Answer to Lockes Second Letter, Text (1 of 3)

Answer to Lockes Second Letter · Text (1 of 3)

p. 3THE Bishop of Worcester's ANSWER TO Mr. Locke's Second Letter, &c.

SIR,

I Was not a little surpriz'd at the length of your Second Letter, considering the shortness of the Answer contained in it: But it put me in mind of the Springs of Modená mention'd by Ramazzini, which rise up with such a plenty of Water upon opening a Passage, that the Undertaker is afraid of being overwhelm'd by it. I see how dangerous it is to give occasion to a Person of such a fruitfull Invention to write; for Letters become Books, and small Books will soon rise to great Volumes, p. 4if no way be found to give a Check to such an Ebullition of Thoughts, as some Men find within themselves. I was apt to think the best way were, to let Nature spend it self; and although those who write out of their own Thoughts do it with as much Ease and Pleasure as a Spider spins his Web; yet the World soon grows weary of Controversies, especially when they are about Personal Matters: Which made me wonder that one who understands the World so well, should spend above fifty Pages of a Letter in renewing and enlarging a Complaint wholly concerning himself. Suppose I had born a little too hard upon you in joyning your Words and anothers Intentions together; had it not been an easie and effectual way of clearing your self, to have declared to the World, that you owned the Doctrine of the Trinity, as it hath been Received in the Christian Church, and is by ours in the Creeds and Articles of Religion? This had stopt the Mouths of the Clamorous, and had removed the Suspicions of the Doubtfull, and would have given full Satisfaction to all reasonable Men. But when you so carefully avoid doing this, all other Arts and Evasions do but leave the Matter more suspicious among the p. 5most Intelligent and Impartial Readers. This I mention, not that you need be afraid of the Inquisition, or that I intend to charge you with Heresie in denying the Trinity; but my present Design is to shew, That your Mind is so intangled and set fast by your Notion of Ideas, that you know not what to make of the Doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation; because you can have no Idea of One Nature and three Persons, nor of two Natures and one Person; as will fully appear afterwards. And therefore, out of regard to Publick Service, in order to the preventing a growing Mischief, I shall endeavour to lay open the ill Consequences of your Way of Ideas with respect to the Articles of the Christian Faith.

But I shall wave all unnecessary Repetitions, and come immediately to the Matter of your Complaint as it is renewed in this Second Letter, which I shall briefly answer, before I proceed to that which I chiefly design. Your Complaint, you say,2d. Letter▪ p. 2. was, That you were brought into a Controversie wherein you had never meddled, nor knew how you came to be concerned in. I told you, It was because the Person who opposed the p. 6Mysteries of Christianity went upon your Grounds,Answ. to first Letter, p. 46. and made use of your Words; although I declared withall, that they were used to other purposes than you intended them; and I confess'd, that the reason why I quoted your Words so much, was, because I found your Notion as to Certainty by Ideas, was the main Foundation on which the Author of Christianity not Mysterious went; and that he had nothing that look'd like Reason, if that Principle were removed; which made me so much endeavour to shew, that it would not hold, and so I supposed the reason why I so often mention'd your Words, was no longer a Riddle to you. These Passages you set down in your Second Letter;2d. Letter, p. 48. but you say, all this seems to you to do nothing towards the clearing of this matter. p. 49.Whether it doth or not, I am content to leave it to any indifferent Reader; and there it must rest at last, although you should write Volumes about it.

But for what cause do you continue so unsatisfied?p. 50. You tell us, It is, that the Author mentioned, went upon this Ground, That clear and distinct Ideas are necessary to Certainty, but that is not your Notion p. 7as to Certainty by Ideas; which is, That Certainty consists in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, such as we have, whether they be in all their Parts perfectly clear and distinct or no: And you say, that you have no Notions of Certainty more than this one.

This is no more than what you had said before in your former Letter,First Letter, p. 57. and I took particular notice of it, and gave three several Answers to it, which I shall here lay together and defend, because you seem to think I had not answered it.

(1.) That those who offer at clear and distinct Ideas bid much fairer for Certainty than you do (according to this Answer) and speak more agreeably to your Original Grounds of Certainty.p. 80. For it is a very wonderfull thing in point of Reason, for you to pretend to Certainty by Ideas, and not allow those Ideas to be clear and distinct? You say, the Certainty lies in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas: How can I clearly perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, if I have not clear and distinct Ideas? For how is it possible for a Man's Mind to know whether they agree or disagree, p. 8if there be some parts of those Ideas, we have only general and confused Ideas of? And therefore I had great reason to say, that if Certainty be placed in Ideas we must have clear and distinct Ideas. You may as well say, a Man may be certain of the Agreement and Disagreement of Colours in a confused or uncertain Light. For so much as the Idea fails of Clearness and Distinctness, so much it fails of that Evidence which it is necessary to judge by. Where-ever there is Obscurity, Confusion or Imperfection in the Ideas, there must be so much Uncertainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of them. And to pretend to Certainty by Ideas without pretending to clear and distinct Ideas, is to judge without Evidence, and to determine a thing to be certainly true, when we cannot know whether it be so or not; for how can you be sure that your Ideas agree with the Reality of things (wherein you place the Certainty of Knowledge) if there be no such Ideas of those things, that you can perceive their true Nature, and their difference from all others? For therein you will not deny that the Notion of clear and distinct Ideas consists.

p. 9But you say more than once or twice,Letter II. …. …, 9, 10.12, 14, 15, 16, 23, 38, 39, 41, 47, 50, 56, 61, 107, 114. or ten times, That I blame those who place Certainty in clear and distinct Ideas, but you do it not, and yet I bring you in among them; which is the thing you so much complain of. I will give you a full Answer to this Complaint. I do not deny, but the first occasion of my Charge was the Supposition that clear and distinct Ideas were necessary in order to any Certainty in our Minds, and that the only way to attain this Certainty was by comparing these Ideas together: But to prove this, your Words were produced, and your Principles of Certainty laid down, and none else; and I could not imagine that you could place Certainty in the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, and yet not suppose those Ideas to be clear and distinct. But finding your self joyned in such Company which you did not desire to be seen in, you rather chose to distinguish your self from them, by denying clear and distinct Ideas to be necessary to Certainty. But it must be here observed, that our Debate about Certainty by Ideas is not about any other Certainty, but about Certainty of Knowledge with regard to some Proposition, whose Ideas are to be compared as to p. 10their Agreement and Disagreement. For your Words are,Essay, B. 4. ch. 6. Sect. 3. Certainty of Knowledge is to perceive the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas as expressed in any Proposition. This we usually call knowing or being certain of the truth of any Proposition. First Letter, p. 57.So that a Proposition whose Ideas are to be compared as to their Agreement or Disagreement, is the proper Object of this Certainty. And therefore this Certainty is to be distinguished,

1. From a Certainty by Sense; or that by which we come to know the Existence of External Objects.B. 4. ch. 11. Sect. 1. For you say, That the Knowledge of the Existence of any other thing we can have only by Sensation. For there being no necessary Connexion of Real Existence with any Idea a Man hath in his Memory; no particular Man can know the Existence of any other Being, but only when by actual operating upon him it makes it self perceived by him. But that this is quite another Certainty from that of Ideas, appears from these following words of yours; For the having the Idea of any thing in our Mind, no more proves the Existence of that thing than the Picture of a Man evidences his being in the World, or the Visions of a Dream make thereby a true History. Therefore this is p. 11a very different Certainty from that of Ideas.

