The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion, Religious tract · Chapter 5
CAP. V.
Of the Peoples power, in erecting Governours: and ſeveral Arguments thence deduced.
WE shall willingly grant, vvith the Surveyer Pag. 1. That God hath made man a Rational creature, and fit for ſociety: And that God hath appoynted, beſides oeconomical ſocietyes, the coalition of people into greater bodyes, conſiſting of many familyes under one kinde of government, and political head, for their mutual good in their neceſſities, and for protection of the whole body, and every Member thereof: That Magiſtracy is God's ordinance, he having appoynted Superiour Heads and Governours, to rule theſe bodyes that they might be preſerved from ruine and deſtruction: And that the hath put this inſtinct and dictate of reaſon into all; ſo that even barbarous people are led together into ſuch politick aſſociations, under their Governours, for their ſubſiſtence in general, for the mutual help one of another, and for the protection of the weaker againſt the injuries of the ſtronger: And therefore we willingly ſay with worthy Calvin Lib 4. Inſt, c. 20, §. 4. That [Nulli jam dubium eſſe debet, quin civilis potestas, vocatio ſit non modo coram Deo ſancta & legitima, ſed ſacerrima etiam, & in tota mortalium vita, longe omnium honeſtiſſima.
Yet as to the right underſtanding of the peoples intereſt in the conſtitution and erection of civil Government, and of civil Governours, unto whom they ſubject themſelves, we would have thoſe Particulars conſidered.
1. It will be readily granted, that there was a time when ſuch people, as are now imbodyed in a politick ſtate, were not ſo imbodyed; but were either living ſeparatly in a wandering condition, or by providence caſt together in one place, and cohabiteing together, and throw proceſſe of time, increaſeing in number, and filling that place of ground with their poſterity and iſſue; in which condition living without any eſtablished civil order common to all, every one ſaw to his owne matters the beſt he could, and governed theſe, according to his beſt advantage having no other law to ſquare his actions by, then the moral law, or law of nature.
2, Among this multitude or company, while in this condition, there was none, who by birth, or any other lawful clame, could challenge to himſelf any civill dominion, power or authority over the reſt, or could exerciſe any Magiſtratical power, whether by makeing civil lawes, or by executing the ſame. I ſpeake here of a civile power for I deny not, but in that condition, parents had power over their children, husbands over their wives, maſters over their ſervants; and, in ſome reſpect, the Elder might have had ſome power over the younger, the more ſtrong and power full over the more weak, the wiſer over the more foolish and ignorant, and upon that account, a ſort of natural preheminence: but this neither did, nor could intit…e them unto a civil ſuperiority, an civil Magiſtracy over theſe, farr leſſe over all the reſt. I grant that even in that ſtate of affaires. Some being endued of God with gifts and qualifications beyond others, and ſo more fitted for Government, then others who wanted thoſe advantages, might look liker the perſons whom they ought to pitch upon and call for that work; but notwithſtanding of theſe enduements and abilityes, They could not upon that ſole ground, lay clame unto Soveraignity, and aſſume unto themſelves a civil power and juriſdiction over the reſt: ſo that as to any actual, and formal right unto Magiſtracy, and ſupream government, all are by nature alike, though not alike qualified thereunto, and ſo, not in alike neare capacity for reception thereof. This, I ſuppoſe, will not need proof, ſince I am here ſpeaking of the firſt, and moſt undoubtedly lawful, and ordinary conſtitutions of Commonwealthes, and abſtracting from that queſtion, What Magiſtratical power he may have, and aſſume to himſelf, who tranſporteth and erecteth colonies; as alſo, from that queſtion, what title or right to government, pure conqueſt by armes, or a lawful conqueſt upon a lawful warre, may give, as being of no affinity with our caſe, though this Surveyor be pleaſed now to account us little better then a conqueſt, of which afterward.
