Answer to Lockes Second Letter, Text (2 of 3)

Answer to Lockes Second Letter · Text (2 of 3)

p. 59And so you tell us,Essay, l. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 9. That Person stands for a Thinking Intelligent Being that hath Reason and Reflection, and can consider it self as it self, the same thinking Being in different times and place. How comes Person to stand for this and nothing else? From whence comes Self-consciousness in different times and places to make up this Idea of a Person? Whether it be true or false, I am not now to enquire, but how it comes into this Idea of a Person? Hath the common use of our Language appropriated it to this Sense? If not, this seems to be a meer Arbitrary Idea; and may as well be denied as affirmed. And what a fine pass are we come to in the Way of Ideas, if a meer Arbitrary Idea must be taken into the only true Method of Certainty? But of that afterwards. We now proceed in the Way of Ideas as you give it us. But if this be the true Idea of a Person, then there can be no Union of two Natures in one Person: For if an Intelligent Conscious Being be the Idea p. 60of a Person; and the Divine and Human Nature be Intelligent Conscious Beings, then the Doctrine of the Union of two Natures and one Person is quite sunk, for here must be two Persons in this Way of Ideas. Again, if this be the Idea of a Person, then where there are three Persons, there must be three distinct Intelligent Beings; and so there cannot be three Persons in the same individual Essence. And thus both these Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation are past recovery gone, if this Way of Ideas hold. So great a difference there is, between forming Ideas first, and then judging of Revelation by them; and the believing of Revelation on its proper Grounds, and interpreting the Sense of it by the due Measures of Reason. You may pretend what you please, that you hold the Assurance of Faith, and the Certainty by Ideas to go upon very different Grounds; but when a Proposition is offered you out of Scripture to be believed, and you doubt about the Sense of it, Is not Recourse to be made to your Ideas? As, in the present Case, whether there can be three Persons in one Nature, or two Natures and one Person; what Resolution can you come to upon your Principles, p. 61but in the Way of Ideas? You may possibly say, That where Ideas are clear and distinct, there you are to judge of Revelation by them; and this is what you assert in your Essay, Essay, B. 4. ch. 18. Sect. 5.That in Propositions whose Certainty is built on clear and perfect Ideas and evident Deductions of Reason, there no Proposition can be received for Divine Revelation which contradicts them; from hence you conclude it impossible for the same Body to be in two Places at once. And yet there is a Person who hath lately told the World,Evangel. Medici Art. 14. p. 170. that there is one certain secret Way how by Divine Power, the same Body, but not the same Person, may be in very distant Places at once; but he is advised to keep it up as a Secret; which was good friendly Advice: But till it be discovered there is no judging of it. Here I observe, that you require clear and distinct Ideas; and yet we find, if a Man's Word may be taken, these clear and distinct Ideas do not prove the thing impossible. But what is to be said when the Ideas are not clear and distinct? You say, Your Method of Certainty is by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, where they are not in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct. And this is your Secret about p. 62Certainty; which I think had been better kept up too: For I pray, in the Case now before us, Are your Ideas of Nature and Person clear and distinct or not? if they are, then it is plain from your own Doctrine, that if Revelation be pretended, you are to reject it. How then comes the Certainty of Faith to be preserved firm and immoveable, although the Grounds of Certainty be disputed? But suppose they are not clear and distinct? What is to be done in a Matter of Revelation contrary to your Ideas? Are you to submit to the Revelation or not?Ch. 18. Sect. 10. Whatever God hath Revealed is most certainly true, no doubt can be made of it. This is the proper Object of Faith; but whether it be a Divine Revelation or no, you say, Reason must judge. Yes, Reason proceeding upon clear and distinct Ideas. But suppose you have Ideas sufficient for Certainty in your Way, but not clear and distinct; what is to be done then? In things that are above Reason, you say, when they are Revealed, they are proper Matters of Faith. What is here being above Reason? Either above the Discovery of Reason▪ as the Fall of Angels, the Resurrection of the Body, &c. and about these, you say, Reason p. 63hath nothing to do. (What not if there be an Idea of Identity as to the Body?) Or such as are above the Comprehension of Reason when discovered. And they are either such as we have no Natural Ideas of; and then you grant, that they are pure Matters of Faith; or they are such, as you have certain Ideas of, but not clear and distinct. Now here lies the pinching Difficulty, as to your Way of Ideas. Sect. 8.You say indeed, That Revelation must carry it against meer Probabilities to the contrary; because the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know, but is only probably convinced of, is bound to give up its Assent to such a Testimony, which it is satisfied comes from one who cannot err and will not deceive. I pray observe your own Words, you here positively say, That the Mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know: So that it is plain here, that you place Certainty only in Evident Knowledge, or in clear and distinct Ideas; and yet your great Complaint of Me was, that I charged this upon you, and now I find it in your own Words (which I observed before.) But let us allow you all you desire, viz. That there may be Certainty p. 64by Ideas, where they are not clear and distinct: and let us now suppose that you are to judge of a Proposition delivered as a Matter of Faith, where you have a Certainty by Reason from your Ideas, such as they are: Can you assent to this as a Matter of Faith, when you are already certain by your Ideas of the contrary? How is this possible? Can you believe that to be true, which you are certain is not true? Suppose it be that there are two Natures in one Person; the Question is, Whether you can Assent to this as a Matter of Faith? If you had said, there had been only Probabilities on the other side, I grant that you then say, Revelation is to prevail; but when you say you have Certainty by Ideas to the contrary, I do not see how it is possible for you to Assent to a Matter of Faith as true, when you are certain from your Ideas that it is not true: For how can you Believe against Certainty? The Evidence is not so great as when the Ideas are clear and distinct, but the Bar against Assent is as strong; because the Mind is actually determined by Certainty. And so your Notion of Certainty by Ideas must overthrow the Credibility of a Matter of Faith in all such Propositions p. 65which are offered to be believed on the account of Divine Revelation.

I shall now summ up the Force of what I have said about this Matter.

Your Answer is, That your Method of Certainty by Ideas, shakes not at all, nor in the least concerns the Assurance of Faith ▪ Against this I have pleaded. (1.) That your Method of Certainty shakes the Belief of Revelation in general. (2.) That it shakes the Belief of Particular Propositions or Articles of Faith, which depend upon the Sense of Words contained in Scripture. Because you do not say, that we are to believe all that we find there expressed; but in case we have any clear and distinct Ideas which limit the Sense another way than the words seem to carry it, we are to judge that to be the true Sense. But in case our Ideas are not clear and distinct, yet you affirm as your proper Doctrine, That we may come to Certainty by Ideas, although not in all Respects perfectly clear and distinct. From whence I infer, That where you have attained to a Certainty by your imperfect Ideas, you must judge of a Matter of Faith, by those Ideas, and consequently, if the Union of two Natures and one Person, or three Persons p. 66in one Nature be repugnant to your Ideas (as I have shewed that they are) you must by virtue of your own Principles reject these from being Matters of Faith. And thus I hope I have proved what I undertook, viz. That your Notion of Certainty by Ideas is inconsistent with these Articles of the Christian Faith.

