The Grounds of Protestant Religion, Part 3 · Chapter 1

The Grounds of Protestant Religion · Part 3 · Chapter 1

p. 505CHAP. I. Of the Infallibility of General Councils.

How far this tends to the ending Controversies. Two distinct Questions concerning the Infallibility, and Authority of General Councils. The first entered upon, with the state of the Question. That there can be no certainty of faith that General Councils are infallible; nor that the particular decrees of any of them are so: which are largely proved. Pighius his Arguments against the Divine Institution of General Councils. The places of Scripture considered, which are brought for the Churches infallibility, and that these cannot prove that General Councils are so; Matth. 18.20. Acts 15.28. particularly answered. The sense of the Fathers in their high expressions of the decrees of Councils. No consent of the Church as to their infallibility. The place of St. Austin about the amendment of former General Councils by latter, at large vindicated. No other places in S. Austin prove them infallible, but many to the contrary. General Councils cannot be infallible in the conclusion, if not in the use of the means. No such infallibility, without as immediate a revelation as the Prophets and Apostles had: taking Infallibility not for an absolute unerring power, but such as comes by a promise of Divine Assistance preserving from errour. No obligation to internal assent, but from immediate Divine Authority. Of the consistency of Faith and reason in things propounded to be believed. The suitableness of the contrary Doctrine to the Romanists principles.

IF high pretences and large promises were the only things,§. 1. which we ought to value any Church for, there were none comparable to the Church of Rome. For there can be nothing imagined amiss in the Christian world, but, if we believe the bills her Factours set up, she hath an Infallible cure for it. If any enquire into the grounds of Religion, they tell us, that her testimony only can give them Infallible Certainty; if any are afraid of mistaking in opinions, they have the only Infallible Judge of Controversies to go to; if any complain of the rents and divisions of the Christian world, they have Infallible p. 506Councils either to prevent or heal them. Who then would not run into the bosom of such a Church as this, with whom there is nothing but what is Infallible? Who but Scepticks, Hereticks, and Schismaticks would keep out of her communion? for what is there, men can desire more in a Church then she hath, where every thing is so Infallible? Faith is Infallible, Tradition Infallible, the Church Infallible, the Pope Infallible, General Councils Infallible, and what not? But who are there that more cheat and deceive the world, then those Mountebanks, who pretend to the most Infallible cures? For, what is wanting in truth and reality must be helped out with the greater confidence; and so we shall find it to be in these Infallible pretenders, who fall short in nothing more then where they lay the highest claim to Infallibility. Thus we have already manifested, that none have more weakened Faith, then such who have given out, that they only could make it Infallibly certain, none have brought more errours then that Church which arrogates to her self, that she is Infallible; it now remains, that we discover that nothing is further from promoting the Churches peace, then this present pretence of the Infallibility of General Councils. For the ending of Controversies was the occasion of this dispute; but this dispute it self hath caused more. And will do so, as long as men desire to see reason for what they do. For it cannot be expected, that men should yield their judgements up to the decrees of every such combination of men as shall call it self a General Council, unless it be evidently proved, that it is impossible they should erre in those decrees. Where there be no other wayes found out for the ending some great Controversies of the Church, but by a free and General Council, all wise men will value the Churches peace so far as not to oppose the determinations of it; it being the highest Court of Appeal which the Church hath. But there is a great deal of difference between a submission for peace sake, in those things which are not contrary to the Fundamentals of Faith, and the assent of the mind to all the Decrees of such a Council as in themselves are Infallible. For, supposing them subject to errour, yet if that errour be not such as doth over-weigh the peace of the Church, the authority of it may be so great as to bind men to a submission to them. But where they challenge an internal assent by vertue of such decrees, there must be first proved an impossibility of erring in them, before any can look on themselves as obliged to give it. And while men contend about this, that which was mainly aimed at, is lost by these contentions, which is the Vnity and Peace of the Church. For it is a most fond and unreasonable thing, to suppose, there may not be as great divisions in the world, about the wayes to end Controversies as any other. Nay it is apparent, that the greatest Controversies this day in the Christian world are upon this Subject. It is not therefore any high challenge of Infallibility in any Person or Council which must put an end to Controversies; for nothing but truth and reason can ever do it, and the more men pretend to unreasonable wayes of deciding them, instead of ending one they beget many. For the higher the pretences are, the more all wise men are apt to suspect them, and to require the more clear and pregnant evidence for what they say; and if they fail in that, they have reason to question their Integrity much more then if they had contented themselves with more moderate claims. For it is not saying Councils are infallible, will make men yield the sooner to their determinations, unless you first convince their reason by proving that they are so. But if you aim at nothing but the Churches peace, you might save your selves this labour; perswade men to be p. 507meek and humble, sober and rational, and I dare promise you the Church shall be more at quiet, than if you could prove all the Councils in the world to be Infallible. For, will that ever put a stop to the contentious Spirits of men? will that alter their tempers, or make them delight in those things which are contrary to them? No, you only offer to apply that Physick to the foreheads of men which should be taken inwards; if you would endeavour to promote true piety and a Christian Spirit in the world, that would tend more to the Churches peace then all your contests about the Infallibility of General Councils. But since you are resolved to contend, the nature of my task requires me to follow you, which I shall more chearfully do, because, in pretence at least, it is for peace sake.

This is then the first of those particular Controversies which this last part is designed for the handling of, and which in the consequence of it,§. 2. brings in many of those particular errours, which we charge your Church with. In handling of which, I must (as I have hitherto done) confine my self to those lines you have drawn for me to direct my course by. Only in this first, to prevent that confusion and tediousness which your discourse is subject to, I find it necessary to alter the method somewhat. For there being two distinct Questions treated of, viz. Whether General Councils be Infallible? and supposing them not Infallible, How far they are to be submitted to? You have intermixed these two so together, that it will easily puzzle the Reader to see which of them it is you discourse of. And although I must confess his Lordship hath gone before you in it, as his occasion of entring into it required, yet now the points coming to be more fully examined, it will be the most natural and easie method to handle them apart, and to begin first with that of Infallibility; for the other supposing the denial of it, it ought to follow the reasons which are given for that denial. But although I thus transpose your method, I assure you it is not with an intention to skip over any thing material, but I shall readily resume the debate of it in its proper place. In your entrance into this dispute, you give us very little hopes of any great advantage is like to come by it, because, upon your principles, it is impossible we should agree about the requisites to a General Council; for his Lordship wishing that a lawful General Council were called to end Controversies, you presently say,P. 222. A pure one to be sure, if according to his wish. Yes, too pure a great deal for you, to be willing to be tryed by. And when his Lordship professes,P. 240. That an easie General General Council shall satisfie him, that is lawfully called, continued, and ended according to the same course, and under the same conditions, which General Councils observed in the Primitive Church: You say, It is too general to be Ingenuous; you mean, such a Council would be too General for your purpose; for, you are resolved in your following words, not to yield to such a Council wherein all excommunicate Bishops, Hereticks and Schismaticks are not excluded; which is, in short, to tell us, You are resolved to account none General Councils, but such as are wholly of your own pary, in which the Pope shall sit as Judge, Who are admitted, and Who not; though this be as contrary to sense and reason, as it is to the practice of the Primitive Church, in those Councils which were then called. In which I have already proved, that the Pope did not sit as President. And, as long as you hold to such unreasonable conditions, it evidently appears, That your discourses of General Councils, are meerly delusory; and, to use your own words, Such a General Council as you would have, is a meer nothing (as to a general and free Council), an empty name to amuse silly people with; p. 508for, you require such conditions in order to it, as are destructive both to the freedom, and Being of a General Council. If therefore it be true, which you say, That morally speaking such a General Council, as Protestants would have, is impossible to be had; it is much more true, that such a General Council as you would have, it is most unreasonable we should submit to. For, as long as you condemn all other Bishops, but those of your own,P. 214. Church for out-laws, and desertors of the Catholick Church; and give no other reason for it, but because you say so; we thereby see, How absolutely averse you are from any Free Council, and that without any shew of justice, you condemn all others but your selves, without suffering them to plead for themselves in an Indifferent Council, where both parties may be equally heard. But it was wisely said of Pope Clement 7. that General Councils are very dangerous, when the Popes Authority is called in Question; and this you know well enough; for, if a Free Council were held, the Pope himself might be found with his party to be the greatest out-laws and desertors of the truly Catholick Church. But in such pack'd Councils, where the Pope sits as President, and orders all by his Legats, I shall desire you once more to ruminate over your own words; What Rebel would ever be found criminal, if he might be allowed to be his own Judge? But of such a kind of Council as you would have, I have spoken sufficiently in the precedent chapter. That which we are now upon, is not the Hypothesis, but the Thesis, in which we are to enquire, Whether such a General Council as you suppose, be Infallible or no? His Lordship maintains the negative, and you the affirmative. Your Opinion then is, That the Decrees of a General Council confirmed by the Pope, are Infallible, and that the holding of this, is a piece of Catholick Faith; and that it secures all the members of the Church from erring in any matter of Faith. For you say, It is not de fide, that the Pope without a Council is Infallible; but, that Pope and Council together are Infallible, you all along above assert to be so; and that the Decrees of General Councils fall nothing short in point of certainty of the Scripture it self; and that the contrary opinion does actually expose and abandon all the adherents to it, to an unevitable wavering and uncertainty in Faith. These are your own words, in several places which I have laid together, the better to discern the state of the Question. The main thing then whereon the use of General Councils depends being, that this must be believed to be de fide, in order to the certainty of mens Faith, and prevention of errours; that I may the better shew, how insignificant all this pretext of the Infallibility of General Councils, is, I shall first prove from your own principles, that this cannot be de fide, and then examine the grounds you insist on for the proof of their Infallibility.

§. 3.I begin with the First, which will sufficiently demonstrate, to how little purpose you talk of this Infallibility of Councils, for preventing uncertainty of Faith, when you cannot have any certainty of Faith at all as to that principle which must prevent it. For, supposing that really General Councils are Infallible, if you cannot give me any reasons to believe that they are so, their Decrees can have no power over my understanding, to oblige me to assent to them. And since you say, this principle must be held de fide, if there be no foundation at all for such an assent of Faith to it, I must needs be uncertain, whatever the Decrees of those Councils be upon your own principles. If you require an assent to the Decrees of Councils as Infallible, there must be an antecedent assent to this Proposition, That whatsoever Councils decree, is Infallible: As I cannot assent to any thing as Infallible, which p. 509is contained in Scripture, unless I first assent to this, That the Scripture it self is Infallible. If I therefore prove from your own principles, that none can have an assent of Faith to this Proposition, That whatever General Councils decree, is Infallible, then all your discourse comes to nothing, and men can have no more certainty by their Decrees, than if they were not Infallible. And this I shall prove by these things; 1. That you can have no certainty of Faith (I must use your own terms) That the Decrees of General Councils in the general are Infallible. 2. That you can have no such certainty as to the Decrees of any General Council in particular.