2. From a Certainty by Reason; When from the Existence of some things evident to Sense, we inferr the Existence of another thing not evident to Sense: As to take your own words in your former Letter.Letter p. 57. As to the Existence of bodily Substances, I know by my Senses, that something extended, solid and figur'd does exist; for my Senses are the utmost Evidence and Certainty I have of the Existence of extended, solid, figured things. These Modes being then known to exist by our Senses, the Existence of them (which I cannot conceive can subsist without something to support them) makes me see the Connection of those Ideas with a Support, or as it is called, Subject of Inhesion, and so consequently the Connection of that Support, which cannot be nothing, with Existence.

Granting all this, yet it by no means proves that we can have a Certainty in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas themselves by which we have the Certainty are obscure and confused; but that supposing the Ideas we have by our Senses to be true, we may from them inferr the Existence of something of which we have only an obscure and confused Idea; p. 12which is the Case of bodily Substances. Of which I grant you may come to a certain Knowledge, but not a Certainty by Ideas, but by a Consequence of Reason deduced from the Ideas we have by our Senses. And this can never prove that we may have a Certainty by Ideas, where the Ideas themselves are not clear and distinct: For there is a great difference between having a Certainty by reason, of a thing whose Idea is confused and obscure, and having that Certainty by obscure and confused Ideas. For in this Case the Idea of Substance is obscure: but the way of Certainty is by a clear Deduction of Reason from the Ideas we have by our Senses.

3. From a Certainty by Remembrance; By which I mean the remaining Impression on the Mind of an Original Certainty by Demonstration. As to use your own Instance;B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. A Man hath found by Mathematical Evidence, that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two Right Angles; The Perception of this at the time of the Demonstration was clear and distinct; but afterwards, the Method of Demonstration may have slipt out of his Mind, yet he retains a Certainty of the thing by virtue of that Demonstration; p. 13but this is not a clear Perception, as you would have it, where the Ideas are confused; but it is an obscure Remembrance of the grounds of that Certainty which he once had; and hath never seen any Reason since, why he should call it in Question.

These things then being put out of the Question, which belong not to it; the Question truly stated is, whether we can attain to any Certainty of Knowledge as to the Truth of a Proposition in the way of Ideas, where the Ideas themselves by which we come to that Certainty be not clear and distinct?

Another thing to be observed is, that Des Cartes who first started this way of Certainty by Ideas, thought it a ridiculous thing in any to pretend to it, unless their Ideas were clear and distinct. He saith,Princip. l. 1. n. 44, &c. That when we assent without clear Perception, we are either deceived, or fall into Truth by chance, but we do often err when we think we have clear Perception, and have not. But to a certain Iudgment, it is necessary that our Perception be not only clear but distinct: that is, when the thing not only lies open to our view, but we see it on all sides, and so can distinguish it from all other things. p. 14You agree with him in placing Certainty in Ideas, but you differ from him in that which alone made his Opinion reasonable, viz. That these Ideas be clear and distinct. If it were possible for us to come to clear and distinct Ideas of the things we pretend to be certain of, it were a just Pretence to Certainty in that way; but since we cannot come at them, we must be content with such Measures of Knowledge as we are capable of. But for you to talk so much of Certainty by Ideas, and yet to allow Obscurity and Imperfection in those Ideas, is like a purblind Man who would pretend to judge exactly of the differences of Colours in the Twilight, because another pretended to do it at Noon-day: Or like one, who would undertake to shew certainly the Agreement or Disagreement of two Men at a distance from him, in their Habit, Features, and Stature, and yet at the same time confess that he could not clearly distinguish one from the other. So that if I did think you spake more consistently to your Hypothesis, than you say now that you did, I hope you will forgive me that Wrong, if at least it be a Wrong to you; for after all, there are several Passages in your Essay, which p. 15suppose clear Ideas necessary to Certainty.

For in one Place you say,B. 4. ch. 18. Sect. 8. That the mind not being certain of the Truth of that it doth not evidently know. What is this but to make clear Ideas necessary to Certainty?

In another,B. 4. ch. 4. Sect. 8. yet more plainly, That which is requisite to make our Knowledge certain is the Clearness of our Ideas.

In a third Place you say;B. 4. ch. 12. Sect. 14. For it being evident that our Knowledge cannot exceed our Ideas; where They are either imperfect, confused or obscure, we cannot expect to have certain, perfect or clear Knowledge.

In a fourth;B. 4. ch. 2. Sect. 15. But obscure and confused Ideas can never produce any clear and certain Knowledge, because as far as any Ideas are confused or obscure, the mind can never perceive clearly whether they agree or disagree. What can be more express? And yet you have complained of me in near twenty Places of your second Letter for charging this upon you. By this the World will judge of the Justice of your Complaints, and the Consistency of your Notion of Ideas.

(2.) I answer'd,Answ. to Let 1. p. 36. That it is very possible the Authour of Christianity not p. 16mysterious, might mistake or misapply your Notions, but there is too much reason to believe he thought them the same, and we have no reason to be sorry that he hath given you this occasion for the explaining your meaning, and for the Vindication of your self in the matters you apprehend he had charged you with.

Let. 2. p. 36.Here you enter upon a fresh Complaint, and say▪ This can be no Reason why you should be joyned with a Man that had misapplied your Notions; and that no Man hath so much mistaken and misapplied your Notions as my self, and therefore you ought rather to be joyned with me. But is this fair and ingenuous dealing, to represent this matter so, as if I had joined you together, because he had misunderstood and misapplied your Notions? Can you think me a Man of so little Sense to make that the Reason of it? No, Sir, it was because he assigned no other Grounds but yours, and that in your own Words, however now you would divert the meaning of them another way. And although I was willing to allow you all reasonable Occasions for your own Vindication, as appears by my Words; yet I was sensible enough, that you had p. 17given too just an Occasion to apply them in that manner, as appears by the next Page.Answer to Letter 1. p. 37. But because these words follow some I had quoted out of your Postscript, you fall into a nice Piece of Criticism about them, Letter 2. p. 45.which, you say, in Grammatical Construction, must refer to the Words of the Postscript; but any one that reads without a design to cavil, would easily interpret them of your Words and Notions about which the Debate was; and not of the Postscript which comes in but as a Parenthesis. This looks like Chicaning in Controversie; which no Man, who knows his Cause is good, ever falls into.

