Answer to Lockes Second Letter, Text (3 of 3)

Answer to Lockes Second Letter · Text (3 of 3)

p. 117But besides Aristotle, the Stoicks took upon them to lay down the true Method of Certainty; and they went another Way to work about it, viz. (1.) By finding out the Criterion of Truth and Falshood. (2.) By examining the Consequences and Deductions of Reason.

As to things which had some Degree of Evidence to Sense or Reason, they made the Criterion necessary, p. 118but for those which had not, but must be proved, the Examination of that Proof was necessary in order to Certainty.

The Criterion was agreed to be foreign, the Measure whereby we are to judge of things. But as in the Use of Balances for Weight, there must be one to hold them, and the Balances themselves, and the Position of them; and as in the judging of a Line, whether straight or crooked, there must be the Artificer, the Rule and the Application of it; so in judging of Truth and Falshood, there must be the Faculty of Understanding as the Artificer, Sense and Reason as the Rule; and the inward Ideas of the Mind, which answer'd to the Position of the Balances, or the Application of the Rule. Now that which they placed their Notion of Certainty in, was that inward and comprehensive Idea, which was called by them foreign. If it were a weak Assent, they called it Opinion; for they made the Assent voluntary, notwithstanding the Criterion; but if it were a firm and immoveable p. 119Assent, that they called Knowledge and Certainty.

But besides these comprehensive Ideas they did allow of common Notions, Arrian. l. 1. c. 22. l. 3. c 26. Simplic. in Epict. c. 33.which they called foreign, or Anticipations: of which Arrian speaks; and Simplicius saith, they are those wherein all are agreed, and are planted in us by right Reason, and confirmed by Time and Observation.

As to the other Part, they took great pains about the true signification of Words, the rank and order of Things, the nature and kind of Propositions, and the difference of Signs, whereof some were Monitory, and others Demonstrative. And the proving a thing uncertain, by something granted to be certain, was that which they called Demonstration. According to the Principles of the Eleatick School, the most simple and natural Way of reasoning was supposed to be by drawing Consequences upon Suppositions, and the Way the Stoicks took to judge of reasoning, was by judging what approached nearest to the first Principles of reasoning; such as that every thing we talk about either must be or not be; and in such p. 120disjunct Propositions, one Part or other must be taken, and then a Train of Consequences follows.

And Plutarch, no friend to the Stoicks, thinks this faculty of drawing Consequences, lays the best Foundation for Demonstration. For the Principle of it,Plut. de Ei Delph. Simplic. in Epict. c. 58. he saith, is the foreign, the connex Way of reasoning; that is as Simplicius explains it, when two things are so joyned together as antecedent and consequent, that by Position of the Antecedent, the Consequent follows, and by taking away the Consequent, the Antecedent is removed. Thus I have, in as few Words, as I could, laid together those old Methods of Certainty, which have obtained greatest Reputation in the World.

But your Way of Certainty by Ideas is so wholly New, that here we have no general Principles; no Criterion, no Antecedents and Consequents; no Syllogistical Methods of Demonstration; and yet we are told of a better Way of Certainty to be attained, meerly by the help of Ideas. But how comes there to be such a Way of Certainty by Ideas, and yet the Ideas themselves p. 121are so uncertain and obscure? I confess, that the more I look into it, the farther it appears to be from a Way of Certainty to me.Essay, B. 4. ch. 12. Sect. 14. For in your Chapter of the Improvement of Knowledge, you have these Words; for it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas, where they are imperfect, confused or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect, or clear Knowledge. And yet how often do you confess, that our Ideas are imperfect, confused, and obscure? How then is it possible to attain to any Certainty by them? And notwithstanding these plain Words, you assert it over and over in your second Letter, as appears in the Beginning, that you do not place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, (as I observed in the Beginning.) How can these things consist? Can Certainty be had with imperfect and obscure Ideas, and yet no Certainty be had by them? I cannot blame you for finding fault with common Principles of Reason, if both Parts of a Contradiction may be true: But I forbear. However I cannot but join other Words of yours to shew how resolved p. 122you were to be inconsistent with your self:Book 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear or distinct Knowledge; because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure, so far the Mind can never perceive clearly, whether thy agree or disagree.

And yet in the same Place, you say, that our Knowledge consisting in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of any two Ideas, its clearness or obscurity consists in the Clearness or Obscurity of that Perception, and not in the Clearness or Obscurity of the Ideas themselves. How is it possible for us to have a clear Perception of the Agreement of Ideas, if the Ideas themselves be not clear and distinct?

If the Mind can never perceive clearly, the Agreement or Disagreement of obscure and confused Ideas, how can its Knowledge lie in the Perception of that which is not to be perceived?

This is a thing which I cannot make consistent.

But besides, I have another Charge upon your Way of Certainty, viz. that you have no Criterion to distinguish false and doubtfull Ideas from p. 123true and certain; how then can any Man be secure that he is not imposed upon in this Way of Ideas?

The Academicks went too far in the Way to Scepticism, but they differ'd from the Scepticks in two Things. 1. They asserted, that there was no absolute Certainty to be had, which the Scepticks would not. 2. They held a far greater Probability in some things than others, and that Men were bound to follow the greatest Probability in what concern'd their own Welfare: but the Scepticks said, that they would do as others did, or follow Inclination, and the Laws of their Country, but they held no Opinion in their Minds, as they said.

The Academicks went much upon Ideas, or Representations of things to their Minds, but they did not proceed upon every Idea, but they examin'd and weighed all the Circumstances belonging to it, before they allow'd it to prevail upon them to give an Assent as to a greater Probability. Carneades, one of the subtilest of them,Sext. Empiric. advers. Mathem. l. 7. as appears by Sextus Empiricus, distinguished a three-fold Idea.

p. 1241. foreign a probable Idea; which the Academicks called foreign. For, said he, neither that which appears false of it self; nor that which is true, but doth not appear so, can perswade a Man's Mind. And of those things which do appear to be true, some have a very slender Appearance, others have a mighty strong one, and therein he placed his Criterion.

2. foreign, an undistracted Idea; i. e. when no Circumstances disturb or shake the first Impression, so as to make us question the Truth of it; which Sextus Empiricus calls foreign, a Concurrence of Ideas and none disagreeing, and yet he would not allow this to be a Ground of certainty but only of Probability.

