from their time, till Albertus Pighius, who first began to defend him. For conclusion of this point, his Lordship would fain know (since this had been so plain, P. 267.so easie a way, either to prevent all divisions about the Faith, or to end all Controversies, did they arise) why this brief, but most necessary proposition, The Bishop of Rome cannot erre in his judicial determinations concerning Faith, is not to be found either in letter or sense, in any Scripture, in any Council, or in any Father of the Church, for the full space of a thousand years and more after Christ? To this you answer, 1. That in the sense wherein Catholicks maintain the Popes Infallibility to be a matter of necessary belief to all Christians it is found (for sense) both in Scripture, Ibid.Councils, and Fathers, as you say you have proved, in proving the Infallibility of General Councils, of which he is the most principal and necessary member. So then, when we enquire for the Infallibility of General Councils, we are sent to the Pope for his Confirmation to make them so; but when we enquire for the Popes Infallibility, we are sent back again to the Councils, for the proof of it. And they are hugely to blame, if they give not an ample testimony to the Pope, since he can do them as good a turn. But, between them both, we see the greatest reason to believe neither the one, nor the other to be Infallible. But, 2. You would offer at something too for his personal Infallibility; in which I highly commend your prudence, that you say, You will omit Scripture; and you might as well have omitted all that follows, since you say only, That the testimonies you have produced, seem to do it in effect; and at last say, That it is an Assertion you have wholly declined the maintaining of, and judge it expedient to do so still. And you may very well do so, if there be no better proofs for it than those you have produced, but however, we must examine them. Doth not the Council of Chalcedon seem to say, in effect, Ibid.that the Pope is Infallible, when, upon the reading of his Epistle to them, in condemnation of the Eutychian Heresie, the whole Assembly of Prelates cry out with acclamation, and profess that S. Peter (who was Infallible) spake by the mouth of Leo, and that the Pope was interpreter of the Apostles voice? You do well to use those cautious expressions of seeming to say in effect, for it would be a very hard matter to imagine any such thing as the Popes Infallibility in the highest expressions used by the Council of Chalcedon. Conci… Chalced. part. 2. Act. 2. p. 2…8.Acts 2For, after the reading of Leo's Epistle against Eutyches, and many testimonies of the Fathers to the same purpose, the Council begins their acclamations, with p. 553these words, This is the Faith of the Fathers, this is the Faith of the Apostles; all who are orthodox hold thus. And after it follows, Peter by Leo hath thus spoken, the Apostles have taught thus. Which are all the words there extant to that purpose. And, Is not this a stout argument, for the Popes personal Infallibility? For, What else do they mean, but only that Leo, who succeeded in the Apostolical See of S. Peter at Rome, did concurr in Faith with S. Peter, and the rest of the Apostles? But, Do they say, that it was impossible that Leo should erre, or that his judgement was Infallible? or only that he owned that Doctrine which was Divine and Apostolical? And the Council of Ephesus (your next testimony) hath much less than this, even nothing at all. For the Council speaks not concerning S. Peter, or the Pope in the place by you cited; only one of the Popes officious Legats, Philip, Concil. Ephes. p. 2. Act. 3. pag. 330.Acts 3begins very formally, with S. Peter's being Prince and Head of the Apostles, &c. and that he to this day foreign; lives in his successours, and passeth judgement. Is it not a very good Inference from hence, that the Council acknowledged the Popes personal Infallibility? because one of the Popes Legats did assert in the Council, that S. Peter lived and judged by the Pope. And yet, Might not this be done without his personal Infallibility, in regard of his succession in that See which was founded by S. Peter? But you are very hard driven, when you are fain to take up with the Sentence of a Roman Priest, instead of a General Council, and any judgement in matters of Faith, instead of Infallibility. Your other testimonies of S. Hierom, S. Augustine, and S. Cyprian, have been largely examined already; and for the remaining testimonies of four Popes, you justly fear it would be answered, that they were Popes, and spake partially in their own cause. P. 281.And you give us no antidote against these fears; but conclude very warily, That you had hitherto declined the defence of that Assertion, and professed that it would be sufficient for Protestants to acknowledge the Pope Infallible in, and with General Councils only. But, as we see no reason to believe General Councils at all Infallible, whether with, or without the Pope; so neither can we see, but if the Infallibility of the Council depends on the Popes Confirmation, you are bound to defend the Popes personal Infallibility, as the main Bulwark of your Church.