But if, you say, by an unintelligible new Way of Construction the word Them be applied to any Passages in your Book: What then? Why then, whoever they are,P. …6▪ you intend to complain of them too. But the Words just before tell you who they are, viz. The Enemies of the Christian Faith. And is this all that you intend, only to complain of them for making you a Party in the Controversie against the Trinity? But whether you have not made your self too much a Party in it, will appear, before we have done.

p. 18I had with great Kindness, as I thought, taken notice of a Passage in your Postscript: in which I was glad to find that in general, you owned the Mysteries of the Christian Faith, and the Scripture to be the Foundation and Rule of it: From whence I inferr'd, that I could not believe you intended to give any Advantage to the Enemies of the Christian Faith.P. 41. This Passage, you say, you were surprized to find in a Paragraph design'd to give you satisfaction. There are some Persons I find very hard to be satisfied. For I speak of my satisfaction in this Passage, and that I was glad you agreed so far with me, although you could not come up in all things to what I could wish. But what Reason have you to express so much dissatisfaction at these Words?P. 43, 44. You call it an extraordinary sort of Complement; and that they seem to intimate as though I took you for a Heathen before.

How like a cavilling Exception is this? Do not we know that in the Debate about the Mysteries of Faith our Adversaries are no Heathens; but they deny any Mysteries: I was glad to find that you owned them; and resolved your Faith into the Scripture as the Foundation p. 19of it. Did not this look more like a good Opinion of you as to these matters, than any Inclination to suspect you for a Heathen?

But you say,P. 4…. It must not be taken for granted, that those who do not write or appear in Print in Controversies of Religion do not own the Christian Faith, and the Scriptures as the Rule of it. I was far enough from any such Apprehension; but the Case is quite otherwise, with those who are not sparing of writing about Articles of Faith, and among them take great Care to avoid some which have been always esteem'd fundamental Articles by the Christian Church. And I think it was no want of Humanity or Christian Charity in me, that I was so glad to find you own the Mysteries of the Christian Faith in general: which shews at least, that you cannot object against any Articles of Faith, because they contain something mysterious in them.

But I said, That in all things your Answer doth not come fully up to what I could wish. And I think I gave sufficient Proof of it, as to your Idea of Substance, the Nature of Ideas, the Materiality of the Soul, the disparaging some Arguments to prove the Existence of God, the Tendency p. 20of your Principles; and the Ground of Certainty, &c. Which are put off to another Letter, except the last, which is therefore now to be examin'd.

(3.) The third Answer I gave was, That your own Grounds of Certainty,Answer to Letter 1. p. 38. tend to Scepticism; and that in an Age wherein the Mysteries of Faith are too much exposed by the Promoters of Scepticism and Infidelity, it is a thing of dangerous Consequence to start such new Methods of Certainty, as are apt to leave Men's minds more doubtfull than before. Letter 2. p. 46.These words, you say, contain a farther Accusation of your Book, which shall be consider'd in its due Place. But this is the proper Place of considering it. For I said, That hereby you have given too just occasion to the Enemies of the Christian Faith, to make use of your Words and Notions, as was evidently proved from your own Concessions. And if this be so, however I was willing to have had you explained your self to the general Satisfaction; yet since you decline it, I do insist upon it, that you cannot clear your self from laying that Foundation, which the Author of Christianity not mysterious built upon. For your Ground of Certainty is p. 21the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas, as expressed in any Proposition. Which are your own Words. From hence I urged, That let the Proposition come to us any way, either by Humane or Divine Authority, if our Certainty depend upon this, we can be no more certain, than we have clear Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas contained in it. And from hence the Author of Christianity not mysterious thought he had Reason to reject all Mysteries of Faith which are contained in Propositions, upon your Grounds of Certainty. By this it evidently appears, that although I was willing to allow you all fair ways of interpreting your own Sense; yet I by no means thought that your Words were wholly misunderstood or misapplied by that Author: but rather that he saw into the true Consequence of them, as they lie in you Book. And what Answer do you give to this? Not a word in the proper Place for it. But afterwards (for I would omit nothing that may seem to help your Cause) you offer something towards an Answer. For there you distinguish the Certainty of Faith, Letter 2 p. 95.and the Certainty of Knowledge, p. 22and you humbly conceive the Certainty of Faith, if I think fit to call it so, hath nothing to do with the Certainty of Knowledge; and to talk of the Certainty of Faith seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing, a way of speaking not easie for you to understand. So that if I shake never so much the Certainty of Knowledge, it doth not at all concern the Assurance of Faith, that is quite distinct from it, neither stands nor falls with Knowledge. Faith stands by it self and upon Grounds of its own, nor can be removed from them and placed on those of Knowledge. Their Grounds are so far from being the same, or having any thing, that when it is brought to Certainty, Faith is destroyed, 'tis Knowledge then and Faith no longer. So that, whether you are, or are not mistaken in the placing Certainty in the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas, Faith still stands upon its own Basis, which is not at all alter'd by it; and every Article of that hath just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. This is the Substance of what you say about this Matter, and is the most considerable Passage in your Book towards clearing this Matter.

p. 23But I was aware of this,Answer to Letter 1. p 83. as appears by these Words; Is Faith an unreasonable Act? Is it not an Assent to a Proposition? Then, if all Certainty in Acts of Reason be derived from the perceiving the Agreement or Disagreement of the Ideas contained in it; either there can be no Certainty in the reasonable Act of Faith, or the Grounds of Certainty must be laid some other Way.

But this is a Matter of too great Weight and Consequence to be easily past over, because the main strength of your Defence lies in it, and therefore I shall more strictly examine what you say; and set this Point of the Certainty of Faith in as good a Light as I can, and shew the Inconsistency of your Notion of Ideas, with the Articles of the Christian Faith. To talk of the Certainty of Faith, say you, seems all one to you as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing; a way of speaking not easie for you to understand.

But how comes the Certainty of Faith to become so hard a Point with you? Have not all Mankind, who have talked of Matters of Faith, allow'd a Certainty of Faith as well as a Certainty of Knowledge, although upon different Grounds? In your former Letter you told us, that p. 24if we knew the Original of Words, we should be much helped to the Ideas they were first applied to and made to stand for. Now what is there in the Original of the word Certainty which makes it uncapable of being applied to Faith? I had thought that our Word was taken from the Latin; and that among the Romans it was opposed to doubting, Nil tam certum quam quod de dubio certum.