3. When a multitude in this condition, do aſſociat together, and conſidering, through the inſtinct of nature, how neceſſary it is, that ſome way be condeſcended upon, for the common ſaifty and preſervation of the whole body from forraigne adverſaries, and inteſtine diviſions, and for the ſaifty and preſervation of every one in particular, from mutual injuries, and acts of injuſtice, do think of eſtablishing ſome civil government and governours, we cannot rationally ſuppoſe, that they goe about ſuch a buſineſſe of moment, rashly, brutishly, inconſiderately and irrationally; If reaſon teach them that a government muſt be erected, for their wel being, and move them to think of falling about it, we cannot rationally ſuppoſe them to acte in this matter irrationally, They being rational creatures, & not a company of brutes, and through the inſtinct of reaſon taught that this was a buſineſſe both neceſſary and of great concernment, cannot but be ſuppoſed to act rationally in this matter.
4. It will not need much diſput to prove, that by this conſtitution of a Policy, and of Politick Governours, they should not be redacted unto a worſe condition, then that was, into which they were, before the conſtitution was condeſcended upon; farr leſſe can it be ſuppoſed, that by this change they enjoy no more the common privilege of rational creatures, but degenerate into beaſts, or are depreſſed into a condition, equal unto, if not worſe then that of beaſts. Sure it muſt be granted that they remaine Rational creatures, and that Rational Creatures would never rationally yeeld unto ſuch a change as should deteriorate their condition, let be brutify them, or make them rather chooſe to be beaſts. And that ſuch a change into a civil ſtate, if accompanyed with ſuch conſequents, could never be the inſtinct of pure nature; nor can we ſuppoſe, that ſuch a thing can be the ordinance of God, appoynted for the good of mankinde. Therefore this muſt ſtand, as a firme truth, that the condition of a people modelled into a civil ſtate, is not worſe then it was before, but rather better.
5. It will be no leſſe readyly yeelded, That ſuch, one or more, as are choſen by the Community, to act the part of Magiſtrates, notwithſtanding of that change made in their condition, abide men of the like paſſions and infirmities with the reſt (yea and ſubject to moe temptations and ſo in greater hazard to miſcarry, then formerly) This change doth not Tranſforme them into Angels, or put them beyond the reach of injuries (as all will grant) nor beyond a capacity of doing injury, even to theſe over whom they are ſet. No humane power can ſet any above God's Law, or looſe him from the binding power thereof: and till this be; or They out of a capacity or tranſgreſſing God's Law (which no humane act can do) He Or They are ſtill obnoxious to the ſin of injuring their neighbour, and tranſgreſſing the law of righteouſneſſe, no leſſe then others;
6. It is Left to the People, in this caſe, to condeſcend upon what forme of government they think moſt expedient, and moſt ſuteable to their temper, and to the condition providence hath caſt them into, whether it be Monarchy or Aroſticracy or Democracy, or a mixed kinde: for though God and Nature hath inſtituted Government, yet not having determined any one forme, to be the only lawful forme; People are it liberty to walke here upon rational grounds, and to conſult their owne advantage, next the glory of God; and to make choiſe of that, which, all things conſidered, promiſeth moſt probable felicity unto them, and of the ſeveral formes or Kindes of government, (all lawful in themſelves) to pitch upon what Kinde they think moſt expedient and conduceing to their ends. This is aſſented unto by all Politians: and ſo it followeth, That it is meerly from the People, that this forme and not another is made choiſe of.
7. As neither God nor Nature hath determined the particular forme of government under which Men muſt live, but hath left it, as was ſaid, to their free choiſe; ſo it is not determined how large or how little, every politick ſociety should be; nor whether a people living at ſome conſiderable diſtance from other, or more contiguouſly, should joyne together in one, and make up one body politick; or whether they should erect moe, diſtinct, and independent Commonwealthes though poſſibly of the ſame extract, and language. Nature ſayeth not that all in one Iland, of one extract, or of one language, should become one Politick Body under one politick head. We have heard of the time when there have been many Kings, diſtinct and independent, in one England: And how many Kings there was at one and the ſame time, in the land of Canaan, no vaſt territory, ſcripture tells us. Nor hath Nature determined that diſtinct bodyes of people, living in diſtinct and far ſeparated places, yea having diſtinct cuſtomes, and languages, may not when they ſee it for their advantage, aſſociate for ſetting up one Supreame Soveraigne over all. So that this alſo is left to the free choiſe and determination of the People.