1. That you cannot in the general have any certainty of Faith as to the Infallibility of General Councils. For, 1. What Infallible Testimony have you for this, without which, you say, No certainty of Faith is to be had? It is not enough for you to say, That the Testimonies of Scripture you produce, are an Infallible Testimony for it: for that were to make the Scripture the sole Judge of this great Controversie, which you deny to be the sole Judge of any: And we must consider this as a present Controversie, which divides the Church, Whether General Councils be Infallible or no; In order to the ending which Controversie, we desire you to assign the way to it; for, you tell us, you have the only Infallible Way of putting an end to Controversies. Shew us therefore, which way this must be ended in the first place? Not by Scripture, for that were to come wholly over to us; and if it may decide this Controversie, it may as well all others. Who must then? The Pope? That cannot be, for we are not bound to believe him Infallible, but only with a General Council, as you tell us often. Must every one judge it by his reason? No, this is the private Spirit, and would leave all to uncertainties. What then must do it? the Pope and Council together? But that is it we are enquiring for, Whether we are to believe Pope and Council, or no: And then the reason is, we must believe them, because they say so. And, Can any thing be more ridiculous, than for you to deny that the Scriptures are to be believed for themselves, and to assert, that the Pope and Council are to be believed for themselves? If the Pope and Council then should declare their Decrees Infallible, On what account are we bound to believe them to be so? You have found it then an excellent way for ending all other Controversies that are so far to seek for ending this; which you cannot possibly do, without renouncing some of your principles, or an apparent contradiction. But besides this, 2. Your very manner of asserting the Infallibility of General Councils, destroyes all certainty of Faith concerning it. For, you say, That Councils are not Infallible, unless they be confirmed by the Pope: which, to the apprehension of any reasonable man, is, that they are not in and of themselves Infallible, but by vertue of the Popes confirmation. And therefore to say that Councils are Infallible, and then make that Infallibility depend upon the Popes Confirmation, is meerly delusory: for, you may as well say, that the Pope and Provincial Councils are Infallible. For, Doth the Decree receive any Infallibility from the Council, or not? If it doth, then the Decree is Infallible, whether the Pope confirm it or no: If it doth not, then the Infallibility is wholly in the Pope: And he may as well make a Provincial Council Infallible, as a General. But, suppose it be some promise which helps the Pope in a General Council, which doth not in a lesser (though there be no reason for that, for he is Head of the Church in one as well as in the other) yet you cannot have any certainty of Faith, that the Council is Infallible. For, you say, The Popes Confirmation is necessary p. 510to make it Infallible, but that the Pope may infallibly confirm the Council is no matter of Faith, and therefore the Infallibility of the Council can be none. For if the Councils Infallibility depend on the Popes Confirmation, you can have no greater certainty of the Councils Infallibility, then you have that the Pope will infallibly confirm it: But you can have no certainty of Faith, that the Pope will infallibly confirm the Council; therefore neither can you have any of the Councils Infallibility. The assumption depends upon this, that you acknowledge you can have no certainty of Faith, that the Pope is Infallible, but when he decrees in a General Council, i. e. that the Decrees by Pope and Council are Infallible. But you can have no certainty, that the Pope in the Act of confirming them, is Infallible; for if so, you might assert it de fide, that the Pope without a Council, is Infallible. For his Act of Confirmation is distinct from that Infallibility which lyes in the Decrees, which have passed both Pope and Council. So that if the Infallibility of Councils lyes wholly in the Popes Confirmation, and you can have no certainty of Faith of the Popes Infallibility, you can have no certainty of Faith of the Infallibility of General Councils.

§. 4.But, suppose we should grant, that you might in general be certain of the Infallibility of General Councils, when we come to instance in any one of them, you can have no certainty of Faith, as to the Infallibility of the Decrees of it. For you can have no such certainty, that this was a lawful General Council, that it passed such Decrees, that it proceeded lawfully in passing them, and that this is the certain meaning of them; and yet all these are necessary in order to the believing those Decrees to be Infallible, with such a Faith as you call Divine.

1. You can have no certainty of Faith, that this was a lawful General Council; for that depends upon such things which you cannot say are de fide, as, that the Bishops in the Council, are lawful Bishops, that the Pope who confirms them is a lawful Pope; for, by your own explication afterwards of your Doctrine, concerning the intention of the Priest, you say, it can be but a moral certainty, and that, you contend elsewhere, can be no ground for a Divine Faith. Besides, you can have no more certainty, that is a lawful Council, whose Decrees you assent to, than you have, that those Bishops who are excluded, are Hereticks or Schismaticks; but, Can you be certain of that with Divine Faith? and, Whereon is that Faith built?

2. You can have no such kind of certainty, of what Decrees were passed by them, and whether those Decrees were at all confirmed by the Pope or no? For Bellarmin confesseth, No other certainty can be had of that, than that whereby we believe there were such persons as Cicero, or Julius Caesar; and condemns Vega for saying, The certainty of it depends upon the definitions of the Council it self. Now this at the best, being but a humane or moral certainty, you must contradict your self, if you say, That a Divine Faith may be built upon it.

3. What certainty can you have, that may be a ground for Faith, that the Council hath proceeded lawfully; for, in case he doth not, your own Authours say, It may not be Infallible: For so Bellarmin answers in the case of the Council of Chalcedon, Concilium legitimum posse errare in his quae non legitimè agit, De Concil. l. 2. …. 7.that a lawful Council may erre, in case it doth not proceed lawfully. Now, Who can assure one, that there have been no practices at all used to bring off some men to give their Votes with them? It is hard to conceive such a body of men, wherein some few do not sway and govern p. 511all the rest, and in that case, Can any one say, that it was the Spirit of God which governed the Council? Especially if one Preside in the Council, who hath authority and power above all the rest, and that others in the Council have any dependence on him; Who can then expect that freedom which is requisite to a General Council? The Councils of Ariminum and Seleucia, are condemned; because, though there were a very great number of Bishops, yet some out-witted all the rest, and, by their subtilty, brought them to subscribe that confession of Faith, which Pope Liberius afterwards confirmed by his own subscription. And if so great a Council as this, must be reprobated on that account; Why not all others, where there are suspicions of the same arts and subtilties? Nay, How can a man be sure there have not been such arts used in Councils? for it is not to be expected, that such things should be much known to the world, they being privately managed with the greatest secrecy that may be. And yet it is in this case necessary to know, that the Council proceeded with all simplicity and plainness; for otherwise their determinations may not be Infallible. In order to which nothing is more requisite than that there be no one, which hath any great Authority over them: For if the second Council of Ephesus, lawfully summoned, and the Popes Legats being present, be therefore rejected, because Dioscorus the Patriarch of Alexandria did over-rule the rest; What assurance can we have of any fair dealing, where the Pope himself presides, who hath more waies both to terrifie and oblige, than ever Dioscorus could have? Besides, set aside this over-awing by some potent person, suppose some active and subtil men perceiving how things are like to go in a Council, use their wits to bring off some men, not of so deep reach as others, to their own party, and it may be by the accession of a small number, they over-vote the rest; Must we presently say, That the Spirit of God went off with those few men to the other party? for the Decrees of Councils going by Votes, and those Votes by the major part; Who doth not see, how easie it is (when it stands, it may be, upon a few Votes) to fetch off a number to the other side. And I do not know, where the Spirit of God hath promised, that where three or four men may so much alter the Decrees of a General Council, those Decrees, if they pass the major part, shall be infallible, and as certain as the Scripture. To be sure then, there ought to be great confidence of the simplicity of the Councils proceedings where a man must assent to them as Infallible: and to that end men must be assured that they came thither without any prejudice upon their minds; that when they were there, they sought nothing but the Truth and the Honour of Christ; or else, to be sure, they are not gathered in his name, and if not so, they cannot expect he should be in the midst of them. Now let any one who understands the world, and humane nature, see if he can perswade himself, that a Council can have no prejudices or by-ends upon them, that nothing of interest and reputation, may sway upon them when they are met there, that there shall be no heats or contentions among them; for if there be, let him then see, Whether he can believe them to be Infallible? If you say, In a matter so highly concerning the Church, the Spirit of God will not suffer them to erre: You must first shew, where the Spirit of God hath promised this; and then, if you could, that those promises do not suppose the performance of some conditions, which if they neglect, they may want the effect of them. In which case, there can be no greater assurance of the Spirit's presence, than there is of performance of the conditions, which is the thing I now aim at. Besides all which, we have known, that when it p. 512hath been a matter of as great concernment to the Church, as any of those you can fancy, great numbers of Bishops at Sirmium, Seleucia, Ariminum, Ephesus, have miscarried, and decreed that which hath been judged Heresie by the Church.

4. Suppose men could be assured of the proceedings of the Council, yet what certainty of Faith can be had of the meaning of those decrees? for we see they are as lyable to many interpretations as any other writings. If the Scriptures cannot put an end to Controversies on that account, how can General Councils do it? when their decrees are as lyable to a private sense and wrong interpretation as the Scriptures are: Nay much more, for we have many other places to compare, the help of original tongues, and the consent of the Primitive Church to understand Scriptures by: when the Decrees of Councils are many times purposely framed in general terms, and with ambiguous expressions to give satisfaction to some dissenting parties then in the Council. Who knows not, what disputes have been raised about the sense of some of the Decrees of the Council of Trent? about which the several parties neither are, nor are like to be, agreed. Nay, Who is so unacquainted with the proceedings of that Council, as not to understand how much care was taken in many of the decrees to pass them in such general terms, that each party might find their sense in them. How fearful were they of declaring themselves, for fear of disobliging a particular party? and are these the effects of an Infallible Spirit? Since we know it hath been thus in some Councils, Who dares venture his faith, it hath not been so in others? Who dare be confident, this or that is the meaning of such a Decree, when it may be capable of several senses? Was it a sign, that Council was Infallible, that was afraid to speak out in a case of great consequence and necessity in the Church? the Council of Trent, I mean, in determining, That due honour be given to Images, without assigning what that due honour was, which was the most needful of all to be done. If the Decrees of Councils were not ambiguous, what mean so many disputes still about them as are in the world? And when at last, you say, That the Councils are Infallible when the Pope confirms them, you say nothing more then if we should say, That Councils are Infallible when Scripture confirms them. Nay, you say nothing near so much; for all are agreed, that Scriptures are Infallible, but many among your selves are far from believing, that the Pope is Infallible. And therefore we are much nearer ending Controversies, in saying, Councils confirmed by Scripture are Infallible, than you are in saying, Councils confirmed by the Pope are so.