3. foreign, a well examin'd Idea, by the best Reason a Man hath and the greatest Application of Mind. And this was the Foundation of the highest Probability a Man's Mind could reach to. Now to apply this to your Case; You tell us of a Way of Certainty by Ideas, and never p. 125offer any such Method for Examining them, as the Academicks required for their Probability. As for instance, Your first Idea which you go upon,Essay, B. 2. ch. 4. is that of Solidity, which, you say, of all others seems the most intimately connected with and essential to Body: And therefore must be of great Moment.Sect. 5. Solidity, you say, consists in Repletion and Resistence; and by this Idea of Solidity the Extension of Body, you say, is distinguished from that of Space; so that of pure Space and Solidity you have clear and distinct Ideas. Now here in the Way of Certainty I have two Questions to ask. 1. How this Idea comes to be clear and distinct to you, when others who go in the same Way of Ideas have quite another Idea of it, and think they have as plain and distinct an Idea that the Extension of Space and Body are the Same? Now, what Criterion is there to come to any Certainty in this Matter? I see none so much as offer'd, but only that they seem to you to be clear and distinct, but to others the contrary. So that here we are at a loss as to any p. 126Certainty in the Way of Ideas. And the blind Man who fansied the Idea of Scarlet to be like the sound of a Trumpet, could hardly be convinced of his Error in the Way of Ideas. This you mention to shew the different Ideas men may fall into; which I think is enough to shew that they have no Way to Certainty in themselves, if it be possible for Men, even for Philosophical and Rational Men, to fall into such contrary Ideas about the same thing; and both sides think their Ideas clear and distinct. 2. But I have another Question to propose; viz. Whether by this Idea of Solidity we may come to know what it is? This is a very reasonable Question in the Way of Certainty, which is to lead us to the certain knowledge of Things. I pray therefore tell me from your Idea, what it is, and wherein it consists? The Question you suppose might be very well asked; and you give a most satisfactory Answer to it. Sect. 6.If any ask me what this Solidity is, I send him to his Senses to inform him. I had thought by the Design of your Book you would have sent him to his p. 127Ideas for Certainty; and are we sent back again from our Ideas to our Senses? What do these Ideas signifie then? But you say farther; That if this be not a sufficient Explication of Solidity, you promise to tell him what it is, when he tells you, what Thinking is, or explains to you what Extension and Motion are. Are we not now in the true Way of Certainty; when such things as these are given over, of which we have the clearest Evidence by Sensation and Reflection? For here you make it as impossible to come to certain, clear and distinct Notions of these things, as to discourse into a blind Man the Ideas of Light and Colours. Is not this a rare way of Certainty?

Thus I have shewed that you have no Security against false and uncertain Ideas, no Criterion to judge them by; no Light into the Nature of Things by them, as will farther appear by what you say of the Ideas of sensible Qualities. To discover, Book II. ch. 8. Sect. 7.say you, the Nature of our Ideas the better, and to discourse of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to distinguish p. 128them, as they are Ideas or Perceptions in our Minds; and as they are Modifications of Matter in the Bodies that cause such Perceptions in us: that so we may not think (as perhaps is usually done) that they are exactly the Images and Resemblances of something inherent in the Subject: most of those of Sensation being in the Mind no more the likeness of something existing without us, than the Names that stand for them are the likeness of our Ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us. Now here again our Ideas deceive us, in the Way of Certainty. We desire to know something of the Nature of those Objects of which we have the Ideas in our Minds, because these we are told, will bring us to a Certainty of Knowledge. Of what? Of what we feel? No certainly, but of that which causes these inward Perceptions. Can we then by these Ideas know the Nature of things without us? No, you say we cannot; for most of those of Sensation are no more the likeness of something without us, than Names are for things which they stand for. So that p. 129these Ideas are really nothing but Names, if they be not Representations of Things; and if they be not, how can we understand Things by them; and if we cannot, what Certainty is attainable by them?

But I will do you no wrong; and therefore I must consider what you say about Demonstration: For it cannot be denied that you own the thing, although you deny it to be ex proecognitis & proeconcessis, B. IV. ch 2. Sect. 8.and say, it is a mistake that they are supposed to be the Foundations of all our Knowledge and Reasonings. We must therefore Examine your Way of Demonstration without Principles.

Certainty, Sect. 12.you say, depends so wholly on Intuition, that in Demonstrative Knowledge, this Intuition is necessary in all the Connexion of the Intermediate Ideas, without which we cannot attain Knowledge or Certainty. By Intuition you mean Self-Evidence. For you say, in this the Mind is at no pains of proving or examining, but perceives the Truth as the Eye doth Light only by being directed towards it. For hence you must suppose Self Evidence p. 130to be in the Ideas of your Mind; and that every Intermediate Idea which you take to demonstrate any thing by, must have a Self-Evident Connexion with the other Idea: which is such a way of Demonstration, as the old Philosophers never thought of. For upon this Ground every Demonstration carries its own Light with it; and can no more be questioned, than whether two and two make four; and I would be glad to see any Demonstration (not about Figures and Numbers) of this kind, which I think is not to be expected in the Way of Ideas. But because in this lies the chief Point as to a Way of Certainty by Ideas, I shall more carefully examine the Grounds you proceed upon, and shew them to be very Insufficient for the purpose you intend them.

Your principal Ground is from Mathematical Demonstrations, and your Examples are brought from them. But his is quite a different Case from yours. For you grant, that those Ideas on which Mathematical Demonstrations proceed, are wholly in the p. 131Mind, and do not relate to the Existence of Things; but our Debate goes upon a Certainty of the Knowledge of Things as really existing; so that, although we should grant all that you say, about the Intuition of Ideas in Mathematical Demonstrations, yet it comes not at all to your Business, unless you can prove that we have as clear and distinct Ideas of Beings, as we have of Numbers and Figures. And yet herein you are not consistent with your self; for you design to prove Demonstrations without General Principles; and yet every one knows, that General Principles are supposed in Mathematicks, and that Person would be thought Ridiculous, who should go about to prove, that General Principles are of little, or of dangerous use in Mathematical Demonstrations. And so in Morality, which you place among the Sciences capable of Demonstration; you confess,B. IV. ch. 3. Sect. 18. That the Way of Demonstration therein is from Principles, as those of the Mathematicks, by necessary Consequences. This is a very intelligible Way of Demonstration: But how then comes it to pass, that in the p. 132Way of Certainty by Ideas as to other Points of Knowledge,Ch. 7. Sect. 10. you deny general Maxims to be the Foundation we are to proceed upon? And the Method you lay down,Sect. 9. is this, that Ideas of particular things are first in the mind, which are first received and distinguished, and so Knowledge got by them; but general Ideas are Fictions and Contrivances of the Mind, Sect. 10.which carry Difficulty with them; but that it is true of our particular distinct Ideas, that they are all known by their Native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no Light, nor are capable of Proof one from another; much less the more particular from the more general, or the more simple from the more compounded, the more simple and less Abstract being the most familiar, and the easier and earlier apprehended. But which ever be the clearest Ideas, the Evidence and Certainty of all such Propositions is in this, that a Man sees the same Idea to be the same Idea, and infallibly perceives two different Ideas to be two different Ideas. For when a Man has in his Vnderstanding the Ideas of One and of Two, the Idea of Yellow and of Blue, he cannot p. 133but certainly know, that this Idea of One is the Idea of One, and not the Idea of Two; and that the Idea of Yellow is the Idea of Yellow, and not of Blue. For a Man cannot confound the Ideas in his Mind, which he has distinct; that would be to have them confused and distinct at the same time, which is a Contradiction: and to have none distinct is to have no use of our Faculties, to have no knowledge at all. And therefore, what Idea soever is affirmed of it self; or whatsoever two entire distinct Ideas are denied one of another, the Mind cannot but assent to such a Proposition, as infallibly true, assoon as it understands the Terms without Hesitation, or need of Proof, or regarding those made in more general Terms, and called Maxims. These are your own Words, which I have set down at large, that you may not complain that I misrepresent your Sense. And if I understand the force of them, you take off the Way of Demonstration from general Principles and Consequences deduced from them, and place it in the Self-evidence of Ideas.

p. 134But that it is impossible to come to a Demonstration about real Beings, in this Way of Intuition of Ideas, I shall now make appear from your self, which will farther discover the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas.

