The Grounds of Protestant Religion, Part 3 · Chapter 3 (1 of 3)
CHAP. III. Of the errours of pretended General Councils.
The erroneous Doctrine of the Church of Rome in making the Priests intention necessary to the essence of Sacraments. That principle destructive to all certainty of Faith upon our Authours grounds. The absurdity of asserting that Councils define themselves to be Infallible. Sacramental actions sufficiently distinguished from others without the Priests Intention. Of the moral assurance of the Priests Intention, and the insufficiency of a meer virtual Intention. The Popes confirmation of Councils supposeth personal Infallibility. Transubstantiation an errour decreed by Pope and Council. The repugnancy of it to the grounds of Faith. The Testimonies brought for it out of Antiquity examin'd at large, and shewed to be far from proving Transubstantiation. Communion in one kind a violation of Christs Institution. The Decree of the Council of Constance implyes a non obstante to it. The unalterable nature of Christs Institution cleared. The several evasions considered and answered. No publick Communion in one kind for a thousand years after Christ. The indispensableness of Christs Institution owned by the Primitive Church. Of Invocation of Saints, and the Rhetorical expressions of the Fathers which gave occ…sion to it. No footsteps of the Invocation of Saints in the three first Centuries; nor precept or example in Scripture as our Adversaries confess. Evidences against Invocation of Saints from the Christians Answers to the Heathens. The worship of Spirits and Heroes among the Heathens justifiable on the same grounds that Invocation of Saints is in the Church of Rome. Commemoration of the Saints without Invocation, in S. Augustins time. Invocation of Saints as practised in the Church of Rome a derogation to the merits of Christ. Of the worship of Images and the near approach to Pagan Idolatry therein. No Vse or Veneration of Images in the Primitive Church. The Church of Rome justly chargeable with the abuses committed in the worship of Images.
ALthough nothing can be more unreasonable then to pretend that Church, §. 1.Person, or Council to be Infallible, which we can prove to have actually erred; yet we have yielded so much to you, as to disprove what you have in general brought for the one, before we come to meddle with the other. But that being dispatched, we come to a more short and compendious way of overthrowing your Infallibility, by shewing the palpable falsity of such principles which must be owned by you as Infallible truths, because defined by General Councils confirmed by the Pope. Whereof, The first in the Endictment, as you say, is that of the Priests Intention defined by the Councils of Florence and Trent (both of them confirmed by the Pope) to be essentially necessary to the validity of a Sacrament. P. 281.Concerning this, there are two things to be enquired into, 1. Whether this doth not render all pretence of Infallibility with you a vain and useless thing? 2. Whether it be not in it self an errour?
We must begin with the first of these, for that was the occasion of his Lordships entering upon it; for he was shewing, That your claim of Infallibility is of no use at all, P. 271.for the settling of Truth and Peace in the Church; because no man can either know or believe this Infallibility. It cannot be believed with Divine Faith; having no foundation either in the written Word of God, or Tradition of the Catholick Church; and no humane Faith can be sufficient in order to it. But neither can it be believed or known, upon that decree of the Councils of Florence and Trent, that the intention of the Priest is necessary to the validity of a Sacrament. And, lest you should think I represent his Lordships words too much with advantage, I will take his Argument in the words you have summed it up in, which are these: Before the Church or any particular man can make use of the Popes Infallibility (that is, be settled, and confirmed in the Truth by means thereof), P. 282.he must either know, or upon sure grounds believe, that he is Infallible. But (sayes the Bishop) this can only be believed of him, as he is S. Peters Successour and Bishop of Rome; of which it is impossible, in the relatours opinion, for the Church or any particular man, to have such certainty as is sufficient to ground an Infallible belief. Why? because the knowledge and belief of this, depends upon his being truly in Orders, truly a Bishop, truly a Priest, truly Baptized; none of all which, according to our principles, can be certainly known and believed; because (forsooth) the intention of him that administred these Sacraments to the Pope, or made him Bishop, Priest, &c. can never be certainly known; and yet by the Doctrine of the Councils of Florence and Trent, it is of absolute necessity to the validity of every one of these Sacraments, so as without it, the Pope were neither Bishop nor Priest. Thus I grant you have faithfully sum'd up his Lordships Argument; we must now see with what courage and success you encounter it. Your first Answer is, That though it be level'd against the Popes Infallibility, yet it hath the same force against the Infallibility of the whole Church in points fundamental; for we cannot be Infallibly sure, there is such a number of Baptized persons to make a Church. By this, we see how likely you are to assoil this difficulty, who bring it more strongly upon your self, without the least inconvenience to your adversary. For I grant, it necessarily follows against the pretence of any Infallibility, whether in Church, Councils, or Pope, as being a certain ground for Faith; for all these must suppose such a certainty of the due administration of Sacraments, which your Doctrine of Intention doth utterly destroy. For these two things are your principles of Faith, that there can be no certainty of Faith, without present Infallibility of the Church; and that, in order to the believing this testimony Infallible, there must be such a certainty as is ground sufficient for an Infallible belief. Now, How is it possible there can be such, when there can be no certainty of the Being of a Church, Council, or Pope, from your own principles? For when the only way of knowing this, is a thing not possible to be evidenced to any one in any way of Infallible certainty, viz. the intention of the Priest, you must unavoidably destroy all your pretence of Infallibility. For, To what purpose do you tell me, that Pope or Councils are Infallible, unless I may be Infallibly sure that such decrees were passed by Pope and Council? I cannot be assured of that, unless I be first assured that they were Baptized persons, and Bishops of the Church; and for this you dare not offer at Infallible certainty, and therefore all the rest is useless and vain. So that while by this Doctrine of the intention of the Priest for the validity of the Sacraments, you thought to advance higher the reputation of the Priesthood, and to take away the assurance of Protestants, as to the benefits which come by the use of the Sacraments of Baptism and the Lords Supper, you could not have asserted any thing more really pernicious to your selves, than this Doctrine is. So strange an incogitancy was it in those Councils to define it, and as great in those who defend it, and yet at the same time, maintain the necessity of a present Infallibility in the Church and General Councils. For can any thing be more rational, then to desire the highest assurance as to that, whose decrees I am to believe Infallible? And yet at the last, you confess we can have but a moral certainty of it, and that of the lowest degree; the utmost ground of it, being either the testimony of the Priest himself, or, that we have no ground to suspect the contrary. Now what unreasonable men are you, who so much to the dishonour of Christian Religion cry out upon the rational evidence of the truth of it, as an uncertain principle, and that Protestants though they assert the highest degree of actual certainty, cannot have any Divine Faith, because they want the Churches Infallible testimony? and yet when we enquire into this Infallible Testimony, you are fain to resolve it, into one of the most uncertain and conjectural things imaginable. For what can I have less ground to build my Faith upon, than that the Priest had at least a virtual intention to do as the Church doth? Whom must I believe in this case? and whereon must that Faith be grounded? On the Priests Testimony? But how can I be assured, but that he, who may wander in his intention, may do so in his expression too? Or must I do it because I have no reason to suspect the contrary? how can you assure me of that, that I have no reason to suspect the contrary? no otherwise then by telling me, that the Priest is a man of that honesty and integrity, that he cannot be supposed to do such a thing without intention? So that, though I were in Italy or Spain, where, some have told us, it is no hard matter to meet with Jews in Priests habits, and professing themselves such, and acting accordingly; yet I am bound to believe (though they heartily believe nothing of Christianity) yet in all Sacraments they must have an intention to do as the Church doth. Without which, we are told by you, No Sacrament can be valid, because the matter and form cannot be determin'd or united without the Priests intention. And therefore I do not only object, that this takes away the comfort of all Sacraments as to the receivers, but that it destroyes all certain Foundations of Faith. Because the promises of Infallibility supposing that, which I can have no assurance of; that Infallibility can be no foundation of Faith at all to me. As for instance, suppose the title to an estate depends upon the Kings free donation, and this donation to be confirmed by his Great Seal; but yet so, that if the Lord Chancellour in the sealing it, doth not intend it should pass on that account, the whole gift becomes null in Law. I pray tell me now, What other assurance you can have of your title to this estate, then you have of the Lord Chancellours intention in passing the