And therefore where the Mind upon examination of the Grounds of Assent saw no Reason for doubting, it might properly be said to be certain: If it sees no Cause to doubt from the Evidence of the Thing it self, or the clear Deduction of Consequences, that is Certainty of Knowledge; but where it sees no Reason to doubt from the Authority of him that speaks, that is Certainty of Believing; and the greater the Authority of him that speaks, the less Reason there is to doubt, and therefore the greater Certainty of Faith. And this I think is very easie to be understood, and so have the Generality of Mankind thought to this Day. But it seems our old Words must not now pass in the current Sense; but then it is fit they be called in, and new stampt, that we may have none but New milled Words p. 25to talk with; but in common Justice, a competent Time ought to be allow'd for it, that none be surprized; and in the mean time they ought to pass in their current Sense; and that is all the Favour I desire in this Matter. But I am utterly against any Private Mints of Words; and think those Persons assume too much Authority to themselves, who will not suffer common Words to pass in their general Acceptation; but will set such Bounds and Limits to the Sense of them, as suit best with their own Speculations.

But is not this all one as to talk of the Knowledge of Believing? For what Reason? Knowledge and Faith are too distinct things, the one relates to Evidence, and the other to Testimony; but Certainty is common to them both, unless you think it impossible to be certain upon any Testimony whatsoever.Postscript p. 3. You tell us in your Postscript (which I hope may be brought hither without Offence) that it is a shame among Christians to raise such a Doubt of this, Whether an infinitely powerfull and wise Being be veracious or no. Then I suppose the Veracity of God is a certain and undoubted Principle; and if there be sufficient Means to assure p. 26us of Divine Revelation (as I doubt not but you yield there are) what should hinder one, that believes upon such Grounds as are sufficient to convince him, from attaining to a Certainty of Faith? But you take Certainty as belonging only to Knowledge. So do the Papists, as belonging only to Infallibility, and say there can be no Certainty of Faith, where there is not an Infallible Proponent; but neither you nor they are to impose upon the Understandings of Mankind, who know how to distinguish the Grounds of Certainty both from Knowledge and Infallibility. You allow such a thing as Assurance of Faith;P. 96. and why not Certainty as well as Assurance? I know no reason, but that you have appropriated Certainty to the Perception of the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas in any Proposition; and now you find this will not hold as to Articles of Faith; and therefore you will allow no Certainty of Faith; which I think is not for the Advantage of your Cause.

But you go on and tell us, That if this Way of Certainty by Ideas doth not hold, yet it cannot affect Matters of Faith which stand immoveable upon other Grounds; Faith in your own words stands still upon p. 27its own Basis; and every Article of it has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. This will appear to be an extraordinary Answer, when we have throughly examin'd it. Here we see Faith is taken not with respect to the general Grounds of Certainty, but to the particular Articles of Faith, i. e. the Propositions contained in that Revelation which we embrace on the Account of its Divine Authority; now these Propositions are of several Kinds.

1. Some that are more clearly expressed therein, but such as might be attained to by the Light of Reason without Revelation. And such are the fundamental Principles of natural Religion, viz. The Being of God and Providence, and the Rewards and Punishments of a future State. These Mankind may attain to a Certainty in, without Revelation, or else there can be no such thing as natural Religion in the World; but these things are more fully and plainly revealed in the Scriptures. Let us now suppose a Person by natural Reason to attain to a Certainty, as to the Being of God and Immortality of the Soul; and he proceeds upon your general Grounds of p. 28Certainty, from the Agreement or Disagreement of Ideas; and so from the Ideas of God and the Soul, he is made certain of those two Points before mention'd. But let us again suppose that such a Person upon a farther Examination of your Method of Proceeding finds, that the Way of Ideas in these Cases will not do; for no Idea proves the Existence of the thing without it self, P. 131.no more than the Picture of a Man proves his Being, or the Visions of a Dream make a true History, (which are your own Expressions.) And for the Soul he cannot be certain, but that Matter may think, (as you affirm) and then what becomes of the Soul's Immateriality (and consequently Immortality) from its Operations? But for all this, say you, his Assurance of Faith remains firm on its own Basis. Now I appeal to any Man of Sense, whether the finding the Uncertainty of his own Principles which he went upon in Point of Reason, doth not weaken the Credibility of these fundamental Articles when they are consider'd purely as Matters of Faith? For before, there was a natural Credibility in them on the Account of Reason; but by going on wrong Grounds of Certainty, all that is lost; and instead p. 29of being certain he is more doubtfull than ever. And if the Evidence of Faith falls so much short of that of Reason, it must needs have less Effect upon Mens Minds, when the subserviency of Reason is taken away; as it must be when the Grounds of Certainty by Reason are vanished. Is it at all probable, that he who finds his Reason deceive him in such Fundamental Points should have his Faith stand firm and unmoveable on the account of Revelation? For in Matters of Revelation, there must be some Antecedent Principles supposed before we can believe any thing on the Account of it.

And the first is, that there is a God; but this was the very thing he found himself at a loss in by his way of Certainty by Ideas; and how can his Faith stand firm as to Divine Revelation, when he is made Uncertain by his own Way, whether there be a God or no? Besides, to suppose Divine Revelation, we must be certain that there is a Principle above Matter and Motion in the World; but here we find, that upon the Principles of Certainty by Ideas he cannot be certain of this; because he doth not know but Matter may think; and consequently, all Revelation may be nothing but the p. 30Effects of an Exalted Fancy, or the Heats of a disordered Imagination, as Spinoza affirmed. Again, before there can be any such thing as Assurance of Faith upon Divine Revelation, there must be a Certainty as to Sense and Tradition; for there can be no Revelation pretended now without immediate Inspiration; and the Basis of our Faith is a Revelation contained in an Ancient Book, whereof the Parts were delivered at distant Times, but conveyed down to us by an Universal Tradition. But now, what if your Grounds of Certainty can give us no Assurance as to these things? I do not mean, that they cannot demonstrate Matters of Fact, which it were most unreasonable to expect; but that these Grounds of Certainty make all things uncertain;p. 131. for I think I have proved, that this way of Ideas cannot give a satisfactory Account as to the Existence of the plainest Objects of Sense; because Reason cannot perceive the Connexion between the Objects and the Ideas. How then can we arrive to any Certainty in perceiving those Objects by their Ideas? And I was in the right, when I said this Way tended to Scepticism; and I do not think that consistent with the Assurance of Faith.

p. 31But this is an Imputation you take very ill,Lett. II. p. 170. and say, that I have brought no Argument for it, but only that my great Prejudice against this Way of Certainty is, that it leads to Scepticism. (Sceptism is the New Mill'd Word.) This is very strange, when that Expression is only the Introduction to the Arguments from p. 125 to 132, to which no Answer at all is given. And so I leave it.