But you have this Comfort left, that you are not the first Person who hath run himself into insuperable Difficulties as to Matters of Faith, by this way of Ideas. For Des Cartes himself did so in a remarkable manner: He was a Person of a great Reach and Capacity, and spent many Thoughts in laying the Foundations of Certainty from Ideas, both as to Incorporeal and Corporeal Substances; and yet was miserably foiled as to both of them. His Demonstrations from his Ideas in his Metaphysical Meditations, did not meet with the Entertainment he promised himself from the Inquisitive part of Mankind; for his Objective Reality from his Idea gave no Satisfaction; and his other Argument was thought to have no Force, unless it were taken off from the Idea and placed upon the Necessity of Existence in the Nature of the Thing. As to Corporeal Substances, his p. 67fundamental mistake was in a wrong Idea of Matter, which he made to be the same with Extension; and upon this he built his Systeme of Nature. But against this first false step many things were objected by his Adversaries, as may be seen by the late Disputes in France about his Principles; they objected, that his Notion or Idea of Matter made it necessary, and impossible for God to Annihilate it; and his Defenders are driven to such shifts as to God's Will and Power, that an indifferent Person might thereby see how dangerous it is to take up with Ideas as to the Ground of Certainty, although neither himself nor his Followers pretend to place it in any thing but clear and distinct Ideas. But when they came to reconcile their Ideas with Matters of Faith, they were so plunged, that they could see no way to get through their Difficulties.Censur. Philos. Cartes. c. 8. Sect. 3. n. 4. For as Monsieur Huet observes, Although Des Cartes professes great submission to Divine Revelation, yet when it came to the Trial, he judged his Opinions could not be repugnant to it, because he was certain of the Truth of them; which shews, that he judged of Revelation by his Rules of Certainty, and whatever he pretended, he did not take p. 68his Measures of Truth from Revelation. A late Defender of Des Cartes in answer to this, produces the Words used by him in his Principles, wherein he owns, That in case of Divine Revelation if God declares any thing concerning himself or others which exceed our Capacity, as the Mysteries of the Trinity and Incarnation, he would not refuse to believe them, although he could not clearly understand them.

This Monsieur Huet denies not, viz. That he made such a general Profession of Submission to Revelation and owning the Mysteries of Faith; but, saith he, when it comes to particular Points, then Ideas are to be the Standard by which we are to judge of Revelation. Monsieur Regis in his Reply saith, That Matters of Faith and Philosophical Truths are of different kinds; and that there can be no Contrariety but between things of the same kind. Which makes him run into that great Absurdity, that although in a Philosophical Sense God cannot do things repugnant to Reason, yet in the Way of Faith he may; and all this to preserve the Certainty by Ideas, when nothing can be more repugnant to all kinds of Certainty than such a Supposition. But another p. 69great Admirer of Des Cartes, Philosophia Scripturae Interpres, c. 5. n. 56.thinks this way unreasonable; But Des Cartes, he saith, hath shewn the right Method of Certainty by clear and distinct Ideas, and therefore he calls it no less than a Divine Certainty;c. 8. and he adds, that Truth cannot be contrary to it self; and he laughs at the Distinction of Philosophical and Theological Truths; or the two ways of Certainty by Knowledge and Faith: For, Truth is always one and the same, and changes not its Countenance: and if Truth be an Agreement of Words with Things, how can the same Words agree in one Book and differ in another? for the same God is the Author of Truth where-ever it is: and therefore he calls it, A most absurd Opinion of those who say, that God who is immutable should teach that as Truth in Philosophy, which is false in Divinity. But I return to you.

You seem to be not a little concerned, that I say, That as you have stated your Notion of Ideas it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith which I had endeavoured to defend. Such an Accusation, you say, brought into any Court in England, would be thought to shew a great Inclination to have the Accused be p. 70suspected rather than any Evidence of being guilty of any thing; and so would immediately be dismissed without hearing any Plea to it. But you must give me leave to say, that you have quite mistaken my Design, which was not to accuse you, but to shew my own Dissatisfaction, as to the Way you had taken to clear your self. I hoped you would have said so much for your own Vindication, as would have satisfied the World, that your Notion of Ideas was far from any Tendency that way to which it was carried by him who made use of your Expressions: But, instead of that you explained it in such a manner as made it far more suspicious that he had not perverted your meaning. And that made me to say, That as you had stated it, it may be of dangerous Consequence. It may be, p. 58.say you, this is no Evidence, but only an Inclination to accuse you. So far from it, that it shewed an Inclination to favour you, when I only said it may be; for now you see, that I think it is of such dangerous Consequence, and I must think so till you have cleared it better.

But the Notion of Ideas as you have stated it, relates to your whole Book: p. 71Why should you carry it farther than I intended it? The stating of it I mentioned was in your first Letter; where you told us what you meant by Nature and Person. p. 60.But you have found out two Particulars wherein it may be of dangerous Consequence, first in making so much use of the word Ideas, and your placing Certainty in Ideas. As to the Term of Ideas, I have no Objection to the use of the word it self; provided it be used in a common Sense, and no Weight be laid upon it more than it can bear; for I am for no new affected Terms which are apt to carry Mens Minds out of the way; they are like Ignes fatui, which seem to give Light, but lead those that follow them into Bogs: Like Fontanges, which seem to set Peoples Heads that wear them higher, but their Understandings are just what they were before. I always dislik'd the Stoical Improvements by New Words, or giving New Senses to Old ones. But I told you, I should never have mention'd this Way of Ideas, but for the ill use I found made of them: and you might have enjoy'd the Satisfaction you had in them long enough, unless I had found them imploy'd in doing Mischief.p. 63. Which, as p. 72you humbly conceive amounts to thus much and no more; that I fear Ideas; i. e. the Term Ideas may some time or other be of dangerous Consequence. Can you possibly think this was my Meaning? I know of no Antipathy I have to the Term Ideas; nor do I understand any Mischief that lies in the bare use of the Term. If it gives you any Satisfaction I pray make what use you please of it, so you do not set it up in your Way of Ideas for a new Method of Certainty; nor weaken Mens Belief as to Matters of Faith by it. These were my Prejudices against your Ideas, and they are increased by your Defences; for I can find nothing that hath any force to remove them.