Seal? and what Infallible certainty you can have of such intention of his? Just such, is your case, you tell us, The only ground of Infallible certainty in Faith is the Churches Infallibility, this Infallibility comes by a free promise of Christ, this promise must suppose a Church in being; that there is a Church, we can have no more assurance then that there are Baptized-persons, but the validity of their Baptism requires the Priests intention in administring it; and therefore we can have no more assurance of the Churches Infallibility, then we have of the Priests intention. And, Is this it at last, which your loud clamours of Infallibility come to? Is this the effect of all your exclamations against Protestants, for making Faith uncertain by taking away the Churches Infallibility? Must our Faith at last be resolved into that, which it is impossible we should have any undoubted assurance at all of? And will not the highest reason, the clearest evidence, the most pregnant demonstrations which things are capable of, be accounted with you sufficient ground to build our Faith of the Scriptures upon? and yet, must a thing so impossible to be certainly known, so generally uncertain and conjectural, be accounted by you sufficient ground to believe your Churches Infallibility? Are not the miracles wrought by Christ and his Apostles, joyned with the Vniversal Tradition of the Christian Church, a ground firm enough, for us to believe the Doctrine of Christ divine? and yet must the intention of the Priest with you be a much surer ground then these are? By all which it appears, that if I had not already largely discovered your grand Imposture in your pretence to Infallibility, this very Doctrine would invincibly prove it; since, notwithstanding that pretence, you must resolve all into something which falls short of those grounds of certainty which we have to build our Faith upon. But we must now consider, how you offer to retort this upon his Lordship; for you say, The same Argument will hold against the Infallibility of the whole Church in Fundamentals; since men cannot be Infallibly sure, there is such a company of men who are truly Baptized. But how manifestly ridiculous this is, will appear, 1. That it will hold indeed against all such who assert this Doctrine of the necessity of the Priests intention, but not others. Therefore if his Lordship had said, This Doctrine had been true, the retortion had been good; but you saw well enough he disproves it as an errour, and urges this as an absurdity consequent upon it. Your Argument then as it is, runs in this form: If they who hold the Priests intention necessary cannot be sure who are Baptized, then they who do not hold it necessary, cannot. Where is your consequence? for he was shewing, the uncertainty of it depended upon that principle, and therefore I suppose the denying of the principle doth not stand guilty of the same absurdity, which the holding it doth. But it may be, the force lyes in being Infallibly sure, and so that none can know the Infallibility of the Church in Fundamentals, but such as are Infallibly sure that men are Baptised. I Answer therefore, 2. That there is no such necessity of being Infallibly sure, upon our principles as there is upon yours. For you build your Faith upon the Churches Infallibility in Pope and Councils, but we do not pretend to build our Faith upon the Churches Infallibility in Fundamentals. All that we assert, is, that the Church is Infallible in Fundamentals, but we do not say, the ground of our Faith is, because she is so, for that were to make the Church the formal object of our Faith: since therefore we do not rely on the Church as our Infallible Guide in Fundamentals, there is no such necessity of that Infallible certainty as to this principle as there is with you, who must wholly establish your Faith upon the Churches Infallibility, The most then that we assert, is, that there is and shall alwayes be a Church, for that (as I have told you) is all that is meant by a Church being Infallible in Fundamentals; now for this we have the greatest assurance possible, that there shall be from the promises of Christ, and that there is, from the certainty we have of the Faith and Baptism of Christians, since no more is required by us to assure men of it, then all men in the world are competent Judges of; which surely they cannot be of the Priests intention. So much for your weak attempt of retorting this Argument upon his Lordship.
But the main thing to be considered, is, your solid Answer you give to it; which indeed is of that weight,§. …. that it must not be slightly passed over. You Answer therefore, That both a General Council and the Pope, Ibid;when they define any matters of Faith, do also implicitely define that themselves are Infallible; and by consequence that both the Pope in such case, and also the Bishops that sit in Council are persons Baptised, in holy Orders, and have all things essentially necessary for that Function, which they then execute. Neither is there any more difficulty in the case of the Pope now, then there was in the time of the Prophets and Apostles of old; whom all must grant that with the same breath they defin'd, or Infallibly declared the several Articles and points of Doctrine proposed by them to the Faithful, and their own Infallibility in proposing them. So indeed Vega answered in the case of General Councils; for when it was demanded, How it should be known that the Council was a lawful Council, he sayes, Because the Council defined it self to be so; but for this he is sufficiently chastised by Bellarmin, De Concil. l. 2. c. 9.who gives this unanswerable Argument against it. Either it doth appear from some other Argument, that while the Council defines it self to be a lawful Council, it was a lawful Council; or it doth not: if it doth, To what purpose doth it define it self to be a lawful Council? if it doth not, then we shall doubt of that Decree whereby it defines it self to be so: for if I doubt, whether the Council were lawful before that Decree; I doubt likewise, whether it might not err in passing that Decree. And therefore he grants, that no more than moral certainty or historical Faith is requisite in order to it. Now this Argument of Bellarmins holds with equal strength (if not more) against you; for you derive the lawfulness of the Council from its Infallibility, and that Infallibility from the Councils definition. Thus therefore I argue: Either it doth appear, that the Council was Infallible before that definition, or it doth not. If it appears to be Infallible before, then its Infallibility is not known by that definition: If it doth not, How can I know it to be Infallible by it? For as I doubt, whether it was Infallible before it, so I must doubt, whether it was Infallible in it: and consequently it is impossible I should believe it Infallible because it defines it self to be so. Neither do you at all salve this, by calling it only an implicite definition, for whether it be implicite or explicite, it is all one, since that definition is made the ground, why we must believe the Council to be Infallible. And of all men in the world you seem the strangest in this, that you declaim with so much vehemency against those who believe the Scriptures to be Infallible for themselves; and yet assert that Pope and General Councils are to be believed Infallible, because they define themselves to be so. Than which no greater absurdity can be well imagin'd. For they who assert that the Scriptures are to be believed for themselves, do not thereby mean that they are to be believed Infallible meerly because they say they are Infallible, but that out of the Scriptures such Arguments may be brought, as may sufficiently prove that they come from God. But when you say, that Pope and General Councils are to be believed Infallible, because of their implicite definition that they are so, you can mean nothing else, but that they are Infallible, because they take upon them to be Infallible, for that is all I can understand by your implicite definition; for if they should decree they were Infallible, that were an explicite definition. But yet how should this implicite definition be known? for it must be some way certainly known, or else we can never believe that they are Infallible upon that account. Which way then must we understand that they implicitely define it? Is it by their meeting, debating, decreeing matters of Faith? that cannot be, for Councils have done all these which are acknowledged to have erred. Is it by Pope and Council joyning together? but how can that be, unless I know before, that, when Pope and Council joyn, they are Infallible? If this then be all the way to prove that Pope and Council are true Bishops because Infallible, and they are Infallible because they define themselves to be so; I see, there is an absolute necessity of a mans putting out the eye of his reason, if ever he hopes to see Pope and Councils Infallible. But further yet, there is more absurdity still (if more can be imagin'd) in this excellent Answer; for here is a new Labyrinth for our Authour to sport himself in. For, we are to believe a Council to consist of lawful Bishops because they are Infallible, and yet his only way to prove them Infallible, is by supposing that they consist of lawful Bishops. For I ask, Whether all persons meeting together in Council are Infallible? No. Are all Bishops of Protestant, and the Greek, and other Churches besides the Roman, assembled in Council Infallible? No. Must it not then be supposed, that the Bishops are lawful Bishops, before they can implicitely define themselves Infallible? And if their lawfulness must be supposed before their Infallibility, they cannot first be proved to be Infallible, before we can know, Whether they were lawful Bishops or no. And we cannot know them to be lawful Bishops, unless we knew the intention of the Priest; and therefore it remains proved with evidence equal to a demonstration, that your certainty of your Churches Infallibility, can be no greater than that you have of the Priests intention in the administration of Sacraments.