These things being thus in the General premised, we come now to the particular handling this Controversie between his Lordship and you.§. 5. And for the greater clearness of proceeding, he premises some things by way of consideration; whereof the first is, That all the power an Oecumenical Council hath to determine, P. 228 sect. 33.and all the assistance it hath, not to err in that determination, is all from the Vniversal Body of the Church, whose representative it is. For the Government of the Church being not Monarchical, but as Christ is head, this principle is inviolable in nature; Every body collective, that represents, receives power and priviledges, from the body which is represented, else a representation might have force without the thing it represents; which cannot be. So, there is no power in the Council, no assistance to it, but what is in and to the Church. But withall his Lordship adds, That the representative body cannot be so free from errour as the whole Church, because in all such assemblies many able and sufficient men being left out, they which are present may p. 513miss or misapply that reason and ground upon which the determination is principally to rest. By which means the representative body may err, whereas the represented, by vertue of those members which saw and knew the ground, may hold the principle inviolated. All the Answer which you return to this, is, That his supposition of the Churches not being Monarchical, is confuted already, P. 245.(and I say, whatever you have produced is Answered already) and that the power and assistance of General Councils cannot possibly be communicated to them by the Church, but must proceed from the same fountain now, it did in the Apostles time, viz. the direction of the Holy Ghost; this spiritual power not being of humane, but divine Institution; and not proceeding so much from the abilities of the persons, as from the co-operation of the Holy Spirit with them. To which I reply, that all this had need be more then thus barely asserted: it being confessed by your selves (as his Lordship shews) that a General Council is a representative of the whole Church, you ought to have shewed us the Divine Institution of this Representative, and the promises made to it under that notion, or else we may still say with his Lordship, That all the power and assistance it hath, is by vertue of that body which it represents. But I need not in this urge the Arguments of Protestants against you; for in this, as in most other Controversies, we have enough from those of your own party to oppose against these affirmations of yours. For Albertus Pighius not only asserts, but proves, that General Councils are not of divine, but humane institution, arising from a dictate of right reason; Hierarch. Eccles. l. 6.. c. 1.Sir 50:6that matters of doubt may be better debated by many prudent and experienced persons then by a few. So that as the supream authority for administration of affairs belongs to one, so it is most agreeable to right reason, that debates should be by many, This he proves at large, that nothing but humane reason is the foundation of Councils in the Church; for, saith he, In Scripturis Canonicis nullum de iis verbum est; nec ex Apostolorum institutione, speciale quicquam de illis accepit illa primitiva Christi Ecclesia. There is not a word of them in Scripture, neither did the primitive Church receive any particular order from the Apostles concerning them: which he from thence proves, because in all the time of the primitive Church till the Nicene Council, there is no mention at all of them. And at that time it did not receive any new revelation concerning the celebrating General Councils, but the Emperour Constantines zeal for the peace of the Church was the first cause and original of them. From whence he concludes that they have no supernatural or divine Institution, sed prorsus humanam, but altogether humane: for they are, saith he, The invention of Constantine sometimes useful, but not at all necessary. This man speaks intelligibly, and not like those who jumble Pope and Council together to make something Infallible between them. For he sayes, It is the better way by far to go immediately to the Apostolical See and consult that, as the Infallible Oracle, in all doubts of Faith. And very honestly tells us, That he believes Constantine was ignorant of that priviledge of the Holy See, when he first instituted General Councils. Than which nothing could be spoken truer. If you have then nothing more to say for the Divine Institution of General Councils, then what you have acquainted us with, it would be much more wisedom in you to contend with Pighius for the Popes Infallibility, and let that of General Councils shift for it self.

His Lordships second Consideration you admit of, viz. §. 6▪That though the Act which is hammered out by many together, must needs be perfecter, then that which is but the child of one mans sufficiency; yet this cannot be Infallible, unless it be from some special assistance of the Holy Ghost. Therefore omitting p. 514your very impertinent addition to this consideration, viz. So as to make its Decrees Infallible, (which is the thing in question): We proceed to the third; which is, That the Assistance of the Holy Ghost is without errour, which (saith he) is no question; P. 230.and as little that a Council hath it. But the doubt that troubles, is, whether all assistance of the Holy Ghost be afforded in such a high manner, as to cause all the definitions of a Council in matters fundamental in the Faith, and in remote deductions from it, to be alike Infallible. From this last expression you would very subtilly infer contrary to his Lordships design, That he granted General Councils to be Infallible in deductions, Ibid.as well as fundamentals, but not to be alike Infallible: whereas it is plain, his Lordship means no more by alike Infallible, then, Whether the assistance be alike in both to make them Infallible. And this you might easily perceive, but it would have prevented your cavil about a graduated Infallibility; which I know none assert but your self. This Consideration brings on the main of the battel, in those texts of Scripture, which are most insisted on to prove the Infallibility of General Councils, viz. John 16.13. I will send you the Spirit of Truth and he shall lead you into all Truth. John 14.16. This Spirit shall abide with you for ever. Matth. 28.20. Behold I am with you to the end of the world. Matth. 16.18. The founding of the Church upon the Rock against which the gates of hell shall not prevail. Luke 22.32. Christs prayer for St. Peter, that his Faith should not fail. Matth. 18.20. Where two or three are gathered together in my Name, I will be in the midst of them. Acts 15.28. It seemed good to the Holy Ghost, and to us. All which places (except the two last) have been already examined as far as concerns any promise of Infallibility in the questions concerning the Churches and the Popes Infallibility: and there being no reason at all given, why any Infallibility at all is promised by them to the Church after the Apostles times, it may seem wholly needless to bestow a particular consideration again upon all of them. For it is evident in those places, all your drift and design, is only to prove a promise of Infallibility in the Church, and to the Councils only by vertue of that. But having at large before shewed, that no such thing can be inferred from these or any other places, that which is built upon it, is wholly taken away too. For the only pretence that you have, why Councils should be proved hence Infallible, is, because the Church hath Infallibility promised by these texts, which must be very well proved, and much better then you have done, either here, or elsewhere, before the other can be deduced from hence. And yet supposing I should grant, that Infallibility was promised to the Church, I see no such necessary consequence from thence, that General Councils must be Infallible: unless you can prove from Scripture, that the Infallibility of the Church is meant of the Church representative and not diffusive; which is a new task which you have not yet undertaken. For it is not enough to say,P. 254. That the body of the Church is bound to believe and profess the doctrine taught by the representative, and therefore the representative must be Infallible, unless you could first prove, that there is a necessity of some continued Infallible teaching by the Church representative: which I despair of ever seeing done. I am so far therefore from thinking as you do, That these texts are sufficiently clear in themselves to prove the Infallibility of General Councils, that I believe a Philosopher might hear them repeated a hundred times over without ever imagining any such thing as a General Council, much less concluding thence, that they are Infallible. But because you again cavil with another expression of his Lordships, in that p. 515he saith, That no one of them doth infer, much less inforce Infallibility;P. 246. from whence you not infer but inforce this consequence, that he was loath to say all of them together did not; I shall therefore give you his Lordships Answer from all of them together. Which is likewise sufficient for every one of them. And for all the places together, saith he, weigh them with indifferency, P. 239.and either they speak of the Church (including the Apostles) as all of them do; and then all grant the voyce of the Church is Gods voyce Divine and Infallible. Or else they are general unlimited, and appliable to private assemblies as well as General Councils, which none grant to be Infallible, but some mad Enthusiasts. Or else they are limited, not simply to all truth, but all necessary to salvation; in which I shall easily grant a General Council cannot err, suffering it self to be led by this Spirit of Truth in Scripture, and not taking upon it to lead both the Scripture and the Spirit. For, suppose these places or any other did promise assistance even to Infallibility, yet they granted it not to every General Council, but to the Catholick body of the Church it self, and if it be in the whole Church principally, then is it in a General Council but by consequent, as the Council represents the whole. And that which belongs to a thing by consequent, doth not otherwise, nor longer, belong unto it, then it consents and cleaves to that, upon which it is a consequent. And therefore a General Council hath not this assistance, but as it keeps to the whole Church and Spouse of Christ, whose it is to hear his Word and determine by it. And therefore if a General Council will go out of the Churches way, it may easily go without the Churches truth. Which words of his, contain so full an Answer to all these places together, that till that be taken off there is no necessity at all to descend to the particular places, especially those which are acknowledged by your selves to speak primarily of the Churches Infallibility.

Yet for your satisfaction (more than any intelligent Readers) I shall add somewhat further, to shew the impertinency of the former places,§. 7. and then consider the force of the two last, which have not yet been handled.