And the Reasons I go upon are these;

1. That you confess, that some of the most obvious Ideas are far from being Self-evident.

2. That there may be contradictory Opinions about some Ideas, which you account most clear and distinct.

3. That granting the Ideas to be true, there is no Self-evidence of the Connexion of them, which is necessary to make a Demonstration.

1. That some of the most obvious Ideas, are far from being Self-evident by your own Confession. Among these you cannot deny those of Matter and Motion, of Time and Duration, and of Light, to be very considerable. But I shall prove from your self, that we can have no Intuition of these things, which are so obvious to us; and consequently can have no Self-evident Ideas of them.

p. 135As to the Idea of Matter: That you tell us,Book 3. ch. 10. Sect. 15. consists in a solid Substance every where the same; and a Body is a solid extended figured Substance.

Now there are two things concerning Matter, which I would be glad to come to a certain Knowledge of. And those are,

1. The Manner of Cohesion of the Parts of Matter, concerning which you have these Words.Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 24. For since no Body is no farther, nor otherwise extended, than by the Vnion and Cohesion of its solid Parts, we shall very ill comprehend the Extension of Body, without understanding, wherein consists the Vnion and Cohesion of its Parts, which seems to me as incomprehensible as the Manner of Thinking, and how it is performed. I would have any one intelligibly explain to me, Sect. 25.how the Parts of Gold or Brass (that but now in fusion were as loose from one another, as the Particles of Water, or the Sands of an Hour-glass) come in a few Moments to be so united, and adhere so strongly one to another, that the utmost force of Men's Arms cannot separate them. A considering Man will I suppose be here at a loss, to p. 136satisfie his own or another Man's Vnderstanding. And can you then imagine that we have Intuition into the Idea of Matter? Or that it is possible to come to a Demonstration about it by the help of any intervening Idea? The Idea of Solidity, or firm Cohesion of Parts cannot be said to come from the Idea of Matter it self, for then there could be no such thing as fluid Matter. Whence then comes the distinction between these Ideas of solid and fluid Matter? That there is such a Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter is evident: now what other Ideas do you compare and connect with this to make it evident, how this Solidity and Matter came to have this Agreement with each other?

Is it by the Density or Compactedness of the Matter in a little Compass? But that is as hard to give an account of; viz. how some Parts of Matter come to take up so much less Room, and to stick closer than others. Is it by bare Rest of the Parts? But how comes the Resistance of solid Bodies to come only from Rest? Is it from the Pressure of the Ambient Air? No you p. 137say,Book 2. ch. 23. Sect. 24. that in Truth the Pressure of an ambient Fluid how great soever, can be no intelligible Cause of the Cohesion of the solid Parts of Matter. So that we are not to look for any thing like a Demonstration of the Cohesion of the Parts of Matter.

2. And as little are we to expect it, as to the Divisibility of it; which was the other thing I hoped to find demonstrated in the Way of Ideas. For you tell us,Ch. 23. Sect. 31. that the Notion of Body is cumbred with some Difficulties which are very hard, and perhaps impossible to be explained, or understood by us. And among these you particularly instance in the Divisibility of Matter; which you say, whether we grant or deny it to be in infinitum, it involves us in Consequences, impossible to be explicated or made consistent. Consequences that carry greater Difficulty, and more apparent Absurdity than any thing can follow from the Notion of an immaterial knowing Substance. So that I think it is vain to expect a Demonstration in the Way of Ideas as to this Matter.

The next is that of Motion. Concerning which you tell us, that the p. 138Definition of the Schools is exquisite Iargon: Book 3. ch. 4. Sect. 8. Sect. 9.That of the Atomists is but putting one Synonymous Word for another; viz. that Motion is a Passage from one Place to another: for Passage may as well be defined a Motion from one Place to another. And the Cartesian Definition, that it is the successive Application of the Parts of the Superficies of one Body to those of another, will not prove a much better Definition of Motion when well examin'd. And what is there so evident as Motion? So that if our Ideas fail us in so plain a Case, what help can we hope from them in things more abstruse and remote from our Senses?

As to Time and Duration, you say, that the Answer of a great Man (to one who asked what Time was,Book 2. ch. 14. Sect. 2. Si non rogas, intelligo, which amounts to this, the more I set my self to consider it, the less I understand it) might perhaps perswade one, that Time, which reveals all other things, is it self not to be discover'd. This shews, that there is no Self-evident Idea of Time. But here you offer to furnish us with as clear and distinct Ideas, as of many other which p. 139are thought much less obscure. However, then it is plain, that we have not the Knowledge by Intuition, but by rational Deduction. For you proceed from the Idea of Succession, Sect. 32.to that of Duration; by observing a Distance in the Parts of Succession; and then from observing Periodical Motions, we get Ideas of the Measures of Duration, as Minutes, Hours, Days, Years, &c. From hence we proceed to imagine Duration not yet come; and such to which we can always add; from which comes the Idea of Eternity: and by considering any Part of Duration with Periodical Measures, we come to the Idea of what we call Time in general. So that the Idea of Time in general is so far from being known by Intuition, that many Steps are to be taken in order to it; and some such as one would hardly have thought of. As how the Idea of Succession should arise from a Train of Ideas in our Minds: Sect. 4.You say it is, because we have no Perception of Duration, but by considering the Train of Ideas, that take their Turns in our Vnderstandings.

What think you of those People that fail'd not in reckoning the Succession p. 140of Time right for many Years together by Knots, and Notches on Sticks, and Figures, without ever so much as thinking of Ideas, or any thing like them? But besides, such Arbitrary Measures of Time, what need any Recourse to Ideas, when the Returns of Days and Months and Years by the Planetary Motions, are so easie and so universal? If a Man hath no Perception of Duration when he sleeps, yet the Time runs on, and Nights have as much their share in Succession as Days have. And although, you say, it seems very clear to you, that Men derive their Ideas of Duration from their Reflection on the Train of the Ideas they observe to succeed one another, yet I think the contrary so clear, that Men may have a clear Idea of Succession without it, that I rather wonder how you came to think of this Way. But it is sufficient to my purpose, that you could never know this Idea of Time by Self-evidence.