8. When a free People have rationally and deliberatly condeſcended upon the forme, it is in their power to condeſcend upon the time, how long that forme shall endure, and either prefix a certaine time, at vvhichwhich it shall evanish, if they ſee it not expedient to continue it: or reſerve to themſelves a liberty to alter it when they vvill. Each of the ſormes being in themſelves lavvful, People may chooſe vvhichwhich they think beſt; and though one Kinde of government vvill agree to ſome People, better then another, yet Bodyes of people, being lyable to cauſal changes, and theſe requireing formes ſuteable, A people at the beginning guyded with reaſon, may rationally foreſee ſuch changes, and accordingly determine the firſt forme condeſcended on to continue, longer or shorter time, definite, or indefinite. It is not to my preſent purpoſe to determine, vvhat a people may do as to this, after their predeceſſours have once imbraced a forme, and engaged themſelves by oath never to change it. Or vvhether it be lavvful to ſvveare unto any one forme.
9. It is from the People, that ſuch perſones, and no other perſones, are made choiſe of to Governe according to that forme, which they have condeſcended upon: before this deed of the People, no man can pretend to it, all being equal, and none over another by nature, in any political capacity no man coming out of the womb into this world, with a crowne on his head, and a ſcepter in his hand: and God (as we here ſuppoſe) immediatly and particularly deſigneing none, nor without the leaſt concurrence of the People inſtaleing any into that place of juriſdiction: and therefore the People muſt do ſomething in order to this, and upon their deed it followeth, that ſuch as before were no lawful Magiſtrates, nor had any formal political power, are now Magiſtrates and Governours, having lawful power and authority to exerce the function of a Magiſtrate: for though the People do not inſtitute the office of Magiſtracy, and though the proper eſſential Magiſtratical power, be from God and not from the People; and though the parts and qualifications wherewith the Magiſtrate ought to be, and the perſon which the people do pitch upon, is actually endued, be from God; yet till the People do ſome thing, all theſe do not formally cloath a man with Magiſtratical power, nor make him a lawful Magiſtrate, nor authorize him, to aſſume that place & charge: for, the preſent condition and temper of a people may call for a Monarchy, as moſt fit, and there may be among the Community, now aſſociated & combined into one body, moe perſones then one, alike well qualifyed for the charge; yet no man will ſay, that theſe, becauſe of their qualifications, become eo ipſo Monarchs, nor can one create himſelfe; for what right and power hath he more than his neighbour as wel qualified as he? Therefore it muſt be granted that the People create the Magiſtrate, and make this man King and not that man: Hence vve often read in ſcriptures of the Peoples making Kings Iudg. 9: 6, I Sam. 11: v. 15. 2 King. 10: 5. 1 Chron. 12: 38. Iudg. 11: 8, 11. 2 King. 14: 21. 1 Sam. 12: 1. 2 Chron. 23: 3. The Surveyer ſeemeth to yeeld this, Pag. 102. See Gerhard. de Magiſtratu, §. 49, & 89. Pag. 718, 719. Althuſ. Politic. Cap. 19. numer. 103, &c.
10. It is from the People that this way of election, and not another is pitched upon: There being ſeveral wayes, how in conſtituted Republiks, or Kingdomes, the Supreame Magiſtrates doe ſucceed to other: Some, at the death of the former, ſucceed by way of free election, and he is choſen who poſſibly hath no relation to his predeceſſour; Some are choſen, who are of the ſame family, but not as neareſt in line, but at moſt fit to exerce the office of the Soveraigne, as it was for a conſiderable time in Scotland; In ſome places the neareſt in line, are choſen, if they be Males, as in France, where, by the old Salicque Law, a Woman muſt not command in chiefe; in other places the neareſt in line ſucceed whether Male of Female, as in …r…anne now a dayes. Now whence floweth this diverſity of wayes of inſtaling the ſucceeding Magiſtrate, or of filling the place when vacant? Doth it not flow alone from the People? Might they not have pitched upon a way of conveyance of the Kingdome, by lineal ſucceſſion, when they made choiſe of continual election; or when they pitched on that, might they not have made choiſe of this? And who will ſay that a Supreame Magiſtrate of Magiſtrates, choſen by election are not as eſſentially Soveraigens, as theſe who came to the place by lineal ſucceſſion ſeing by all politicians, Election is made one of the ordinarie wayes of conſtituteing of Magiſtrates, and by many, preferred to Succeſſion? And ſeing the firſt of that Race had it by free election, he muſt be as eſſentially and lawfully the Supreame Magiſtrate, as any of his Succeſſours.