1. There can be nothing drawn from promises made to the diffusive body, for the benefit of the representative, unless the maker of those promises did institute that representation. Therefore, supposing that Infallibility were by these promises bestowed upon the Catholick Church, yet you cannot thence inferr that it belongs to a General Council, unless you prove that Christ did appoint a General Council to represent the Church, and in that representation to be Infallible. For this Infallibility coming meerly by promise, it belongs only to those to whom the promise is made, and in that capacity in which it is made to it. For, Spiritual gifts are not bequeathable to Heirs, nor can be made over to Assigns; if the Church be promised Infallibility, she cannot pass away the gift of it to her Assigns in a General Council, unless that power of devolution be contained in the Original Grant. For she can give no more then is in her power to bestow; but this Infallibility being out of her disposal, the utmost that can be given to a General Council is a power to oblige the Church by the acts of it, which falls much short of Infallibility. Besides, this representation of the Church by a General Council is a thing not so evident from whence it should come, that from a promise made to one it must necessarily be understood of the other. For, as Pighius sayes, It cannot be demonstrated from Theological grounds, Hierarch. Eccles. l. 6. c. 4.Sir 50:6that a General Council which is so far from being the whole Church, that it is not a thousandth part of it, should represent the whole Church. For either, saith he, it hath this from Christ or from the Church: but they cannot produce one tittle from Scripture, where Christ hath conveyed over the power and authority of the whole p. 516Church to a hundred or two hundred Bishops. If they say, It is from the Church; there are two things to be shewed, first, that it is done; and secondly, that it is de jure or ought to be so done. First, it can never be shewed, that such a thing ever was done by the Vniversal Church; for if it were, it must either be by some formal act of the Church or by a tacit consent. It could not be by any formal act of the Church; For then there must be some such act of the Vniversal Church, preceding the being of any General Council; for by that act they receive their Commission to appear in behalf of the Vniversal Church. And this could not be done in a General Council, because that is not pretended to be the whole Church but only to represent it: and therefore it must have this power to represent the Church by something antecedent to its being. Else it would only arrogate this power to it self without any act of the Church in order to it. Now that the Vniversal Church did ever agree in any such act, is utterly impossible to be demonstrated, either that it could be, or that it was. Yet such a delegation to a General Council must be supposed in order to its representation of the whole Church; and this delegation must not only be before the first General Council, but, for all that I can see, before every one. For how can the Church by its act in one age bind the Church in all ages succeeding to the acts of those several Councils which shall be chosen afterwards? If it be said, That such a formal act is not necessary, but the tacit consent of the whole Church is sufficient for it: then such a consent of the Church must be made evident, by which, they did devolve over the power of the whole Church to such a representative. And all those must consent in that act whose power the Council pretends to have, and so it cannot be sufficient to say, That those who choose Bishops for the Council do it; for then they could only represent those who chose them, and so their authority will fall much short of that of the whole Church. But suppose such a thing were done by the whole Church, of which no footsteps at all appear, we must further enquire by what right or authority this is done, for the authority of the Church being given it by Christ, it cannot be given from it self without his commission for doing it. Which if we stay till it can be produced in this case, we may stay long enough before we see any such Infallible Representative of the Vniversal Church. The utmost then, that can be supposed in this case, is, that the parts of the Church may voluntarily consent to accept of the decrees of such a Council; and by that voluntary act, or by the Supream authority injoyning it, such decrees may become obligatory. But what is this to an Infallibility in the Council because it represents the whole Church? For neither is there evidence enough for such a representation, neither, if there were, could any priviledge of that nature belong to the representative body, because of any promise made to the diffusive body of the Church.

§. 8.2. What belongs to the representative body of the Church by vertue of a promise made to the diffusive, can in no other sense be understood of the representative, then as it belongs to the diffusive. Because no further right can be derived from any then they had themselves. Therefore supposing a promise of Infallibility made to the Church, it is necessary to know in what way and manner that promise belongs to it; for in no other way and manner can it belong to the Council which represents it. If therefore the Churches Infallibility lyes only in Fundamentals, the Councils Infallibility can extend no further. If the Churches Infallibility doth not imply, that all the Church or the major part should be Infallible, but that though the major part err, yet all the Church shall not, then neither can it be true of a General p. 517Council, that all, or the major part should be Infallible, but only that there should be no such General Council, wherein all the Bishops should erre. But then this is utterly destructive to the Infallibility of the Decrees of General Councils, for those must pass by the major part of the Votes: Which Canus, one of the acutest of our adversaries, was sensible of, and grants, that the major part in a General Council may erre, and the lesser part hold the truth; but then, he saith, That the Pope is not bound to follow the major part. Canus loc. Theol. l. 5. c. 5▪Which is expresly to take away any pretext of Infallibility from the Decrees of the Council, and place it wholly in the Pope: And, Why may not then the Pope and a Provincial Council be as Infallible, as the Pope and the lesser part of a General Council? What then do the promises of Infallibility to the Council signifie, if the major part may definitively erre? And therefore Bellarmin likes not this Answer, as being too plain and open, but gives another as destructive to the Councils Infallibility, as this is. Which is, that in case the major part doth resist the better in a General Council, as in that of Ariminum, and the second at Ephesus,Bellarm. de Concil. l. 2. c. 9. yet that it cannot conquer it. How so? Doth it not conquer it when the Decrees are passed by the major part? No, saith he, for these Decrees are afterwards made void. Very good: But then, I suppose in the Council, the major part did conquer, although not after. But by whom are they made void? By him to whom it belongs to confirm his Brethren, saith Bellarmin. Well, but the skill is, to know who that is in this case, who can reverse the Decree of the representative body of the Church under the plea of confirming his Brethren? If it be the Pope, Who reversed the Decrees of the Council of Sirmium, to which the Pope subscribed? And for that of Ariminum and Selencia, Hilary did more to reverse it, than ever the Pope did. Therefore others say, It is in the Churches power to make void the Decrees of General Councils, as she did the Decrees of the Arrian Councils. If so, then we plainly see, the Infallibility doth not lye in the representative, but in the diffusive body of the Church still; if that hath the power to avoid and repeal the Decrees of General Councils. So that all the Infallibility of Councils is meerly probationary, and stands to the good liking and consent of the d…ffusive body of the Church. By which means the Decrees of a Provincial Council being accepted by the Church, are as Infallible as of a General. But in all these waies, there is no proper Infallibility at all in the major part of a General Council, but it wholly lyes either in the Pope, or in the diffusive body of the Church still.

3. If these places which mention a promise of Infallibility to the Church, must imply the Infallibility of General Councils, as the Churches representative, then it will thence follow, that the Decrees of General Councils are Infallible, whether the Pope confirm them or no. For the Infallibility is not promised at all mediante Papâ, but virtute Ecclesiae; for if they be infallible as representing the Church, they are Infallible, whether there be any Pope or no: for the Pope doth not make them more represent the Church than they did before. And this is very well understood and proved by those, who from these promises to the Church, and from that Infallibility consequent upon it (by their adversaries confession) to a General Council, do inferr the Councils Authority to be above the Popes. Which is a just and necessary consequence from this assertion, That the priviledges of the Vniversal Church, are by vertue of its representation in a General Council. Which Doctrine was asserted by the Councils of Constance, and Basil, and by the Sorbonne Doctors, till their being Jesuited of late. Who have therefore p. 518asserted, that it might be as lawful to call in question the Decrees of the Council of Trent, as of those two Councils. And whereas their adversaries object, That this is not de fide: they answer, It is impossible but that it should be de fide, since it is decreed by General Councils. For, say they, Were the Fathers at Constance and Basil, acted by any other Spirit, than those at Nicaea, and Ephesus? Why may not then the Council of Trent be opposed as well as them? For if there be any difference, they had much the advantage. In the Council of Constance (say they) two Popes were present, all the Cardinals, two Patriarchs of Constantinople, and Antioch, and the Emperour himself, and the Legats of all Christian Princes; and besides all this, it was confirmed by Pope Martin, and the Acts of Confirmation extant in the 45. Session. And so the Council of Basil was begun, according to the Decrees of the Councils of Constance and Pisa, and by vertue of the Bulls of Martin and Eugenius; and the Popes Legats were presidents in it. So that if General Councils be Infallible, it must be de fide Catholicâ, that their Authority is above the Pope's: And if so, their Infallibility cannot depend upon his Confirmation. Now, if we search into the grounds on which they build this power of General Councils independently on the Pope, we shall find they derive it wholly from those places of Scripture, which speak so much concerning the Church and Councils, as is agreed on both sides. And therefore Aeneas Sylvius (afterwards Pius 2.) sayes,Aeneas Sylv. de gest Concil. Basil. l. 1. That is not the less de fide, because it is contradicted by some, since it is founded on the promises of Christ concerning the Church. Since therefore the Pope himself is but Filius Ecclesiae, and the Church is Sponsa Christi; they say, It is unreasonable that the Son of the Church should not be subject to the Spouse of Christ. If therefore these promises concerning the Church, inferr an Infallibility in it, and that Infallibility be in a General Council, as representing the Church; it follows thence, that Councils must be in themselves Infallible, whether confirmed by the Pope or no. And we may see, how little this Opinion of Infallibility of General Councils is like to stand between them, by the Answers which are given by those of the other party, who mak… …he Popes Confirmation necessary to the Infallibility of the Council. For Canus expresly saith, That the Council is said to be Infallible in no other sense than the Church is, i. e. in those things wherein all agreed, and not the major part. Bellarmin likes not this; For, saith he, if the major part of the Council erre, De Concil. l. 2. c. 11.the Council must of necessity erre; for that which properly belongs to the Council, is, Passing judgement in matter of Faith, or making Decrees: now, if that were not the lawful Decree of the Council, which is made by the major part, there never could be a lawful Decree, for none passes without some dissenting: and therefore he denies that the Council doth fully represent the Church without the Pope. So that on both sides we see, how pregnant these proofs are for the Councils Infallibility, when one saith, That if they be understood of the Church, the Councils Infallibility doth not want the Popes Confirmation, the other to make the Popes Confirmation necessary, denies such an absolute representation of the Church in the Council. If then the Council doth represent the Church, it is Infallible, although not confirmed by the Pope, if it doth not, then the promises made to the Church cannot belong to the General Council. Thus I have shewed you, how far these places concerning (as you say) the Infallibility of the Church, are, from proving the Infallibility of General Councils.