And by this it appears, how absurdly you go about to compare the case of Pope and Council, with that of the Prophets and Apostles of old. For you challenge not an Infallibility by immediate inspiration, but such as is constantly resident in the Church by vertue of some particular promises, which must suppose the persons in whom it lodges to be actually members of the Church. And therefore all the proof of their Infallibility depends upon the certainty of that, which you can never satisfie any rational men in; but, I hope, you will not say, it was so in the Prophets and Apostles. Besides, God never sent any persons with a message from himself to the world, but he gave the world sufficient evidence in point of reason that He sent them; either by Miracles, the Testimony of other Prophets who wrought them, or some other satisfactory way to humane reason, as I have elsewhere proved at large. But there is no such thing in your case, no rational evidence at all is offered, but we must believe the Council lawful because Infallible, and we must believe it Infallible because it defines itself to be so. Neither is it possible to conceive that any man should believe whatever the Prophet or Apostle said, to be Infallibly true; unless he were before convinced, that they were Infallible who spake it. But for this you have a further Answer, That it is not necessary to believe the Infallibility of the proposer, viz. prioritate temporis, in respect of time, and afterwards the Infallibility of the Doctrine he proposeth: but it sufficeth to believe it first prioritate naturae, so as the Infallibility of the teacher be presupposed to the Infallibility of his Doctrine. But what this makes to your purpose, I understand not. For it is not the time, but the evidence we enquire for, or the ground on which we are to believe the proposer Infallible. Whether it must not be something else besides the implicite defining himself to be Infallible? You assert that to be a sufficient ground in the case of Pope and Councils? and I pray, Will it not be as sufficient in the case of a Quaker, or Enthusiast? May not they as well pretend this, that they are Infallible? and if you ask them what evidence they have for it, they may tell you, just the same that Pope and Council have to be so: for, as they implicitely define themselves to be Infallible, so do they. So that, talk what you will of private Spirits and Enthusiasms, I know none lay so great a foundation for them as you do upon this pretence; That we are to believe the Pope and Council Infallible, because implicitly they define themselves to be so. Than which, one could hardly meet with a more absurd Answer from the highest Enthusiast: for, he can tell you as boldly, that he hath the Spirit of God, because he hath it; and just so much you say, and no more, Pope and Council are Infallible, because they are Infallible. But I must pity you: I know you would not willingly have run into these absurdities, but it was your hard fortune to maintain a bad cause, and you could not possibly help it; for the straights you were in, were so great, that you must venture thorow some great absurdity to get out of them. But all the pity I have for you is gone, when I read your next words. Thus we conceive the Relator's Achilles is fallen. How fallen? If he be, it is only with Antaeus, to rise the stronger. But I assure you, so far was he from falling by any force of your Answer, that he stands more impregnably than ever, having not so much as a heel left, that you can wound him in. And if you have nothing more to say, than what you here give us in answer to this argument, which you tell us, is the common Answer of Divines; I am so far from wondring that his Lordship took no notice of it, that I shall only wonder at the weakness of your judgement, or largeness of your Faith, that can so contentedly swallow such grand absurdities.
§. 3.If this be but, as you say, the Prologue to the Play, I doubt you will find but a sad Catastrophe in it:P. 283. The main business, you tell us, is about the Priests intention, concerning which he positively layes down, that it is not of absolute necessity to the essence of a Sacrament, so as to make it void, though the Priests thoughts should wander from his work, at the instant of using the essentials of a Sacrament; yea, or have in him an actual intention to scorn the Church. What now have you to shew to the contrary? If the Priests intention be not absolutely necessary to the essence or validity of a Sacrament, you desire a reason of your adversaries, Why we should not think a Priest consecrates the body of Christ, as much at a Table where there is Wheaten Bread before him, and that eieither by way of disputation, or reading the 26. Chapter of St. Matthew, he pronounces the words, Hoc est corpus meum, as he doth at the Altar; since here is the true form, Hoc est corpus meum, the true matter Wheaten Bread, and he that pronounces the form, is a true Priest, and yet in all mens judgement here's no true Sacrament made. Something else therefore is requisite to the essence of a Sacrament, and, What can that possibly be, if it be not the intention which the Church requires? Since your request is reasonable, I shall endeavour your satisfaction, and the rather because it tends to the full clearing the business in hand. To your Enquiry then, I answer, That the Institution of Christ requiring such a solemnity for the administration of it, and such a disposition in the Church for the receiving it, and the performance of such acts, in order to the administration, by the dispenser of it; these do sufficiently distinguish the Lords Supper from all other actions, what matter, form, or person soever be there. Were not in the Apostles times the assembling of the people together for this end, and the solemn performance of the acts of administration, sufficient to discriminate the Lords Supper, from reading the 26. of Matthew, by an Apostle at the Table, when there was Bread and Wine upon it? And I must confess, I cannot but wonder that you should be so much to seek, as not to know the one from the other, unless you knew the Priests intention? But I consider, your Question was not made for Apostolical times, but for private Masses, wherein the Priest may mumble over the words of Consecration to himself, and none else be the wiser or better for what he saith, or doth. Here it was indeed very requisite you should make the Priests intention necessary to discriminate this action, from that you mentioned; but, where-ever the Lords Supper is duly administred according to the Primitive Institution, the solemnity of the action and circumstances do so far individuate it, as sufficiently to difference it from any other formalities whatsoever. And so it is in conferring Orders; Is there not enough, do you think, in the solemnity of the action, with the preceding circumstances, and the Bishops laying on of his hands, with the using the words proper to that occasion, to difference it from the Bishops casual laying his hands on the head of a man, and in the mean time reading perchance the words of ordination? We assert then, that no further intention is at all necessary to the essence of a Sacrament, but what is discoverable by the outward action. Which being of that nature, which may difference it self by reason of peculiar circumstances from others, there is no imaginable necessity to have recourse to the private intention of the Priest for satisfaction. But see how unreasonable you are herein; for you would make that to be necessary to distinguish a Sacramental action from any other, which it is impossible any man should be acquainted with. For, if I had no other way to distinguish in the case you mention, but the Priests intention, I must be as much to seek as ever, unless I cerrainly knew what the Priests intention was; which if you have an art of being acquainted with, I pretend not to it. Is it then necessary to distinguish the one from the other, or not? If not, To what end is your Question? If it be, To what purpose is the Priests intention, when I cannot know it? But you would seem to object against the circumstances discriminating a Sacramental action. 1. If the circumstances do shew to the standers by, that the Priest really intends to make a Sacrament, and this signification be necessary; then the Priests intention is necessary, or else, Why is it necessary it should be signified? I answer, The circumstances are not intended to signifie the Priests intention any further, than that intention is discoverable by the actions themselves, so that it is not any inward intention which is thereby signified, but only such an intention as the outward action imports, which is the celebration of the blessed Sacrament. So it is not the Priests intending to make a Sacrament, as you phrasify it, but his intending to celebrate it, i. e. not such an intention as is unitive of matter and form, as your Schools speak in this case, but such as relates to the external action. But against this you urge, 2. That such external signification is not at all necessary; for, say you, Might not a Catholick Priest, to save the soul of some dying Infant, baptize it, if he could, without any such signification by circumstances? Yes, and a very charitable man he would be in it too, if without any signification by circumstances, he could save the soul of a dying Infant. But I should think his meer intention were sufficient and well, as the chief Priest would supply the rest, as the Schools determine in a like case. For they put a very hard Question to themselves, If the intention of a Priest be necessary to the validity of a Sacrament, then, What becomes of the soul of an Infant, which dyes, being baptized without the Priest's intention? To which they answer, It may very piously be believed, Alexand. Alensis. part 4. quaest. 8. memb. 3. art. 1. sect. 1. Reo. sine praejudicio, &c. Bonaventur. l. 4. dist 6. art. 2. quaest. 1. ad finthat in that case, summus Sacerdos supplebit, the High Priest will supply that defect; and what they say of intention, is much more true of Baptism it self; for in case it be not done out of contempt, I say that summus Sacerdos supplebit: it is not the meer want of Baptism will damn the soul of the Infant, (as you suppose) when you make it so necessary, to use such shifts as you speak of, to save the soul of a dying Infant. But, Do you think seriously, that is the way to do it; for a Priest, under a Physical pretence to sprinkle water on the Childs face often, and once among the rest, to say softly, or by way of discourse, Ego te baptizo, &c. with intention to conferr the Sacrament? But you ask however, Whether the Child be not really baptized by this, although none took notice of what the Priest did? I answer, though we should grant it, yet it proves not that the Priests inward intention was it which made it a Sacrament; but the observation of the institution of Christ in the external actions; and so far, as that is observed in this odd kind of baptizing, so far it is Baptism, and no more. There are two things therefore to be observed in Sacramental actions. 1. The differencing of them from other common or ordinary actions, and this we say is done by the circumstances attending them. 2. The validity of them as Sacraments, and this depends wholly and only on the observation of Christs Institution. For, as it is Institution which makes a Sacrament, so it is the observation of it, which makes this a Sacramental action, and not another. But in neither case is the Priests intention necessary to the essence of a Sacrament; for it may have its full force in all respects it was appointed for, whatever the Priests inward intention be. So that neither of your Instances, as to the Sacraments of Baptism, or the Eucharist, do at all imply the necessity of the Priests intention, in order to the essence of a Sacrament, in either of them.