11. Even where the way of lineal ſucceſſion is condeſcended upon and eſtablished, the new Soveraigne, though he ſeem to be full and compleat heire, haeres ex aſſe, unto his Father or Predeceſſour; Yet originally, and radically he is conſtitute, and choſen by the People. For, whence cometh it but from the Peoples free choiſe that ſuch a familie, or line is choſen, and not another; and that the Eldeſt, or neareſt in the line is made choiſe of as Succeſſour, and not he, of that line, who is moſtly qualified for that place and function? So that in this caſe the Son hath not his Kingdome from his Father; for he doth not ſucceed Iure haereditario, ſed vi legis per quam primogenitus, vel alius preximus ſuccedere jube…ur, as ſayeth, Boxhornius de Majeſtrate Regum, Pag. 11, and 12. Now the Authors of this Law and conſtitution, are only the people. See Althuſ. Polit. Cap. 19. n. 90.
12. In all this, the People muſt be ſuppoſed to have ſome certane good End before their eyes: for a Rational People muſt act rationally, and rationally they cannot act, unleſſe they have before their eyes ſome certain good End; Now this end which they Intend as men, muſt be their outward Peace & Tranquillity, freedome from oppreſſion from ſtrangers or one from another, and the like; and as Chriſtians, the glory of God, the good of Religion, and of their ſouls. Therefore the People ſetteth Magiſtrates over themſelves, to promove the glory of God, the good of Religion, and their temporal felicity: And if they ſaw that this meane had not a tendency unto theſe Ends, they would never have condeſcended upon it; far leſſe if they had ſeen that it had a tendency to deſtroy theſe Ends: and therefore, in ſo far as that meane is preverted, and actually abuſed to the deſtruction of thoſe high and noble Ends, they muſt be interpreted as Non-conſenters, and eatenus de Iure, in no worſe condition, then they would have been into if they had not erected ſuch a conſtitution, or ſet ſuch over themſelves.
It is like the Surveyer, will from ſome or all of theſe, draw ſcuh Concluſions as he hath done from ſome innocent expreſſions of Naphtaly ill underſtood by him, and as ill applyed; and ſay that we drive at nothing elſe, but to have all the pariſhes of the land cantonized into ſo many free Republicks, or little Kingdomes of Ivetot. But is he an able, or if able, a faithful maintainer of the Union and integrity of his Majeſties, dominions, who vvreſteth expreſſions, far contrary to the intent of the Author and ſtarteth queſtions in Hypotheſi, according to his fancy, and that he may confute the Hypotheſis, falleth foule upon the Theſis which he ſuppoſeth (without ground) vvas the intent and deſigne of the Author of Naphtali, and vvhichwhich will be granted by all Politicians and Lavvyers. Sure, as in this he hath shewed himſelf vveak in his Politiks, ſo he hath bewrayed himſelf as weak in his prudentials: and wiſe Stateſmen will think, that (to uſe his owne expreſſions elſe where, or the like,) ſince he raiſed the Devil, he should have laid him better then he hath done, both in his firſt and in his third Chapter: and ſome will think, that ſince he had no cleare cal to meddle with thoſe queſtions, policy should have taught him either to have forborne, or to have confuted them better; And that for his very cauſe, he should be punished as an ignorant Traitor, and his pamphlet condemned to a fire, whereof it is much more worthy, then ſeverals that have gote that meaſure. But of his foolish and unfaire dealing in thoſe particulars, we shall ſpeak more afterward▪ and shall now goe on & draw ſome arguments for our purpoſe, from what hath been ſaid.