You tell me, my Quarrel must be with the Term Ideas as of dangerous Consequence: But why so? It was the Way of Certainty by Ideas which I insisted upon, and the new Terms as imploy'd to that purpose. I confess, I say, The World had been strangely amuzed with Ideas of late, and we have been told, what strange things might be done by the help of Ideas, i. e. as to Matter of Certainty. But you tell me more than once, that I own,p. 65, 79. That these come only to be common Notions of things, which I have no Aversion p. 73from. This is a way of turning things upon Me, which I could not expect from You. For those Words are brought in by me on this Occasion, you had said, that you see no such Opposition, but that Ideas and sound Reason may stand together, i. e. Reason rightly managing those Ideas, so as to produce Evidence by them. Upon this, I used these Words. But what need all this great Noise about Ideas and Certainty; true and real Certainty by Ideas, if after all it comes only to this, that our Ideas only represent such things, from whence we bring Arguments to prove the Truth of things? But the World hath been strangely amused, &c. Judge now how fair and ingenuous this Answer is. That which I bring in as a Consequence of your Assertion, you make to be my own Sense as to your Notion of Ideas: when I all along distinguish the Way of Reason, by deducing one thing from another, from your Way of Certainty, in the Agreement and Disagreement of Ideas; and I therefore mention it as an Argument of your own departing from your beloved Notion of Ideas. I never said any thing against Reason rightly managing Ideas, so as to produce Evidence by them. I was glad p. 74you came so far towards my own Apprehension as to the Use of Ideas, and I declare soon after That if you mean no more by your Certainty from Ideas, but a Certainty from Reason, I was not so unreasonable a Man to disagree with you.From p. 63. to p. 73. And yet you spend many Pages to justifie your Use of the Term Ideas: which is all lost upon me. For in short, it is not your Way of Ideas, but your Way of Certainty by Ideas, which I was unsatisfied about, and am so much the more by the Method you have taken to defend your self. And this was the thing I found fault with, as you could not but see; but you found it much easier to run into a long Discourse, to no purpose, about the Use of the Word Ideas. How far your Use of the Term is new I will not dispute with you; be it new or old the thing you do pretend to by your Ideas is that which I disliked, and am forced to do so still; for you give me no manner of satisfaction about it, as will appear by the Examination of what you say, about the new Method of Certainty, which is the matter in Question:p. 87. You desire to know whether there be any other or older Method of Certainty? That is not the p. 75Point, but whether yours be any at all? Which I deny. If there be no Older, you say, the World is obliged to you for this New one: Very true, if it were what it pretends.p. 88. But you tell me, I ought to set the World right in a thing of that great Concernment, and to overthrow yours, and thereby prevent the dangerous Consequence of your unseasonable starting this new Method of Certainty. I did never pretend to inform the World of new Methods, and therefore am not bound to go any farther than to that I found fault with, which was your new Method; and although I thought I had said enough before, to shew how far it was from what it pretended; yet because you call me to it in such a manner, I shall endeavour more freely to represent to you the Vnsatisfactoriness and Inconsistency of it. For it is still to me a strange thing, that you should talk so much of a new Method of Certainty by Ideas; and yet allow, as you do, such a Want of Ideas, so much Imperfection in them, and such a want of Connexion between our Ideas, and the things themselves. One would think, that he that owned these things rather design'd to prove there could be no Certainty by Ideas. And when I had objected p. 76these things in the Conclusion of my former Answer, you do not deny them; and all the Return you make is, that it is better to have some way of Certainty (though it will not lead us to it in every thing) than no way at all. p. 171, 172.As though the Dispute between us had been, Whether any Certainty be not better than none. No doubt any true Certainty is desirable, but it is, as I have often said, of ill Consequence to set up such a Method of Certainty, as if it hold, will overthrow our Faith, and if it doth not, must deceive all those that follow it. And it is the Certainty of Faith which I defend against your pretended Certainty of Knowledge. But to let you see what Ground I had to be unsatisfied with it, I shall now wave all the Instances of Ideas I insisted on before, as to Substances and sensible Qualities; and I shall single out one remarkable Idea, by which the Uncertainty of your way of Ideas will be fully discover'd. And that is the Idea of Space; upon which a famous Systeme of Natural Philosophy hath been built, and as upon a clear and distinct Idea; and yet you will by no means allow it to be so; and think you have a clear Idea to the contrary; although p. 77those who will not allow it to be true cannot deny it to be consistent with it self, and that the Ideas in it have an Agreement with one another.

As to Space, Essay, B. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 2.you say, that we have it both by Sight and Touch, which inform us of the Distance between Bodies: which in several Respects may be called Distance, Capacity and Extension; and so Extension, you say, is an Idea belonging to Body only, but Space may, as is evident, be consider'd without it. But here now arises a great difficulty to me in the way of Certainty by Ideas: viz. that some very thinking Men in this way of Ideas, have look'd on the Idea of Space, and extended Matter to be the same; for say they, it appears to us from clear Ideas, that Body and Extension are the same thing, and therefore if there be Extension in Space there must be Body. But, you say,Sect. 12. those that do so, either change the signification of Words, and so render it a doubtfull Idea, or they confound very different Ideas with one another, and so can never come to Certainty by the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. But you conclude,Sect. 14. that the clear and distinct Idea of simple Space distinguishes it plainly and sufficiently from Body. Here we see you p. 78pretend to a clear and distinct Idea. But it falls out very unluckily for the Way of Ideas, that the first starter of this Way of Certainty is as positive,Princip. p. 11. n. 16. that the Idea of Space and extended Body are the same. So that here we have clear and distinct Ideas both Ways. And is not this an admirable Method of Certainty, when in one of the plainest Ideas which depend upon our Senses, the greatest Defenders of Ideas differ so fundamentally. What can other Men hope for in this Way of Ideas, if such Men can agree no better in one of the most evident to our Senses? But then we must consider, who hath the better Reason? This is not Certainty by Ideas, but by Reason upon them, which is another thing: Let us go to Reason. Is that Reason built only on some intermediate Idea, which makes it clear? I find intermediate Ideas on both sides, and urged with equal Assurance. Des Cartes saith, that from Extension we rightly conclude a Body to be a Substance; because it is a Repugnancy that there should be an Extension of Nothing; and therefore, if there be Extension in Space there must be Body. And he proves it from the Idea of Body; for, if we cast off all such things as are not necessary to p. 79Body, as Hardness, Colour, Gravity, Heat, and Cold, and all other Qualities, we shall find nothing to remain but Extension, and therefore nothing but Extension is in the Idea of Body, which being likewise in Space the Idea of Body and Space are the same. But say you on the other side,Essay, l. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 12. I appeal to every Man's own Thoughts, whether the Idea of Space be not as distinct from that of Solidity, as it is from the Idea of a scarlet Colour. 'Tis true, that Solidity cannot exist without Extension; but this hinders not but they are distinct Ideas. One appeals to Thoughts, and the other to Reason: Had Des Cartes no Thoughts? Yet his Reason convinced him, that whatever Thoughts he had, he must be perswaded by Reason, which was the true Idea. You say, that is a clear and distinct Idea that a Man's thoughts dictate to him to be so. No, saith Des Cartes, that only is the true Idea, which a Man comes to by the Exercise of his Reason; and he look'd upon those others as meer Ideas of Imagination, and not Rational Ideas. So that here we have another Work to do, and that no easie one, which is to distinguish the Ideas of Imagination from those of Reason: and what way have you laid down to prevent so great p. 80a Mistake? Of what Rules have you to judge, how far Imagination is to be allowed in the Matter of Ideas? For in all Objects of Sense the Impression is made upon the Imagination; which is the Seat of Ideas, that come in by Sensation. now here lies a very considerable Difficulty, how far Reason is to judge of these Ideas or Imagination? For if all our simple Ideas of things without us come in by Sensation, then one would think those Ideas are to be allow'd which come in that Way; and so the Impressions of Fancy are to be the Standard and Rule of Certainty, which I think you will not affirm. But what Rule then have you when, and where, and how far, you are to correct the erroneous Ideas of Imagination?

