The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion, Religious tract · Chapter 6

The Peoples Right to Defend Themselves and their Covenanted Religion · Religious tract · Chapter 6

CAP. VI.

Of the Covenant betwixt King and People. Our Arguments hence deduced.

IT is no great wonder to ſee this Surveyer labouring, to free the King from any covenant-obligation unto his Subjects; when he and his party have proclaimed him exempted from his Covenant-obligation unto God: and ſince the have put both conſciences and wit upon the rack, to finde out ſome plauſible grounds of evaſion, that the King may be free from the Covenant, which he ſwore with hands lifted up to the Moſt High God oftener then once; with which, however they may ſatisfy ſuch as love licentiouſneſſe, and to live above God's Law, as well as man's; yet God will not be ſo deceived, let men dream what they will; it should be no matter of aſtonishment to us, to ſee them uſeing shifts whereby to bring the King from under any Covenant tye unto his Subjects: But it might ſeem ſtrange to us (if we knew not the Men) that when lawyers and polititians tell us, that the King, is abſolutely bound unto his Subjects, and the People, obliged unto the King condionally, ſee Hoenonius, diſp. polit. 2. and Iunius Brutus vindiciae contra Tyrannos quaeſt. 3. and Althuſ. pol. c. 20. n. 3. 21. & cap. 38. n. 30. They on the contrary should averre, that the people were abſolutly bound unto the King, & the King not only not tyed conditionally, but not at all, unto the People.

But, from what was ſaid in the preceeding chapter, it wil clearly follow, That when a people do inſtitute a Governement, and do commit the Supreame Managment of affaires unto one or more, They do it upon certane tearmes and conditions, which conditions, polititians ordinarily call fundamentall lawes, others think that name not proper enough, but whether we call them ſo, or call them tearmes and conditions of the conſtitution of compact, it is all one thing. p. 96That there are certane tearmes and conditions on which the Soveraigne is choſen, is cleare from theſe grounds. 1. The man who is made Soveraigne by the People, can pretend no right to the Soveraignity, (as was shewed before) until he be named and choſen by the People. And this conſtituting of him Soveraigne, muſt be by compact and contract betwixt him and them; for ſuch mutual relations, as are betwixt Prince and People, can ariſe from no other act then a compact, unleſſe they ſay, it ariſeth from a free donation; but then they muſt grant that the whole power cometh from the People, and was theirs before and might be given out by them, or not, as they thought fit; for no law can conſtraine a man to give a gift: & further, if it was from them by free gift, the very nature and end of that Donation puts it beyond debate that it was upon ſome valueable conſideration, of which when fruſtrated, they might recal their donation; and ſo ſtill it will be, a virtual compact. But now it being by a real comapct and formal, either explicite or implicite, that this man and not that man is made Soveraigne, There muſt be ſome conditions on which this mutual compact ſtandeth: for a compact cannot be vvithout conditions. 2. We shevv that in this Act of conſtituting a Government ad Governours, the People acted rationally; and carryed themſelves in this buſineſſe, not as irrational brutes, but as rational men; and if ſo, hovv is it imaginable that they vvould ſet any over them vvith an illi mited povver, vvithout any tearmes and conditions to be condeſcended unto by him? Would rational men, acting deliberatly about a matter of ſuch moment and conſequence, not to themſelves alone, but to their poſterity in after ages, ſet a Soveraigne over them, vvithout any limitations, conditions, or reſtrictions, ſo as they might rob, ſpoile, plunder murther, deflore, do acts of injuſtice and oppreſſion, and act tyranny as they pleaſed? 3. We shew that in this matter; the People had certane▪ real, good and neceſſary Ends before them: now, can it enter into the heart of any man to think, that Rational men acting rationally, & laying downe wayes for attaineing good aud neceſſary Ends, would p. 97ſet a Prince over themſelves, without any conditions or reſtrictions; ſince otherwiſe they could not rationally expect, that the meane which they had condeſcended upon, could ever attaine the End? For every one of them might ſaifly have judged of the Prince by themſelves, and ſeing they might have found in themſelves, an inclination to domineer, to oppreſſe and tyrannize over others, they might rationally have concluded that the Prince was, and would be but a Man of the ſame pasſions and infirmities with themſelves, and ſo as ready, if not more, to deborde and to do wrong: & therefore unleſse they had made him Soveraigne upon tearmes and conditions, they could not have expected that their chooſeing of him, could have been a meane fitted and accommodated for attaining the Ends propoſed: A Soveraigne left at liberty to tyrannyze, to oppreſse and to deſtroy the Subject, is no fit meane to procure their welfare, either in ſoul or body, or to ſet forward the glory of God. 4. We shew that their condition after the conſtitution, was not to be worſe then it was before the conſtitution. But if they had ſet up a Soveraigne without any conditions, their condition could not but be worſe; and rational men could not but for ſee that their condition would, of necesſity, be worſe; for, to ſet up a Soveraigne without conditions, is to ſet up a Tyrant ſince if they do not limite him to termes and conditions, they give him leave to Rule as he liſteth, and his will muſt be to them for a law; and what is that but to ſet up a Tyrant; and if a Tyrant be ſet up over a People, shall not their condition in that caſe, be worſe then when they were at liberty to manage, their owne matters, as they could beſt?

Moreover this may be cleared from other reaſons, as 1. In all other relations, which ariſe from mutual conſent, and compact, there are alwayes, tearmes & conditions on which the contract or compact is concluded: as in the contract betwixt Man and Wife, Maſter and Servant, Tutor & Pupil, Maſter & Scholer, & the like, Here alwayes are preſuppoſed tearms & conditions, on which the compact, the only fundation of theſe relations, is founded: for, no Man marryeth a wife, but upon condition, she carry as a dutyfull wife, p. 98and no woman maryeth a Husband but upon the like tearmes. So a Maſter indenteth with his Servant, and his Servant bindeth himſelf to him, upon tearmes. The Tutor, is under obligations to his Pupil, and if he break ſuch or ſuch conditions, he loſeth his benefite, and moreover is anſwerable as law wil. So is the Maſter obliged to performe ſuch and ſuch conditions unto his Scholer, So are there conditions betwixt the Lord and his Vaſſals, and betwixt Paſtor and People. 2. This will be cleare from the Nature of that power and authority, which the Soveraigne hath over the Subjects, of which afterward. 3. It is againſt Nature, to ſet up any Tyrant, or one who is free from all conditions; for, that were, upon the matter, to ſet up a Waſter, an Enemy to the Commonwealth, a bloody Tyger or Lyon, to deſtroy all: ſee Althuſ. Pol c. 19. n, 33. 35. 36. 37. 4. To imagine a King free of conditions unto his Subjects is to put them in among bona fortunae: and to ſay, they are as the King's gold, his sheep, his oxen, his lands and revenues, unto which, he ſtandeth no way obliged. 5. If a People should ſet a Soveraigne over them, without conditions, they should ſin againſt the Law of God, which vvill have ſuch and ſuch dutyes performed by them, vvho are Soveraignes; and they, by ſetting up Soveraignes vvithout theſe limitations, should ſay▪ ſuch and ſuch shall be our Soveraignes, contrare to the limitations of God's Law. 6. This is confirmed by the practice of all Nations, where a free People ſet up Soveraignes: It is alwayes upon tearmes and conditions. They Perſians (as Xenophon lib. 8. Cyri Paed. tell us) did thus Covenante with Cyrus, that he should ſend aide to them, out of his owne Countrey, if any should warre againſt them, or violate their lawes; and they againe did promiſe, that they should helpe him, if any would not obey him, defending his Countrey; and therefore Xenophon calleth this contract or compact foreign. So the Spartan King (as the ſame Xenophon tells us, de Rep. Laced:) did every MonethMonth Renew their oath unto the Ephori, & promiſed to governe them according to the lawes of the land, & the Ephori upon the other hand, promiſed to Eſtablish the Kingdom in their hands. We reade of a compact betwixt Romulus, and the people p. 99of Rome Dioniſ. Halicarn. Lib. 1. betwixt the Senate & the Caeſars Idem Lib. 2. It is notoure enough that the Emperour when he is choſen, agrieth unto tearmes and conditions; and alſo the King of Poland: and hiſtoryes tells us, what conditions are made betwixt King and People, at the coronation of Kings in England, France, Boheme, Spaine, Portugal, Sweden Denmark, &c. 7. The practice of our owne Kingdome, doth ſufficiently confirme this, of which more, when we conſider what this Surveyer ſayeth to the contrary. 8. Lawyers, Polititians & Divines tell us, that there are ſuch conditions condeſcended on in all free Republicks. Hoenonius Diſp. Pol. 2. Theſ. 4. tells us that the Subjects do ſtipulate from the Magiſtrates, whether they will rule ſo as they may lead a peacable and quyet life under them, and Theſ. 5. that the Magiſtrates do abſolutely promiſe; and the Subjects upon condition promiſe what is their duty. So Althuſius cap. 38. Polit. n. 31. and cap. 19. n. 15. 23. 29. and Timplerus Polit. Lib. 2. Cap. 1. Quest. 5. proveth that there is a mutual obligation betwixt Magiſtrates and Subjects. See likewiſe Gerhard de Magiſtratu, Theſ. 94. Pag. 726. Where he proveth that it is no new thing, That Magiſtrates and Subjects do Covenante with each other.