The last I shall mention is Light, and one would think, if any Idea be Self-evident, it should be that. But p. 141let us see what you say about it; you explode the Peripatetick Definition of it as unintelligible; Book 3. ch. 4. Sect. 10.and the Cartesian you allow to be but little better. For when they make it to be a Number of little Globules striking briskly on the bottom of the Eye, you say, to a Man that understands it not before, these Words would make the Idea of Light no more known to him, than if one should tell him, that Light was nothing but a Company of little Tennis-balls, which Fairies all day long strook with Rackets against some Men's Foreheads while they pass by others. And is this a Self-evident Idea of Light? Thus we have seen what Account your self have given of these Self-evident Ideas, which are the ground Work of Demonstration.

2. But suppose an Idea happen to be thought by some to be clear and distinct, and others should think the contrary to be so, what hopes of Demonstration by clear and distinct Ideas then? As suppose a Man entertain Des Cartes his Idea of Space, as the same with Body, or extended Matter, which he affirms to be clear and distinct; the p. 142Consequence from hence is, as your self confess,Book 4. ch. 7. Sect. 12. that he may from thence demonstrate that there can be no Vacuum: but again, let us suppose another to have a clear and distinct Idea of Space from Body, this Man, you say, may demonstrate as easily that there may be a Vacuum, or Space without a Body, as Des Cartes demonstrated the Contrary. Say you so? What! Demonstrations on both sides, and in the Way of Ideas too? This is extraordinary indeed. But if we may be allow'd the Use of common Principles, we may be sure, that both Parts of a Contradiction cannot be true, and therefore there must be a fundamental Mistake some where. You say, it is in wrong Application of that general Maxim, What is, is. But there is no fault in the Principle, which is the true meaning of the other; that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be, which undoubtedly holds true; but it is in supposing the Reality of the thing to be according to what you call a clear and distinct Idea. So that the general Principles of Reason stand firm and good; but your p. 143Self-evidence of clear and distinct Ideas is such a Principle, we see, as serves for Demonstrations of both Parts of a Contradiction.

3. But granting the Ideas to be true, yet when their Connexion is not Self-evident, then an intermediate Idea must complete the Demonstration. But how doth it appear that this middle Idea is Self-evidently connected with them?Book 4. ch. 2. Sect. 7. For you say, if that intermediate Idea be not known by Intuition, that must need a Proof; and so there can be no Demonstration. Which I am very apt to believe in this Way of Ideas; unless these Ideas get more light by being put between two others. This will best appear by a remarkable Instance already mention'd, viz. in the Ideas of Space and Body; the Question supposed is, whether they be the same or not; some we see affirm it, and others deny it. So that here we must use an intermediate Idea, and that is of Motion, and we are to consider whether this hath a Self-evident Connexion, with the other Ideas? The Motion of Bodies, you say,Essay, B. 2. ch. 13. Sect. 22. that are in our view and neighbourhood, p. 144seems to you plainly to evince a Vacuum. But how? Is it by Intuition or Self-evidence? No, you do not pretend to it. But by Reason: Because there must be a void Space equal to the Bulk of that Body, which moves within the Bounds of such a Superficies. And if there be a Space without Body there must be a Vacuum. But Gassendus attempted to prove Motion impossible, if there were no Vacuum: For every Body must go into the Place of another, and so in insinitum; which he said was ridiculous and impossible.

The Cartesians answer'd, that the Motion was Circular. Gassendus urged, that still it was impossible: For suppose A the first Body, and X the last; A cannot move, unless X can be moved: but X cannot move, because the Place is filled with A.

The Cartesians say, this proves nothing, because in the same instant, that X goes into the Places of A, that gives way.Joh. Bapt. Morini Dissert. de Atomis & vacuo, p. 14. Ioh. Bapt. Morinus (Professor of the Mathematicks at Paris, at the same time with Gassendus) answers to Gassendus his Argument, that p. 145the Separation of two Bodies and Succession are at the same time; and so there can be no Vacuum.

Bernier defends Gassendus his Argument,Bernier Favilla Ridiculi Muris, p. 99. and saith, that no Motion can begin without a Vacuum; but other Philosophers and Mathematicians as stifly deny it. And is it possible to imagine, that there should be a Self-evident Connexion of Ideas in this Case?

But what hath Reason now to do in this Way of Intuition? Yes, say you, Reason is to discover the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas. Sect. 2.But this is nothing but an imploying the Faculty of Reason in such a manner: And so in the Beginning of your Chapter of Reason, Ch. 17. Sect. …you tell us, that it is sometimes taken for true and clear Principles, and sometimes for clear and fair Deductions from those Principles; but you take it for a saculty in Man. But why, in a Chapter of Reason, are the other two Senses neglected? We might have expected here full Satisfaction as to the Principles of Reason as distinct from the faculty, but you wholly avoid it;Sect. 2. and only shew how it is used in finding out the certain Connexion of Ideas p. 146in Demonstration; and the probable Connexion in other things. So that the Difference lies between us, as to this Matter of Reason, in these two things.

(1.) You affirm, that general Principles and Maxims of Reason are of little, or no Vse; I say that they are of very great use, and the only proper Foundations of Certainty.

(2.) You say, that Demonstration is by Way of Intuition of Ideas, and that Reason is only the faculty imploy'd in discovering and comparing Ideas with themselves, or with others intervening; and that this is the only Way of Certainty.

I affirm, and have proved, that there can be no Demonstration by Intuition of Ideas; but that all the Certainty we can attain to, is from general Principles of Reason, and necessary Deductions made from them.

But before I conclude this Discourse, I must observe that you prove that Demonstration must be by Intuition, in an extraordinary Manner, from the sense of the Word. For you say, it is called Demonstration, Essay, B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 3.it being shewn to the Vnderstanding, and the Mind made see, that it is so. I have told p. 147you formerly, how very uncertain a Way of Arguing it is, which is taken from the Original signification of Words; and if it would hold in this Case, it would be most proper for Ocular Demonstrations, or by the Finger. But in the Philosophical sense of the Word, Demonstration was never taken for Intuition, or the knowing of a thing by its Self-evidence. But you assert the Necessity of intuitive Knowledge, Sect. 7, 8.in every Step of a Demonstration. Whereas,Aristot. Metaph. l. 4. c. 4. Aristotle saith, things that are Self-evident cannot be demonstrated; and that it is Weakness and Folly not to know what things are capable of Demonstration, and what not.