I cannot deny but you were sensible of the Difficulty from the Ideas of Imagination, and thus you propose it.B. 4. ch. 4. Sect. 1. To what purpose is all this stir? Knowledge, say you, is only the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of our own Ideas, but who knows what those Ideas may be? Is there any thing so extravagant as the Imagination of Men's Brains? Where is the Head that hath no Chimaera's in it? Or if there be a sober and wise Man, what p. 81difference will there be by your Rules between his Knowledge, and that of the most extravagant Fancy in the World: They both have their Ideas, and perceive their Agreement and Disagreement one with another. Let us now consider the Answer you give to it, and by that we shall better judge of your Way of Certainty.

Your general Answer is,Sect. 2, that if our Knowledge of our Ideas terminate in our Fancies, our Assurance would go no farther than that of Dreams, or the Visions of a heated Fancy. But our Knowledge is real, only so far, as there is a Conformity between our Ideas, and the Reality of Things.

All this is undoubtedly true. But you say, How shall the mind, when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with Things themselves?

There indeed lies the Difficulty, but how do you remove it?

There are two sorts of Ideas, you say, we may be sure, agree with things.

And these are worth the knowing.

1. The first are simple Ideas, Sect. 4▪which since the mind can by no means make to it self, must necessarily be the Product of Things operating on the Mind in a natural Way. p. 82and producing therein those Perceptions which by the Wisdom and Will of our Maker they are adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple Ideas are not Fictions of our Minds.

All that can be proved from hence is no more, but that the Objects of our Senses do make those Impressions upon them, that from them we may be certain there are such things without us, which produce those Impressions. And this is all you mean when you say, that you are certain these Ideas are no Fictions of our Brains. But let us apply this to the present Case. Our Senses truly inform us of a Distance between Bodies; and so far we are certain of an Idea of Space, but the Question about the Idea of Space goes farther; viz. Whether the Idea of Space imply something or nothing? How can nothing be extended? If it be something extended it must be Body; and so Space and Body are the same.

And so your simple Ideas give no manner of satisfaction in this Matter.

Sect. 5.2. All our complex Ideas, except those of Substances, you say, being Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not referr'd to the Existence of any thing, cannot want any Conformity p. 83necessary to real Knowledge; for that which is not designed to represent any thing but it self, can never be capable of a wrong Representation, nor mislead us from the true Apprehension of any thing by its dislikeness to it.

Where are we now? What in the Way to Certainty still? Methinks it seems to be too intricate and winding to be that plain Way. What is meant by these Archetypes in the Mind which cannot deceive us? I confess here are such things said in order to Certainty, which are above my Understanding, if taken with respect to Things; as how we cannot but be infallibly certain, that all the Knowledge we attain concerning these Ideas is real, and reaches things themselves, and yet they are Archetypes of the Mind's own making, not intended to be the Copies of any thing, nor referr'd to the Existence of any thing. How can the Certainty by these Ideas reach the things themselves, if they are Archetypes of the Mind, not referr'd to the Existence of any thing? But I suppose all this is meant of Mathematical Truths, and so reaches not the Case, which is concerning the Certainty of our Knowledge of things that really exist.

p. 84Sect. 11.3. You say, there is another sort of complex Ideas, which being referr'd to Archetypes without us may differ from them, and so our Knowledge about them may come short of being real. Now these were the things we desired to be made certain in; and to find out such Rules as would make our Knowledge real. But for all that I can see, the hopes of any Criterion is quite lost, as to the Point in Question: How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own Ideas, know that they agree with the things themselves?

For upon these Grounds we can have no Certainty as to simple Ideas, but only as to the Power of making Impressions on our Senses; but as to complex Ideas as of Substances, our Knowledge about them may come short of being real, i. e. we cannot arrive to Certainty about them in the way of Ideas; because, they may differ from the Archetypes without us. And you confess,Sect. 12. that our Ideas are not very exact Copies, and yet are the Subjects of real, (as far as we have any) Knowledge of them; which will not be found to reach very far. But to make it real concerning Substances, the Ideas must be taken p. 85from the real Existence of things. And if our complex Ideas may deceive us as to the things from whence they are supposed to be taken, what an Account of Certainty in the way of Ideas is here? And yet you conclude this Chapter in that Triumphant manner; I think I have shewn wherein it is that Certainty, real Certainty consists, which whatever it was to others was to me heretofore one of those Desiderata's, which I found great want of: And for all that I can see may do so still. For here is nothing said to distinguish the strong Impressions of Fancy from the Appearances of things, from that Certainty of Knowledge which comes from the things themselves. For, a confident Opiniator will talk with greater Assurance of the Agreement and Disagreement of things with his Ideas; than a Man of far greater Judgment and more Modesty. And you have given us no Rules to make a difference between Opinion and rational Certainty; especially when the Ideas of Fancy are found to agree with one another.

But I shall go a step farther to shew, that the Agreement of Ideas is no Ground of Certainty, and that from a Supposition p. 86relating to the present Case.

We have seen how possible it is for an ingenious Person skilled in the Phaenomena of Nature to contrive such an Hypothesis, that one Part may agree with another, so as that no discernible Inconsistency may be found in it, and yet all this may be built on such a Foundation, as cannot be consistent with your Certainty by Ideas; nay, such as you are certain cannot be true.

The Hypothesis, I mean, is that of Des Cartes; for allowing him his Laws of Motion, and his three Elements, the Phaenomena of Nature, or the Ideas of it agree with one another, and yet all this is built upon Space being the same with Body; and consequently, that there can be no Vacuum: upon which his Laws of Motion, and his Solution of the Phaenomena is all built. And therefore, when a learned Man of our own objected that to him, and thought it of no great Consequence to his Philosophy; he replied with some smartness,Des Cartes Epist. … 1. Ep. 87, 88. that he was mistaken, for he took it for one of the most certain Principles of his Philosophy. What Certainty then can there be in Ideas, when so absurd a Principle as that shall be look'd on p. 87by so great a Man, as so certain a thing in the Way of Ideas, as to build his whole System of Natural Philosophy upon it? And his followers to this day stifly defend it, who are otherwise ingenious Men.