There are other Propositions or Articles of Faith which wholly depend on the Sense of Words contained in the Scripture,2. and we are to enquire, whether the Assurance of Faith, as you call it, be consistent with the overthrowing your Grounds of Certainty; i. e. whether those who embrace the Articles of Faith in the Way of Ideas, can retain their Certainty of those Articles when these Ideas are quitted. And this alone will be a plain Demonstration in the Case, that the Certainty of Faith cannot stand with such Men, if this way of Certainty by Ideas be destroyed. And by this which I am now to make out, let any one judge how true your Words are like to prove, when you say, Let the Grounds of Knowledge or Certainty be resolved into what they please, it touches not your Faith; p. 32the Foundation of that stands as sure as before, and cannot be at all shaken by it. Of this we shall judge by some important Articles of Christian Faith according to your Ideas.

The first shall be that of the Resurrection of the Dead. The Reason of believing the Resurrection of the same Body upon your Grounds is from the Idea of Identity; which I take to be this from your own words.Essay, B. 2. ch. 27. n. 3. 1. That the Identity of living Creatures depends not on a Mass of the same Particles, but on something else; for in them the variation of great Parcels of Matter alters not the Identity; for which you instance in the growth of an Oak and a Horse. n. 6.2. That the Identity of a Man consists in nothing but a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter, in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body. n. 9.3. That Personal Identity, i. e. the sameness of a Rational Being lies in Self-consciousness, and in that alone, whether it be annexed only to one Individual Substance, or can be continued in a Succession of several Substances. n. 11.4. That those who place Thought in a purely material, animal Constitution, void of Spirit, do place Personal Identity in something else that Identity p. 33of Substance, as Animal Identity is preserved in Identity of Life and not of Substance. n. 16.5. That it matters not to this point of being the same self, whether this present self be made up of the same or other Substances. n. 18.6. That in this Personal Identity of Self-consciousness is founded all the Right and Iustice of Reward and Punishment, Happiness and Misery, being that for which every one is concerned for himself, not mattering what becomes of any Substance not joined to, or affected with that Consciousness. n. 26.7. That the Sentence at the Day of Iudgment will be justified by the Consciousness all Persons shall have that they themselves in what Bodies soever they appear, or what Substances soever that Consciousness adheres to, are the same that committed those Actions and deserve that Punishment for them. This I suppose to be a true and just Account of your Sense of this Matter; and so the Article of the Resurrection is Resolved into your Idea of Personal Identity. And the Question between us now is, Whether your Certainty of this Matter from your Idea have no influence on the Belief of this Article of Faith? For the main of your Defence lies upon this Point, Whether your Method of Certainty p. 34by Ideas, doth at all shake, or in the least concern the Assurance of Faith? which you absolutely deny,Letter 2. p. 96. and affirm, That Faith stands upon its own Basis, and is not at all altered by your Method of Certainty; and every Article of that has just the same unmoved Foundation, and the very same Credibility that it had before. Now I take this Article of the Resurrection of the Dead to be an Article of Faith, and we are to consider, whether if your Method of Certainty by Ideas do hold in this Matter, it continues as firm, and in the same Credibility it had before? I shall not urge you with the Sense of our own or other Christian Churches in this Point of the Sameness of the Body in the Resurrection of the Dead, But I shall continue my self to the Scripture as the Foundation and Rule of our Faith; and the main Point is, Whether according to that, it be not necessary for the same Substance which was united to the Body to be raised up at the last Day? I do not say the same individual Particles of Matter which were united at the Point of Death; for there must be a great Alteration in them in a lingring Disease, as if a Fat Man falls into a Consumption: I do not say, the same Particles p. 35which the Sinner had at the very time of commission of his Sins; for then a long Sinner must have a vast Body, considering the continual spending of Particles by Perspiration; but that which I suppose is implyed in it is, that it must be the same Material Substance which was vitally united to the Soul here. You mention the Hypothesis of those, who place Thought in a purely Material Animal Constitution void of Spirit: but you agree, n. 25.that the more probable Opinion is, that this Consciousness is annexed to the Affection of one Individual Immaterial Substance. It is very well that it is allowed to be the more probable Opinion; but it seems without any Certainty as to the Truth of it. For you have told us, what the Effect of Probability is,Essay, E. 4. ch. 15. Sect. 1. viz. That it is enough to induce the Mind to judge the Proposition true or false rather than the contrary; and that it is conversant about things whereof we have no Certainty, Sect. 4.but only some Inducements to receive it for true. Thence I cannot but observe, that we have no Certainty upon your Grounds, that Self-consciousness depends upon an individual immaterial Substance, and consequently that a Material Substance p. 36may, according to your Principles, have Self-consciousness in it; at least, that you are not certain of the contrary. Now I pray consider, whether this doth not a little affect the whole Article of the Resurrection? For, if it may be only a Material Substance in us that thinks, then this Substance, which consists in the Life of an Organiz'd Body, must cease by Death; for how can that, which consisted in Life, be preserved afterwards? And if the Personal Identity consists in a Self-consciousness depending on such a Substance as cannot be preserved without an Organiz'd Body, then there is no Subsistence of it separate from the Body, and the Resurrection must be giving a new Life. To whom? To a Material Substance which wholly lost its Personal Identity by Death. So that here can be no Personal Identity at all; unless you say the very same Life which was long since at an end can be Reproduced. Which I suppose you will not assert.