And 1. If People at the firſt erection of Government and Governours, acted rationally, it can never be ſuppoſed that they reſigned and gave their birth-privilege, and power of ſelf-defence away, ſo as they might not lavvfully ſtand to their ovvne defence, in caſes of neceſſity, vvhen that Government of theſe Governours, should either come short of giving the aſſiſtence expected in ſuch caſes, or prove lets and impediments in their vvay, far leſſe in caſe they should prove their avovved and open enemies: for is it imaginable that national men would erect ſuch a Government, of ſet up ſuch Governours, if it were told them that ſuch Would prove their bane, and that by appointing of them, and proceeding in that buſineſſe, they should denude themſelves of that power of ſelf defence, vvhichwhich novv they vvere in poſſeſſion of, See Althuſ. Polit. Cap. 38. num. 32.
2. If by this conſtitution, they were not brutified, they cannot after the conſtitution, be ſuppoſed to be in a caſe worſe then Brutes. Therefore Since Brutes may defend themſelves againſt injuries, this liberty & privilege of ſelf defence, againſt manifeſt injuries, cannot be taken away from Rational Creatures, by the erection of a Government. Againe, if by the erection, and new conſtitution, the caſe of the people cannot be ſuppoſed to be made worſe, if it was, lawfull unto them before, to defend themſelves againſt injuries, and to repel violence with violence, it cannot become unlawful afterward: it is true, it is the part of the Magiſtrate to defend them from injuries, and for this end, was he ſet up by them, that they might be the more ſecure and ſaife, but it he neglect his duty, they are not to forget themſelves, or to thinke that their hands are bound up; much leſſe, if he himſelf turne an enemie unto them.
3. If the Erected Magiſtrates remaine men, and ſinful men, and men that can do wrong and violence and injuſtice, can oppreſſe innocents, deſtroy, pillage, plunder, kill and perſecute unjuſtly: Then the innocents may no leſſe defend themſelves againſt their violence, injuries, oppreſſions, murthers, &c. then againſt the violence, oppreſſions, and injuries of others: for the wrongs and injuries they do, are as reall wrongs & injuries (and in ſome reſpect greater) as the wrongs and injuries committed by others. Therefore the People are ſtill allowed to uſe their privilege of ſelf defence even againſt them, and their unjuſt violence, in caſes of neceſſity, as wel as againſt others
4. If it was of the People that this forme of Government, and not another was pitched upon and made choiſe of, no man in reaſon can thinke, that their condition should be worſe under that forme, then under any other, ſince they acting rationally, made choiſe of that, as the beſt and moſt convenient and conduceable to their ends; But that that forme should be every was as much for their peace, ſaifty, welfare, and ſecurity, as any other, ought no more to binde up their hands from neceſſary ſelf defence, when urged thereunto by inevitable neceſſity, then if they were free from under that forme.
5. If it was of the Peoples owne accord, that they aſſociated with ſuch of ſuch, without any previous determination of Nature, neceſſitating them thereunto. Then it is rational to inferre that their aſſociation with ſuch, should not be to their detriment and manifeſt hurt, nor should it incapacitate them for doing that in their owne defence, which, before that aſſociation and combination, they were allowed to do. So that if the equal half, major or minor part, should lye by, and refuſe to concurre with the reſt in their neceſſary defence, Thoſe who deſire to ſtand to their owne defence, and repel violence with violence, are not, in poynt of conſcience, juſtly reſtrained or bound up. If the equal half, or major or minor part of an army, betray the cauſe, or revolt to the Enemy, the honeſt party will be allowed in poynt of Law and Conſcience and Valour, to ſtand to the cauſe, and defend themſelves and their Countrey to the laſt man, yea even though the General himſelf should become a Head unto that revolting party.
6. If it was in the Peoples power to limite the time definitely or indefinitly, how long ſuch a forme should continue, and therefore had power (as Politicians will readily grant) to change that forme, when the neceſſity of their condition did require it: Sure it cannot be repugnant to Reaſon to ſay, That the People have ſtill a power to defend themſelves from the manifeſt injuries, and intolerable oppreſſion of that forme, or of theſe who are exerceing in that forme. If a people may lawfully change a forme of Government, when it becometh intolerably grievous, and not only not conduceing to the good of the Commonwealth, but clearly and ſenſibly tending to its deſtruction, they may be leſſe (if not more) lawfully defend themſelves againſt the manifeſt and intolerable injuries thereof. Yea even in caſe they had by vowes or engagements ſo bound up their hands that they could not alter the forme; it were not rational to thinke that their caſe should therefore be irremediably the worſe, but that rather God and Nature would allow them in that caſe, ſo much the more to make uſe of their primaeve privilege of ſelf defence, becauſe they could not uſe their power of altering the forme, for their ſecurity and ſaifty, as otherwiſe they might have done.