Nothing now remains to be answer'd in your second Letter, but what relates to the Defence of what I had said in my Book concerning Nature and Person. For I cannot but observe, that instead of clearing some pressing Difficulties in my Answer to your former Letter, you run back to my Book, and begin a new Critique upon that Part of it; and take in the help of some ingenious Persons of your Acquaintance, to whom I must shew so much Civility as to take notice of their Objections. Which I shall the rather do, because the Doctrine of the Trinity is expressed in the first Article of our Religion by one Nature and three Persons, and so it hath been understood by the Christian Church long before. And it is the Sense of the Christian Church which I am bound to defend, and no particular Opinions of my own.

You tell me,p. …17 that there hath not been one of your Acquaintance who owned that p. 88he understood my Meaning; but confessed that the farther he look'd into what I had said, the more he was at a loss about Nature and Person. But I hope I am not to answer for other Men's want of Understanding in these Matters: which requires greater Application of Mind, than most Men are willing to allow themselves about them. But I am to judge no otherwise of their Sense and Capacity, than as you have represented them.

p. 118.One said I began with giving two significations of the word Nature; One of them, as it stood for Properties; and this he understood; but the other wherein Nature was taken for the thing it self, wherein those Properties were, he said he did not understand. But he said he was not very well acquainted with Greek, and Aristotle was brought to explain and settle the Sense of Nature.

But why did not this Gentleman in the first Place consider what it was I undertook to shew, which was, that we had an Idea of Nature, which came not in by our Senses; and in the very next words I said, That Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent; and so, that which is the Subject of Powers and Properties p. 89is the Nature, whether it be meant of bodily or spiritual Substances. And although by Sensation and Reflection we know the Powers and Properties of things; yet it is by Reason we are satisfied there must be such a Nature or Substance, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves.

Methinks if the Gentleman were so much at a loss as you represent him, you should have helped him out by your relative Ideas: For hard things go down much better with some Men's minds in the Way of Ideas, (which is a sort of gilding the Pills) and I doubt not but you could have satisfied him, that the Understanding may by virtue of a relative Idea be very well satisfied of the Being of Nature, as well as Substance, when I declared that I took them to be of equal Extent; as they were the Subject of Powers and Properties. But he saith, that this he understood not, p. 120.because Nature extended to things that were not Substances. Did I not say, that Nature was sometimes taken only for Properties, but that there must be another Sense proved, because there must be a Subject wherein these Properties are, and in that respect, p. 90I said, that Nature and Substance were of equal Extent. But he doth not understand the Deduction; Aristotle takes Nature for a corporeal Substance, therefore Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent. What a hard Fate doth that Man lie under, that falls into the hands of a severe Critick! He must have a care of his But, and For, and Them, and It; For the least Ambiguity in any of these will fill up Pages in an Answer, and make a Book look considerable for the Bulk of it. And what must a Man do, who is to answer to all such Objections about the Use of Particles? But let any indifferent Reader judge, how I am used in this Place. My words are Sometimes Nature is taken for the Thing it self in which those Properties are; and so Aristotle took Nature for a Corporeal Substance, which had the Principles of Motion in it self; but Nature and Substance are of an equal Extent. Doth not any Man of Common Sense see, that I oppose this to Aristotle's Sense of Nature for a Corporeal Substance? He confines it to that only; I say, That it is of equal Extent with Substance whether Bodily or Spiritual: and those very p. 91words follow after. If you had really such a Conversation with a Gentleman, I am sorry for him; and I think you did not deal so like a Gentleman by him, to expose him thus to the World.

But I perceive he is a Philosopher too; for he proves,p. 119. That Aristotle's Notion of Nature for a Corporeal Substance will not hold. Did I ever say that it would? I am far enough from thinking, that a Corporeal Substance hath a Principle of Motion from it self; but might not I mention Aristotle's taking Nature for a Substance, although I presently add, his Sense was too short and narrow, because Nature and Substance were of equal extent? But did not his Notion of Nature imply that it was a Principle of Motion in it self? Whatever Aristotle thought, the Notion of Nature doth not depend upon a Principle of Motion from it self; but it was considered, not as in it self as the Cause, but in it self as the Subject. And that Philosophical Gentleman might be pleased to consider, that Aristotle did not make Motion to arise from Matter, but asserted it to come from a first Mover, and said, That those Philosophers talked like Men not well in their Wits, who attributed p. 92Motion to Matter of it self; as I could easily prove, if it were needful. And methinks you should not have been such a Stranger to Aristotle, to let your Acquaintance run into such Blunders, and then to print them for them.

But the Gentleman is farther plunged and knows not how to get out.p. 121. He cannot for his Life understand Nature to be Substance and Substance to be Nature? Where lies the Difficulty? Is the Repugnancy, in the Words, or in the Sense? Not in the Words or Sense either in Greek or Latin. For the Greek, (if I may have leave to mention that Language in this Case) those who have been very well acquainted with the force of Words therein, have made Nature of the same importance with Substance. So Hesychius renders it by foreign, Substance; but I shall not bring the Testimony of Criticks but of Philosophers. And Aristotle may be allowed to understand his own Language,Arist. Metaph. l. 5. c. 4. he saith positively, foreign; every Substance is called Nature, and the Reason he gives for it is, foreign, because Nature is a Substance. It may be said, That Aristotle said this, because he took Nature p. 93for such a Substance as had the Power of Motion in it self; I do not deny, but he look'd on that as the proper Acception of Nature; but from hence it follows, that whatever Substance had such a Principle of Motion in it self was truly and properly Nature; not as exclusive of a Superiour Principle of Motion, but as having an internal self-moving Principle. And herein Aristotle differed from some modern Philosophers, who make all Motion to come from the Impulse of another Body, and to be a meer Mode of Matter continued from one Body to another. I confess Aristotle was of another Opinion from those Gentlemen, and look'd on Motion as an Effect of an inward Principle; and not meerly of an External Impulse: but whether Aristotle were mistaken herein is not the Question; and it is possible he was not; however, it plainly appears, that Substance with a Power of Motion in it self, and Nature, had the same Sense; and none of those who have been the most severe Criticks upon Aristotle have disputed, that I remember, against this Sense of Nature in him.P. Rami Schol. Metaph l. 9. c. 4. One of them finds this fault, that it was but a Repetition p. 94of what he had said in his Physicks;Physic. Ausc. l. 2. c. 1. where he doth likewise treat of the Sense of Nature. And there he takes it for such a Substance which hath the Principle of Motion and Rest within it self and by it self; which he opposes to artificial things, as a Bed or a Garment. And as much as this Definition hath been run down by some Men, if we set aside some affected Obscurity in his Philosophical Writings, there is no such Absurdity in it; when he explains himself not to understand it of meer Local Motion, or change of Place, but of all Alterations incident to Bodies. So that Nature in his Sense, was a Substance endued with a Principle of Life and Action. And all those things which did partake of Nature in this Sense, he said, were Substances; foreign. For Nature is always a Subject and in a Subject; i. e. the Substance it self is Nature, and that which is in it is according to Nature. And this Sense of Aristotle Plutarch relies upon,Plut. de Plac. Phil. l. 1. c. 1. as the true Notion of Nature which he saith is the Principle of Motion and Rest; because the beginning and ending of things depend upon it: But Plutarch by no means approves of those Mens Opinion p. 95who made Nature to be an Original Self-moving Principle;c. 3. For, saith he, Matter of it self cannot move without an Efficient Cause, no more than any Metal can frame it self into a particular Form without an Artificer. From whence we see that Aristotle's Notion of Nature was very consistent with an Efficient Cause of Nature. But your Gentleman saith,Letter II. p. 119. That to those who admit not Matter and Motion to be Eternal, no Nature in that Sense will be left, since Nature is said to be a Corporeal Substance which hath the Principles of Motion in it self, and such a sort of Corporeal Substance those Men have no Notion of at all, and consequently none of Nature, which is such a Corporeal Substance. But if Aristotle did not suppose Matter to move it self, without an Efficient Cause, (as certainly he did not) then all this falls to the Ground, and his Notion of Nature for a Substantial Principle of Life and Action may remain good.