As for the inconvenience which, you say, the Bishop pretends would follow out of this Doctrine, §. 4.viz. that no man can rest secure that he hath been really made partaker of any Sacrament, P. 284.no not of Baptism it self. You answer, 1. That as to the far greater part of Christians, the inconvenience follows as much out of the Bishops principles as yours, that they cannot be absolutely certain that they are baptized; because the Priest may vitiate something pertaining to the essentials of Baptism. 2. You answer, That moral Assurance is sufficient in such cases, i. e. such as is liable to no just cause of doubting and suspecting the contrary. We accept of this latter Answer in reference to your retortion of the inconvenience upon us, as to which we say, That where is no sufficient cause of doubting, a man ought to rest satisfied. But I shall now shew you, that this moral Assurance cannot be sufficient in your case, and that for these Reasons, 1. Because you build a main principle of Faith upon it, and you say, That moral Assurance cannot be a sufficient foundation for Faith; for then all your discourse of the resolution of Faith, comes to nothing, which runs upon this principle, That nothing short of Infallibility can be a sufficient foundation for Faith. Now that you build a principle of Faith upon it, is evident, as I have proved already, even all that Infallibility, you pretend to in Church, Pope, and Council; for all depends upon this, that you certainly know, that such persons in your Church have had the Sacrament of Baptism truly administred, which cannot be without knowing the Priests intention. 2. Because you acknowledged before, that there must be such a certainty as is sufficient to ground an Infallible belief; for this you placed in his Lordships Objection, and this you pretended to satisfie, by saying, That the Pope and Council implicitly define themselves to be Infallible; and therefore you fall much beneath your self now, when you say, Moral Assurance is sufficient. 3. Because we have far greater ground for moral Assurance than you: for we make no more requisite to the essence of a Sacrament, than what all men are competent judges of; and our Church allows no such Baptisms, wherein none but the Priest is present; therefore if he vitiates any thing essential to Baptism, it may easily be discovered; but in your case you have no positive Assurance at all of the Priests intention, the utmost you can pretend to, is, your having no ground to suspect it, which in many cases there may be. So that you cannot have properly a moral Certainty, which hath some evidence to build it self upon; but in your case there can be no evidence at all of the Priests intention, and therefore the knowledge of it is uncertain and conjectural. So that there is a vast difference between that moral Assurance, which we may have from the external action, and that which you can possibly have from the Priests intention. 4. The danger is far greater, in not having this Assurance upon your principles, than upon ours, and yet we have far greater Assurance than you can possibly pretend to. Your danger is manifestly greater, as appears by this evident demonstration of it, viz. that in case the Priests intention be wanting, you must, by your own confession, be guilty of gross Idolatry; and yet you cannot certainly know, what the Priests intention was. This is plain in the case of the Eucharist, whose adoration you profess to be lawful, because you suppose Christ to be present there. Now this depends upon a thing impossible for you certainly to know, and that is the Priests intention in the Consecration. For if the Priest wanted that inward intention which you make necessary to the essence of a Sacrament, then, for all his pronouncing the words of Consecration, Hoc est corpus meum, Christs body may not be there; and in case it be not there, you are by your own confession guilty of Idolatry, for you do not then worship Christ, but meerly the Bread. Therefore, supposing adoration of the Eucharist upon your principle of Transubstantiation were not Idolatry, yet since that depends upon a thing impossible to be known, Who can with a good conscience do that, which he cannot be certain, but in the doing it, he may commit the greatest Idolatry? Wherefore, all the ill consequences of this Doctrine of the intention of the Priest considered, besides the palpable errours of it, never was any Doctrine more imprudently contrived, or more weakly managed, than when this was decreed at the Councils of Florence and Trent.