But let us take the more probable Opinion; which I think certain, viz. That Self-consciousness depends upon an Immaterial Principle in us; and then the Question is, How far the Scripture determines p. 37the sameness of the Body at the Resurrection, i. e. of that Material Substance, which was vitally united with that Immaterial Substance in this Life. The Doctrine delivered by our Saviour is,John 5.28, 29.John 5:28John 5:29 that All that are in the Graves shall hear his voice; and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the Resurrection of Life, and they that have done evil to the Resurrection of Damnation. What is the meaning of all that are in their Graves? Doth this relate to any other Substance than that which was united to the Soul in Life? Can a different Substance be said to be in the Graves and to come out of them? Is it not material, as you say, whether the present Self be made up of the same or other Substances? If it be not so to your Idea of Identity, it is as to the Sense of our Saviour's Words: unless you can make it out, that a Substance which never was in the Grave may come out of it. But it may be said, That if these Words be taken strictly they confine the Resurrection to those Particles of Matter only which were in the Grave; if not, then they may extend to another Substance. I answer, that by comparing this with other places we find that the Words are to be understood of p. 38the Substance of that Body to which the Soul was united; and not to those Individual Particles.2 Cor. 5.10.2 Cor 5:10 So St. Paul, For we must all appear before the Iudgment Seat of Christ, that every one may receive the things done in his body, according to that he hath done, whether it be good or bad. Can these words be understood of any other Material Substance, but that Body in which these things were done? How could it be said, if any other Substance be joyned to the Soul at the Resurrection, as its Body, that they were the things done in or by the Body? Curcellaeus his Copy reads it, foreign; the Complutensian foreign, and several of the Fathers so took it; either way, it must relate to that which was the real Body in which the Person lived and acted, whether Good or Evil. And St. Paul's Dispute about the manner of raising the Body might soon have been ended, if there were no necessity of the same Body.1 Cor. 15.16.1 Cor 15:16 If there be no Resurrection of the Dead, then is not Christ raised. It seems then, other Bodies are to be raised as his was; and can there be any doubt whether his Body were the same material Substance which was united to his Soul before? And the p. 39Apostle lays so much weight upon it, that he saith,17. if Christ be not raised your Faith is vain; doth he mean, if there were not the same personal Identity, as to the Soul of Christ and the Matter united to it after the Resurrection? That cannot be his meaning, for then there would have been no necessity of Christs own Body being raised; which he asserts and proves by undoubted Witnesses. Were they Witnesses only of some material Substance then united to his Soul?6. He saith, He was seen of five hundred Brethren at once. What He was this?4. It was Christ that died. Yes, the Person of Christ; but personal Identity doth not require the same Substance, but the same Consciousness; and so if Christ were conscious to himself in another Substance, there was no necessity of the same Body. And so truly from the seeing the Person of Christ they could not prove it was the same Individual Body.John 20.25.John 20:25 But Thomas said, Except I shall see in his hands the print of the Nails, and put my Finger into the print of the Nails, and thrust my Hand into his side, I will not believe. The doing whereof convinced him it was the same Individual Body; but there will be no such proof at the great Day. And there p. 40is no Reason there should, since the Resurrection of Christ was a sufficient proof of God's Power to raise the Dead, and the Dissimilitude of Circumstances can be no Argument against it, since the Power and Wisdom of God are concerned in it.

But the Apostle insists upon the Resurrection of Christ, not meerly as an Argument of the Possibility of ours, but of the Certainty of it; because he rose as the first Fruits; 1 Cor. 15.20, 23.1 Cor 15:201 Cor 15:23Christ the first Fruits, afterwards they that are Christs at his coming. St. Paul was aware of the Objections in Mens Minds about the Resurrection of the same Body; and it is of great Consequence as to this Article, to shew upon what Grounds he proceeds.35. But some Man will say, How are the Dead raised up, and with what Body do they come? First he shews, that the seminal Parts of Plants are wonderfully improved by the ordinary Providence of God in the manner of their Vegetation.36, 37, 38. They sow bare Grain of Wheat, or of some other Grain, but God giveth it a Body, as it hath pleased him, and to every Seed his own Body. Here is an Identity of the Material Substance supposed; foreign, that proper Body which belongs to it; every Seed having that Body in little, which p. 41is afterwards so much inlarged; and in Grain the Seed is corrupted before its Germination; but it hath its proper Organical Parts, which make it the same Body with that which it grows up to. For although Grain be not divided into Lobes as other Seeds are, yet it hath been found, by the most Accurate Observations, that upon separating the Membranes these Seminal Parts are discerned in them; which afterwards grow up to that Body which we call Corn. St. Paul indeed saith, that we sow not that Body that shall be; but he speaks not of the Identity but the Perfection of it. And although there be such a difference from the Grain it self, when it comes up to be perfect Corn with Root, Stalk, Blade and Ear, that it may be said to outward Appearance not to be the same Body, yet with regard to the Seminal and Organical Parts, it is as much the same as a Man grown up is the same with the Embryo in the Womb. And although many Arguments may be used to prove, that a Man is not the same, because Life which depends upon the course of the Blood and the manner of Respiration and Nutrition is so different in both states, yet that Man would p. 42be thought Ridiculous that should seriously affirm, that it was not the same Man.Sect. 4. And you grant, that the variation of great parcels of Matter in Plants, alters not the Identity: and that the Organization of the Parts in one coherent Body partaking of one common Life makes the Identity of a Plant; so that in things capable of any sort of Life, the Identity is consistent with a continued succession of Parts; and so the Wheat grown up is the same Body with the Grain that was sown. And thus the Alteration of the Parts of the Body at the Resurrection is consistent with its Identity, if its Organization and Life be the same; and this is a Real Identity of the Body which depends not upon Consciousness. From whence it follows, that to make the same Body, no more is required but restoring Life to the Organized Parts of it. And you grant likewise,Sect. 6. That the Identity of the same Man consists in a Participation of the same continued Life by constantly fleeting Particles of Matter in Succession vitally united to the same Organized Body. So that there is no difficulty as to the sameness of the Body, if Life were continued; and if by Divine Power Life be restored to that Material Substance p. 43which was before united, by a Re-union of the Soul to it, there is no Reason to deny the Identity of the Body. Not from the Consciousness of the Soul, but from that Life which is the Result of the Union of Soul and Body. But St. Paul still supposes that it must be that Material Substance to which the Soul was before united.42. For saith he, It is sown in Corruption, it is raised in Incorruption: It is sown in Dishonour, 43.it is raised in Glory; It is sown in Weakness, it is raised in Power; It is sown a Natural Body, 44.it is raised a Spiritual Body. Can such a Material Substance which was never united to the Body be said to be sown in Corruption, and Weakness, and Dishonour? Either therefore he must speak of the same Body, or his meaning cannot be comprehended. For what doth all this relate to a Conscious Principle? The Apostle speaks plainly of that Body which was once quickened and afterwards falls to Corruption; and is to be restored with more noble Qualities.53, 5…. For this Corruptible must put on Incorruption, and this Mortal must put on Immortality. I do not see how he could more expressly affirm the Identity of this Corruptible Body, with that after the Resurrection, and p. 44that without any Respect to the Principle of Self-consciousness; and so if the Scripture be the sole Foundation of our Faith, this is an Article of it, and so it hath been always understood by the Christian Church. And your Idea of Personal Identity is inconsistent with it; for it makes the same Body which was here united to the Soul not to be necessary to the Doctrine of the Resurrection, but any Material Substance being united to the same Principle of Consciousness makes the same Body. The Dispute is not, how far Personal Identity in it self may consist in the very same Material Substance; for we allow the Notion of Personal Identity to belong to the same Man under several changes of Matter; but whether it doth not depend upon a Vital Vnion between the Soul and Body and the Life which is consequent upon it; and therefore in the Resurrection the same Material Substance must be reunited; or else it cannot be called a Resurrection, but a Renovation; i. e. it may be a New Life, but not a raising the Body from the Dead.