It seems there were some Philosophers, who would have first Principles demonstrated; This, saith Aristotle cannot be done without running in infinitum, which is absurd. Whence it is plain, that Demonstration was supposed to lie in some antecedent Proof; and where any thing was Self-evident it was absurd to look for it: So that the Way of Intuition and Demonstration, were thought inconsistent. For what a Man sees by its own Light, he p. 148needs no Proof of. But you say, that in a Demonstration the intervenient Ideas are called Proofs; Sect. 3.and where by the help of these the Agreement or Disagreement is plainly perceived, that is Demonstration: Sect. 7.And that in every step there is an intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement or Disagreement it seeks with the next intermediate Idea, which it uses as a Proof; for, if it were not so, that would need a Proof. So that according to your Method of Demonstration, that which is used as a Proof must need no Proof, but must be known by immediate Intuition. Of which kind of Demonstration, I would fain see any one instance in the Knowledge of Things, and not in abstracted and mathematical Demonstrations. For it may be, it hath been the occasion of some great Mistakes in the Philosophy of this Age, that ingenious and mathematical Men have labour'd so much to accommodate the Principles of that Science to the Nature of material Things; of which we have a remarkable Instance in the System of Des Cartes. And supposing we could come to a Certainty about the Nature and p. 149Tendency of Bodies here within our Reach, (I mean with respect to the Earth) I do not know, how far the greatest Mathematician can proceed in making Demonstrations as to the Nature and Tendency of those Bodies which are so much out of our Reach, as the Heavenly Bodies are, both in themselves and with respect to one another. For, if the Phaenomena depend upon a force given them by the Great and Wise Creator, how can we know in what Manner or Degree that force is given to Bodies at such a wonderfull Distance from us, as the fixed Stars are? For, if God can alter the Laws of Motion in another System, as it is not denied; how can we be Mathematically certain, that the Laws of Motion in Bodies, so much above us, are the very same that we find them here? I do not by any means take off from the laudable Endeavours of those who have gone about to reduce natural Speculations to mathematical Certainty: but I mention it to shew, that it is a very easie way for thinking Men to deceive themselves, in talking so much of p. 150demonstrative Certainty about natural Things, when all their Instances are brought from Mathematical Demonstrations. Aristotle, Arist. de Part. Anim. l. 1. c. 1.whom I cannot despise so much as some do (I do not say for want of reading him) hath a Discourse on purpose in the Beginning of his Books of Animals, in what way natural Things are to be handled; and he saith, there are two ways. 1. By way of Science. 2. By way of Instruction, which must be suitable to the Nature of the things. So that in natural History he saith, there must be certain bounds set for Enquiry, without proceeding to strict Demonstration. And, saith he, the Manner of Demonstration as to natural Things, is different from what it is in speculative or mathematical Things. In another Place he laments the want of Experiments as to natural History, (although he made far more than any before him, and was better able to do it by the plentifull Assistance of Philip and Alexander, while he lived at Court) and he looks on that as the best way of satisfying our Reason about such things; … Gen. A… l. 3. c. 10.and our Reasons, saith he, are then good, when they agree with the Phaenomena.

p. 151And he was so far from thinking he had made Demonstrations in Physicks, that in one Place he saith,De Meteor. l. 1. c. 7. that in things not evident to Sense, he thought it sufficient to shew the Possibility of it; and therefore he ought not to be run down for his Modesty; however his physical Notions fall far short of Demonstrations.

In his Morals, Moral. Magn. l. 1. c. 1.he saith, all Principles must be suitable to the Nature of the Science; for it would be absurd for a Man to go about to prove the three Angles of a Triangle, equal to two right Angles; and take this for his Principle, That the Soul is immortal. For the Proof must be proper and connected with it. And from hence he excludes Plato's Idea, from being a Principle in Morals.

In his Eudemia, Eudem. l 1. c. 6.the Way of Proceeding in Morals, he saith, is by Reasons, Testimonies, and Examples; and he looks on it as great want of Iudgment for Men not to consider what Reasons are proper for every Science. So that according to him, Morality is not uncapable of Demonstration; so it be upon Moral Principles: For that he lays p. 152down in the Beginning of his Ethicks, and afterwards that the same Exactness is not to be required in all sorts of Reasoning: Ethic ad Nicom l. 1. c. 1, 7. l. 2. c. 2.but that it ought to be suitable to the Matter it is about. foreign.

If therefore the Principles in Morality be clear and proper, and the Deductions be plain and natural, I do not see, but that it is as capable of Demonstration as any other Science; if Men were as willing to be convinced in Morals, as they are in Mathematicks. And therein I fully agree with you: But the Way of Demonstration by Ideas will not do, either there or any where else. I mean by this intuitive Knowledge in every Step of the Demonstration: when the intervening Ideas are far from being capable of this intuitive Certainty.

And as to your Argument from the Notation of the Word, it is certain, that after the Philosophical Use of it, it signified no more among some Philosophers, than the Conclusion of an Argument; whereby we are brought from something we did perceive, to somethiug we did not.

p. 153Not by Way of Intuition, but by a Deduction of Reason. Itaque Argumenti Conclusio quae est Graecè foreign ità definitur; Ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit. Cicero in Lucullo, c. 8. foreign, Plato in Phaedro. V. Dialect. Ciceron. Adam Bu…sii, l. 6. c. 10.And Plato makes use of the Word Demonstration in his Phoedrus, for such a Reason which wise Men would believe, and others would not. But there could be no intuitive Certainty in such a Demonstration.

I have been longer a clearing this Matter than I thought I should have been; but it is the main Point as to Certainty by Ideas, and what remains will admit of an easier Dispatch. I now return to the Difference between Nature and Person; and I shall only single out what is material and pertinent; and now leave the interlocutory Gentlemen to maintain their Conversation by themselves.

I had said in my Vindication,

That Nature may be consider'd two Ways. (1.) As it is in distinct Individuals. (2.) Abstractly without respect to individual Persons.

(1.) As it is in distinct Individuals, as the Nature of a Man is equally p. 154in Peter, Iames and Iohn, and this is the common Nature with a particular Subsistence belonging to each of them. For the Nature of Man, as in Peter, is distinct from the same Nature, as it is in Iames and Iohn; otherwise they would be but one Person, as well as have the same Nature.

Which to my understanding is plain and clear Reason. And if so, then here we have an Identity of Nature, and a Distinction of Persons in the same Nature.

But to this you object these three Things:

P. 127.(1.) That you cannot put together one and the same, and distinct; and consequently there is no Foundation for the Distinction of Nature and Person.

P. 131, 132.134.138, &c.(2.) That what I say about common Nature, and particular Subsistence and Individuals, is wholly unintelligible to you and your Friends.

P. 154.(3.) That to speak truly and precisely of this Matter, as in reality it is, there is no such thing as one common Nature in several Individuals; for all that is Truth in them is particular, and can be nothing but particular. But the p. 155meaning is, that every particular individual Man or Horse, &c. has such a Nature or Constitution as agrees, and is conformable to that Idea which that general Name stands for.