§. 9.But, though these general places concerning the Church, may not so clearly prove the Infallibility of General Councils, yet, you say, There are p. 519some particular places to this purpose. Which are, Mat. 18.20. and Act. 15.28. Which not having been handled already, I must follow you more closely in the examination of them. The first place is, Mat. 18.20. Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them. The substance of the argument from this place, his Lordship thus repeats from Bellarmin. The strength of the argument is not taken from these words alone, P. 234.but as they are continued with the former, and that the argument is drawn à minori ad majus, from the less to the greater, thus. If two or three gathered in my name, do alwaies obtain that which they ask at Gods hands, viz. wisdom and knowledge of those things which are necessary for them: How much more shall all the Bishops gathered together in Council, alwaies obtain wisdom and knowledge, to judge those things, which belong to the direction of the whole Church? To which his Lordship answers, That there is very little strength in these words, either considered alone, being generally interpreted by the Fathers, of consent in prayer, or with the argument à minori ad majus, 1. Because, though that argument hold in natural or necessary things, yet not in voluntary or promised things, or things which depend upon their institution. 2. Because it follows not, but where, and so far as, the thing upon which the argument is founded, agrees to the less: Now this Infallibility doth not belong to the lesser Congregation, and therefore cannot be inferred as to the greater. 3. Because it depends upon conditions here supposed of being gathered together in the name of Christ, and therefore supposing Infallibility promised these conditions here implied, must be known before such a Congregation can be known to be Infallible. 4. Because Christs promise of presence in the midst of them, is only to grant, what he shall find to be fit for them, not infallibly whatsoever they shall think fit to ask for themselves. 5. Because Gregory de Valentiâ and Stapleton confess, that this place doth not properly belong to prove an Infallible certainty of any sentence in which more agree in the name of Christ, but to the efficacy of consent for obtaining that which more shall pray for in the name of Christ, if at least that be for their souls health. For else it would hence follow, that not only the definition of a General Council, but even of a Provincial; nay, of two or three Bishops gathered together, is valid, and that without the Popes consent. The utmost I can make of your reply to these Answers, lyes in this, That you grant that primarily and directly our Saviour doth not intend that particular Infallibility, and this is that which Gregory and Stapleton assert; P. 252, 252.but only that he signified in general, that he would be present with his Church, and all faithful people gathered together in his name, so often, and so far, as their necessities required his presence, they duly imploring it. But yet the argument holds for the Infallibility of General Councils, and not National or Provincial, because the necessities of the Church require one, and not the other: and that it will follow à minori ad majus, in things promised, as well as natural, where the motive is increased, and neither goodness nor power wanting in the promiser. But all this depends on a false supposition, viz. that there is a necessity of Infallibility to continue in the Church, and that all persons are bound to believe the Decrees of the Councils to be the Infallible Oracles of truth: but we say, neither of these are necessary in the Church, and therefore you have no ground to extend this promise of Christs presence to the Infallibility of Councils. For you are not to extend the power and goodness of Christ as far as you shall judge fitting, but as far only as he hath promised to extend it. For otherwise it would be far more for the peace and unity of the Church, if every particular Congregation had this Infallibility, than if only General Councils had it: Because by that means, many p. 520disputes about the authority, calling, and proceedings of General Councils would be prevented: Nay, it might be extended much further, for by this argument from the goodness and power of Christ, you might, for all that I can see, inferr with more force, that every true Christian should be Infallible, and so there be no need of any Councils at all. For, whatever argument you can produce, why Christ's goodness should extend to make Councils Infallible, it will much more hold as to the other; for the peace, and unity of the Church would be far better secured this way. If you say that experience shews, Christ never intended this by the errours of particular men in all ages: To the same purpose we answer you as to Councils, that large experience shews, that when Bishops have solemnly met in Council, they have been grosly deceived; as you confess in all the Arrian Councils. If your argument would have ever held from the power and goodness of Christ; Would it not have held at that time, when so great a matter of Faith was under debate? If Christ therefore suffered so many Bishops so grosly to erre, in a matter of such importance, wherein the Church was so highly concerned, How can you inferr from his power and goodness, that he will never suffer General Councils to erre. If you answer, That these erred for not observing the conditions requisite in order to Christs hearing them, viz. that they were not met in the name of Christ, did not come without prejudice, nor rely on Divine Assistance. I pray take the same Answer as to all other Councils, that we cannot know that Christ hears them, or that they are Infallible, till we are assured of their performance of the conditions requisite in order to that Infallibility. And when you can assure us, that such a Council met together in the name of Christ, and came meerly with a desire to find out truth, and relyed wholly on his assistance for it, we do not so much distrust the power and goodness of Christ, as to think he will suffer them to be deceived. For we know upon those conditions he will not suffer any good man to erre, much less an Assembly of them met in a General Council. But here you have the hardest task of all lying upon you, which is, to prove that a General Council hath observed all these conditions, without which nothing can be inferred from this place, as to Christs being in any sense in the midst of them.

The last place mentioned for the Infallibility of General Councils, is that, Act. 15.28.§. 10. Where the Apostles say of themselves, and the Council held by them; It seems good to the Holy Ghost, P. 237.and to us. And, saith his Lordship, they might well say it. For they had infallibly the assistance of the Holy Ghost, and kept close to his direction. But there is a great deal of difference between them and succeeding Councils, who never arrogated this to their definitions, though they presumed of the assistance of the Holy Ghost; and though that form might be used, yet they did not assume such an Infallibility to themselves, as the Apostles had. And therefore it is little less than blasphemy in Stapleton, to say, That the Decrees of Councils are the very Oracles of the Holy Ghost. And, that all Councils are not so Infallible, as was this of the Apostles, nor the causes handled in them, as there they were, is manifest by the ingenuous confession of Ferus to that purpose. This is the substance of his Lordships Answer to this place. Which you think to take off by saying, That there's no essential difference between the certainty of the things determined by the Apostles, P. 253.and those decided by a General Council, confirmed by the Roman Bishop: and though after-Councils use not the same expression in terms, yet they do it in effect, by enjoyning the belief of their decisions under the pain of Anathema. If this be the meaning of the Anathema's of Councils, there had need indeed be no great difference between p. 521the Apostles Decrees, and theirs. But this had need be very well proved; and so it is by you: for you produce several expressions of Cyril, Athanasius, Austin, Leo, Gregory, and some others (out of Bellarmin) in which they magnifie the Decrees of General Councils, calling them a Divine Oracle, a Sentence inspired by the Holy Ghost, not to be retracted, and some others to the same purpose, by which you vindicate Stapleton, and tell us, he said no more than the Fathers had done before him. Yet all this is far from any vindication of Stapleton, or proving your assertion as to the equal certainty of the Decrees of Councils, and of the Apostles. For the ground of all those expressions, and several others of the same nature, was not the supposition of any inherent Infallibility in the Decrees of General Councils, but their great assurance of the truth of that Doctrine, which was determined by those first General Councils. For although I am far enough from believing the Council of Trent Infallible, yet if that had determined the same points of Faith, which were determined in the first four General Councils, and nothing else; I might have said, That the Decree of that Council was a Holy and Divine Oracle, a Sentence inspired by the Holy Ghost, &c. not that I thought the Council in the least Infallible, in determining these things; but that they were of themselves Divine Truths, which the Council determined. And in this sense Athanasius might well term the definition of the Nicene-Council against Arius, the word of our Lord which endureth for ever; and Constantine stile it a coelestial mandate; and Gregory might reverence the four first Councils, as the four Gospels (though Bellarmin tells you, that expression must be taken in a qualified sense) yet all these, and any other of a like nature, I say, import no more than that they were fully assured, the matters decreed by them, were revealed by God in his Word, and not that they believed that they became such holy and divine Oracles, meerly by the Councils definition. For the contrary might be abundantly manifested by many expressions in them quite to another purpose: and if, instead of all the rest, you will but read Athanasius and Hilary concerning Councils, you will find your self strangely deceived, if you believed they ever thought them Infallible. What you add afterwards,P. 254. that it is sufficient that there be a real Infallibility, though not like to that of the Apostles, will not be sufficient for me, till you can shew me the degrees of Infallibility; for, I will promise you, if you can once prove that Councils are really Infallible, I shall not stick to say, That they are alike Infallible with the Apostles. As for your discarding Ferus as a prohibited Authour, it only shews the great integrity of the man, who spoke too much truth to be born by the tender ears of the Roman Inquisition.

Before I had proceeded any further, I had thought (because of a former promise) to have looked back to the place,P. 249. where you speak in vindication of the decretal Epistles; but because you only referr to Turrianus his defence of them, I shall only return you an equal courtesie, and referr you to the abundantly sufficient Answer to him by David Blondel. One would have thought you should have been ashamed of so notorious an imposture as those decretal Epistles are; but we see, what shifts a bad cause puts you upon, that such men as Ferus, Cassander, Erasmus, are under an Index Expurgatorius, but the decretal Epistles must be still justified; but he that doth not see the reasons of these proceedings, wants a greater Index Expurgatorius for his brains, than ever they did for their Books.