2. The next Articles of Faith which your Notion of Ideas is inconsistent with, are no less than those of the Trinity, and p. 45of the Incarnation of our Saviour. The former by the first Article of our Church is expressed by three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature: the latter is said Art. 2. to be by the Vnion of the Divine and Humane Nature in one Person. Let us now see whether your Ideas of Nature and Person can consist with these. But before I come to that I must endeavour to set this Matter right, as to the Dispute about the Notion of Nature and Person, which you have endeavour'd with all your Art, to perplex and confound, and have brought in several Interlocutors to make it look more like an Entertainment. Of which afterwards: The Original Question was, whether we could come to any Certainty about the Distinction of Nature and Person in the Way of Ideas; and my business was to prove that we could not, because we had no simple Ideas by Sensation or Reflection, Essay B. 2. c. 1. Sect. 5.without which you affirm that our Vnderstanding seems to you not to have the least Glimmering of Ideas: and that we have nothing in our Minds which did not come in one of these two Ways.

These are your own Words.Vindication of the Trinity, p. 252. &c. And then I undertook to shew, that it was not possible for us to have any simple Ideas p. 46of Nature and Person by Sensation or Reflection: and that whether we consider'd Nature as taken for Essential Properties, or for that Substance wherein that Property lies: whether we consider it in distinct Individuals or abstractly; still my Design was to shew that in your Way of Ideas, you could come to no Certainty about them.P. 260. And as to Person I shew'd, that the Distinction of Individuals is not founded meerly on what occurs to our Senses, but upon a different manner of Subsistence, which is in one Individual, and is not communicable to another. And as to this I said, that we may find within our selves an intelligent Substance by inward Perception; but whether that make a Person or not, must be understood some other way; for if the meer intelligent Substance make a Person, then there cannot be the Union of two such Natures, but there must be two Persons. Which is repugnant to the Article of the Incarnation of our Saviour.

That this was the true State of the Question will appear to any one that will vouchsafe to look into it. But what said you in your first Letter in Answer to it?

p. 47As to Nature you say,Letter 1. p. 165. That it is a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex, abstract Idea, which when they are found united in any Individual existing, though joyned in that Existence with several other Ideas, that individual or particular Being is truly said to have the Nature of a Man, or the Nature of a Man to be in him; forasmuch as these simple Ideas are found united in him, which answer the …omplex, abstract Idea, to which the specifick Name is given by any one: which abstract specifick Idea, he keeps the same when he applies the specifick Name standing for it to distinct Individuals.

And as to Person, P. 216in the way of Ideas, you say, that the Word Person in it self signifies nothing, and so no Idea belonging to it, nothing can be said to be the true Idea of it. But as soon as the common Vse of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person, and so of Nature.

Against this I objected in my Answer to that Letter,Answer to Letter 1▪ p. 103. that if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas; then it is plain that they are only Notions p. 48of the Mind, as all abstracted and complex Ideas are; and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more.Letter 2. p. 109.

To this you answer in your second Letter, That your Notion of the Terms Nature and Person is, that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another, nor in themselves signifie any thing at all, but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition. Whoever imagined that Words signifie any otherwise than by Imposition?

But the Question is, whether these be meer Words and Names, or not? Or whether there be not a real Foundation in things for such a Distinction between Nature and Person? Of which I gave this evident Proof, that if it were not the same Nature in different Individuals, every Individual must make a different Kind.

And what Answer do you give to this plain Reason? Nothing particular that I can find. But in the general you say, that all that you can find that I except against in your Notion of Nature and Person is nothing but this, P. 100.viz. that these are two sounds which in themselves signifie nothing. And is this all indeed? Did not I tell you in these Words, (which I am forced to repeat on this occasion, although I am p. 49very unwilling to fill Pages with Repetitions.) The Question now between us comes to this,Answer to Letter 1. p. 107. whether the common Nature or Essence of things lies only in an abstract Idea, or a general Name, and the real Essence consists only in particular Beings from which that Nature is abstracted? The Question is not whether in forming the Notion of common Nature, the Mind doth not abstract from the Circumstances of particular Beings; but it is whether there be not an Antecedent Foundation in the Nature of things, upon which we form this abstract Idea? For if there be, then it cannot be called an Universal Name only; or a meer sign of an Idea, which we have formed from putting many simple Ideas together, which Name belongs to all of such a sort, as have those simple Ideas united together.

In these Words, which you cannot deny to be in the place mention'd, I thought I had stated the Case fairly between us. And why do you not return an Answer to them? But instead of that you only mention another Passage more liable to cavilling, where I say, That upon your Notions of Nature and Person, I do not see p. 50how it is possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity.P. 103. For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas, which the common Use of Language hath appropriated to be the sign of two Ideas; then it is plain that they are only Notions of the Mind, as all abstract and complex Ideas are; and so one Nature and three Persons can be no more.

Upon this you charge me with affirming that of you which you never said, viz. that these Terms are only abstract or complex Ideas: Letter 2. p. 112.but your Words are, Taking therefore Nature and Person for the sign of two Ideas they are put to stand for: Letter 1. p. 27.and by enumerating all the simple Ideas, that are contained in the complex Idea, that each of them is made to stand for, we shall immediately see the whole difference that is between them.

These are your own Words. Now from thence it appears, that Nature and Person are Terms which are the signs of two Ideas by your own Confession: but you never made these, or any other Terms to be Ideas: and you should be ashamed of such Iargon.

p. 51But have not you said in your Essay,Essay B. 4. c. 6. Sect. 1. that it is a very common Practice for Names to be made use of instead of the Ideas themselves, especially if the Ideas be very complex. Nature and Person you grant to be complex Ideas; and these Terms you confess are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas: Therefore here is an Ambiguity in the Use of these Words, for they are complex Ideas themselves, and they are made the signs of them; and so the Words of the Sentence are capable of both those Senses.

For it is true, according to you, that these Terms, Nature and Person, really signifie nothing in themselves, but are only complex and abstract Ideas; and those Terms are appropriated to be the signs of two Ideas. So that Nature and Person are both Ideas themselves, and those Terms are the Signs of two Ideas: and the Sense had not been liable to Exception, if And had been inserted; For if these Terms really signifie nothing in themselves, but are only abstract and complex Ideas; And which the common Use had appropriated to be the Signs of two Ideas, &c. But whether this be properly expressed or not, according to your Sense of Ideas, the Weight of the Controversie p. 52depends not at all upon it; but whether Nature and Person can be any other but abstract Ideas, according to your own plain Expressions; and if they are so, they are no more than Notions of the Mind, and then the Consequence must hold, that One Nature and three Persons can be no more. Upon which I said, I did not see how it was possible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity, (and I now add of the Incarnation) which was the thing I undertook to make out.