You spend many words to explain that virtual intention which the Schools have taken up from Scotus upon this subject; but, all that you say,§. 5. P. 284, &c.adds nothing of satisfaction: upon these grounds, 1. Because this virtual intention must suppose some actual intention, so it is in all those cases you mention of a servant on his journey, a labourer at his work; though these may not have alwaies an express intention of the design of their journey or labour, yet there is sufficient evidence from both of them, to know they had an actual intention, and there is no necessity of knowing any more of it, than what their actions discover: but in your case it is necessary to know that there was once an actual intention, because upon that depends the essence of the Sacrament: and that is it which we object against you, that you cannot have any assurance that the Priest ever had an express intention. We do not therefore say, that any wandring thoughts after, do destroy the essence of a Sacrament; but the want of an actual intention at all upon your principles doth it, and this you cannot be certain of upon your grounds. And therefore your virtual intention doth you no service at all; for you say, This virtual intention is, when the Priest doth really operate, or celebrate the Sacrament in virtue of an express intention which he had to do it; therefore it necessarily follows, that the essence and validity of the Sacrament must depend upon the first express intention, and not the after virtual one. So that if you cannot be certain of the first actual intention, the Sacrament may want its essence, for all that you know. 2. Though a virtual intention may be consistent with some wandring thoughts from the first intention, yet not with an express intention to the contrary. As in your own instance, A servant sent upon business, hath at first an express intention, to do what his Master commands him; after, falling into company upon his way, he loseth for the time his actual intention; but, as long as he goes on upon his first business, he retains, I grant, a virtual intention of it: but, supposing that company disswade him from it, or his own mind turn, so that he hath an actual intention to the contrary, Will you say, this man retains his virtual intention still? Now our argument doth not lye meerly in this, that the Priest, at the instant of Consecration, may have his mind distracted from the matter, in which case you say, The virtual intention remains still, and is sufficient; but, that you cannot have any certainty, but he may have an actual and express intention to the contrary, at the instant of Consecration, and this destroyes his virtual intention, and consequently the essence of the Sacrament. For, as long as you require an inward intention, besides the external action, you must be assured, that he had no actual contrary intention at that time, or else your virtual intention signifies nothing to your purpose or satisfaction. That which remains, is concerning Catharinus, P. 273.of whom his Lordship sayes, That being present at Trent, he disputed this case very learnedly, and made it most evident, that this Opinion cannot be defended, but that it must open a way for any unworthy Priest, to make infinite nullities in the administration of Sacraments; and that his arguments were of such strength, as amazed the other Divines which were present. And concluded, that no internal intention was required in the Minister of a Sacrament, but that intention which did appear, opere externo, in the work it self performed by him; and that if he had unworthily any wandring thoughts; nay more, any contrary intention within him, yet it neither did, nor could hinder the blessed effect of any Sacrament. To this you answer, That the Cardinal Palavicino is clear of opinion, P. 285.that the Council decreed nothing against him; because he denied not an intention to be necessary in the Sacrament, but only explicated the thing differently from the common way of the Schoolmen. But whosoever will read the arguments which Catharinus used in the Council of Trent against the Priests intention, will easily find that he disputes against all manner of inward intention, but such as may be discovered by the external action. But we must consider that Palavicino had a particular kindness for Catharinus, as being of Siena (the present Popes Country) insomuch that Caesar Aquilinius saith, If Luther had been of Siena, the Cardinal Palavicino would have defended him: and thence he endeavours to vindicate him in the point of certitude of Grace, as well as in this of the Priests intention, though in both, he goes contrary to the general sense of your Divines, both then at Trent, and ever since; who looked on both Opinions of Catharinus, as condemned there, as is manifest by Bellarmin, Suares, Vasquez, Valentia, and others. But however, we may observe this from hence, What an excellent Rule of Faith, and Judge of Controversies the Decrees of your Council of Trent are, when there have been, and are still, such different Opinions, and eager contests about the sense of them; that in one point Dominicus à Soto saith, the Council decreed of his side, Catharinus saith just the contrary, and yet both great Divines and present in the Council. And in this Doctrine of the intention of the Priest, the general apprehension then was, and hath been since, that Catharinus his Opinion was condemned there, but Cardinal Palavicino undertakes to prove the contrary. So that in the mean time here is like to be a fair end of Controversies, by your pretended Infallible Decrees of Councils, when you are so far from being agreed, what the sense of them is: and yet You, You are the men who say, Controversies cannot be ended by the Scripture, because there are such differences in the sense and interpretation of it. Thus (we hope) we have sufficiently vindicated his Lordships first charge of errour against your pretended General Councils confirmed by the Pope.
Before we come to the second, you say,§. 6. His Lordship presents such a quaint subtilty against the Popes right to confirm them, P. 258.and the necessity of his Confirmation, that you cannot well avoid the taking notice of it. Thus then, you say, he argues, No Council is confirmed till it be finished: and when it is finished, even before the Popes Confirmation be put to it, either it hath erred, or it hath not erred: If it hath erred, the Pope ought not to confirm it; and if he do, it is a void act: for no power can make falshood truth: If it hath not erred, then it was true before the Pope confirmed it; so his Confirmation adds nothing but his own assent. As quaint a subtilty as you call this, I am sure you are hard put to it, to return any satisfactory Answer to it. For you distinguish of the Popes joynt-consent, and of his actual Confirmation; in case, say you, the Pope either in person, or by his Legats concurr with the Council, then the definition is unquestionably Infallible; but in case he doth not, then the actual Confirmation is necessary; but in case the Council erre, the Pope ought not, and it is impossible he should confirm it; but if he doth not erre, you grant it is true, before the Pope confirms it, but his Confirmation makes us infallibly certain that it is true. This is the full force of your Answer, which by no means takes off the difficulty, as will appear, 1. That by reason of the Pope's rare appearance in General Councils (never in any that are unquestioned by the Greek and Latin Churches) that of his joynt-consent cannot serve you: neither doth the presence of his Legats suffice; for it is determined by Bellarmin, and proved by many reasons, that though the Pope's Legats consent,De Concil. l. 2. c. 11. yet if they have not the express sentence of the Pope, the Council may erre notwithstanding. So that still the Popes actual Confirmation is supposed necessary, and that after the definitions of the Council are passed. And this is the case which his Lordship speaks to: and for your answer to that, I say, 2. That in plain terms you assert the Popes personal Infallibility, which you disowned the defence of before: for you say, In case the Council erre, not only the Pope ought not to confirm it, but that it is impossible he should. Which, What is it other than to assert, that the Pope shall never erre, though the Council may? Neither is it sufficient to say, That he shall never erre in confirming the Decrees of a Council: for in this case the Council is supposed actually to erre already, so that nothing of Infallibility can be at all supposed in the Council; and if the Pope be not considered in his personal capacity, he might erre as well as the Council. From whence it follows, since you suppose that a Council may erre, but not the Pope, that you really judge the Council not to be Infallible, but the Pope only. 3. When you say, That if the Council erred not, the Popes Confirmation doth not make the definition true, but makes us infallibly certain that it is true. I enquire further, Whereon this Infallible Certainty depends? on a promise made to the Council, or to the Pope? not to the Council, for that you grant may erre; but it is impossible the Pope should confirm it, therefore still it is some promise of the Popes Infallibility which makes men Infallibly certain of the truth of what the Council decrees. 4. To what purpose then are all those promises and proofs of Scripture which you produced concerning the Councils Infallibility, if, notwithstanding them, a General Council may err? Only the Pope shall never confirm it, and although it do not err, yet we cannot be Infallibly certain of it, but by the Popes confirmation. And let any reasonable man judge, whether a promise of the Popes Infallibility, though there be none at all concerning Councils, be not sufficient for all this? So that upon these principles you take away the least degree of necessity of any Infallibility in Councils, and resolve all into the Popes Infallibility. For to what purpose are they Infallible, if we cannot be certain that any thing which they decree is true, but by the Popes confirmation?