Finally, This is cleared, from ſome Scripture inſtances, as firſt The Covenant, which David made with the Tribes of Iſrael, 2 Sam. 5. 3. 1 Chron. 11. 3. So all the elders of Iſrael came to the King to Hebron, and King David made a league with them in Hebron before the Lord, and they anoynted David King over Iſrael. Sanches on the place thinketh, He promiſed to rule them according to the law Deut. 17 15. and that ſome other things were contained in that Covenant, which did relate to the preſent ſtate of a affaires, as concerning the war with their near and inſolent enemies, concerning an act of oblivion, and other things, which they could think upon, in that troubleſome ſtate of affaires: and upon the other hand the People promiſed fidelity and obedience, and what elſe is required in well conſtituted Commonwealths; and that this Covenant was ſealed by oath of both parties] Cornel a Lap: calleth it a mutual promiſe, wherein David Covenanted p. 100to governe the Kingdome faithfully, according to the law of God Leut. 17. 16. &c. &. Iſrael, on the other hand, promiſed to be obedient and faithful to him: The Surveyer tryeth many shifts to make this, no mutual Covenant, or conditional Covenant Pag. 94. 95. He cannot deny but there was a Covenant here agreed upon, betwixt David and theſe Tribes of Iſrael. But he ſayes [the Quaeſtion is, what was the nature, the matter and import of that Covenant, The Scripture ſayes not it was ſuch a Covenant (as theſe men would have it) I shall rule you rightly, if you obey medutifully, otherwiſe not (upon the King's part) and (upon the peoples part) we shall obey you and be ſubject to you, if ye rule us rightly, otherwiſe we will not, but uſe our coactive power upon you, to dethrone, and deſtroy you, and punish you.] Anſ. If it be granted that here was a mutual contract, wherein the King accepted of conditions and obliged himſelf thereunto, it is enough for our preſent purpoſe, (& the Dutch Annotators on 2 Sam. 5. 3. ſay hereby they were bound on both ſides by oath, to performe their dutyes to other) for we are not yet ſpeaking of the nature and import of ſuch Covenants, and what right or power the party keeping, hath over the party failing. 2. The Text doth not tell us what was the particular matter of this Covenant, but from the Text, we may clearly ſee, that this was a conditional Covenant, a Covenant wherein the King promiſed ſuch and ſuch things, as ſatiſfied them, and induced them to accept of him as King, and anoynt him: ſo that if the tearmes had not pleaſed them, they would not have accepted of him as King, If the King had ſaid, I will be an Abſolute Prince to account you ſtill mine Enemies, and kill ſuch of you, as I will, and keep a live ſuch of you as I will, and ſo play the Tyrant, be like he had gote the anſwere that Rehoboam gote To your tents … Iſrael: What portion have we in David? 3. How can he prove, That they did not minde to offer themſelves to David upon ſuch tearmes, [They (ſayes he Pag. 95) recognoſe, his right of reigning over them is of the Lord, and that he was not ſubjecte to be removed by them, for they ſay The Lord ſayd to thee, thou shalt feed my p. 101people Iſrael, and thou shalt be Ruler over them, and it is added Therefore they came, &c.] Anſ: 1. All this will not prove that this Covenant was not conditional, or that David did not oblige himſelf to ſuch and ſuch conditions; for if theſe reaſons have any force, they will as well ſay, that they should not have made a Covenant with him it all, but ſubmitted without Covenant: and they knew his right by promiſe to the throne, before this, and yet for all that, they refuſed to come till now, and now when they come, David muſt make a Covenant with them. 2. The ſame Tribes of Iſrael did recognoſce Rehoboam's right to reigne; for they came to Shechem to make him King▪ 1 King. 12. 1. 2. Chron. 10. v. 1. & yet when Reh…boam would not agree unto the tearmes propoſed, They refuſed to acknowledg him King. 3. That 1 Chron. 11. 3. Therefore came is but the ſame with So came, 2 Sam. 5. 3. and it may be as well rendered, alſo or and came, for in the Original it is in both places foreign and it is there told, that alſo the Elders of Iſrael came, who were not mentioned before. 4. Gods promiſe to David, gave him no power to play the Tyrant, nor was it to be fulfilled but ſuch a way, God's purpoſes concerning the End includeth the Meanes with the End, and his purpoſe or promiſe was not that David should obtaine the throne without the Peoples conſent, or that the People was obliged to ſubmit unto him notwithſtanding he should refuſe to Covenant with them, or promiſe to Rule them in righteouſneſſe, and not to play the Tyrant over them: and hence it appeareth that it is not falſe that the People gave the Kingdome to David conditionally (as he ſayeth Pag. 101.) for, if He ſay theſe promiſes or purpoſes of God, did lay obligations of the People to accept Such upon any tearmes, he cannot condemne the Ten Trybes for accepting of Ieroboam, as he doth elſwhere! 5. As for their coactive ſuperiority over him, we ſpeake not of it now, it not being our preſent buſineſſe, but ſure his reaſons will not validely conclude the contrair: for if ſuch a promiſe or purpoſe of God, gave David ſuch a right, as that in no caſe, ſuppoſe he had turned the greateſt Tyrant imaginable, & had ſold the Land of Canaan unto the Uncircumciſed, p. 102or done ſome ſuch thing; the Elders of Iſrael had had no coercive power to have with-ſtood him, and dethroned him, then they might not now have refuſed to have ſubmitted unto him: And by the ſame reaſon, The elders of Iſrael might not have refuſed to have ſubmitted to Iero…oam who alſo had a promiſe, which I know he will not grant. But it is enough to our preſent purpoſe, if it be granted that David agreed with them upon tearmes. This he cannot get well denyed, but ſayeth. [All the Covenant that can be ſuppoſed here, is upon the peoples part, an engagement to humble ſubjection and homage; & upon the Kings part, a Covenant of indempnity for former oppoſitions to him, wherein they had need to be comfortably ſecured.] Anſ. If it was ſuch a Covenant, then it ſecured all the People of Iſrael, and their Elders with them, and David was bound to have keeped it, and did keep it. He did not then execute thereafter ſome of them upon ſcafſolds, and ſet up their heads upon poles, as Traitours. 2. We finde nothing in the Text, of their acknowledging a crime done, ſo as they needed an act of indempnity: it is like David in a piece of holy policy, meet for that time, to gather together the ſcattered people of God, (to uſe the Surveyer's words, Pag. 94.) Would have been content to have paſſed an act of oblivion, as leſſe irritateing, then an act of indempnity. 3. If they were now coming to be his Subjects who were not ſo before, but were under another King (as he ſayes himſelf Pag. 94.) what neceſſity was there, either for an act of indempnity or yet an act of oblivion? Ay [but it was fit (ſayes he ibid to give them ſecurity, touching his good minde toward them, they having ſo long ſtood it out, in armes againſt him.] Anſ. But was there no more requiſite to ſecure them touching his good minde towards them, and his willingneſſe to accept of them as ſubjects, who before were enemies, except this act of indempnity? Since they were in open hoſtility one againſt another, and if upon this ground, the Covenant on David's part was of indempnity, why should it not be alſo a Covenant of indempnity on their part; ſeing, as he confeſſed, they were not his ſubjects before, but under p. 103another King? But now, when they come to bee ſubjects who were not ſo before, and engage to humble ſubjection, and homage, muſt not David in this Covenant engadge to ſomething correſponding to this? we shall not repugne (ſayeth he) if it be called a Covenant both of protection & right ruleing them.] Anſw. That is all I am ſeeking, to have David here obliged by Covenant, unto his Subjects, to ſuch and ſuch tearmes, as to Protect and Rule them a right. Ay but he adds [Yet ſo, as not ſubjecting himſelf to their cenſures, or co-action, or that they should be his ſubjects only upon that condition, being otherwiſe free to fall upon him.] Anſw. This is not to our preſent buſineſſe. But yet how can he prove this? Is it enough to ſay ſo? Will his adverſary take that for an anſwere? Is there not here a mutual Convenant, wherein each party is bound to other? Are not the tearmes condeſcended upon? And is it not granted by all, that in mutual Covenants the obſerver hath a jus againſt the breakers? But ſayes he [a Covenant may be to mutual dutyes, & yet on neither ſide conditional, but absolute, eath party obligeing themſelves to their owne duty abſolutely, but not on condition that the other party do their duty.] Anſ. Then it ſeemes Iſrael was bound to David, whether he would be a King to them or not; Yea even though he would ſell them to morrow to the Philiſtines for ſlaves and bond men for ever, and David was bound to Protect and Rule them a right, whether they would be Subjects or not. 2. How can he prove that this was ſuch a Covenant? 3. Yea, how can he prove that there is any ſuch Covenant among men; or how can he explaine ſuch a Covenant? [As if (ſayes he) a man bind himſelf by oath, to give me one hundereth pounds, & I bind my ſelf againe by oath to him, to give him one hundereth pounds, without conditional proviſion that he pay me the money he promiſed me; albeit he should fail in his oath, & not pay me; yet muſt not I fail in mine but muſt pay him: becauſe my oath is ſeparate from his & independent upon it, and hath a ſeparate obligation abſolute, which no faileing of the other party to me, can looſe] Anſw. It is true manus manum fricat, and if this Surveyer p. 104give to one a hundereth pounds. He will know it is for an hundereth pounds againe, or ſomething better: and I wish he should think himſelf as wel bound by his oath, to pay the thing, he promiſed to God abſolutely, as he thinks he is bound to pay to man what he had promiſed abſolutely. But to our buſineſſe, what ſort of mutual Covenants can thoſe be, which he here ſpeaketh of? We hear to Pactions or Covenants where there are promiſes without a ſtipulation, but of a Covenant or Paction betwixt two, concerning mutual duties to be performed by each to other, wherein there is no ſtipulation, or which is no conditional Covenant, I have not yet heard. 2. Where heare we that ſuch a transaction (if it can have that name) wherein one perſon promiſeth abſolutely to another to give him ſuch or ſuch a ſumme of money; and that other perſon againe promiſeth abſolutely to give to the firſt another ſumme, is called a Covenant? 3. Lawyers tell us that even Promiſſiones, promiſes, if compleat and not mere Policitations, wil give a jus a right unto the perſon, to whom they are made to call for the performance, and ſue the promiſer at Law: And if this be granted (as it cannot be denyed) he will loſe his cauſe: For when the queſtion cometh betwixt the Magiſtrate and the Subjects, it is the ſame caſe, as when the queſtion cometh betwixt two diſtinct Nations: For as there is not a Superiour Judge over both Nations to determine the controverſy; ſo nor is there a Superiour ordinary Judge to decide the queſtion that falleth out betwixt King and Subjects: And therefore, as the ſword muſt determine it, in the one caſe, ſo in the other. 4. But how shall he evince that the Covenant, betwixt King & People is not a reciprocal contract of things to be done by each to other upon conditions? It is true, he tells us that ſubjection is not promiſed to Kings conditionally, but abſolutely; but in ſo ſaying, he doth onelyonly beg the queſtion. A better Polititian then he, Althuſius Polit. c. 19. num. 6, 7. calleth it a mutual compact betwixt Prince and People upon certaine conditions, and calleth it Contractum mandati, and he tells us, that in this contract the Prince is a Mandataruis, and his obligation preceedeth as the obligation p. 105of the Mandatarius and promiſer, uſeth to do, and then followeth the obligation of the People ſecundum naturam mandati, whereby they promiſe obedience and fidelity to him governing the Commonwealth according to the conditions preſcribed.