We return therefore to our present subject, and having manifested,§. 11. how far the Infallibility of General Councils is from being grounded on the p. 522veracity of Divine promises, as you pretend without ground; we now proceed to the consent of the Church, as to this subject: which his Lordship speaks to in the next Consideration. Which is, That all agree that the Church in general can never err from the Faith necessary to salvation; P. 240.but there is not the like consent that General Councils cannot err. Whether Waldensis asserting, that General Councils may err, speak of such Councils as are accounted unlawful or no, is not much material; since, as his Lordship sayes, The Fathers having to do with so many Hereticks, and so many of them opposing Church authority, did never in the condemnation of those Hereticks utter this proposition, That a General Council cannot err. And supposing that no General Council had erred in any matter of moment to this day, which will not be found true, yet this would not have followed, that it is therefore Infallible and cannot err. And to shew that St. Augustin puts a manifest difference between the rules of Scripture and the definitions of men, he produceth that noted place in him, wherein he so fully asserts the prerogative of Scripture above all the writings of men or definitions of Councils: Which, because it will be often refer'd to, I have cited at large in the margin,Quis autem nesciat sanctam Scripturam canonicam, tam veteris quam novi Testamenti certis suis terminis contineri, eam que omnibus posterioribus Episcoporum literis ita praeponi, ut de illâ omni o dubitari & disceptari non possit, utrum verum, vel utrum rectum sit, quicquid in eá scriptum esse constiterit? Episcoporum autem literas quae post confirmatum Canonem vel scriptae sunt vel scribuntur, & per sermonem forte sapientiorem, cujustibet in eâ re peritioris, & per aliorum Episcoporum graviorem autoritatem, doctiorumque prudentiam, & per Concilia licere reprehendi, si quid in eis forte à veritate deviatum est. Et ipsa Concilia quae p…r singulas regiones vel provincias fiunt, plenariorum Conciliorum autoritati, quae fiunt ex universo o be Christiano, sine ull…s ambag…bus cedere, ipsa que plenaria saepe priora posterioribus emendari, cum aliquo experimento verum aperitur quod clausum erat, & cognos…itur q…od latebat, sine ullo typho sacrilegae superbi…, sine ullâ inflatâ cervice arrog…n…iae, sine ullâ contentione livid… invidi…, cum sanctá humilitate, cum pace Catholic…, cum cha…itate Christianâ. August. l. 2. de b…pt. c. Donatist. c. 3. but his Lordship gives the sum of it in these words. That whatsoever is found written in Scripture, may neither be doubted nor disputed, whether it be true or right. But the letters of Bishops may not only be disputed, but corrected by Bishops that are more learned and wise then they, or by National Councils; and National Councils, by Plenary or General. And even Plenary Councils themselves may be amended, the former by the latter. From whence he inferrs, That it seems it was no news with St. Austin, that a General Council might err, and therefore be inferiour to the Scripture, which may neither be doubted nor disputed, where it affirms. And if it be so with the definition of a Council too, where is then the Scriptures Prerogative? But his Lordship adds, That there is much shifting about this place, but it cannot be wraft off. And therefore undertakes punctually to answer all the evasions of Stapleton and Bellarmin, who have taken most pains about it. But before you come to particular answers, you are resolved to make your way through them, by a more desperate attempt:P. 255. which is, to prove that it cannot be St. Austins meaning in this place, that general Councils may err in their definitions of Faith, because then St. Austin must contradict himself, because he delivers the contrary in other places. This is indeed to the purpose, if you go through with your undertaking; but we must examine the places; The first is l. 1. c. 7. de baptism. c. Donatist. where you say, he expresly teacheth, that no doubt ought to be made of what is by full decree established in a General Council. But here a great doubt may justly be made, Whether ever you searched this place or no; for if you had, you would have had little heart to produce it to this purpose. For St. Augustin is there giving an account, why he would not insist upon any humane authorities, but bring certain evidence out of Scripture for what he said; and the reason he gives for it, is, because in the former times of the Church before the Schism of Donatus brake forth, the Bishops and particular Councils did differ from each other about the Question in hand, viz. rebaptizing Hereticks, untill that by a General p. 523Council of the whole world, that which was most soundly held etiam remotis dubitationibus firmaretur, was confirmed the disputes being taken away. The utmost that can be drawn hence, is, that when this Controversie was decided by a General Council, the disputes were ended among the Catholick Bishops. But by what arts can you hence draw, that St. Austin thought the Council Infallible in its definitions? When the business came to be argued in a free Council by the dissenting parties, and they more fully understood each other, and agreed upon one sentence, St. Austin sayes the former doubts were taken off: that is, the reasons and Scriptures produced on the other side satisfied them: but he doth not say, that no doubt is to be made of what is by full Decree established in a General Council; but, that no doubts were made after it. But if you say, There could be no agreement unless the Councils definition were supposed Infallible, you speak that which is contrary to the sense and experience of the world; and even of that general Council where this decree is supposed by Bellarmin to be made, viz. the Council of Nice. For, Will you say the Council was Infallible in deciding the time of keeping Easter, because after that Council the Asian Bishops submitted to the custom of other Churches? Is there no way imaginable to convince men, but by Infallibility? If there be, their doubts may be taken away by a General Council, and yet that Council not be supposed Infallible. For if St. Augustin had meant so, nothing had been more pertinent then to have insisted on the decree of that Council; and yet he there leaves it, and calls all arguments of that nature humane arguments, and therefore saith, ex Evangelio profero certa documenta; I bring certain evidences out of the Gospel. Which words doubtless he would never have so immediately subjoyned to his former concerning a General Council, if he had judged it Infallible, or its decrees as certain as the Scripture. In your second place l. 7. c. 5. there is nothing hath any shadow of pertinency to your purpose; that which I suppose you may mean, is, l. 5. c. 17. where what he said before was decreed by a General Council, he after saith, was the judgement of the Holy Catholick Church: from whence you may indeed infer that the Catholick Church did approve that decree of the Council, but how it proves it Infallible I cannot understand. Your last place is one sufficiently known to be far enough from your purpose, Ep. 118. ad Januar. where he saith, In case of indifferent rites, it is insolent madness to oppose the whole Church; but you are an excellent disputant, who can hence infer, that therefore General Councils are Infallible in their definitions in matters of Faith. For any thing then you have brought to the contrary St. Austin is far enough from the least danger of contradicting himself. But if you could prove that he were of your mind, that the definitions of Councils are Infallible as well as the Scriptures, never did any man more expresly contradict himself then St. Augustin must do in a multitude of plain places, wherein he saith, That no other writing is Infallible but the Scripture; Aug. ep. 19. ad Hierony…um c. Crescon. Grammat l. 2. c. 31. De Nat. & Gratiâ c. 61. c. Faustum l. 11. c. 5. Epistol. 112.That only according to them he judged freely of all other writings; and that because he could yield an undoubted assent to none but them. That there is no other writing wherein humane infirmities are not discovered but in them; that men are at liberty to believe or not believe any thing besides the Scripture. Can any man, who sayes these things be reasonably supposed to assert that the decrees of General Councils are as certain as the Scripture is? You see then what little advantage you have gained by this attempt of offering to make St. Austin contradict himself, if in this place he should be supposed to assert that General Councils may err: which he doth plainly enough to any but those who are resolved not to understand him.

p. 524§. 12.This prejudice being therefore removed, we come to the particular evasions of this place; which you thus sum up, in order to the defence of them.P. 256. That when he saith, Former General Councils may be amended by the latter, it is only to be understood in matters of fact, in precepts pertaining to manners and discipline, or by way of more full and clear explication of what had been delivered by former Councils. To both these, his Lordship offers very just exceptions. To the first, that it is to be understood of precepts of manners and discipline; he saith, 1. That Bellarmin contradicts himself, because he had said before, P. 241.that General Councils cannot err in precepts of manners: No, (say you) this is no contradiction, because these depend much upon circumstances of time, place, person, &c. which varying, it often so falls out, that what at first was prudently judged fit to be done, becomes afterwards unfitting, and in this case one General Council may be amended by another, and yet neither charged with errour. But do you suppose the mean while that St. Austin spake pertinently to this business, or no? If he did, he can be understood only of such a precept as that relating to the baptism of Hereticks. Suppose then one Council should decree Hereticks to be baptized, and another afterwards correct this, and say, They should not, Will you say that neither of these were in an errour? So that your Answer is wholly impertinent to the scope of St. Austins discourse. And so his Lordship saith, This whole Answer is concerning precepts of manners: for St. Austin disputes against the errour of St. Cyprian followed by the Donatists, which was an errour in Faith; namely, that true Baptism could not be given by Hereticks and such as were out of the Church. But you say, St. Austin doth not confine his discourse to St. Cyprians case only, P. 257.but by occasion of his, and his Councils errour, he layes down general doctrine, touching the different authority of the writings of particular Bishops, Provincial National and General Councils. Although I should grant you this, it will make little for your purpose; for St. Austins main design is, to set the Authority of Scripture far above all these, and that in point of Certainty and Infallibility; and this being his main scope, whatsoever he sayes of any of these, it is certain his purpose is to shew that all of them fall short of the Sacred Scripture, as to our yielding assent to them. For these in the first place are set by themselves, as only being Infallible and deserving an undoubted assent to all that is contained in them: which being supposed, he proceeds to shew what the extent is of all other authority besides this. For the writings of Bishops, saith he, they are so far from deserving such an assent as we give to the Scriptures, that they may be corrected by others, or by National Councils; and National Councils, by Plenary; and Plenary may be amended, the former by the latter. In all which gradations two things must be repeated foreign as running through the whole Discourse, which are, 1. The difference of all these from the Scripture in regard of our yielding assent to them; for that is it, which he begins with, that we are not in the least to doubt, whether any thing contained therein be true or no: and then comes the other in, by way of immediate Antithesis; but, the writings of Bishops, &c. and although there be a gradation in all these, yet all of them are therein different from Scripture, that whatsoever is found there may neither be doubted nor disputed; but the writings of Bishops may be doubted or disputed of, because they may be corrected by other Bishops or Councils. And those National Councils may be, because they may be corrected by General; and even these General Councils cannot require such an undoubted assent as the Scripture doth, because the former may be amended by the latter. So that if you take p. 525the scope of S. Austin's discourse in this place, whether he speaks generally; or particularly, nothing can be more evident, than that he puts this difference between the Scriptures, and all other writings or Councils, that the one may not at all be doubted or disputed of, but the other may: and the common reason of all is, because none are so Infallible, but they may be corrected by something besides themselves, which cannot be in any sense said of the Scripture. 2. Although Saint Austin adds that clause, Si quid in eis fortè à veritate deviatum est, If they have erred from the truth, only where he speaks of the writings of Bishops; yet the series of his discourse implies, that it should be understood in what follows too: that, as the writings of Bishops may be corrected by Councils, if they have erred, so National Councils may be corrected by General, if they have erred; and so former General Councils by latter on the same supposition still, that they have erred. For, as the errours was supposed to be the ground of correction in the former, it must be likewise of amendment here. And whatever is not so perfect, but that it may be amended, cannot be supposed Infallible; for, if the persons had been Infallible, who had made those Decrees in General Councils, they would have prevented any necessity of further amendments by succeeding Councils. So that, take amendment in what sense you will, either for supplying defects, or correcting errours, it is destructive to your pretence, that the Decrees of General Councils are Infallible, and as certain as the Scripture. Which is so repugnant to the scope of this speech of S. Austin, as nothing can be more. Your Criticism then, from the signification of emendare from menda, and menda from minus, and so importing only the taking away any defect, yields you no relief at all:P. 252. for that defect which is supposed in General Councils, which needs that emendation, doth sufficiently argue, there was no Infallible Assistance of the Spirit of God in the Decrees of those Councils. For where Gods Spirit assists infallibly, it leaves no such defects as are necessary to be amended afterwards, by some other Council which can pretend to no higher assistance than the other had before. But your critical judgement is not extraordinary, if you will have the signification of words taken from the conjectural Etymologies of them, such as this of Scaliger is in the place where he corrects Varro's Etymologies (at the end of his Conjectanea) but, besides that, all attempts of that nature are but Conjectural Essayes, it is but an ill way to judge of the use of a word by the Etymology of it; for, What multitudes of words are carried further in their sense, than their Originals would bear? His Lordship therefore takes a far surer way to know S. Austin's meaning, than running to Martinius for the signification of the word menda; which is, by producing a parallel place in S. Austin, where it is taken for to correct, and supposes an evident fault; aliud quod praecipere jubemur, C. Faustum▪ l. 20. c. 21.aliud quod emendare praecipimur; where emendare is, plainly to amend something amiss, not to supply something defective. So that Stapleton's sense of amending by explication of something not fully known, and not by correction of something erroneous, cannot here have place. For, as his Lordship well observes the National Council, which S. Austin did in this dispute speak most of, was not guilty meerly of not fully explaining it self, but of a positive errour, viz. that under S. Cyprian, determining that Baptism of Hereticks was no Baptism. And therefore when S. Austin speaks of amendment, it is such an amendment as doth suppose errour, and not barely defect. And so the words used before of reprehension and yielding, do both imply more than a p. 526bare explanation; and those which follow after, evince it fully, where S. Austin layes down the cautions, whereby such amendments should be made, without sacrilegious pride, or swelling arrogancy, without contention of envy, and in holy humility, in Catholick peace, in Christian Charity. All which words were very needless, if he meant only an explanation of something not fully declared before; but are very necessary, supposing it to be the amendment of some former errour. All the Answer you have, is, That these last words relate not in particular to General Councils (by no means,Ibid. although they follow them at the heels) but to the other several subjects, viz. private Bishops, Provincial and National Councils; which are subject to pride, arrogancy, and contention in their emendations. But, Was not S. Austin an unhappy man then at expressing himself, that he must needs set those Caveats after he had spoken of General Councils, which referr to the particulars that went before, without any reference to the immediate antecedents? For if they do at all respect the proceedings of General Councils, (as doubtless they do, and that most immediately, as appears to any one who reads them) then they imply still, that this amendment of General Councils must be done without pride, arrogance, and envy, and with the greatest humility, and peace, and charity; which it is hard to conceive why S. Austin should add, unless he supposed some errours to be amended in them. Nothing remains further for the clearing this place, but only that his Lordship mentions that which he calls,P. 244. The poorest shift of all in Bellarmin, viz. that he speaks of unlawful Councils: and it is a sign it is so indeed, when you have nothing more to say for it, but only, that it was given ex superabundanti, and with a Peradventure. When his Lordship concludes, that the Popes Confirmation to make Councils Infallible, is a meer trick, and unknown to the ancient Church; you have nothing more to prove it to be grounded on the practice of Councils of the Church, and of Reason, but to referr the Reader back to what you have said about the Popes Supremacy; and therefore I must do so too, for an Answer to what you have said on that subject.