But that the Popes confirmation cannot make the Decrees of those you account General Councils Infallible,§. 7. nor us Infallibly Certain of the truth of them, his Lordship proves by another evidence in matter of fact, viz. That the Pope hath erred by teaching in and by the Council of Lateran (confirmed by Innocent 3.) that Christ is present in the Sacrament by way of Transubstantiation. P. 257.Which (his Lordship saith) was never heard of in the Primitive Church, nor till the Council of Lateran; nor can it be proved out of Scripture; and taken properly cannot stand with the grounds of Christian Religion. P. 287.This you call a strange kind of proceeding to assert a point of so great importance, without solving or so much as taking notice of the pregnant proofs your Authours bring both out of Scripture and Fathers to the contrary of what he mainly affirms. How pregnant those proofs are, we must examine afterwards; but his Lordship might justly leave it to those who assert so strange a Doctrine to produce their evidence for it. Especially, since it is confessed by so many among your selves, That it could not be sufficiently proved, either from Scripture or Fathers to bind men to the belief of it, Scotus in 4. sent. dist. 11. q 3. Gabr. Biel in Canon. Missae. lect. 40. Fisher contr. captivit. Babyl. c. 9. p. 99. Cajetan. in 3. Qu. 75. A. 1. Petrus de Alliaco in 4. sent q 6. Tonstall de verit. corp. Christi. &c. p. 46. Erasmus in 1 Cor. 7. Ferus in Matth. 26. Apud Episcop. Elicus. resp. ad Apol. Cardinal. Bollarm cap. 1 p. 7. Suarez in 3. disp. 50. sect. 3.till the Church had defined it in the Council of Lateran: Since, the more moderate and learned men among your selves (Bishop Tonstall for one) have looked on that definition as a rash and inconsiderate action. Since, the English Jesuits confessed, that the Fathers did not meddle with the Doctrine of Transubstantiation. Since, Suarez confesseth that the names used by the Fathers, are more accommodated to an accidental change. Since, Father Barns acknowledgeth that Transubstantiation is not the Faith of the Church, Barns Catholico Romanus Pacificus M S. s. 7. liter. C.and that Scripture and Fathers may be sufficiently expounded of a Supernatural presence of the body of Christ without any change in the substance of the Elements. For which he produces a large Catalogue of Fathers and others. Since therefore we have such confessions of your own side, What need his Lordship (in a Controversie so throughly sifted as this hath been) bring all the Testimonies of both sides which had been so often and so punctually examin'd by others. At least (you say) he should have cleared how Transubstantiation may be taken improperly, whereas of all the words which the Church useth, there is none methinks less apt to a Metaphorical and figurative sense, then this of Transubstantiation. By which I see you are a man who would really seem to believe Transubstantiation, and are afraid of nothing, but that it should not be impossible enough for you to believe it. For his Lordship was only afraid, that though the word it self were gross enough, yet some of the more refined and subtle wits might transubstantiate the word it self and leave only the accidents of it behind, by taking it in a spiritual sense; as Bellarmin confesses those words of St. Bernard, In Sacramento exhiberi nobis veram carnis substantiam sed spiritualitèr non carnalitèr, have a true sense; but adds, that the word spiritualitèr must not be too often used; and the Council of Trent would seem to provide an evasion by Sacramentaliter: and his Lordship not well knowing what they would have by such expressions, therefore he saith, properly taken it cannot stand with the grounds of Christian Religion. And for all those expressions, Bellarmin as well as the Council take it in as gross a manner as you can desire; and I think the Physitian who wanted impossibilities enough to exercise his Faith, needed nothing else to try it, but your Doctrine of Transubstantiation. But you say,P. 288. The term indeed was first authorised by the Council of Lateran, as foreign by that of Nice; but for the thing it self signified by this term, which is a real conversion of the substance of bread into the body of Christ and of wine into his blood, 'tis clear enough, that it was ever held for a Divine truth. If you prove but that, I will never quarrel with you about the term, call it Transubstantiation or what you will; but we do not think it so clear, as not to want proofs stronger for the belief of it, then all the repugnancies of sense and reason are against it. For it is a vain thing for you to attempt to prove so unreasonable a Doctrine as this is, by some few lame citations of Fathers, unless you can first prove that the Authority of them is so great, as to make me believe any thing they say, though never so contrary to sense and reason. If you could bring some places of the Fathers to prove that we must renounce absolutely the judgement of sense, believe things most contradictions to reason, yet you must first shew that the evidence they bring is greater then that of sense or reason. Or that I am more bound to believe them, then I am to believe the greatest evidence of sense or reason. When you say, In these cases we must submit reason to Faith; we acknowledge it, when it is no manifest contradiction, in things so obvious to sense or reason, that the asserting it, will destroy the use of our faculties and make us turn absolute Scepticks; for then Faith, must be destroyed too. For may not a man question, as well, whether his hearing may not deceive him as his sight, and by that means he may question all the Tradition of the Church, and what becometh of his Faith then? and if his sight might deceive him in a proper object of it, Why might not the Apostles sight deceive them in the body of Christ being risen from the grave? And if a man may be bound to believe that to be false which his sense judges to be true, what assurance can be had of any miracles which were wrought to confirm the Christian Doctrine? and therefore his Lordship might well say,Pa…t 1 ch. 5. sect. 7. That Transubstantiation is not consistent with the grounds of Christian Religion. But of this I have spoken already. That which I am now upon, is not how far reason is to be submitted to Divine Authority, in case of certainty that there is a Divine Revelation for what I am to believe; but how far it is to be renounced, when all the evidence which is brought is from the Authority of the Fathers? So that the Question in short is, Whether there be greater evidence that I am bound to believe the Fathers in a matter contrary to sense and reason, or else to adhere to the judgement of them though in opposition to the Fathers Authority? And since, you do not grant their Authority immediately Divine; since you pretend not to places as clear out of them as the judgement of sense and reason is in this case; since you dare not say, that all the Fathers are as much agreed about it, as the senses of all mankind are about the matter in dispute; I think with men who have not already renounced all that looks like reason, this will be no matter of Controversie at all. From whence it follows, that supposing the Fathers were as clear for you (as they are against you) in this subject, yet that would not be enough to perswade us to believe so many contradictions as Transubstantiation involves in it meerly because the Fathers delivered it to us. I speak not this, as though I did at all fear the clearness of any Testimony you can produce out of them, but to shew you that you take not a competent way to prove such a Doctrine as Transubstantiation is. For nothing but a stronger evidence than that of sense and reason, can be judged sufficient to oversway the clear dictates of both.