Another Scripture inſtance is 2 King. 11: v. 17. 2 Chron. 23: v. 3. 16. where Iehojadah made a Covenant betwixt the King and the People, which (as the English Annotators and the Dutch alſo on the place ſay) was a civil Covenant betwixt them, viz. That the King should governe then well, They should obey him in the Lord. Peter Martyr, alſo ſayeth that [not only King and People covenanted with God; but the King alſo with the People; and the People with the King] and thereafter that [the King was bound to rule the People according to the Lawes, & equity, Secundum Iura & Leges, and the People promiſed to obey him.] [Zanches more fully tells us, there was a Covenant betwixt the King and the People, as uſes to be betwixt the Prince and Commonwealths: The Prince undertaketh to defend the Kingdome, Lawes, Equity, and to be a keeper and defender of the Countrey, and of Religion: And upon the other hand, People promiſe obedience, and fidelity and ſuch expenſes, as are neceſſary for keeping up the Majeſty of the Prince, &c.] Now what ſayes our Surveyer to this? He tells us Pag. 96. That it was alſo made upon an extraordinary occaſion; & extraordinaryes cannot ſound ordinary rules] Anſw. How doth he prove that it was meerly upon the extraordinaryneſſe of the occaſion that this Covenant was made? he might as well ſay that the crowning of him, & giving him the teſtimony, & making him King, and making a Covenant betwixt the Lord and the King, were extraordinary, and ſo could not found ordinary rules: yea and that it was extraordinary for the People to ſweare allegiance unto him. But he hath two things remarkable to his purpoſe as [1. That he is crowned & made King before the Covenant is made, which croſſeth the antimonarchiſts, who aſſert, the King cannot be made King, until he make the Covenant with the People, & that he gets the crowne and royal authority covenant wiſe, and p. 106conditionally] Anſw. Antimonarchiſts properly ſo called, are againſt all Monarchs limited or abſolute, or doth he account them all antimonarchiſts who ſay that the King is a limited Magiſtrate? then we know what to think of the Monarchiſts and Royaliſts, of him and his party. 2. He knoweth himſelf that the ſeries or order of the relation of a complex buſineſſe, is not alwayes juſt according to the ſeries of the things done; but be it ſo, this maketh for us in the former inſtance of David's Covenanting with Iſrael, Which is mentioned, before their making of him King. 3. But ſuppoſe the King had refuſed to enter into Covenant with the Lord, or with the People (for mention is made of both Covenants after his Coronation) might they not for all their ſolemnities in crowning of him, have refuſed to have ownned him, as King? 4. But to put the matter beyond all debate, we finde, compareing the two places together, That beſide the Covenant betwixt Iehojadah, and the Rulers of Hundereds &c. mentioned 2. King. 11. 4, and 2 Chron. 23. 1. which was rather a Covenant betwixt themſelves, to depoſe Athalia, and to ſet up joash; to put down Idolatry, and to ſet up the true worshipe of God, (as the English annotations & the Dutch ſay) then a Covenant of fidelity or allegiance to the King, as he would have it, we finde 2 Chron. 23. 3. a Covenant made betwixt the Congregation and the King, and this was, before he was crowned or made King, which Covenant (as the English annotators ſay) [was a mutual ſtipulation, betwixt the King, and Them, That the King should maintaine the true worshipe of God, the peace of the Kingdome, and privilege of the ſubjects; and that the People should maintaine the King, and yeeld unto him his due.] The next thing he ſayeth is [That it is not told us what the tenor of this covenant is, Dioda… ſeems to ſay that Iehojadah made them ſweare allegiance and fidelity to the King but how shall it be cleared that it was conditional, & with a reſerve of coactive, & punitive power over him?] Anſw. Of this coactive power over Kings, we are not now ſpeaking, and he but playeth the fool to ſtart ſuch queſtions without ground. 2. That it was a conditional Covenant, the ſcope p. 107of the place cleareth: for, if they had not expected tha… their condition had been better under his reigne then under Athaliah, be like they had never reſolved to have ventured their lives, and eſtates for him: and if the Covenant had not been conditional, they could have had no rational expectation of the bettering of their condition from the young King, Againe, if it was not a conditional Covenant. The King could with no more certainty have expected their dutyful obedience, then They his faithful government. 3. It is true, the matter and tenor of the Covenant is not expreſſed; but the nature of the act, doth abundantly cleare what it was, and that it was ſuch as the English annotators have expreſſed. 4. If Diodat ſay it was nothing elſe, but the Peoples ſwearing allegiance, he ſpeaketh without ground, for it was a mutual Covenant, a Covenant betwixt King and People, But ſayes he, ſuppoſe [all the Kings of Judah made ſuch covenants with the People, yet will any judicious man force the Particular cuſtomes of that Nation on all Nations? that might be beſt for that Nation, that was not ſimply beſt; their cuſtomes without a law of God bearing a ſtanding reaſon, cannot be obligatory on others, leſt we judaize too much] Anſw. 1. We are not now preſſing their practice as our only warrand; but by their practice, we prove the lawfulneſſe of the King's being brought under conditions, and obligations to the people; which Politicians Lawyers, and Divines uſe to do. 2. He muſt show why ſuch a practice was beſt to them, & not alſo to other nations. 3. We Judaize not more in this, then in crowning and making of Kings (though I grant they do, who uſe the ceremony of anoynting with oile.) 4. We have the Law of Nature, which is the law of God, bearing a ſtanding reaſon of this▪ as was shewed above. 5. Yea that lavv of God mentioned Deut. 17. 15. &c. Limiting the Prince, shovveth that it was the Peoples duty (unto whom that is ſpoken) when they were to ſet a King over themſelves, to provide for these conditions: ſo that as they might not de jure ſet a ſtranger over them, neither might they ſet any over them, who vvould not engage to keep the conditions vvhichwhich they were to required of him p. 108v. 16. 17. 18. 19. and theſe Conditions of the King being held forth unto them, ſayes that they were impowered to ſtipulate ſuch of the King, whom they were to create: and that poynts forth a Covenant to be made betwixt them and their King, & power alſo in them to reſtraine the King from tranſgeſſing theſe conditions as Ioſephus tels Ant. Lib. 4. cap. 14. Si autem fuerit alias, &c. …. e. [But if otherwiſe a deſire of a King shall adhere unto you, let him be of your ſtock, let him make much of Juſtice and other vertues, and let him know that there is moſt wiſdome in the lawes and in God: let him do nothing without the advice of the High prieſt, & Elders: neither let him aſſume to himſelf many vvives, nor ſeek after abundance of riches nor horſes with the pleanty of vvhichwhich things, he may vvax proud & deſpiſe the lawes; but leſt he have an earneſt ſtudy to be more mighty then is convenient for your profite, Prohibeatur(ſayeth the copy at Paris) obſtandum est (ſayeth another) ne potentior fiat quam rebus veſtris expedit. …. e. he is to be incapicat or reſiſted in caſe he should do ſo. But then he tells us that the conſtant practice of the prophets and people of God ſpeaks clearly that they never had ſuch thoughts &c.] Anſ. Though (as I ſaid) it doth not concerne us to vindicate ſuch a liberty in the People, as by vertue of this Covenant, to fall vvith violence on their Kings; our purpoſe being only to vindicate a liberty in the People to defend themſelves againſt unjuſt violence; yet he doth but vveakly maintaine the King's head by this; for he ſaid himſelf juſt novv, that none vvith Reaſon could force the particular cuſtomes of that Nation on other Nations; and vvith more reaſon it may be ſaid, that none can force the Omiſſions or non-practices of that Nation, as binding to others. But 2. We knovv the Ten tribes rejected Rehoboam & vve finde no Prophets ever condemning them in this, they never ſuggeſted that their obligation to ſubjection unto their Supream Magiſtrate or King, vvas abſolute: had this been ſuch a ſin as he allegeth, no doubt (to uſe his ovvne vvords) God's Prophets vvould plainly and dovvnright have told them of it, vvithout circumlocutions; but this they never did. Either that vvas no ſin, or the Prophets vvere p. 109not faithful in reproving it. Novv let him anſvvere his ovvne argument if he can, and this he muſt do, or elſe confeſſe he is an advocate for the King, vvorth no vvages. 3. We finde that the Prophets vvere ſent of God, to ſtirr up Subjects againſt their vvicked and tyrannous Kings: as a Prophet vvas ſent to anoynt Iehu to goe againſt his Maſter, 2 King. 9. [When at firſt (ſayes he) that people ſought a King from Samuel, they reſolved not to take him conditionally, ſi bene regnaverit, but vvith all the faults that might follovv him, &c.] Anſ. It is very like that their importunity made them neglect their duty, in making any expreſſe Covenant, or in condeſcending upon expreſſe conditions; but he shall never prove that they did right in this; far leſſe shall he make this example binding unto others; and leaſt of all shall he hence conclude that there was not a tacite and virtual compact, and that Saul was under no tearmes. 2. Notwithſtanding of what he ſayes, we finde that the People did actually reſiſt and oppoſe him, in reſcueing Ionathan, and that David defended himſelf with armed men againſt him, and his fury, and unjuſt violence, and this is enoughe to our purpoſe.