But it may be said, That this was one of his singular Notions, and that no other Philosophers took it so. Which is so far from being true, that a great Enemy of Aristotle's confesses,Fr. Patrit. Discuss. Peripat. T. II. l. 2. p. 207. That the Name of Nature among the Writers before him extended p. 96to all kinds of Beings, and not only to Individual but to Specifick Natures.

Aristotle's fault lay in applying Nature only to Corporeal Substances; and whatever was above them he look'd on as above Nature; but the Pythagoreans and Platonists took Nature to extend to Spiritual as well as Bodily Substances. Which appears by Timaeus Locrus his Book of Nature; in the beginning whereof he divides Things into two kinds, Intellectual and Corporeal; and the former, whose Nature was more excellent, he derives immediately from the best Principle, viz. God himself.

But to make this plainer, we are to consider, that there were four Opinions, among the Old Philosophers about Nature. Some held Nature to be the same with Matter, and attributed the Beginning of all things to that alone; such were the followers of Anaximander and Democritus. Others rejected this Doctrine as absurd and impious, and held a Divine Being above Matter, which gave the beginning to Motion and framed the World, and they asserted Spiritual as well as Corporeal Natures, and these were p. 97the followers of Pythagoras and Anaxagoras. Others asserted the Beginning of Motion and of the World from a first Cause; but confined the Sense of Nature to the Course of things established in this Visible World by an Universal Providence at first. And this was the Notion of Aristotle and his followers to the time of Strato who attributed all to meer Nature. Lastly, there were some who made Nature to be the first Principle which formed all things; which sometimes they called God, and sometimes Nature, as is obvious in all the Writings of the Stoicks; Vis illum Naturam vocare? non peccabis; saith Seneca: Nat Quaest. l. 2. c. 45.and in another place, Quid aliud est Natura, quam Deus & divina Ratio? De benef. l. 4. c. 7, 8.and again, Nec Deus sine Naturâ est, nec Natura sine Deo, sed idem est utrumque, which he elsewhere calls,De Cons. ad Helv. c. 8. Incorporalis Ratio ingentium operum Artifex. With which Balbus in Cicero agrees,Cic. de Nat. l. 2. when he defines Nature from Zeno, to be an Intelligent Fire that produces all things. For what he calls Ignem artificiosum ad gignendum, &c. Laertius calls foreign p. 98foreign; and it is called in Cicero, Natura Artifex, Consultrix & Provida, &c. which can agree to nothing but a Spiritual Substance; and when he explains what Nature is, he saith, That Epicurus called all by the Name of Nature; and divided it into Matter and Vacuity and the Accidents of both: but we (saith he of the Stoicks) by Nature understand no Inanimate Things which have no Principle within to unite them, as Earth and Stones; but a living Substance, as an Animal, in which is no Chance, but Order and Contrivance. And so Plato said,Plato in Phileb. That Nature ordered all things with Reason and Vnderstanding. By which he understood the Divide Being. If we come lower down among the Philosophers, we shall find Nature taken for a Principle of Life. Sext. Empir. l. 8. c. 2.So Sextus Empiricus distinguishes the Union of Matter in Stones and Wood from that which is in Plants,p. 324. and this he calls Nature, which is the lowest degree of it; for afterwards, he speaks of Rational and Intellectual Natures, and places God in the head of them.Anton. l. 6. sect. 14. Antoninus distinguishes p. 99Nature in Plants from a heap of the Particles of Matter in Wood and Stone.l. 10. Sect. 2. But in another place he distinguishes that which is meer Nature in Man, viz. what he hath in common with Plants, from the Nature of an Animal in him; and that again from the Nature of a Rational Creature in him. Here indeed he speaks of the Properties of those Natures; but he still supposes, that where they are separate, they are founded in distinct Substances.

So that I hope, if the Philosophers of old, of all kinds did understand the Sense of Nature and Substance, the Gentleman may not continue in such a peremptory Humour of saying, That for his Life he cannot understand Nature to be Substance, nor Substance to be Nature. For they all agreed in this, however they differed in their Opinions of Nature.

But I have something farther to add concerning the Sense of the Christian Church in this Matter; which I think is by no means to be despised.

It is observed by Damascen, Damasc. Dial. c. 32.that some of the Philosophers made this p. 100difference between foreign and foreign; that the former was taken for simple Essence, but the latter for Essence with a Specifical Difference; but that the Christian Writers took both of them for that which was common to more than one, as an Angel, a Man, a Horse, &c. So St. Chrysostom calls Angels foreign,Chrysost. Hom. 22. in Gen. and foreign, and Theodoret foreign,Theod. in Gen. Qu. 2. St. Basil foreign; but they all agree,Basil. in Hex. Or. 1. that Incorporeal and Invisible Substances are real Natures. And the Reason Damascen gives is, That they have both the same Original (and you know that it is a good way to find out the true Idea) for as foreign is from foreign, so foreign is from foreign, both which are the same. So that if Real Existence belong to Substance, and Nature hath its Name from thence too, then Substance and Nature must be of the same Importance. And this Notion of Nature they do not take up meerly from the Etymology of the Word, but from the Sense of it in Scripture; as when St. Paul saith, They worshipped those which by Nature are no Gods;Gal. 4.8.Gal 4:8 foreign p. 101foreign, as the Alexandrian Copy hath it more clearly; i. e. which are not really and substantially Gods. They had the Names of Gods, and the Divine Properties were attributed to them; but because they had not the Divine Essence, they are said not to be Gods by Nature. And what Sense would this Gentleman make of the Apostle's words, who cannot for his Life understand that Nature is the same with Substance? He must understand this only of the Properties which belong to God. But these Properties must be somewhere, and so a Substance must be supposed as the Subject of them; and what Reason can there be to exclude that which is the Subject of those Properties? For there must be a Divine Being, as well as Properties; and that Being must have Essential Properties belonging to it; and what imaginable Reason can there be, why that should not be called the Divine Nature? And if it be, then Substance and Nature are the same. I might easily pursue this farther, but I design to bring things into as little a compass as I can.