7. If the People make Magiſtrates, and ſet them over themſelves, then, though it were yeelded (which yet lawyers and politicians not a few will not grant, ſee Althuſ. pol. cap. 38.) n. 35. where he proveth it by l. nemo qui 37. de reg. jur. l 6. ſolent de offic. proconſ. l. 3. de re. jud. novel 15. de. ef. civ. c. 1 §. 1.) that they had no power to depoſe them againe in caſe of male-adminiſtration, and abuſeing the power to the deſtruction of the Commonwealth; yet) it will undenyably follow, that the people may defend themſelves againſt their manifeſt iyranny and oppreſſion: for, it wil be granted that a People have more power, in creating a Magiſtate then in making a Miniſter; and it will be granted likwayes, that if the Miniſter; turne heretical, and preach atheiſme, Mahumetaniſme, or the like, the People, though they could not formally depoſe him, or, through the corruption of the times, could not get him depoſed by theſe who had power, yet they might lawfully guard themſelves from his unſound doctirne, and defend their ſouls from his haereſie by withdrawing: and if he should uſe violence to force them to heare him, & acknowledg him as an orthodox teacher, they might repel violence with violence, and peremptorily maintaine the Truth.
8. If it was from the People, That ſuch a way of conveyance of the Magiſtratical power, was condeſcended on, ſo that when they pitched on this, they might have choſen any other; Then (as Lawyers will grant) they have ſtill power to alter the ſame as neceſſity requireth, much more then have they power to defend themſelves, againſt the Tyranny thereof: and if either at the firſt conſtitution or afterward ſomething interveened which laid ſuch a reſtraint upon them, that they could not change that manner of conveyance, then ſo much the more are they allowed to defend themſelves from the tyranny thereof, by recurring, in caſes of neceſſity, unto their primaeve privilege, and this inward wall and bulwark ought to be the more fortified, that they want their outter fortifications.
9. If even where the conveyance runeth in a line, the Succeſſour cannot pretend to more dominion over the ſubjects, then his Predeceſſours had, and the People cannot rationally be ſuppoſed to be in a worſe condition under the Succeſſour, then they were under his Predeceſſour, ſeing he holdeth the place, not jure haereditario; but jure legali or jure conſtitutionis: and therefore if they might lawfully reſiſt the unjuſt violence of his Predeceſſour, or of the Firſt in the Line; no man, in reaſon can deny it lawful for them to reſiſt his tyranny, who cometh to that place by vertue of the fundamental conſtitution: and no otherwayes.
10. If upon pregnant conſiderations, and for good, laudable and neceſſary ends, the People erected a civil ſtate, and ſuch a forme of Government, and ſuch Governours to ſucceed to other in ſuch a manner of way, as the apparent and probable meane, for the ſure, ſaife, ſpeedy and moſt effectual way of attaineing theſe ends. It were irrational to think that being diſappoynted of their expectations and fruſtrated of their hopes, of attaineing the deſired ends by ſuch meanes, They were in an irremediable caſe, and had no meane left them of attaineing theſe neceſſary ends, no not ſo much, as that pure product of Nature, ſelf-preſervation, and power to repel force with force. No man will ſay, but that a People are looſed from their obligation to uſe ſuch meanes which they formerly pitched upon for theſe neceſſary and important Ends, when i they not only prove not uſeful, as meanes for attaineing of theſe ends, but prove deſtructive, and ſtand in contra-oppoſition there unto; and in this caſe, muſt be ſuppoſed, to have the ſame liberty to uſe ſuch meanes as they were allowed to uſe in their primeve ſtate, that is, to joyne together and aſſociate, the beſt way they can, for repelling of what deſtroyeth theſe noble and important Ends, and defend their Religion, Lives and Libertyes.