As for theſe words Eccleſ. 8. 2. I Counſel thee to keep the Kings commandement, and that in regaird of the oath of God, becauſe they are variouſly rendered, and by ſome otherwayes then by us, as by Iunius (to which the dutch come near) praeſtitutum Regis obſerva, ſed pro ratione juramenti Dei. i. e. Obey the Kings command, but according as your oath to God will permit, Mercerus rendereth them thus. It is my pairt to obſerve the Kings command and to have reſpect unto the oath of God, meum est obſervare praeceptum Regis, & rationem habere juramenti Dei. We shall not much labour to preſſe this Covenant out of them: But if the Surveyer, will hold cloſſe to our tranſlation, and fish out from thence the oath of allegaince, we muſt then ſay that they will alſo, clearly ſuppoſe on oath of the King unto the People, by which he is bound to them as wel as they are bound to him. He granteth that ordinarly among the people, there were not oathes of fidelity and obedience given to their Kings, and where ever we finde p. 110that the people ſwore an oath or Covenant to the King, there we finde that the king ſwore and Covenanted to them: and ſo the Covenant being mutual, he was bound unto conditions as well as they were, and They no more then He. And if Their chooſeing and ſetting up of a King, did virtually include their engagement to him; ſo did His accepting of the place virtually lay bonds on him, to acquieſce unto the neceſſare conditions, & make him obliged to performe theſe neceſſary and indiſpenſable conditions, which is all deſire now.

We ſee ſome thing more explicite for this, Iudg. 11. ver. 2, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13. Where there paſſed conditions betwixt Iephthah and the People: See Althuſ. Polit. Cap. 19. num. 20.