p. 102But it may be there is something in our own Language which hinders Nature from being taken for a Substance; and for this I appeal to a late Ingenious and Honourable Person and Philosopher of our own; I mean Mr. Boyle, Mr. Boyle of the Notion of Nature, p. 27.who hath written a Philosophical Enquiry into the Notion of Nature; and he tells us of the various Acceptations of it. (1.) For the Author of Nature. (2.) For the Essence of a Thing. (3.) For what comes to Men by Birth; as a Man is Noble by Nature. (4.) For an Internal Principle of Motion: as that a Stone is carried downwards by Nature. (5.) For the established course of things; as that Nature makes the Night to succeed the Day. (6.) For an Aggregate of Powers belonging to a Living Body; as that Nature is strong or weak. (7.) For the System of the Universe; as when we say of a Chimaera, there is no such thing in Nature. (8.) For a Semi-Deity; which is the Notion he opposes. But we may observe, that he allows God and all the real Beings of the Vniverse to have Nature belonging p. 103to them; and he saith,P. 35. The Word Essence is of great Affinity to it, if not of an adequate Import. But the Real Essence of a thing is a Substance; and therefore Nature and Substance are of the like Importance.

The next thing fit to be considered is, How far your Certainty by Ideas and the Certainty by Reason differ from each other.

The occasion of this Debate stands thus.

I had said in my Book,Discourse of the Trinity, p. 25. That I granted, that by Sensation and Reflection we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but our Reason is satisfied, that there must be something beyond these, because it is impossible that they should subsist by themselves. So that the Nature of things properly belongs to our Reason and not to meer Ideas.

In answer to this you said, That you can find no Opposition between Ideas and Reason; but Ideas are the Objects of the Vnderstanding, and Vnderstanding is one of the Faculties imployed about them.

p. 104To which I replied, No doubt of it. But you might easily see, that by Reason I understood Principles of Reason, allow'd by Mankind; which I think are very different from Ideas. But I perceive Reason in this Sense is a thing you have no Idea of, or one as obscure as that of Substance.

If there be any thing which seems too sharp and reflecting in the Manner of Expression, I do not go about to defend it; but the worst of it is, That your Idea of Reason is as obscure as that of Substance. And whether there were not a just Occasion for it, the Reader must judge when the Faculty was put for the Principles of Reason. Could any Man judge otherwise, but that you had a very obscure Idea of Reason, who could mistake the Vnderstanding for it?

P. 124.But Reason, you say, taken for the Faculty is as different from Ideas in your Apprehension. But what is that to the Point in Dispute, whether the Notion of Nature be to be taken from Ideas or from Reason? You say, the Vnderstanding is imploy'd about p. 105them. And what then? I shewed that the Nature of things belongs to Reason and not to bare Ideas; because Ideas come in by Sensation and Reflection; by which we come to know the Powers and Properties of things; but we cannot come to know the Notion of Nature as the Subject of them, but by this Reason that we are convinced they cannot subsist of themselves. And is this no more than to say, the Vnderstanding is imployed about Ideas? But now you answer farther, That if Reason be taken for the Faculty or the Principles of Reason allowed by Mankind, Reason and Ideas may consist together. This leads me to the Examination of that which may be of some use, viz. To shew the Difference of your Method of Certainty by Ideas, and the Method of Certainty by Reason.

And the Way of Certainty by Reason lies in two things;

1. The Certainty of Principles.

2. The Certainty of Deductions.

As to the former, the Gentleman your Defender in your Book saith, That in your Essay, Ibid.in more places than p. 106one, you have spoken, and that pretty largely of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims; so that if I have ever read them, I cannot doubt, but you have Ideas of those common Principles of Reason.

Book 4 ch 7. Sect. ….What Ideas you have of them must appear from your Book. And I do there find a Chapter of Self-evident Propositions and Maxims; which I cannot but think extraordinary for the Design of it; which is thus summed up in the Conclusion, viz. That it was to shew, That these Maxims, as they are of little use where we have clear and distinct Ideas, so they are of dangerous use, where our Ideas are not clear and distinct. And is not this a fair way to convince me that your Way of Ideas is very consistent with the Certainty of Reason; when the Way of Reason hath been always supposed to proceed upon General Principles; and you assert them to be Vseless and Dangerous.

Sect. 4.Your first Design you say is to prove, that the Consideration of these General Maxims can add nothing to the Evidence or Certainty of Knowledge; p. 107which overthrows all that which hath been accounted Science and Demonstration, and must lay the Foundation of Scepticism. Because our true Grounds of Certainty depend upon some general Principle of Reason. To make this plain, I shall put a Case grounded upon your Words, which are,Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 17. that you have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually denied that they are Men. These Words, I. S. understands as spoken of themselves, Solid Philos. asserted Preface, Sect. 16. Reflex. 19. p. 378.and charges them with very ill Consequences; but I think they are capable of another meaning: However, let us put the Case that Men did in earnest question, whether they were Men or not; and then I do not see, if you set aside general Maxims, how you can convince them that they are Men. For, the way I look on as most apt to prevail upon such extraordinary Sceptical Men, is by general Maxims and Principles of Reason. As in the first place, that Nothing can have no Properties; which I take to be the Fundamental Principle of Certainty, as to real Beings. For, all our inward Perceptions are only of some Acts or p. 108Properties, as of Thinking, Doubting, Reasoning, &c. and if a Man proceeds so far as to question every thing, in order to the discovering the true Ground of Certainty, he cannot be satisfied with finding out only some Modes of Being; but that which he aims at is, satisfaction as to his real Existence.

But this wholly depends upon the Truth and Certainty of this Fundamental Maxim; That Nothing can have no Operations; and therefore, whatever thinks, or doubts, or reasons, must certainly be. And since by another Fundamental Maxim, it is impossible for the same Thing to be and not to be; he cannot entertain any possible doubt of his own Existence.

It may be said, that this reaches only to bare Existence, and not to the Being Men. I answer, that for the Certainty as to that, there are other general Maxims of necessary Use; As, That all different sorts of Beings are distinguished by Essential Properties; That the Essential Properties of a Man are to Reason, Discourse, &c. That these Properties cannot subsist by themselves p. 109without a real Substance: And therefore, where these Properties are found, those who have them must be real and substantial Men.

You may possibly say,Book 4. ch. 9. Sect. 3. that these Maxims are useless, because you affirm that nothing can be more evident to us, than our own Existence; and that we have an internal infallible Perception that we are.

But I answer, that these Maxims do not at all appear to be useless, because the Certainty we enquire after is a Certainty of Reason, and not of bare Perception. And if it be a Certainty of Reason, some Ground of Reason must be assigned for it: but all that the Perception reaches to, are those Acts mention'd by you. I think, I reason, I feel pleasure and pain: but the Question goes farther as to the Subject of those Acts, and the Nature of that Subject, whether it be a Man or not.