This is the Substance of what I can gather out of your Discourse in several Pages, but as to the general Reflections I pass them over, having no other Design, but to set Truth in as good a Light as I can. And if I have the Misfortune not to be understood, I cannot help it; I wish it were in my Power to help other Men's Capacities as well as to help my own.

But you say,P. 144. the Notionists and Ideists, (as they are called) seem to have their apprehensive Faculties very differently turned? I do not think, that there is any different Turn in their Faculties; but there may be a very wrong Turn in the Method of Reasoning in those, who go in this Way of Ideas, from what there is in those who pursue the general Principles of Reason, and from thence draw particular Conclusions.

If any Man takes it for granted, that your Way of Ideas is the only Way to p. 156Certainty (and he must take it for granted, if he will believe it) then I cannot see how he can apprehend one and the same common Nature in different Persons or Individuals, because all his Ideas are taken from Particulars; and therefore a common Nature is no more but one common Name; and every Individual is consider'd as ranked under those Names. But herein lies the fundamental Mistake, that you presume that we are not to judge of things by the general Principles of Reason, but by particular Ideas. For if Men set aside this new Way of Judging only by these Ideas; things would appear in another Light to them: But I find it is to very little purpose to argue with such Men, who are resolved to stick to this Way of Ideas; For they can apprehend nothing but just in their own Way. And let us say what we will, it is jargon, and unintelligible to them; although very rational Men have said the same things that we do, and have been thought by the rest of Mankind to have spoken intelligibly. But now it seems nothing is intelligible, but what p. 157suits with this new Way of Ideas, however repugnant it be to the common Principles of Reason; which must be the Standard to Mankind, whatever becomes of this Way of Ideas.

And therefore in this Debate, I shall proceed upon these Principles of Reason, which have been receiv'd among Mankind; and from them I hope to make it appear, that the Difference of Nature and Person is not imaginary and fictitious, but grounded upon the real Nature of things.

The Principles of Reason, which I go upon are these;

1. That Nothing hath no Properties.

2. That all Properties being only Modes or Accidents must have a real Subject to subsist in.

3. That Properties essentially different, must subsist in different Essences.

4. That where there is an Agreement in essential Properties and a Difference in Individual, there must be both an Identity and Diversity in several Respects.

p. 158Now upon these Principles I build my Assertion, that there is one real and common Nature or Essence in Mankind, and a Difference of Persons in the several Individuals. For, that there are such essential Properties in Mankind which are not in Brutes, I suppose you will not deny. Now these essential Properties must subsist somewhere; For Nothing can have no Properties, and these Properties cannot subsist (where Individuals are multiplied) in any one Individual: For that is to exclude all the rest from the essential Properties which belong to them; and if they have them in common, there must be some common Subject wherein they subsist, and that can be nothing but the common Essence of Mankind. For the Essence of Brutes or Plants have them not; and therefore these Essences must be really different from one another.

But because Individuals of the same kind, have something to distinguish, as well as to unite them, therefore there must be a different Subsistence in every Individual: and so one and the same, and yet distinct, may very p. 159easily and intelligibly consist together.

But you say,P. 131. I have not told you what Nature is; I think my Discourse sufficiently shew'd it, if you had a mind to understand it; for you could not but see that I meant the Subject of the essential Properties, whether you call it Nature, Substance, or Essence. Your Objection about Nature and Substance being of equal Extent, I hope, I have sufficiently removed in the foregoing Discourse.

You tell me,P. 132. that it is more than you know, that the Nature of a Man is equal in Peter, James and John. I am sorry for it. For I thought you had Ideas of particular Substances. But they may be Drills or Horses for any thing you know. I am again sorry, that you know particular Men no better; but that for ought you know, they may be Drills or Horses.

But you know a Horse that was called Peter,P. 133. and you do not know but the Master of the same Team might call other of his Horses, James and John. Suppose all this. And could you not in the Way of Ideas distinguish them from p. 160those of your Acquaintance who had the same Names? I confess, this tempts me to think that Ideists (as you call them) have a particular Turn of their understandings about these Matters. For I cannot but think, that those who were not very rational Men, might understand the Difference between Men and Horses; without being told, that although Horses might be called by their Names; yet that these were real Men, and their Constitution and Nature was conformable to that Idea, which the general Name Man stands for. But this is no more than to say, that he that has the Nature of a Man is a Man, or what has the Nature of a Drill is a Drill; and what has the Nature of a Horse is a Horse; whether it be called Peter, or not called Peter. If this were really the Discourse of your Friends in private Conversation, you have been very obliging to them to publish it to the World: For Mankind are not so stupid, as not to know a Man from a Horse or a Drill, but only by the Specifick Name of Man. You may have a Horse called Peter if you please, and another Iames, and p. 161a third Iohn; but for all that, there is no one that hath the Understanding of a Man, but will be able without your Specifick Names to tell the Difference of your Horse Peter from your Man Peter; and call them by what Names you please the Difference will not depend upon them, but upon the Essential Properties which belong to them; and so it will be owned by all that have not this New turn of their Vnderstandings. But I plainly see, that a new Notion when it hath got deep into a Man's Head doth give a strange Turn to his Understanding; so that he cannot see that, which every one else can, that hath not the same Tincture upon his Mind. And I remember an Observation of yours,B. II. ch 11. Sect. 13. How dangerous it is to a Man's Reason to fix his Fancy long upon one sort of Thoughts. These Ideas are a very odd sort of Spectacles to our Understandings, if they make them see and understand less, than People of very, ordinary Capacities do. For even the Man who had the Horse with the Name Peter, and might have others by the Names of James and John, would not a little wonder at a grave Philosopher that should seriously say to p. 162him; You see, Friend, that your Horses have the Names of Men, how do you know but that they are Men? Know, saith the Country-man, I hope you are wiser than to ask me such a Question? Or what do you take me for, if I cannot tell the Difference of Men from Horses whatever Names they have. Do not tell me of your Specifick Names, and Conformity to your Ideas, I know well enough the Difference between my Horse Peter and my Man Peter without such Gibberish. My Man Peter and I can sit and chop Logick together, about our Country Affairs, and he can Write and Read, and he is a very sharp Fellow at a Bargain; but my Horse Peter can do none of these things, and I never could find any thing like Reason in him, and do you think I do not know the Difference between a Man and a Beast? I pursue this no farther lest the Country-man should be too rude to the Gentlemen, with whom you had this Learned Conversation, about the Difference of Men, and Horses, and Drills.