§. 13.The next thing which belongs to this Question, is contained in his Lordships sixth Consideration;P. 248. which is, If the definition of a General Council be Infallible, then the Infallibility of it, is either in the conclusion, and in the means that prove it; or in the conclusion, not the means; or in the means, not the conclusion. But it is Infallible in none of these. Not in the first; for there are divers deliberations in General Councils, where the conclusion is Catholick, but the means by which they prove it, not Infallible. Not in the second; for the conclusion must alwaies follow the nature of the premises, or principles out of which it is deduced; therefore if those which the Council uses, be sometimes uncertain, the conclusion cannot be Infallible. Not in the third; for the conclusion cannot but be true and necessary, if the means be so. Your Answer is, That it is Infallible in the conclusion, that is, in the Doctrine defined, though it be not Infallible in the means, or arguments upon which it proceeded to the definition. P. 263.And your reason is, because one is necessary for the Government of the Church, but the other is not; for, Deus non deficit in necessariis, nec redundat in superfluis. You mean, it is necessary for you to assert it, whether it hath any foundation in reason or no: for you have not yet proved, that the Infallibility of General Councils is necessary for the Churches Government, and therefore cannot thence inferr so great an absurdity as this; that, where all the premises are fallible and uncertain, yet the conclusion may be prophetical and Infallible. But so p. 527involved and obscure are your discourses on this subject, that while you pretend a General Council is seeing Visions, one might easily believe you were dreaming dreams. For, I pray, speak out, and tell us, what you mean by Councils being fallible in the use of means, and yet Infallible in the conclusion drawn from those premises, which she was fallible in the deducing the conclusion from? For the deducing the conclusion, is in the use of the means; therefore how is it possible that the Council should be Infallible in the conclusion, when it was fallible in making that Conclusion? But it may be I do not yet fully apprehend what you would have, neither I doubt do you. For you would fain be Infallible in the conclusion too, without so much as truth in the premises. But I shall attempt to make you speak intelligibly; it must be one of these two things you mean, when you say, Councils are Infallible in the conclusion, either that they are Infallible in deducing the Conclusion, or in assenting to the Conclusion. If Infallible in the deducing the Conclusion, then it must be Infallible in the use of the means; for, unless it doth infallibly discern the connexion of the premises, it is impossible it should be Infallible in drawing the Conclusion from them. So that it is non-sense, and a contradiction to say, That a Council is Infallible in the drawing a Conclusion, and not Infallible in the use of the means: for, it is to say, It is Infallible, and not Infallible at the same time, and about the same thing, and in the same manner. For, What is drawing a Conclusion, but a discerning that truth which results from the connexion of the premises together? for that which is concluded, hath all its truth depending upon the evidence of the premises, otherwise it is a simple Proposition, and not a Conclusion. If you had then said, That the Spirit of God did immediately reveal to the Council the truth of what was to be decreed; you had spoken that which might have been understood, though not believed; but this you durst not say, for fear of the charge of Enthusiasms, and new Revelations: but when you say, The Council must use means, and make Syllogisms, as other fallible creatures do, but then it is Infallible in the drawing the Conclusion from the premises (though it be fallible in the connexion of those premises) is an unparalleld piece of profound non-sense. For, suppose the matter the Council was to determine, was the Popes Infallibility; in order to the proving this, you say, The Council must use all arguments tending to prove it; there comes in Christ's Prayer for S. Peter, that his Faith should not fail, and that this must be extended to his Successors, thence the argument is formed. Whomsoever Christ prayed for, that his Faith should not fail, is Infallible; but Christ prayed for the Pope, that his Faith should not fail; therefore he is Infallible. Now you say, The Council is fallible in the use of the means for this Conclusion, i. e. it may not infallibly believe the truth of the major or minor Proposition, but yet it may infallibly deduce thence the Conclusion, though all the strength of the Conclusion depends upon the truth of the premises. You must therefore either assert that the Decrees of Councils are immediately revealed as Divine Oracl…s, or else that they are fallible Conclusions drawn from fallible premises. And, were it not for a little shame, because of your charging others with immediate Revelations, I doubt not but you would assert the former; which you must of necessity do, if you will maintain the Infallibility of General Councils: for if there be any infirmity in the use of the premises, it must of necessity be in the Conclusion too. But, suppose you mean an Infallible Assent to the matter of the Conclusion, though it be fallibly deduced, you are as far to seek as ever; for, Whereon must that p. 528Assent be grounded? It must be either upon the truth of the premises, or something immediately revealed: If on the truth of the premises, the Assent can be no stronger than the grounds are on which it is built; if on something revealed, it must needs be still an immediate Revelation. But I forget my self all this while, to urge you thus with absurdities consequent from reason; for, in answer to his Lordship, you grant, That it is a thing altogether unknown in nature, and art too, that fallible principles can either as Father or Mother, beget or bring forth an Infallible Conclusion; for, when his Lordship had objected this, you return him this Answer, That this is a false supposition of the Bishop, Ib…d.for the Conclusion is not so much the child of those premises (i. e. it is not the Conclusion) as the fruit of the Holy Ghost, directing and guiding the Council, to produce an Infallible Conclusion, whatever the premises be (true, or false, certain, or uncertain, all is a case.) This is necessary for the peace and unity of the Church (to believe Contradictions) and therefore not to be denied, unless an impossibility be shewed therein. (I doubt, believing contradictions is accounted no impossibility with you.) But, I hope, no man will attaque Gods Omnipotency, and deprive him of the power of doing this. Is it come to that at last? Whatever you assert that is repugnant to the common reason of mankind, and involves contradictions in it, that you call for Gods Omnipotency to help you in. Thus Transubstantiation must be believed, because God is Omnipotent; and that men may believe any thing, though not grounded on Scripture, and repugnant to Reason, because God is Omnipotent. We acknowledge God's Omnipotency, as much as you, but we dare not put it to such servile uses, to make good any absurd imaginations of our brains. If you had said, It was possible, for God to enlighten the minds of the Bishops in a General Council, either to discern infallibly the truth of the premises, or immediately to reveal the truth of the Conclusion, you had spoken intelligible falshoods. But to say, that God permits them to be fallible in the use of the means, and in drawing the Conclusion from them; but to be Infallible in the Conclusion it self, without any immediate Revelation, and then to challenge Gods Omnipotency for it: I know not whether it be a greater dishonour to God, or reproach to humane understanding. And if such incongruities as these are, do not discover that you are miserably hampered, as his Lordship saith, in this argument, I know not what will.

§. 14.But we must proceed to discover more of them; two things his Lordship very rationally objects against Stapletons assertion,P. 249. That the Council is discursive in the use of the means, but prophetical in delivering the Conclusion. 1. That since this is not according to principles of nature and reason, there must be some supernatural Authority, which must deliver this truth (which, saith he, must be the Scripture.) For if you fly to immediate Revelations; the Enthusiasm must be yours. But the Scriptures which are brought, in the very exposition of all the Primitive Church, neither say it, nor enforce it. Therefore Scripture warrants not your prophecy in the Conclusion. Neither can the Tradition: Produce one Father, who sayes, This is an Vniversal Tradition of the Church, that her definitions in a General Council are prophetical, and by immediate Revelation: Produce any one Father that sayes it of his own authority, that he thinks so. To all this you very gravely say nothing; and we can shrewdly guess at the reason of it. 2. His Lordship proves, That it is a repugnancy to say, That the Council is prophetical in the Conclusion, and discursive in the use of the means; for no Prophet, in that which he delivered from God as Infallible truth, was ever discursive at all in the use of the means; Nay p. 529(saith he) make it but probable in the ordinary course of prophecy, and I hope you go no higher, nor will I offer at Gods absolute power (but his Lordship was deceived in you, for you run to Gods Omnipotency) that that which is discursive in the means, can be prophetical in the Conclusion, and you shall be my great Apollo for ever. And this, he shews, is contrary to what your own Authours deliver concerning the nature and kinds of prophecy, and that none of them were by discourse. To this you answer,P. 264. That both Stapleton and you deny that the Church is simply prophetical, either in the premises or Conclusion, but rather the quite contrary; and that by the definition of the Councils being prophetical in an Analogical sense, no more is meant but that by vertue of divine assistance and direction, such a Conclusion or definition, in regard of precise verity, is as infallibly true and certain, as if it were a prophecy. But if you had a mind that we should understand, or believe what you say, Why do not you come more out of the clouds, and shew us the difference between that which is simply prophetical, and that which is only Analogically so, but as infallibly true and certain as the other? But, that you may no longer blind the world with such insignificant discourses, I shall put you upon speaking more distinctly, by enquiring into those waies, whereby God may be supposed supernaturally to work upon the minds of men, in order to the discovery of truth. These two waies we may conceive that God may make known truth to the minds of men. 1. By the immediate discovery of something, which could not otherwise be known but by immediate Revelation: And of this nature were all those future events which were revealed to the Prophets, and this I suppose you call simply prophetical; so likewise all those Doctrines which are of pure Revelation, i. e. such as could never have been known, unless God had revealed them: of which kind there are several in the Gospel. 2. God may discover such things to the minds of men, which, though they might otherwise be known, yet not with that degree of certainty, as by this immediate assistance of Gods Spirit: Now this I suppose, is that you call Analogically prophetical, which you assert to differ nothing at all from prophecy, in regard of Infallible truth and certainty, being by vertue of divine assistance and direction. And this you say a General Council hath, but not the former.