But it may be the Surveyer, or ſome for him will ſay. That all this is nothing to the purpoſe; becauſe, The ſtate of our government and conſtitution is of a diſtinct and far different nature.
Anſ. As to this, (reſerving what is further to be ſpoken on that ſubject unto the next chapter, where we shall ſpeak of the obligation of the Soveraigne unto the People) theſe things ſeeme cleare and undenyable. 1. That before Fergus the firſt, was choſen by the People, to be their King and Chiftane, there were a people living in Scotland, manageing their owne matters, the beſt way they could. 2. While they were in this condition, we heare on none among them, however poſſibly excelling others in wealth, power, wiſdome and ſuch like enduements, that took upon them the Soveraignity, otherwayes Fergus had not been the firſt King. 3. When they thought of ſending for Fergus, and of making him King, they were not acted as beaſts, but went rationally to work, conſidering their preſent hazard from their adverſaries, and the advantage they would have by ſetting ſuch over themſelves, and erecting a ſtablished policy. 4. After the conſtitution and erection of the Kingdome, they remained rational creatures, ſenſible of injuries done unto them, whether by their Kings or others, as after experience manifeſted. 5. Nor did their Kings, after their election, become Angels, or Creatures above their reach, but for male-adminiſtration, oppreſſion or tyranny, were made to know they were Men, as ſubject to erring and doing wrong, ſo to examination, tryal, and condigne punishment for their injuries done to the Commonwealth. 6. When they condeſcended upon Monarchy, though, as matters then ſtood, they ſaw it moſt for their advantage to have a King; yet none vvill ſay, but they might, notvvithſtanding of that exigent, have choſen an Ariſtocracy for a ſtanding forme of government. 7. When they compacted themſelves into a diſtinct body, and ſeparated both from the Picts and from the Britones, they might, had they ſeen it for their advantage, either joyned vvith the Picts or Britones, and made one firme Commonvvealth vvith them; or have divided themſelves into tvvo or moe diſtinct Bodyes, and diſtinct Republiks, as they had ſeen it convenient: No previous neceſſity, ſave that they ſavv if for their only advantage to do as they did, conſtraining them to the one more then to the other. 8. When they made choiſe of a King, they might, if they had ſeen it good, preſcribed the time how long that Government should have endured, whether until the death of Fergus, or hovv long there after. 9. When they made choiſe of Fergus, vvho then vvas in Irland, and ſent for him, they might (without any injury done to any man) have choſen any other, they had thought moſt for their advantage; and before they made choiſe of him, He could challenge no power or authority, over them, nor could He be accounted their King; and when they made choiſe of him and made him their King, then, and not till then, was he their King. 10. It was in their power to have named▪ ergus without his ſucceſſours by line, and ſo have reſerved power to themſelves, to chooſe of new another after his death: and though they did include his ſucceſſours by line; yet their after practiſe declared, that they had liberty to chooſe the fitteſt of the family, when the neareſt in the line, was not judged fit for government, which cuſtome continued above a Thowſand yeers, till the dayes of Kenneth the third: 11. And, when it afterward came to a lineal conſtant ſucceſſion, The ſone had no right but by the conſtitution condeſcended on, in the dayes of this Kenneth. 12. That in all theſe reſolutions and conſtitutions they levelled at nothing, but their owne good and ſaifty is body and ſoul, is beyond contradiction. And finally, their after practices did declare that they looked not upon themſelves, as rendered incapable by all thoſe forementioned reſolutions, to defend themſelves againſt manifeſt and unjuſt violence, even of the King and his followers; though this Surveyer Pag. 78. accounts theſe nothing but the i… ſurrection of Nobles againſt the Kings, and violent oppreſſions of ſuch of them, as have been flagitious and tyrannous. Yet they were cleare inſtances of the peoples reſerving power to themſelves, notwithſtanding of the conſtitution, to defend their libertyes and lives, from oppreſſion and tyranny of flagitious and tyrannous Kings, abuſing their power and ſubverting the ends of governments, and deſtroying what they were bound to maintaine and defend.