Thus we have cleared. 1. That lawful Magiſtrates are admitted to their Thrones conditionally, upon ſuch and ſuch tearmes. And from what we have ſaid, it is alſo clear, 2. That the Prince accepting of the Crowne doth either explicitely or implicitely promiſe to fulfil theſe conditions; because the People have made choiſe of him as a fit meane to procure thoſe Ends which they did deſigne: But if he should not be engaged to proſecute, ſo far as lyes in his power, thoſe Ends, why did they make choiſe of him? Or how could they expect that he should prove a fit meane for theſe Ends? Or how can we think that People acting rationally, would be ſo far dementat as to choiſe a meane, which they had no more rational ground to expect, would prove a meane for attaining theſe neceſſary Ends: then the very bane of theſe good & neceſſary Ends which they propoſed unto themſelves. The Covenants, which we have now ſpoken of do cleare this alſo. 3. It is cleare likewiſe from what hath been ſaid, That the Soveraigne, in theſe Compacts and Covenants with his People, is not only bound unto God, to performe what he hath promiſed, but alſo unto his Subjects: For 1. As was ſaid, He ſtill remaineth a ſociable creature, and under the Lawes of God and Nature, and therefore is not above what transactions or compacts he maketh with any, whether equalls or inferiours. 2. If by vertue of theſe Compacts p. 111he were not obliged unto his Subjects, neither should they be obliged unto him by theſe compacts, ſeing in erecting the conſtitution, and condeſcending upon theſe tearmes, He and They are equal, according to that, Contractus non …netur nisi inter aequales. 3. The People in ſetting up a King should not act rationally, if the King as King were not bound to ſtand to his conditions, and really obliged unto them. Could we imagine that Men in their wits, would Covenant with a Man, to make him King, on ſuch and ſuch tearmes, it after he were made King, he were no more obliged unto them, then if there had been no compact with him? 4. How could they think of attaineing thoſe Ends, which they propoſed, if he were not bound unto them, to performe theſe conditions, which they though neceſſary to limite him unto for the better & more ſure, attaineing theſe Ends? 5. This compact or Covenant being mutual, concerning conditions to be mutually performed, ſure, each party muſt be formally obliged to other. 6. If this be denyed, it muſt be aſſerted, that a Soveraigne can do no wrong or injurie unto his Subjects, can borrow no money from them, can not be engaged by Covenant, Promiſe, of Bond unto them, which were moſt ridiculous, and a doctrine as much tending to the real deſtruction of Monarchs and Soveraignes, as any elſe: for if this hold good, Subjects might never think themſelves ſecure: And moreover that ordinance, could never be an ordinance of God, ſeing thereby People could never expect the leaſt rational ground of ſecurity for their lives, and what they have.

But we need not ſtand on this, ſeing our Surveyer perceiving wel enough, what a groundleſſe and irrational aſſertion this of the Royaliſts is, thinketh beſt to ſtrick in with Lex Rex and grant Pag. 100. [That where a Covenant is made between a King and a People, the Covenant on the Kings part, binds him, not only to God, in relation to the People, as the object of this duty, but doth bind him to the People formally.] 4. It is alſo cleare and undenyable, that in Kingdomes which are commonly called haereditary, the Son is obliged to performe the ſame conditions p. 112which his father was obliged to perfome) for as the law ſayeth. Conditionalis obligatio tranſit ad haeredes L. ſi quis D. de Verborum obligatione. Rational People, condeſcending rationally upon the conſtitution, did certanely pitch upon that way of conveyance of the Soveraignity, that might beſt ſecure them, as to their Ends, and if none had been obliged unto the conditions agreed upon, but the firſt in the line, they had not rationally ſecured theſe Ends. 5. It is no leſſe cleare, That when the Soveraigne doth not performe the Principal, maine, and moſt Neceſſary Conditions condeſcended and agreed upon, de jure he falleth from his Soveraignity. This all will grant, as flowing natively from the nature of a compact: for, qui non praeſtat officium promiſſum, cadit beneficio hâc lege dato. He who doth not preforme the conditions agreed upon, hath no right to the benefite granted upon condition of performance of theſe conditions. I do not here ſay that every breach, or violation doth degrade him de jure; but that a violation of all, or of the maine, moſt neceſſary, and principally intended conditions, doth. 6. Lawyers grant that every conditionall promiſe giveth a right to the party to whom the promiſe is made, to purſue for the performance: and this is the nature of all Mutual compacts. And therefore by vertue of this mutual compact, the Subjects, have jus againſt the King, a Right in law to purſue him for performance. The worthy author of Lex Rex told us Pag. 97. [That even the Covenant between God and Man is ſo mutual I will be your God, and yee shall be my people, that if the people break the Covenant, God is looſed from his part of the Covenant, Zach. 11. 10. and 2 The Covenant giveth to the beleever a ſort of action of law, and jus quoddam to plead with God in regard of his fidelity to ſtand to that Covenant, that bindeth him by reaſon of his fidelity, Eſa. 43. 26. & 63. 16. Dan 9. 4. 5,] and hence inferred [That farr more a Covenant giveth ground of a civil action or claime to a People, and the free Eſtates, againſt a King] But ſayes the Surveyer Pag. 101. [It had been better ſaid, That upon this ground they might humbly plead with him, ſupplicate and reaſon with him, as God's deputy bearing the impreſſe of his Soveraignity and Majeſty on earth: But as God cannot otherwiſe be pleaded with, upon account of his promiſe (wherein he is bound not ſo much to us as to his owne fidelity, to evidence p. 113it, reddit ille debita nulli debens) and cannot be pleaded with by force or violence: So his deputyes on earth, on whom under himſelf, he hath ſtamped inviolable Majeſty, whatever they be, are not to be pleaded with by ſtrong hand and force.] Anſw. If he had shewed. 1. That Migiſtrates could not miſcarry. 2. That Subjects had no hand in making theſe conditions in the Covenant betwixt Them and the King. 3. Nor any hand in ſetting up the King and conferring that benefite upon him, on ſuch and ſuch conditions, then his inference had had ſome colour: but now hath it none. 2. Inferiour Magiſtrates are God's deputyes as wel as the Superiour, and yet vve finde no impreſſe of Majeſty or Soveraignity on them, but they may be oppoſed vvhen doing injury. 3. This is a large aſſertion, vvhichwhich I much doubt if any Royaliſt vvill defend That the Supream Magiſtrats vvhatever they be, can in no caſe be pleaded vvith by ſtrong hand and force. Sure vve heard Cap. 2. ſome conceſſions ſmelling othervviſe. 4. Himſelf vvill grant that notvvithſtanding of all his Majeſty and Soveraignity, a forraigne Prince may reſiſt him by force, and plead his right vvith a ſtrong hand, hovv doth he then ſave his Majeſty inviolable? [But (ſayes he Pag: 102.) who will judge it more reaſon, that theſe who are plaintifes, shall be judges of the party they compleane of, more then the party or Prince, judge to them? Is not this a perverſion of all judgment, that in one and the ſame body politick, the accuſer and judge shall be co incident, in the ſame perſon or perſons.] Anſ. This makes as much againſt the king, as againſt us; for by this reaſon the King hath no jus over the People, more then they over him, and can no more plead his cauſe, then they can: for himſelf cannot be judge and plaintife both: and if this be the perverſion of all judgment, vve have ſeen enough of it, vvhere the King hath been both judge and party purſuer by his advocate. But let him anſvver this himſelf, and he vvill help us to anſvvere alſo. Againe he ſayeth in that ſame Page? [Though it be true, that all Covenants and contracts amongst men, embodyed in a ſociety, brings each of the contracters under a law claime, in caſe of failing (coram judice proprio) before his owne and competent judge: yet it is not true, That any contract, betwixt man p. 114and man, in one and the ſame ſociety, giveth the party keeping contract, co-active power over the party breaking.] Anſw. He is but a ravv lavvyer that ſayes ſo, for if one Man ſet a piece of land to another, for ſo many yeers, for ſo much yeerly, and the other be bound at the expireing of theſe yeers, to remove vvithout proceſſe of lavv, The party ſetter hath by contract a coactive povver, and may uſe Major vis and thruſt him out vvith the broad ſvvord, without further action of lavv. But (ſayes he Pag. 103.) [There is no judge over all Magiſtrates, nor the Supreame Magiſtrate, before whom a complaineing people can plead wrong done to them. This complainte lyeth before God only to take order with it.] Anſw. When Arniſaeus objected that, The worthy and Learned author of Lex Rex anſwered, [That the conſequence was not neceſſary, no more then when the King of Judah and the King of Iſrael make a covenant to performe mutual dutyes one to another, it is neceſſary, there should be a King and ſuperiour Ruler above both who should compell each one to do a duty to his fellow: King and People are each of them above and below others, in diverſe reſpects.] But in cometh this Surveyer Pag. 100. and tells us, there is a great difference [God having allowed lawful wars, allows ſeeking of reparation, or repelling of wrongs done by one Nation to another, by force of the ſword, when no rational meanes can bring the doers of the wrong to do right, and there being no other remedy, he himſelf, the Lord of hoſtes, and God of armies, ſits judge and moderator in that great buſineſſe, and in the uſe of war, is appealed to as judge, there being no common judge on earth to ſit on the cauſes of theſe independent Nations. But God having ſet and eſtablished in one Particular Nation and Political ſociety, his owne ordinance of Magiſtracy, to which every ſoul muſt be ſubject, and all ſubject to the Supreme. &c.] Anſ. This ſayes wel when the difference or diſput is between two ſubjects, both under one Magiſtrate; but is ſayes nothing to our caſe, where the difference is betwixt the Magiſtrate and the Subjects: for in the other caſe there is a judge over both eſtablished, unto whom both are ſubjects, but in our caſe there is no judge on earth Common to both, or who can ſit and judge in ſuch cauſes: for the King muſt here be no more both judge and party then the People, and ſo the caſe is irremediable unleſſe there be an p. 115allowance of repelling force with force: for in our caſe there are no rational meanes which can be uſed to bring the Prince to do right unto the injured Subjects: and therefore it God allow war, in the uſe of which, he is appealed to as judge, betwixt two Nations, he wil allow alſo a neceſſary defenſive warre in Subjects againſt their Soveraigne when there is no other remedy, or rationall meanes of redreſſe. This Man dictats but what proveth he? [The Magiſtrates are by their official power, above the whole Nation, and as abſurd it is to ſay they are above the powers, which God hath ſet over them (as L. R. pag. 460. ſayeth thraſonically he hath proved unanſwereably) as to ſay that every parish is above the Miniſter, in an eccleſiaſlical way, though he hath official power over them all, or that every Lord in Scotland hath their Tennants and vaſſals above them, a thing which the nobles of Scotland had need to look to; for certainely the principles which lead to subject Kings to People, lead clearly and by undoubted conſequence, to Subject them to their vaſſalls, and to all under them, yea and all Maſters to ſervants, and parents to children, and to confound and invert the order of all humane ſocieties.] Anſ. 1. The law will tell us That in mutual compacts the party obſerver is Eatenus in ſo far, ſuperiour unto the party who faileth. 2. The author of Lex Rex ſayeth truly and not Thraſonically (as this Thraſo, and windy man, allaigeth, who would make the world beleeve that his one word is enough to confute all which that learned author hath ſolidly proved with ſuch reaſons that he thought (with the little wit he hath) it was more wiſdome to forbeare once to name then to offer to anſwere) that he hath proved unanſwereably (if not, let this windy Thraſo try his hand in confuteing his reaſons) the Peoples power above the King. 3. This man's reaſons are as weak as water. For 1. the Paroche is ſo above the Miniſter, that, in caſe he teach haereſy, & there be no eccleſiaſtick or civil power to put him away, they may ſave their owne ſoulls, thruſt him out, and chooſe another more Orthodox. 2. All know that the Lord is bound to the Vaſſalls, as well as they are to him, and that the Lord may not oppreſſe them, or if he tranſgreſſe the bounds and limites preſcribed him, they will get action of law p. 116yea in ſome caſes be free to renunce him as their Supream, and chooſe another. Let the nobles take heed they drink not in this Man's doctrine: for if they arrogate to themſelves a power to oppreſſe, pillage, plunder, murther, Maſſacre, their vaſſals, (as this man pleads for ſuch power to the King, without control) I fear their vaſſals let them know they are not ſlaves. 3. What a poor Politician is this? He ſpeaks this, to move them ſo much the more to owne the King's cauſe, but who ſeeth not, that he is either a falſe or a foolish advocate for the King in this matter, for if the King get no moe on his ſide but the Superior Lords, & if all the Vaſſalls and Tennants be againſt him, he will have the weaker party by farre, on his ſide. 4. I would deſire Nobles & all to take notice of this, that he would here ſeem to give to the king, as much power over them and all the lands, as Maſters have over their Tennants, who have their lands only from them upon certaine conditions, and may be removed when theſe conditions are broken. 5. What a fool is he to put Tennants and Vaſſals together? doth he not know that Lords have more power over their Proper Tennants, then over their Vaſſals? 6. Doth he think that Servants may not in ſome caſes be above their Maſters; a noble man's ſon may be an apprentice to a very meane man; But thinks he that Servants will get no action of law againſt their Maſters, or if there be no law or judge, over him and his Maſter, he may not defend himſelf, againſt his Maſter's unjuſt violence? 7. As for the ſubjection of parents to Children it is impertinent in this caſe, as shall be shewed in due time, and yet we know that the father hath been a ſubject, and the ſon a King over him, and we know alſo that, in caſe of neceſſity, the children may defend themſelves againſt their father taken with a mad phrenzy. Then he adds [This truth we muſt cleave to, that in one and the ſame civil ſociety, where God hath appoynted Rulers and Ruled, Subjects cannot without ſacrilegious intruſion and contempt of God, ſnatch the ſword out of the Magiſtrates hands to punish him with it (though in ſome partilars he abuſe it) neither can a war intended for this end by p. 117meer, private perſones, be lawfull againſt their head or heads.] Anſw. We may let him cleave to this truth, and this truth cleave to him, and be no loſers: for we ſpeak not of Subjects taking the ſword of juſtice to punish the King; we ſpeak of no warre raiſed by the ſubjects for this end: we plead only for a power in private Subjects to defend themſelves, in caſes of neceſſity, againſt their head or heads, (and he, nor none of his party, have the forehead to deny this to be lawful in ſome caſes) eſpecially if the Magiſtrate abuſe his power, not in ſome particulars only, but in many, and in many maine particulars, if not in all.