Now to convince you of the absurdity of your assertions,§. 15. I shall shew you these two things. 1. That this cannot be without an imm…diate Revelation. 2. That being so, it cannot be discursive, as you say it is in the use of the means. 1. That this cannot be without an immediate Revelation: for which I need nothing but your own assertions, viz. that this is a higher discovery of truth, than nature can ever attain to, or ordinary Grace; and that it is such as obliges all men to an internal assent to it, when it is declared. Now I shall desire you, or any of your party, to tell me, What difference there is between this, and the Inspiration which the Apostles had in writing the Books of Scripture. I mean not such as contain prophesies in them, but those which deliver to us the Gospel of Christ: as for instance, in S. John's Gospel, he doth not pretend to deliver any thing which was not revealed before, but to give an account of the Doctrine and life of Christ. And so that Inspiration was not simply prophetical, as in writing the Prophecies in the Apocalyps, but Analogically so, in that such an assistance of Gods Spirit, as made what he writ, to be as infallibly true and certain, as if it were a Prophecy, which are your own words concerning the Infallibility of Councils. Shew us therefore any rational difference between this kind of Infallibility, and that Inspiration by which the Books of Scripture are written. If you say, the one was p. 530immediate and the other not, you beg the Question: for I am proving that what you assert, doth necessarily imply, that it is as immediate as that which the Apostles had. Nay I will go yet further, and say it is as immediate as that which the Apostles themselves had in Council. For when they said, It seemed good to the Holy Ghost and to us, Can any thing more possibly be understood, then that the Spirit of God did so far assist their minds, that they should not err in their Definitions? And therefore when of late you are grown (forsooth) somewhat jealous of the word Infallibility, and you give us a grave advertisement at the end of your Preface, that you do not mean by it an intrinsecal unerring power in all things, in those whom you account Infallible, but only that they never have erred, nor shall err in definitions of Faith; you do not at all advantage your selves by it. For none of your considerate adversaries do charge you so much with usurping Gods incommunicable attribute of Infallibility, (which is thereby avoided because you pretend to derive it from him) but that you challenge the same Infallibility which the Apostles had. And so must of necessity assert as much of Divine Enthusiasm and immediate revelation in your Church, as any of the Apostles themselves had. For what ever they had, came by vertue of Christs promise, and that is all you say for the Churches Infallibility: but that doth no more take it off from being an immediate revelation in the Church, then it did in the Apostles. If you say, The Church is only secured that it neither hath erred, nor can err in definitions of Faith, What more had the Apostles then this? And if this in them did require an immediate inspiration, certainly it must do so in the Church too. But you say, Neither Church nor Council do publish immediate revelations, Ibid.nor create any new Articles of Faith, but only declare and unfold by their definitions, that doctrine, which Christ and his Apostles in some manner first delivered. But all this, supposing it true, doth not hinder, but the Councils Infallibility must imply an immediate revelation on the part of the Council, though not of the Doctrine decreed by them. For granting the decrees of the Council are no new Articles of Faith (which is yet contrary to your own principles; for if by the definitions of Councils that may be de fide which was not before, then the Councils do make new Articles of Faith, though not new Doctrines) i. e. that the matter of them in some manner was before revealed, yet since you say the Council in declaring them, hath an Infallibility, equal to Prophecy, it must be by immediate inspiration. For, Hath the Council greater certainty, and higher assistance then any ordinary believer hath or not? if not, it can be no more Infallible then an ordinary believer; if it hath, it must be immediate, because it hath a higher degree of certainty, then can be attained by the use of means. And to say this, as you do expresly, when you assert the Council fallible in the use of means, but infallible in the conclusion, is a most palpable Contradiction. For, it is to assert a certainty beyond and above the use of means, and yet not immediate. But here lyes your perpetual mistake, as though nothing could be an immediate revelation, but what is a revelation of some Doctrine never revealed before: whereas if there be a further explanation of that Doctrine in as Infallible a manner as the Apostles at first revealed it, that explanation is by as immediate a revelation, as the first discovery of it. As is clear in the Council of the Apostles, for I hope you will not deny, but the non-obligation of the ceremonial Law was in some manner revealed to them before; and yet I hope you will not say, but the Apostles had an immediate revelation as to what they decreed in that Council. p. 531It is very plain therefore, that when you say, General Councils neither have erred nor can err in their definitions, they usurp as great a priviledge thereby as ever the Apostles had, and in order to it must have as immediate an inspiration. For, never was there any such Infallibility, either in the Prophets or Apostles, as did suppose an absolute impossibility of errour; but it was wholly hypothetical in case of Divine assistance, which hindred them from any capacity of erring so long as that continued with them and no longer. For, inspiration was no permanent habit, but a transient act in them; and that being removed, they were lyable to errours as well as others; from whence it follows, that where revelations were most immediate, they did no more then what you assume to your Church, viz. preserve them from actual errour in declaring Gods will. So that nothing can be more evident then that you challenge as great an Infallibility, and as immediate assistance of Gods Spirit in Councils as ever the Prophets and Apostles had. And therefore that Divine was in the right, of whom Canus speaks,Canus l. 5. c. 5. who asserted, That since General Councils were Infallible, their definitions ought to be equalled with the Scriptures themselves. And although Canus and others dislike this, it is rather because of the odium which would follow it, than for any just reason they give, why it should not follow. For they not only suppose as great a Certainty or Infallibility in the Decrees of both, but an equal obligation to internal assent in those to whom they are declared. Which doth further prove, that the revelation must be immediate: for if by vertue of those definitions, we are obliged to assent to the Doctrines contained in them as Infallibly true, there must be an immediate Divine Authority which must command our Assent. For nothing short of that can oblige us to believe any thing as of Divine revelation; now Councils require, that we must believe their definitions to be Divine truths, though men were not obliged to believe them to be so, before those definitions. For that is your express Doctrine, That though the matters decreed in Councils were in some manner revealed before, yet not so as to oblige all men with an explicite assent to believe them; but after the definitions of Councils they are bound to do it. So that though there be not an object newly revealed, yet there ariseth a new obligation to internal assent; which obligation cannot come but from immediate Divine Authority. If you say, The obligation comes not simply by vertue of the Councils definitions, but by a command extant in Scripture, whereby all are bound to give this assent to the decrees of Councils; I then say, we must be excused from it, till you have discharged this new obligation upon your self, by producing some express testimony of Scripture to that purpose: which is, I think, sufficient to keep our minds at liberty from this internal assent to the definitions of General Councils by vertue of any Infallibility in them. And thus having more at large considered the nature of this Infallibility which you challenge to General Councils, and having shewed that it implyes as immediate a revelation as the Apostles had; the second thing is sufficiently demonstrated, That this Infallibility cannot suppose discursiveness with fallibility in the use of the means, because these two are repugnant to each other.

The next thing to be considered, is, Stapletons argument, why Councils must be Prophetical in the conclusion; §. 16.because that which is determined by the Church is matter of Faith, and not of knowledge, and the assent required else would not be an assent of Faith, but an habit of knowledge. To which his Lordship Answers, That he sees no inconvenience in it, if it be granted; for one and the same conclusion may be Faith to the believer, that cannot prove; p. 532P. 251.and knowledge to the learned, that can. Which he further explains thus: Some supernatural principles which reason cannot demonstrate simply, must be supposed in order to Faith; but, these principles being owned, reason being thereby inlightned, that may serve to convert or convince Philosophers, and the great men of reason in the very point of Faith where it is at the highest. This he brings down to the business of Councils; as to which, he saith, that the first immediate, fundamental points of Faith, as they cannot be proved simply by reason, so neither need they be determined by any Council, nor ever were they attempted, they are so plain set down in Scripture. If about the sense and true meaning of these, or necessary deduction out of the prime Articles of Faith, General Councils determine any thing, as they have done at Nice and the rest; there is no inconvenience, that one and the same Canon of the Council should be believed as it reflects upon the Articles and grounds indemonstrable; and yet known to the learned, by the means and proof, by which that deduction is vouched and made good. And again the conclusion of a Council, suppose that in Nice about the consubstantiality of Christ with the Father, in it self considered, is indemonstrable by reason; there (saith he) I believe, and assent in Faith: but the same conclusion if you give me the ground of Scripture and the Creed (for somewhat must be supposed in all whether Faith or knowledge) is demonstrable by natural reason against any Arrian in the world. So that he concludes, The weaker sort of Christians may assent by Faith, where the more learned may build it on reason, the principles of Faith being supposed. This is the substance of his Lordships Discourse. In Answer to which, you tell us, That the Bishop seems to broach a new Doctrine, that the assent of Faith may be an habit of knowledge. P. 265.But surely (say you) Divine Faith is according to the Apostle, Heb. 11. an Argument of things which do not appear, viz. by the same means, by which we give this assent of Faith: otherwise our Faith would not be free and meritorious. An Answer I must needs say, hugely suitable to your principles, who are most concerned of all men to set reason at a distance from Faith; and so you do sufficiently in this Discourse of it. For it is no easie matter to understand what you mean, but that is not to be wondered at, since you make obscurity so necessary to Faith. Divine Faith is (you say) an Argument of things which do not appear, viz. by the same means, by which we give this assent of Faith. Do you mean that the objects of Faith do not appear? or that the reason of believing doth not? If only the former, which is all the Apostle means; that is nothing to your purpose, for we are not enquiring, whether men may not believe the things which are not seen, but, whether the assent of Faith may not be consistent with reason: which I am so far from thinking any strange doctrine, that I cannot see how there can be an assent of Faith without reason. And they must be such great meriters at Gods hands, as you are, who must think to oblige him with believing what you cannot understand, or see any ground in reason for. For, assent being an act of the mind cannot be elicited without sufficient reason, perswading the mind to it; or else, it is so far from being free, and as you (who are so loath to be beholding to God) call it, meritorious, that it is brutish and irrational. Not that there are demonstrations to be expected for every thing we believe, but there must be sufficient reason for the mind to build its assent upon, and that reason is evidence, and that evidence destroyes that obscurity which you make necessary to Faith. Evidence, I say, not of the object, but of the reason and obligation to assent. When you say, That Faith, as Faith, cannot be Knowledge, his Lordship grants it; but yet it doth not thence follow, that p. 533what may be believed by one may not be known by another: and though Christ (as you add) did not set up a School of knowledge but of Faith, yet he did not set up a School of blind implicite Faith, but such a one as consists of a rational and discursive act of the mind. You must not therefore expect that we should believe the definitions of Councils because they pretend to be Infallible, but you must first convince our reasons that they are so, and then we shall assent to them. But you have very well contrived your business, to have an obscure, implicite Faith, for such Doctrines which are so far from any evidence of Reason.