But you or your Friend, or both,p. 114. are very hard set again about a Common Nature p. 163with a particular Subsistence proper to each Person. For such is your Misfortune, you say,p. 121. that for your Life you cannot find it out. This is a hard Case; before, for your Life you could not understand Nature and Substance to be the same; and now again, for your Life you cannot find out this. Where lies the monstrous Difficulty of it? You say, You repeated, and this twenty times to your self; and your weak Vnderstanding always Rejolts. At what? My Words are, Nature may be considered, as it is in distinct Individuals, as the Nature of Man is equally in Peter, Iames and Iohn. And this is the common Nature with a particular Subsistence proper to each of them.

You say, p. 135.That the Nature of Man in Peter is the Nature of a Man, if Peter be supposed to be a Man, but if it be the Name of a Horse, your Knowledge vanishes. Cannot you, for your Life, know the Difference between a Man and a Horse, by their Essential Properties, whatever their Names be? If so, there is a greater turn of Mens Vnderstandings, than I imagined. But again say you, Let it be impossible to give that Name to p. 164a Horse (who ever said or thought so?) yet you cannot understand these Words, the common Nature of a Man is in Peter; for whatsoever is in Peter exists in Peter; and whatever exists in Peter is particular; but the common Nature of Man is the general Nature of Man, or else you understand not what is meant by Common Nature; and it confounds your Vnderstanding to make a General a Particular.

To this I answer, That the Common Nature of Man may be taken two ways. In the way of Ideas, and in the way of Reason. In your way of Ideas it is not at all to be wondered at, that you cannot understand such a Common Nature, as I spake of, which subsists in several Persons, because you say, You can have no Ideas of Real Substances but such as are Particular; all others are only Abstract Ideas, and made only by the Act of the Mind. But I say, That in the Way of Reason you may come to a better understanding of this Matter. Which is by considering the Nature of Beings, and the Causes of the Differences amongst the several kinds of them. I had told you before,Answ to Lett. l. p. 110. in my Answer to your first Letter, that we are to consider p. 165Beings as God hath ordered them in their several Sorts and Ranks, and that he hath distinguished them by Essential Properties from each other, as appears by Mankind, and Brutes, and Plants: And that although the Individuals of the several kinds agree in Essential Properties, yet there is a real Difference between them in several Accidents that belong to them, as to Time, Place, Qualities, Relations, &c. Now that wherein they agree is the Common Nature; and that wherein they differ, is the Particular Subsistence. And if this be so hard to be understood, why was it not answered here in the proper place for it? is not that a Real Nature that is the Subject of Real Properties? Is not that Nature really in all those who have the same Essential Properties? And therefore the Common Nature of Man must exist in Peter, because he is a Man, and so in Iames and Iohn: and yet every one of these is so distinguished from the other, that we may justly say he hath a Particular Subsistence with that Common Nature. And this is no making a General a Particular; but distinguishing one from the other, which is a Distinction p. 166so easie and necessary, that I cannot but wonder at those who say, that for their Lives they cannot find it out.

I had said, For the Nature of Man as in Peter, is distinct from that same Nature, as it is in Iames and Iohn, otherwise they would be but One Person as well as One Nature. And what Reply is made to this?p. 137. You cannot understand what this is a Proof of. It is plain that I meant it of a Particular Subsistence; and if you cannot for your Life understand such easie things, how can I for my Life help it? Read the Words over again which are before them, and join them together. And this is the Common Nature with a Particular Subsistence proper to each of them; for the Nature of Man as in Peter is distinct from that same Nature as it is in Iames and Iohn. But I am really ashamed to be put to explain such things; I hope Ideas do not give another Turn to Common Sense.p. 138. But you say, That otherwise they could not be three Persons, is to prove it by a Proposition unintelligible to you, because you do not yet apprehend what a Person is. Of that in its p. 167proper place. These Words of mine follow, And this Distinction of Persons in them, is discerned both by our Senses as to their different Accidents, and by our Reason because they have a separate Existence, not coming into it at once and in the same manner. And is this unintelligible too?p. 140. You say, It will hold as well for three Physical Atoms, which are three distinct Individuals, and have three distinct Natures in them, as certainly as three distinct Men. But are three Atoms as much three Persons as three Men? But you cannot discern the distinction by our Senses as to their Accidents, nor by your Reason as to separate Existence, because God might create them at once. Therefore we cannot distinguish three Humane Persons that way? In this Reasoning in the Way of Ideas? Or in any Way?

Suppose we put the Common Nature of an Animal for the Common Nature of Man. p. 141.What follows? Therefore three Animals are three distinct Persons, as well as three Men? I thought there was some cause for your Disliking the Common Principles and Methods of Reasoning. I am forced to give but short touches at p. 168such things, which I cannot answer more largely, without being thought to make Marks of Distinction.

Come we now therefore to the Second Sense of Nature, as it is taken abstractly without Respect to Individual Persons; and then I said, it makes an entire Notion of it self. For however the same Nature may be in different Individuals, yet the Nature in it self remains one and the same; which appears from this evident Reason, that otherwise every Individual must make a different kind.

Is this to be understood any better? No. An entire Notion of it self is an Expression never met with before. p. 144.An entire Idea of it self had been very plain and easie; but this is not to talk with Men in their own Dialect. But if we put it so, the Difficulty remains. What Difficulty? It then makes no more an entire Notion than the Nature of Peter. Is it not the same Nature considered as common to all Individuals, distinct from that Nature as in Peter? I wish among all the Ways of inlarging Knowledge, you could think of some new Way of conveying Notions into Mens Minds, p. 169for I find your Way of Ideas will never do it. For you cannot be brought one step beyond the first Cast of Ideas. And you will not allow, that which I give for an Evident Reason,p. 146. to prove any thing towards clear Apprehensions of one Common Nature. But if Nature be one and the same in different Individuals, then there must be one Common Nature, which makes an entire Notion of it self: If it be not one and the same, then every Individual must make a Distinct Kind? Can any thing be more evident? But you give one common Answer;p. 147. I understand not any thing that is meant in this whole Paragraph, as to the right Apprehension of one Common Nature. And so I am very well content to leave it to the Reader's Understanding.

And now I come at last to the Idea of a Person. And here I am glad to find something you do understand: Which is great News.p. 149. This, say you, I understand very well, that supposing Peter, James and John to be all three Men, and Man being a Name for one Kind of Animals, they are all of the same Kind. Do you mean that they have the same common Essence, p. 170or have only the same common Name? If you mean the former, there must be a common Nature; if only the latter, that cannot make them of the same Kind. For Kind signifies nothing but a meer Name without it. If it be asked you, whether Men and Drills be of the same Kind or not? Could you give no other Answer, but that the Specifick Name Man stands for one sort, and the Specifick Name Drill for the other; and therefore they are not of the same Kind? Are those Names arbitrary, or are they founded on real and distinct Properties? If they be arbitrary, they have no other Difference, but what a Dictionary gives them. If they are founded on real and distinct Properties, then there must be a real Difference of Kinds founded in Nature; which is as much as I desire. But to go on. You understand too very well, that Peter is not James, and James is not John, but that there is a Difference in these Individuals. You understand also, that they may be distinguished from each other by our Senses, as to different Features and Distance of Place, &c. But what follows, you say, You do not understand, viz. that supposing there were no such external p. 171Difference, yet there is a Difference between them as Individuals of the same Nature. For all that this comes to, as far as you can understand, is that the Ground of the Distinction between several Individuals in the same common Nature is that they are several Individuals in the same common Nature. P. 152.You understand, it seems, that they are several Individuals, that Peter is not James, and James is not John; and the Question is, what this Distinction is founded upon? Whether upon our observing the Difference of Features, Distance of Place, &c. or on some antecedent Ground? I affirm, that there is a Ground of the Distinction of Individuals antecedent to such accidental Differences as are liable to our Observation by our Senses.