Having thus cleared and vindicated the 6. thing. The 7. And laſt is this, which followeth alſo from the former: viz. That when the Prince doth violate his compact, as to all its conditions, or as to it's cheef, maine, and moſt neceſſary condition, the Subjects are de Iure free from ſubjection to him, and at liberty to make choiſe of another. The very nature of a compact doth clear this: For it is abſurd to ſay, that in a mutual conditional compact, one party shall ſtill be bound to performe his conditions, though the other performeth none of his conditions, or performeth not the maine and principal one. It is abſurd to ſay, that when one hath given a benefite upon a certaine condition, that he is ſtill bound to beſtow that benefite, though the condition on which he promiſed it, be no way performed. Were it the rational act of rational creatures to ſet up Soveraignes upon theſe tearmes? or to ſay, wee chooſe thee, to be our Soveraigne upon condition thou rule us according to juſtice and equity, and not tyrannize over us, and yet we shall always hold thee for our Prince and lawful Soveraigne, Though thou should tranſgreſſe all lawes of equity, humanity, and reaſon; and deal with us as ſo many sheep, kill whom thou will, for thy ſport and luſt, &c. will any body think that rational men would do ſo? The law tells us L. ſi fund. c. de pactis, &c. That ceſſante cauſâ, propter quam res est data, pignus debet reddi.

Before we come to draw our arguments from what is ſaid, we shall firſt roll out of our way what this Surveyer p. 118ſpeaks further againſt theſe Covenants, Pag. 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, & 93. He hath five particulars which he toucheth on.