§. 8.This being premised, I come to consider the clear evidence you produce out of Antiquity for this Doctrine, and since you pretend to so much choice in referring us to Bellarmin and Gualtierus for more, I must either much distrust your judgement, or suppose these the clearest to be had in them, and therefore the examination of these will save the labour of searching for the rest. And yet it is the great unhappiness of your cause, that there is scarce one of all the Testimonies you make use of, but either its Authority is slighted by some of your own writers, or sufficient reasons given against it by many of ours.Serm de Coen… Domini. Your first is of St. Cyprian (or at least an Authour of those first ages of the Church) who speaking of the Sacrament of the Eucharist, saith. This common bread chang'd into flesh and blood giveth life. And again, The bread which our Lord gave to his Disciples being chang'd not in its outward form or semblance, but in its inward nature or substance, by the omnipotency of the word is made flesh. As to this Testimony there are two things to be considered, the authority, and the meaning of it. For its Authority, you seem doubtful your self, whether S. Cyprian's or no (since Bellarmin and others of your own deny it) but at least you say, an Authour of those first ages of the Church, but you bring no evidence at all for it. Bellarmin grants that he is younger then St. Augustine; and others say that none mention him for 800 years after St. Cyprians time.De amiss. grat. l 6. c. 2. And the abundance of barbarisms which that book is so full fraught with, manifest, that it is of a much later extraction then the time it pretends to. But the matter seems to be now out of question; since the Book is extant in the King of France's Library with an Inscription to Pope Adrian, and a MSS. of it is in the Library of All-Souls in Oxford with the same Inscription and the name of Arnaldus Bonavillacensis;James of the Fathers. p. 12. who was St. Bernards co-temporary, and lived in the twelfth Century. And those who have taken the pains to compare this Book with what is extant of the same Authour in the Bibliotheca Patrum, not only observe the very same barbarisms, but the same conceptions and expressions about the Sacrament which the other hath.Albertinus de Eucharist. Sacramento l. 2. p. 381. Although therefore I might justly reject this testimony as in all respects incompetent, yet I shall not take that advantage of you; but, supposing him an Authour as ancient as you would have him, I say he proves not the thing you bring him for. For which, two things must be enquired into. 1. What kind of presence of Christ he asserts in the Sacrament. 2. What change he supposes to be made in the Elements. For your Doctrine asserts, That there is a conversion of the whole substance of bread and wine into the substance of the natural body and blood of Christ, and that this conveniently, properly, and most aptly is call'd Transubstantiation. Now if this Authour speaks wholly of a real but spiritual presence of Christ, and if he asserts that the substance of bread and wine do remain still, you can have no pretence at all left, that this Authour asserts your Doctrine of Transubstantiation. For the first, he expresly saith, That these things must not be understood after a carnal sense: Sed in cogitation bus huj…smodi, caro & sanguis no… prodest quidquam; quia sicut ipse m…gister exposuit, verba haec spiritus & vita sunt: nec carnalis sensus ad intellectum …antae profunditatis p…netrat, nisi fides accedat. Auctor de Coenâ Domini. sect. 4.viz. unless ye eat the flesh and drink the blood of the Son of man, ye shall have no life in you; for Christ himself hath said, His words are spirit and life. And nothing can be more evident, then that this Authour speaks not of any corporeal, but spiritual presence of Christ, by the effects which he attributes to it, calling it inconsumptibilem cibum, that food which cannot be consumed: and the reason he gives of it, is, because it feeds to eternal life, and therefore he saith it is immortalitatis alimonia, that which nourisheth to immortality; which cannot possibly be conceived of the corporal presence of Christ, since you confess the body of Christ remains no longer in the body then the accidents of the bread and wine do. And after he tells us, What the feeding upon the flesh of Christ is, Esus igitur carnis hujus q…aedam aviditas est, & quoddam desiderium manendi in ipso per quod sic imprimimus, & eliquamus in nobis dulcedinem charitatis, ut haereat palato & visceribus sapor dilectionis infusus, penetrans & imbuens omnes animae corporisque recessus. Id. sect. 9.viz. our hunger and desire of remaining in Christ, by which the sweetness of his Love, is so imprinted and melted as it were within us, that the savour of it may remain in our palat and bowels, penetrating and diffusing it self through all the recesses of soul and body. And so just before he saith, Christ did, Spiritualinos instruere documento, instruct us by a spiritual lesson, that we might know, that our abiding in him is our eating of him, and our drinking a kind of incorporation, by the humility of our obedience, Vt sciremus quod mansio nostra in ipso sit manducatio, & potus quasi quaedam incorporatio, subjectis obsequiis, voluntatibus junctis, affectibus unitis. Id. ib. Et non tam corporali quam spirituali transitione Christo nos uniri. Sect 4. Haec quoties agimus, non dentes ad mordendum acuimus, sed fide sincerâ panem sanctum frangimus & partimur. Id. sect. 18.the conjunction of our wills, the union of our affections. And in another place denyes, That there is any corporal union between Christ and us, but a spiritual; and therefore adds afterwards, As often as we do these things, we do not sharpen our teeth to bite, but break and divide the holy bread by a sincere Faith, All which and many other places in that Authour make it plain, that he doth not speak of such a corporal presence as you imagine, but of a real but spiritual presence of Christ, whereby the souls of Believers have an intimate union and conjunction with Christ, which he calls Societatem germanissimam, in which respect they have communion with the body of Christ. But I need mention but one place more to explain his meaning, in which he fully asserts the spiritual presence of Christ, and withall that the substance of the elements doth remain. That immortal nourishment is given us, which differs from common food, Sed immortalitatis alimonia, datur, à communibus cibis differens, corporalis substantiae retinens speciem, sed virtutis divinae invisibili efficientiâ probans adesse praesentiam. Id. f. 2.that it retains the nature of a corporeal substance, but proving the presence of a Divine power, by its invisible efficiency. So that what presence of Divine power there is, is shewed in regard of the effects of it, not in regard of any substantial change of the bread into the body of Christ; for in reference to that efficiency he calls it, immortal nourishment, and afterwards, That as common bread is the life of the body, so this supersubstantial bread is the life of the soul, and health of the mind. Id. sect. 6.But I know you will quarrel with me for rendring, corporalis substantiae retinens speciem, by, retaining the nature of a corporal substance; for you would fain have species to signifie only the accidents of a corporeal substance to remain. This being therefore the main thing in dispute, if I can evince that species signifies not the bare external accidents, but the nature of a corporeal substance, then this Authour will be so far from asserting that he will appear pointblank against your Doctrine of Transubstantiation. Now, I shall prove that species was not taken then, for the meer external shape and figure, but for the solid body it self especially of such things as were designed for nourishment. Thence in the Civil Law we read of the species annonariae, and of the species publicae, largitionales, and fiscales; and those who had the care of corn are said to be curatores specierum; and thence very often in the Codes of Justinian and Theodosius, Cod. Theod. de eursu publ. & leg. 67. Arcad l. ult. De munerib. & honor. Cassiod. l. 12. Vegetius de remilit. l. 3. c. 3.there is mention of the species vini, species olei, species tritici. But lest you should think, it is only used in this sense in the Civil Law, not only Cassiodore and Vegetius use it in the same sense for the species tritici, and species annonariae; but, that which comes home to our purpose, St. Ambrose uses it where it is impossible to be taken for the meer external accidents, but must be understood of the substance it self: speaking of Christs being desired to change the water into wine, he thus expresses it,Ambros. serm. 21. de die sancto Epiphan. Vt rogatus ad nuptias aquae substantiam in vini speciem commutaret, that he would change the substance of water into the species of wine; Will you say, that Christ turned it only into the external accidents and not the nature of it? So when St. Austin sayes, that Christ was the same food to the Jews and us, significatione nonspecie, he opposes species to a meer type, Augustin. in Psalm 82.and therefore it imports the substance and reality of the thing. And so the translator of Origen opposes the regeneratio in specie to the baptismus in aenigmate, and the manna in aenigmate to the manna in specie: Origen. hom. 7. in Num.in both which, being opposed to the figure it denotes the reality. And one of those Authours whom you cite in the very same Book and Chapter which you cite,Ambros de Sacram. l 4 c. 4. uses species sanguinis for the substance of blood, for he opposes it to the similitudo sanguinis; for when the person objects, and sayes, That after the cup is consecrated speciem sanguinis non video, I do not see the nature or substance of blood; he answers him, Sed similitudinem habet, But it hath the resemblance of it; for as (saith he) there is the similitude of his death, so there is the similitude of his blood. These may be sufficient to shew that species corporalis substantiae, does not relate to the external shape and figure, but to the nature and reality of it: So that his meaning is, although it remains still the same substance of bread and wine; yet there is such an invisible efficiency of Divine power going along with the use of it, as makes it to nourish the souls of men to eternal life.