Letter 2. p. 113.But you very freely say, whether I rightly deduce from it this Consequence, viz. And so one Nature and three Persons can be no more; is what you neither know not are concerned to examin. Which I think is an Expression could hardly drop from a Person, who did know how to declare his Belief of three Persons in the Vnity of the Divine Nature. But you pretend these are none of your Notions of Nature and Person, nor indeed any thing you can understand. But it is plain, that this Consequence follows from your own Notions of Nature and Person; as they are set down expresly by your self in the former Letter.

P. 109.You tell me, I made this Inference a little in haste! Whether a Man write in p. 53haste or not, the World will judge by what appears, and not by what he or any other saith. And I think it will appear, that I did not make this Inference in haste, but from a deliberate Consideration of your Notion of the Ideas of Nature and Person. P. 109.But by those Terms signifying nothing in themselves, you say, that you meant, that they are two sounds that naturally signifie not one thing more than another, nor in themselves signifie any thing at all, but have the signification which they have barely by Imposition. And was this truly all that you meant by it? And do you think that Peter, and Iames, and Iohn signifie any thing by Nature? Are not all Words made significative by Imposition? But is there no difference in the signification of Words as they stand for signs of Things? If they be Words for particular Substances, then you grant, that there is something really existing which is meant by those Words; but if they relate only to the Conceptions of the Mind, then they signifie them and no more. And the Question is, which of these two you meant by those Words Nature and Person? And you plainly affirm both of them to be complex Ideas, which are made only by an Act of the p. 54Mind, and therefore your meaning can be no otherwise understood.

You presume, that upon more leisurely thoughts, both my self and the rest of Mankind will concur with you. I never affected Singularity, and am ready to comply with the rest of Mankind in any reasonable thing.P. 110. But you say, that this Notion of Nature and Person, That they are two Words that signifie only by Imposition, is what will hold in the common Sense of Mankind. No doubt of it: But I must again and again tell you, that is not the Point in Question, but whether they are only abstract and complex Ideas, which have no other Being but in the Mind. And to this you answer not a Word. I do not in the least think as you suggest, that it is necessary to the Defense of the Trinity, P. 111.that these two Articulate sounds should have Natural significations, and that unless they are used in those significations, it were impossible to defend the Doctrine of the Trinity. But I do affirm, that those who make Nature and Person to be only abstract and complex Ideas; can neither defend nor reasonably believe it.P. 112. And this is making no extraordinary Supposition necessary to the Belief or Defence of it; but only that which in the common p. 55Sense of Mankind is necessary to it. For, if you have expressed your own Mind in your former Letter; that must guide us in your Notion of Nature and Person, where you undertook to explain them. For if Nature and Person be abstract, and complex Ideas, as you say, and such are only Acts of the Mind, I do not see how it is possible for you to reconcile these Notions with the Articles of the Trinity and Incarnation.

I do not go about to accuse you of denying these Doctrines; I hope you do not. But I impute all this Hesitancy, and doubting only to your Notions of Ideas; which you had been so long forming in your Mind, that as it often happens in such Cases, one darling favourite Notion proves too hard for some Points of far greater Consequence, when they are found inconsistent with it. And because you had first fixed your Notion of Ideas, and taken much Pains about them, you thought all other things were to be entertained as they appear'd consistent with them. But you could not but find, that the Articles of three Persons, and one Nature; and two Natures, and one Person, were not reconcileable with your Ideas of Nature and Person; which is that they p. 56are complex Ideas, which depend upon the Act of the Mind; for this were to make the two Natures in Christ to be only two complex Ideas. For if Nature, as you say, be a Collection of several Ideas combined into one complex, abstract Idea; then two Natures can be nothing else but two such Collections, or two abstracted and complex Ideas. It may be said, that when you make Nature an abstracted and complex Idea, you speak of a specifick Idea, but the Humane Nature in Christ was a particular Substance, and this you assert to be a real thing, and not to depend on the Act of the Mind.

But this doth not clear the Matter. For in your former Letter you said, that all the Ideas we have of particular distinct Substances, Letter 1. p. 32.are nothing but several Combinations of simple Ideas: which in Corporeal Substances are sensible Qualities, in Incorporeal are Operations of the Mind. The utmost then which the Idea of Humane Nature in Christ comes to is, that there were in him the sensible Qualities and Intellectual Operations of a Man, with an unknown Substance to support them: which belongs not to the simple Ideas, but is supposed by them. This is all I can make of your way of Ideas: and so p. 57the Incarnation of Christ is the assuming the sensible Qualities, and intellectual Operations of a Man, to which a Substratum doth belong: but is no Part of the simple Ideas. So that we can have no Idea at all of the Humane Nature of Christ; but only an Inference, that since those are but Accidents, there must be a Substratum to support them; and consequently there was a particular Substance in him made up of Mind and Body. But if this had come in the Way of Ideas, yet it cannot make out the Humane Nature of Christ. For if it were in him no otherwise than in other Men, then the Mystery of the Incarnation is quite gone, and Christ is to be consider'd but like other Men; which doth not answer to what the Scripture saith of the Word's being made Flesh, and that God was manifest in the Flesh. There must be therefore something beyond the meer Humane Nature in him; and either it must be only some Divine Operation upon, and with it, and that is no Substance; or if it be a Substance, it must either cohabit with it, or else be united to it. If it only co-habits, then there are two Persons dwelling together in one Body, and the Actions of one cannot be attributed p. 58to the other; If there be a real Union between them, so as the Acts belong to one Person; then there must be such a Manner of Existence in the Humane Nature of Christ, which is different from it in other Persons. For in all others, the Acts belong to the Humane Person; but if it were so in Christ, then the Divine Acts of Christ must flow from the Humane Nature as the Principle of them; which is to confound the Divine and Humane Nature, and Operations together; If they come from the Divine Person, then the Humane Nature must have another kind of Subsistence, than it hath in others, or else there must be two Persons;Essay l. 2. ch. 27. Sect. 26. and Person being as you say, a Forensick Term, there must be two different Capacities of Rewards and Punishments; which is so absurd an Opinion as I think no one will assert.

If there be then but one Person and two Natures, how can you possibly reconcile this to your Way of Ideas? Person, say you,Letter 1. p. 216. in it self signifies nothing; but as soon as the common use of any Language has appropriated it to any Idea, then that is the true Idea of a Person, i. e. Men may call a Person what they please, for there is nothing but common use required p. 59to it: They may call a Horse, or a Tree, or a Stone a Person if they think fit; but since the common use of Language hath appropriated it to an Intelligent Being, that is, a Person.