And the Ground I go upon is this, that the true Reason of Identity in Man is the vital Union of Soul and Body: And since every Man hath a different Soul united to different Particles of Matter, there must be a real Distinction between them, without any respect to what is accidental to them. For, if Peter have a Soul and Body different from Iames, and Iames from Iohn, they must p. 172have different Principles of Individuation, without any respect to Features or Place, &c.

P. 149.You say, You cannot suppose a Contradiction, viz. that there is no difference of Place between them. But that is not the Point, whether when we consider them with respect to Place, there can be such a thing as Identity of Place to two different Bodies? But whether we cannot consider two several Individuals of Mankind without particular Regard to Place? Which I say, we may, and for this Reason; because Relation to Place, is an external Difference, but the real Distinction of Individuals doth not relate to any Accident of the Body; because the Individual consists of the Union of Soul and Body; and you cannot judge of the Existence of the Soul by the Place of the Body. You say, that when we see any thing to be in any place in any instant of Time, Essay, B. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 1.we are sure (be it what it will) that it is that very thing, and not another which at that Time exists in another Place, how like and undistinguishing soever it may be in all other Respects. And in this consists Identity. But I think the Identity of Man depends p. 173neither upon the Notion of Place for his Body; nor upon the Soul consider'd by it self, but upon both these, as actually united and making one Person. Which to me seems so clear and intelligible, that I can imagine no Objection against it. I am certain, you produce none.

My next Words are, And here lies the true Idea of a Person, which arises from that Manner of Subsistence, which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another.

In your Answer to this, I pass over the trifling Exceptions,P. 155. about the Dissyllable Person, and the true Idea and Signification of the articulate Sound; and about here and herein, &c. being resolved to keep to what appears material. And the only thing of that kind is,P. 156. that according to my Sense of Person, it will as well agree to Bucephalus as to Alexander; and the Difference will be as great, between Bucephalus and Podargus, as between Alexander and Hector, all being several Individuals in the same common Nature: but for your Part you cannot understand that Bucephalus and Podargus are Persons in the true signification of the p. 174Word Person in the English Tongue. And whoever desired you should? For I expresly say, that a Person is a compleat intelligent Substance, with a peculiar Manner of Subsistence. And again, For a Person relates to something which doth distinguish it from another intelligent Substance in the same Nature. So that it is impossible to apply my Notion of Person to any irrational Creatures, although they be Bucephalus and Podargus: And I think a Man must strain hard to make such Objections, so directly against that Idea of a Person which I set down. And it is very easie to understand the Difference between a Distinction of Individuals as such, and of intelligent Individuals, and that Manner of Subsistence in them, which makes them distinct Persons.

P. 159.But you say, that I affirm, that an individual intelligent Substance is rather supposed to the making of a Person, than the proper Definition of it; and yet afterwards I make it to be the Definition of a Person, that it is a compleat intelligent Substance.

To this I answer, That in the former Place I give an Account of the Reason p. 175of Personality, which I say lies in the Manner of Subsistence, and not in the intelligent individual Substance; which is rather supposed to the making of a Person: For that which critically distinguishes the Person is the Reason of Personality; but when we come to give a common Definition of it, there is no such Necessity of insisting upon the Reason of the Difference, but upon the common Acception of it Person. And upon that Account I call it a complete intelligent Substance, because, although the Soul be so in it self; yet we take Person with Relation to Soul and Body united together. And so the Identity of Person must take in both, not only here, but at the Resurrection.

And thus I have gone through all that I could find, that seem'd material in the Dialogue between you and your Friends as to this Subject, and I assure you, I have omitted nothing which I apprehended had any Appearance of Difficulty in it. And I find not the least Reason to be unsatisfied in the Account I had given of the Difference of Nature and Person: but I still think that it doth tend very much to the right Apprehension p. 176of the Doctrine of the Trinity; as I hope doth farther appear by the foregoing Discourse.

And now to come to a Conclusion of this whole Debate. (For I intend not to draw this Saw any longer: having done as much as I think sitting for my self to do.)

I saw no Necessity of writing again for my own Vindication as to your first Charge, which I was contended to leave to the Reader's Judgment. But in the Conclusion of my former Answer, I had said, That as you had stated your Notion of Ideas, it may be of dangerous Consequence to that Article of the Christian Faith, which I endeavour'd to defend.P. 57. This you call a new Charge against your Book; and you complain, that I do not specifie the Particulars, 59.wherein I apprehend it may be of such dangerous Consequence; and you blame me for this saying, 84.without shewing that it is so: 85.and that all the Reason I give is, that it is made use of by ill Men to do mischief: 57.that when I say, it may be, it shews only an Inclination to accuse, 84and proves nothing: 85.that Danger may be apprehended where no Danger is; that if p. 177any thing must be laid aside, because it may be ill used, you do not know what will be innocent enough to be kept: and lastly, that the Imputation of a Tendency to Scepticism, 17….and to the overthrowing any Article of the Christian Faith are no small Charge;171. and that you cannot see any Argument I have brought, that your Notion of Ideas tends to Scepticism. These things laid together, made me think it necessary to do that which I was unwilling … do, till you had driven me to it; which was to shew, the Reasons I had, why I look'd on your Notion of Ideas, and of Certainty by them, as inconsistent with it self, and with some important Articles of the Christian Faith.

What I have now done, I thought it my Duty to do, not with respect to my self, but to some of the Mysteries of our Faith; which I do not charge you with opposing, but with laying such Foundations as do tend to the Overthrow of them; of which we have had too much Experience already; and may have more, if your Way of Certainty by Ideas should obtain. Which I cannot think it will among such as are capable, and willing, to judge impartially. I have p. 178now done with this Matter: And as some may think it the first Part of Wisdom not to begin in such Disputes (and I am of their Mind if they did not touch the Christian Faith) so they cannot but judge it the next (as I do) to know when to make an End.

I am, Sir, Your faithfull Friend, and Servant, Ed. Wigorn. Sept. 22. 1697.

FINIS.