Now here lies the main Difficulty, whether without the help of these Principles you can prove to any that doubt, that they are Men? And I shall now shew, that in your Way of Ideas you cannot. For,

p. 110(1) You suppose that we must have a clear distinct Idea of that which we are certain of in the Way of Ideas.

(2) You deny that we have any such clear and distinct Idea of Man.

1. You suppose, that we must have a clear and distinct Idea of that we are certain of. For in your Chapter of Maxims, Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 4.you say, that every one knows the Ideas that he has, and that distinctly and unconfusedly one from another. Which always being so (I pray mark that, and judge whether you do not make clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty) he can never be in doubt when any Idea is in his mind, that it is there, and is that Idea it is, and that two distinct Ideas when they are in his mind are there, and are not one and the same Idea: From whence you infer the Necessity of Certainty, when the Ideas are clear and distinct. This is so plain and clear, that I wonder how you came to forget it, and to think that I did you wrong when I charged you with holding clear and distinct Ideas necessary to Certainty. But of that in the Beginning of this Discourse.

p. 1112. But let us now examine your Idea of Man, whether that be clear and distinct or not; and if not, then according to your Principles very rational Men cannot be certain that they are Men. For if they have no Way of Certainty but by Ideas, and you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man, then they can come to no Certainty; and I hope you will not deny them to be very rational Men, if they follow the Way of Ideas.

First,Book 4▪ ch. 7. Sect. 16. you shew, that there can be no Demonstration in the Way of Principles what Man is.

Secondly,Sect. 17. that there are very different Ideas of Man, some, you say, make the Idea of a Man without a Soul; as Children do. Others add Laughter and rational Discourse, and these may demonstrate by general Principles that Ideots and Infants are no Men by this Maxim, that it is impossible for the same thing to be, and not to be; and you have discoursed with very rational Men, who have actually denied that they are Men.

Others take in the Idea of Body in general, Sect. 18.and the Powers of Language and Reason, and leave out shape; and p. 112so a Man may be a Four-footed Creature, or in whatever Body or Shape he found Speech and Reason joined, that was a Man.

But where is the clear and distinct Idea of a Man all this while? We can have no Certainty by Principles, you say, and you offer none in the Way of Ideas; for the Ideas are very confused, imperfect and repugnant to each other; and so in this new Method of Certainty by Ideas, we cannot be so much as certain that we are Men.

But is it possible to suppose, that a rational Man should talk of Certainty by Ideas, and not be able to fix the Idea of a Man? One would have thought this had been only an Omission in this place out of pure Zeal against Principles; but certainly in other places this Idea of a Man must be made clear and distinct. So far from it, that in other places, you industriously set your self to disprove the common Idea of a Man.Book 3. ch. 6. Sect. 26. It could not possibly be, say you, that the abstract Idea to which the Name Man is given, should be different in several Men, if it were of Natures making; and that to one it should be animal rationale; to another animal p. 113implume bipes latis unguibus. From whence it is plain, that you allow no clear and distinct Idea of Man; and you endeavour to expose the sacred Definition, as you call it, of animal rationale; which was never exposed by any Man without Cause. But you conclude,Sect. 17▪ That we are far from knowing certainly what Man is; though perhaps it will be judged great Ignorance to doubt about it. And yet you think you may say, That the certain Boundaries of that Species are so far from being determined, and the precise Number of simple Ideas, which make that nominal Essence so far from being setled and perfectly known, that very material Doubts may still arise about it. So that I begin to think I. S. was in the right, when he made you say, That you had discoursed with very rational Men who denied themselves to be Men. But this is a little too hard to deny themselves to be Men. If it had been only, who doubted whether they were Men or not; you could not deny them to be very rational Men, because they went upon your Grounds, that we can have no Certainty either by Principles, or p. 114by any clear and distinct Ideas, what a Man is.

Thus I have shew'd how inconsistent your way of Ideas is with true Certainty; and of what Use and Necessity these general Principles of Reason are.

I now come to the Certainty of Reason in making Deductions. And here I shall briefly lay down the Grounds of Certainty, which the Ancient Philosophers went upon, and then compare your way of Ideas with them.

Aristot. Metaph. l. 5.Aristotle observes, that Socrates first brought in Definitions and Inductions in order to Certainty; and went no farther. Plato allowed no Certainty, but only Opinion, as to External Objects; but he said▪ that Certainty depended upon abstract and separate Ideas, which were always the same. This he took,Answer to the first Lett. p. 32. (as I observed in my former Letter) from the Pythagoreans, only changing Numbers into Ideas. For by Numbers, they understood first Principles, not gross and material; but immaterial and eternal, Iambl. in Nicom. p. 5.as Iamblichus saith; and therefore Moderatus Gaditanus, one of the most understanding p. 115Men among them saith, the Pythagoreans brought in Numbers, Porph vit. Pythag.foreign, for a more decent Way of Instruction, following the Practice of Geometricians, who make use of Figures to represent things to the Mind; and therefore their Doctrine of Numbers was the Philosophy of Principles, or the general Grounds of Certainty; but this was so abstruse and so little understood, that it soon lost its Reputation, as Porphyry observes, or was mixed with Plantonism; and therefore Photinus joins the Pythagorean and Platonick Principles together. But Aristotle was a great Enemy to these abstracted Speculations, and therefore set himself so much on all occasions against Ideas and Numbers, especially in his Metaphysicks. Metaphys. l. 7. c. 15, 16. l. 12▪ c. 4, 5.But instead thereof, he endeavour'd to bring down Certainty to material Things, and to real Beings. In order to this, he saw it necessary to avoid Confusion, by explaining doubtfull Terms, and by ranking things under several Heads, which he called Categories; wherein all things are reduced to Substance, and Accidents belonging to them; to p. 116which he joins some general Discourses about the right Apprehension of things simply consider'd. But it is observable, that in all the Categories from Archytas the Pythagorean downwards, (who first placed them in that Order,) Substance was first ranked, as the most proper Idea of the Mind, and all Accidents or Modes were consider'd with respect to that. And the French Cartesians in their Logick, place Substance as the first Object of their Ideas: and do not leave us a relative Idea, to be supposed only, because Accidents cannot subsist without a Subject. Then follows the Way of understanding the Truth and Falshood of Propositions; after which, he pursues the Way of Reasoning, or inferring one thing from another, which he calls Syllogizing, wherein he professes to go upon this common Principle of Reason, That what things do agree in a third must agree among themselves. But being not content with the ordinary Dialectical Way, which proceeded upon the Concessions of the Party, he attempted to bring in true Demonstration. To which he p. 117supposes general Axioms necessary, and Definitions, and Postulata: and he distinguishes between a necessary Conclusion, and a Demonstration; for the former may arise from the manner of reasoning; but a Demonstration supposes a necessary Cause, and that the Propositions are such as that the Conclusion necessarily follows from them. So that Demonstration according to him must be of an inseparable Property, and by the most immediate and necessary Cause. How far Aristotle's Notion of Demonstration can be applied to Physical matters is not my business to enquire; it being only to shew what his Method of Certainty was.