And now it will be no matter of difficulty at all to Answer the places you bring out of this Authour.§. 9. The first is, This common bread chang'd into flesh and blood giveth life. But how little this place makes to your purpose is easie to discern, because we do not deny a Sacramental change of the bread into the flesh and blood of Christ, but only that substantial change which you assert, but that Authour sufficiently disproves, even in that very sentence from whence those words are cited, if you had given them us at large. For, saith he, that common bread being chang'd into flesh and blood, Panis iste communis in carnem & sanguinem m…atus pro…rat vitam & increment…m corpo…bus; ideo que ex consueto rerum effectu, fidei nostrae adjuta infirmitas, sensibili argumento edocta …st, visibilibus sacramentis inesse vitae aeternae effectum, & non tam corporali quam spirituali transitione Christo nos ua…ri. Id. sect. 5.procures life and increase to our bodies; and therefore from the usual effect of things, the weakness of our Faith is helped, being taught by a sensible argument, that the effect of eternal life is in the visible Sacraments, and that we are not united to Christ so much by a Corporal as Spiritual union. In which words he compares the sign and the thing signified together: that as the bread being Sacramentally changed into the flesh and blood of Christ, doth yet really give life and nourishment to our bodies, (which certainly is far enough from that substantial change into the body of Christ, which you assert) so by that effect of the sign it self upon our bodies, our Faith is helped the better to understand the efficacy of the thing signified upon our souls, in order to eternal life; there being as real, though spiritual, union between Christ and Believers, as there is between the bread and our bodies. And that this is the plain and unsophisticated meaning of this Authour in these words, I dare appeal to the impartial judgement of any intelligent Reader. By which we see, Those first words of the change of the bread into the flesh and blood of Christ, must be understood of a sacramental, and not a substantial change. But your other is the great and (as Bellarmin thinks) unanswerable place; which you thus render, The bread which our Lord gave to his Disciples, Panis iste quem Dominus discipulis porrigebat, non effigie, sed naturâ mutatus, omnipotentiâ verbi factus est caro. Id. sect. 6.being changed not in its outward form and semblance, but in its inward nature and substance, by the omnipotency of the word is made flesh. As to which place, I must tell you first, that there are very shrewd suspicions of some unhandsome dealings with it; for some great Criticks have assured us, that the place is corrupted, and that the ancient MSS. read it quite otherwise, non effigie, nec naturâ mutatus, which is so far from your purpose, that it is directly against it; and this seems far more consonant to the following words; For, saith he, as in the person of Christ, the humanity was seen, but the divinity lay hid; so in the visible Sacrament, Et sicut in personâ Christi humanitas videbatur, & latebat divinitas; ita Sacramento visibili, ineffabilitèr divina se infudit essentia. Ib.the divine essence doth infuse it self after an unexpressible manner. In which it is considerable, how he doth parallel these two together; for as the humane nature of Christ did substantially remain, notwithstanding the presence of the divine nature, so to make good the parallel, the substance of Bread and Wine must remain too, and that because he doth not say, That the body of Christ is present, which might exclude the substance of the elements, but the divine essence, which only imports a spiritual and real presence. And when he saith, That the Bread is neither changed in its form or nature, when by the Omnipotency of God it is made flesh (i. e. as to the real communion which believers have of the body of Christ; which is an act of divine power as well as goodness) he saith no more, than Theodoret, Ephraim, and Gelasius do expresly speak. For, saith Theodoret, The mystical symbols after Consecration, go not out of their own nature, foreign. Theodoret. Dialog. 2. Tom. 1. p. 85.but remain in their former substance, figure, and shape, and are visible and tangible as they were before: Which words, considering the occasion and importance of them, are so express, as nothing can be more. And in his former Dialogue, he gives an account, Why the external symbols are called by the names of the body and blood of Christ, foreign. Id. Dialog. 1.not by changing their natures, but by superadding Grace to nature; which is the same with that our Authour saith here, Though neither figure nor nature be changed, yet by Gods Omnipotency it is made flesh; that foreign, in Theodoret and this omnipotentia Dei, here importing the same thing. To the same purpose Ephraim the famous Patriarch of Antioch speaks in Photius. For, saith he, the body of Christ, which is received by believers doth not lose its sensible substance; foreign. Ap…d Photium in Biblioth. Cod. 229. p. 794.and yet is inseparable from spiritual Grace. And so Gelasius, as plainly as either of the foregoing, asserts, That the Sacraments of the body and blood of Christ, which we receive, Certè Sacramenta quae sumimus, corporis & sanguinis Christi, divina res est, propter quod, & per eadem divinae efficimur consortes naturae & tamen esse non desinit substantia vel natura pani… & vini. Gelas. tract advers. Eutych. & Nestor.are a divine thing, through and by which we are made partakers of the divine nature (which answers to the Omnipotency of God, by which it is made flesh, in our Authour) and yet it doth not cease to be the substance, or nature of Bread and Wine (which is the same with the former clause, That the Bread is not changed in figure or nature.) So that the ancient reading of this place is not only consonant to the other parts of his discourse, but asserts no more than is in express terms said by genuine and unquestionable Authours; who plainly overthrew your Doctrine of Transubstantiation. For these testimonies being so express for the remaining of the substance of Bread and Wine after Consecration, are of far greater force against it, than the highest expressions concerning the change of the elements can make for it. For in these they speak their judgements, clearly and punctually against Hereticks, and speak that which is absolutely inconsistent with Transubstantiation; but in their other they speak mystically and sacramentally; and their most lofty expressions, must be understood by the nature and design of their discourse, which is to represent symbolical things in the most lively and affecting manner. But when our Adversaries are urged with the former testimonies, they then tell us, That substance and nature are not alwaies taken properly, but sometimes at large for the accidents or use of things: but although this can never be applied to the places of the foregoing Authours, in their disputations with the Eutychian Hereticks; yet from thence we are furnished by themselves with a further answer to this place. So that although we admit of the present reading, non effigie, sed naturâ mutatus, yet since by their own confession nature doth not alwaies import the substance of a thing, they cannot in any justice or reason from hence inferr a substantial change. Let them then take their choice, Whether are the words of substance and nature in the Fathers alwaies to be taken properly, or no? If they must be taken so, we have three unquestionable testimonies of ancient Fathers directly against Transubstantiation, and we only lose the testimony of an uncertain Authour, built upon an uncertain reading, and contrary to other expressions in the same book: If they be not, then from the change of nature here expressed, no such thing as a substantial change can be inferred, but only accidental, upon consecration, in regard of the sacramental use and effect of it. Which that it is nothing strange in Antiquity, might be easily proved, but that our Adversaries confession saves me the labour of it.
§. 10.The second Testimony, is of Gregory Nyssen, out of whose Catechetical Oration you produce these words, With good reason do we believe, that the Bread being sanctified by God's Word, is changed into the body of the Word of God: and a little after, The nature of the things we see being trans-elemented into him. I might here tell you, What Exceptions are taken against this book,Not. in Greg. Nyss. p. 45. as not being genuine, not only by Protestants (as Fronto Ducaeus would have it, because of these expressions) but by others too. But I will not insist on this, because I see no sufficient reason to question the Authority of it; yet I know not how you can excuse it from some interpolations, since he therein mentions Severus, an heretical Acephalist, who lived not till after Gregory's time; yet for the main of the book, I say as Casaubon doth,I… Casaub. Not. … Greg. Ep…st. ad Eustath, &c. p 99. that it is, Opus planè eximium si paucos navos excipias, An excellent piece in the general, and becoming its Authour, some few escapes excepted. And the design of it being to shew, that Christian Religion hath nothing absurd or unreasonable in it, it would be very strange that he should assert so absurd and unreasonable a Doctrine, as Transubstantiation is. But there is nothing tending to that in the places cited, but only the use of those two words, foreign and foreign; for the main force of all, you say, depends upon them.foreign. Gregor. Nyssen. orat. Catachet. cap. 37. Tom 3. So that if we can give a good account of them, without any Transubstantiation, there remains no difficulty at all in these words of Gregory Nyssen. For, we deny not that there is a change in the elements after Consecration, but we say, It is a sacramental, and you, That it is a substantial change, and this you offer to prove from these two words here used in reference to the Eucharist. The argument commonly formed by your Authours from the first words, is, Whatsoever is changed, is not what it was before: which we readily grant, so far as the change is; but still it remains to be proved, that the substance is changed in it self. But it were easie to shew, that the word foreign, in multitudes of places of the Fathers is used for an accidental and relative change, and Gregory Nyssen himself very frequently uses the word, where it is capable of no other sense, as when he saith, Of the shining of Moses his face, that it was foreign, De vit… Mosi… ▪ Hom. 1. in Cant. Orat. Catech. c. 37. c. 40.a change to that which was more glorious; and when he affirms, the souls of men by the Doctrine of Christ, foreign, to be changed into that which is more divine. And in this same Catechetical Oration he uses it several times to the same purpose, about the change which shall be in glorified bodies, and the change of mens souls by Regeneration: But I need not insist more on this, since I produced before the confession of Suarez, that such expressions are more accommodated to an accidental mutation. Neither is there any more strength in the other word, foreign, though Suarez thinks this comes nearer the matter, and you confidently say, What can here be signified by trans-elementation of the nature of the outward element, but that which the Church now stiles Transubstantiation? I will therefore shew you, what else is signified by that word which Gregory used, which cannot be properly rendred trans-elementation; for foreign, doth not come from the Noune foreign, but from the Verb foreign, and the Greeks expound foreign by foreign: and so foreign; as you may see in Suidas, and others. So that it imports not a substantial, but an accidental change too: and in that sense Gregory Nyssen uses it to express Regeneration by, foreign, those who are trans-elemented by Regeneration; Would you say,Epist. Canon. those who are transubstantiated by it? So that▪ neither of these Testimonies import any more than that there is a sacramental change in the elements after Consecration, by which believers are made partakers of the body and blood of Christ; which is no more than we assert, and falls far short of your Doctrine of Transubstantiation.