The firſt is this, [It is eaſily conceded (ſayes he) that there is a mutual obligation betwixt Magistrats and Subjects, to mutual dutyes, which is indeed eſſential to the conſtitution of the politike body; but his obligation ariſeth not from any tacite or expreſſe Covenant betwixt them, but from the ordinance and will of God, enjoyning them theſe dutyes in theſe relations, in that ſociety, wherein they are combined.] Anſw. 1. Subordinata non pugnant. This mutual obligation may ariſe both from the Law of God, and from the Covenant, without any repugnancy. 2. If this obligation ariſe only from the Law of God, neither partyes shall be formally obliged unto other, but both obliged only unto God; and yet we heard himſelf ſay Pag. 100. that [Where a Covenant is made betwixt a King and a People, that the Covenant on the King's part, binds him not only unto God, in relation to the People as the object of the duty, but doth bind him to the People formally.] Now, whence ariſeth this formal obligation, if not from the Covenant? 3. By this meanes the obligations of fidelity in the ſubjects unto their Princes, have no riſe from their oath of allegiance, which he elſewhere calleth Foedus unilaterum. 4. To what purpoſe then are Covenants and compacts made, If by vertue of theſe, each party be not formally obliged unto other? For if David's Covenant with the People of Iſrael laid no obligation upon him, he could not be ſaid to have made a Covenant with them, more then with the Phaliſtimes, and yet the Scripture tells us, he made a Covenant with Iſrael: And King Ioash made a Covenant with the People. 5. I do not well underſtand, how an obligation to future dutyes can be called eſſential to a conſtitution, which neither floweth from the conſtitution, nor giveth a being to the conſtitution. 6. Againe, if there be no obligation unto theſe mutual dutyes, until there be a conſtitution by compact, and if then the obligation be eſſential, how is it imaginable that the obligation shall have no ſubordinat riſe from the p. 119conſtitution; or compact whereupon the conſtitution is founded?

The 2. thing he ſayeth, is, That though this obligation be mutual, yet is it not conditional, and how proves he this? [There is (ſayes he a mutual obligation to mutual dutyes betwixt Parents and Children, but it is not conditional, that if Parents be undutiful, Children shall be looſed from their duty, or on the contrary.] So is it (ſayes he) betwixt King and People, and the citeth Calvin. Inst. Lib. 4. Cap. 20. §. 29. But it is eaſily anſwered. That there is a vaſt diſparity betwixt the riſe of that relation, which is betwixt King and People, and that which is betwixt Father and Son: And this being once diſcovered the parity diſappeareth: And 1. Subjects come not out of the loyns of their King, as Children do out of the loines of their Fathers. 2. The Son createth not the Father as the Subjects create the King. 3. Yea Children do not ſo much as give their conſent that ſuch an one shall be their Father, before the relation have being, yet Royaliſts will grant this much, unto the People, in relation to their King. 4. The relation betwixt Father and Son hath no dependence leſſ or more upon any act of will in the Son, or upon any Covenants, Agriements or Compact, expreſſe or tacite, betwixt the Father & the Son, it is not ſo as to the relation betwixt King and People; for before this mutual relation ariſe, there muſt be a conſtitution, and this conſtitution includeth, at leaſt, ſome act of the will in ſubjects, ſome previous conſent. 5. This relation can never ceaſe, ſo long as both are in life, but the other may, by a Subject's chooſeing to live under another Soveraigne. 6. Let the Father do what he wil, the relation betwixt him and his Son shall never be looſed or weakened. But the greateſt Royaliſts will grant, that in ſome caſes, the King may be made no King, and his relation either wholly taken away, or much diminished. So then the conſequence is null, that becauſe Children are not bound to their Parents conditionally; therefore Subjects are bound conditionally to there Prince: For Children have no hand in making up that relation, betwixt Parents and them; their conſent is not ſo p. 120much as required; but in making up the relation betwixt King and Subjects, there is a previous compact, required, in which compact, the People have their great share: Children give not paternity unto their Parents; but Subjects give the Kingship, at leaſt inſtrumentally, under God; and they ſet up Kings, when they might ſet up Nobles, and ſet up his Man, when they might have ſet up Another, can Children do ſo? How then shall the caſe be alike, And the one be no more conditional then the other? Next, as for Calvin we willingly with him grant, that Subjects are to obey evill Magiſtrates, and to do their duty to them, though the Magiſtrates should come short of theirs, as Wives, & Children are bound to love and be Subject unto undutiful Husbands and Fathers. But Calvin will not ſay, that in no caſe a Wife is looſed from Subjection to her Husband: adultery and wilful deſertion will give ground for a divorce, and that ſayes that the Wives ſubjection is not abſolute, but conditional; though we ſay not, that every breach of ſome of the conditions, looſeth the obligation. Neither will Calvin. ſay' That in no caſe, the Soveraigne may be oppoſed or reſiſted: or, that in no caſe the obligation can be looſed; for ibid. §. 31. He granteth liberty to the Eſtates of a Land (whom yet our Surveyer putteth in one category with private Subjects,) to ſtand for the libertyes of the People againſt the rage and Tyranny of Princes, Yea he ſayeth they are bound to do ſo, as they would not preſidiouſly, betray their truſt.

The 3. thing is, that [the fancy of a tacite virtual natural Covenant betwixt King and People, overthrows the diſtinction that all ſound proteſtant Divines and Politicians make, betwixt a limited or pactional Prince and an abſolute Prince, or one who is integrae Majeſtatis.] And then he citeth Rivet. in Pſal 68. Gerhard de Magistratu, Pag. 13 11. mihi (or 935.) And therein, he ſayes, they agree with Calvin in the place cited. Anſw. That there are abſolute Princes de facto, who come to the Soveraignity by falſe and corrupt meanes, or by conqueſt, we deny not, but we are ſpeaking of Princes, de Iure, and of Princes ſet up by the People, which is only to our purpoſe. p. 121It is true, Rivet (a very short ſum of all the ſound Proteſtant Divines, though he joyne Gerhard with him too, who is but Lutherian Proteſtant, and for his Politicians we ſee none) make uſe of ſuch a diſtinction, but aſſert not poſitively that ſuch an abſolute Prince is lawful. Calvin maketh uſe of no ſuch diſtinction, and if they agree with him, they ſay no more then he ſayeth, and what he ſayd, we have heard. But ſayes our Surveyer it is [Falſe to ſay that an abſolute Prince is contrary to the Word of God: for as our Lawes allowes our Kings to be ahſolute, in expreſſe tearmes Jam. 1. (he should ſay Jam. 6.) Parl. 18. Anno 1606.] Anſw Our Lawes and eſpecially of that Parliament, and the like, are evil proofs of what is Iure Divino, or not contrary thereunto. But of that Supermacy granted to the King, by that act and others, the Apology hath ſpoken enough. Furder he addeth, [So the Scripture is not against an abſolute Prince, as our Lawes and we underſtand him?] But how is that? May he Rule as he lifts? No, for [He is ſubordinate (sayes he) unto God and his Lawes, and he ought alſo to walke according to the particular good Lawes he hath made with conſent of his People.] This is more then other Royaliſts would grant to us, for he acknowledgeth him not only not above the Law of God, but alſo not above the municipal Lawes, and conſequently not above the fundamental conditions of the conſtitution: And we are ſure in this, This King hath fowlely broken, whatever he doubt of. But how is he abſolute? [He is abſolute (ſayes he) that if he deviate he is not under coactive power of Subjects, that they should have Law-claime againſt him, and in their courts of nature and neceſſity, pronounce judgement upon him, to deſtroy him, far leſſe that by vertue of this ſuppoſed tacite Convenant, any minor private party of the People, may pull King and all Magistrats out of their ſeate, punish them, and poſſeſſe themſelves in their roomes, as Naphtaly ſayes] Anſw. What he layeth to Naphtali's charge shall be conſidered afterward. 2. To ſay that Subjects have no law claime againſt a King, who breaketh the maine and principal condition, or all the conditions of the Covenant made betwixt Him and the People, is to deſtroy the nature of the mutual compact, made between Him and the People as we p. 122have shewed. 3. By this it ſeemeth all the abſoluteneſſe that he ſayes is due to the King, is, that he is from under the co-active power of Subjects, but though this were granted to him, (which yet we cannot, becauſe of what we have ſaid already) we should ſuffer no loſſe, as to our intendment: for if this be all his abſoluteneſſe, then he may be withſtood, and reſiſted (though not brought to the barr) even by private ſubjects, when he contraveeneth his principal conditions, and breaketh Covenant unto his people: and this is all we contend for.

The ſumme of what he ſayes in the 4 place, is this [Where there is freedome of Election (as in Germany and Poland, where there is but perſonated and painted Kings) there may poſſibly be expreſſe limiteing conditions allowing ſome to coerce deviating ſoveraignity. But in all proper Monarchies, there is neither tacite nor expreſſe Covenants impowering any to be judges over the King. Some Kingdomes are attained by a conqueſt in a juſt warre (which is a ſufficient title) & this power being hereditarily tranſmitted, the ſucceſſours receive power from the Parents and not from the People, nor is there any shaddow of tacite or expreſse Covenant in this matter.] Anſw. 1. If he be not well pleaſed with what Lex Rex hath ſaid, concerning conqueſt giving a ſufficient title to crownes, he should have conſidered and anſwered the arguments there made uſe of, and not jejunely have told us he is of another judgment; for they are either fooles, or mad who will beleeve his bare word, better then the worthy author of Lex Rex his aſſertions baked & confirmed with many ſolid & unanſwereable arguments, 2. This though true, ſpeaks nothing to our purpoſe: for we ſuppoſed always that our Kingdome was not founded upon a conqueſt, and we never heard any ſay it was, till this unnatural abject aroſe to ſpeak non ſenſe, of which more preſently: We never heard a King challenge it upon that account, nay, nor ſay that our Kingdome was ever conquered by any of their predeceſſours, except King Iames, who in his baſilicon doron, allaiged that Fergus the firſt, was a conquerour, contrare to the teſtimony, of all approven hiſtorio-graphers: what meaneth the large long roll of the King's predeceſſours, that is read over at the coronation; p. 123doth any of our lawes ſpeak ſuch a thing? or do they found his abſolute power upon ſuch a dreame? It would ſeem the cauſe is deſperate and gone, when he can get no other bottome to his abſoluteneſſe, but a fiction of his diſtempered braine, which may deſervedly make him odious to all true ſcottish men, and may (and poſſibly will) make his cauſe odious alſo, to all who are acquanted with the true, genuine and ancient conſtitution of the Kingdome. 3. This ravv. Statiſt exſcreats his raw notions, as he pleaſeth, but they muſt be rude and unskilful in this matter, that will think to digeſt them. He tell's us that the Emperour of Germany and the King of Poland are but painted Kings, and Monarchs, and to confirme this, tels us that, there are no Monarches, or proper princes, but ſuch as are abſolute: What will then become of the Diſtinction, of all ſound proteſtant divines and polititians, which he mentioned in the preceeding page? Do they think that all the limited and pactional princes, are but cyphers, or as painted men are men, ſo are they but painted princes? Sure none of the divines he named take ſuch princes for no true princes. 4. If in proper Monarchies, there be ſuch Covenants and compacts tacite or expreſſe, which will gave a law claime unto the Subjects againſt the King, and a Ius againſt him, as a formal tranſgreſſour of his Covenant made with them, and liberate them from ſubjection to him, we could have enough for our buſineſſe, though it should be granted, that there is no Covenant impowering others to be his judges. Though it should be granted (which ſome politicians Doubt of) that in Kingdomes purchaſed by conqueſt, the power haereditarily tranſmitted, should be received from the parent, and not from the people; yet in kingdoms founded upon a lawful and free conſtitution, the ſucceſſour, (as we shewed above) hath his power not from his predeceſſour, but from the conſtitution, or the people condeſcending upon the conſtitution,

But he thinks to obviate all this by what he ſayes in the 5. place viz. That our Kingdome is not founded on any ſuch Covenant, but rather on a conqueſt, of which he p. 124giveth five remarkable inſtances. The firſt is, That Fergus the first, was not admitted upon conditions, but the Subjects, by their oath confirmed the Kingdome to him, and his poſterity: and that the black book of paſley ſayes, Fergus made himſelf King. Anſw. 1. What that black book of paſley (which neither he nor I ever ſaw) ſayeth, is not worth the inquiry to ſearch, Seing all other hiſtorians, ſuch as Iohn Fordon, Iohn Major, Boëthius, Hollanshade, beſide Buchanan, ſay, that he was freely choſen by the People. And the ſtory tells us, that he was then in Irland, when the Scots ſent for him, how could he then make him ſelf King? 2. If he had been a conquerour, he might have tranſmitted the Kingdom unto his ſone, without the conſent of the People, and yet we ſee this was not done; yea we finde that the People would ſuffer none of his ſones to enjoy the place after him, becauſe unfit for government, but made choiſe of a third perſon: and when his eldeſt ſon did afterward challenge the Kingdome as his owne, he was made to underſtand himſelf better. 3. It is true Buchanan mentioneth no oath of the King, but that will not ſay, that there was no compact betwixt Him and the People, There might be conditions communed and condeſcended upon, though the King was not put to ſweare them. But however, that there was an implicite and tacite Covenant, at leaſt, betwixt them, Is cleare from the oath of the People confirming the Kingdome unto him; for it ſayes that all the right he had unto the Kingdome, was from the People, and that he could not be ſecured in it but by them, and ſeing they gave him the Kingdome, and did ſecure him in it, Nature and Reaſon will ſay, that it was upon good tearmes, particularly, that he and his should not tyrannize over them, but should rule them aright: and though there be no written contract concerning this, extant, yet their conſtant after-practice doth abundantly cleare it; for, though they confirmed the Kingdome by oath to him, and his poſterity yet their chooſeing of Feritharis his brother, paſſing by both his ſones, ſayes, that this condition was tacitely underſtood, viz. provideing that they, should be able for government and to diſcharge the place, and accordingly p. 125they did then eſtablish it, in a ſtanding law for time to come: and after this manner, and according to theſe tearmes did chooſe their Kings until Kennethus the third, by force or fraud, obtained a change. So their taking courſe with ſuch of their Kings, as did tyrannize, ſayeth, that this was an other condition of the compact, viz. That they should not tyrannize, but governe righteouſly: Thus we ſee theſe after practices are cleare ſtanding commentaryes, ſufficiently explaineing the nature and maine conditions of that compact.

His 2 inſtances: is of Fergus the ſecond, the 40 King. [Who by his valour, under the conduct of divine providence, & by the help of Danes and others, with ſome ſmall remainder of Scots, recovered the Kingdome and was not beholden to the People for it, nor had it by paction with them.] Anſw. Buchanan tells us, that he was called home ad regnum avitum ſuſcipiendum, to take upon him the Kingdome which belonged to him, according to the ancient conſtitution, as being of the family of Fergus, and then giving proof of his provveſſe, and ability for government, and accordingly being then in Scandia or Norway took the offer, and came home, accompanyed with the banished Scots, and ſome Danes: and after he came home, after the wonted cuſtome, more patrio, he was created King by a Parliament; for, comitiis peractis, the Parliament being ended, he falleth about his work, and at length freeth the Kingdome of its adverſaryes: Now, how can he be accounted a conquerour, obtaineing his right to the crowne by conqueſt, who had it by a faire, free, and full call of the People, who might have choſen any other of that race, that had been remaineing, and qualified for their purpoſe? This is ſtrange doctrine, to ſay, that every Prince who cometh to his Kingdome, by the free conſent of his People, in a troubleſome time, becauſe that through their help and concurrence, he freeth the land of Enemies, and reſtoreth peace to the inhabitants, is a conquerour, and hath no right to the Crowne, but by his ſword. He will not ſay that every conqueſt will give a juſt title, but a lawfull conqueſt, now what right had Fergus to conquere theſe adverſaries? p. 126What title or claime could he lay to that crowne from whence he and his forebears were banished or conſtrained to flee, if not by the ancient grant made by the People unto Fergus the firſt and to his race? So then, his right was not obtained by the ſword, but only the peaceable poſſeſſion thereof, and the practice of the people afterward when his ſon Conſtantinus came to reigne, and turned vitious, declared whether they looked upon this Fergus the ſecond, as a Conquerour, and upon what tearmes he and his ſucceſſours had the crowne: for becauſe of his vitiousneſſe, and refuſeing to amend his manners, when admonished by the Nobles, they were almoſt at waging war againſt him and of revolting from him, had not Dougall of Galloway diſſwaded them.

His 3 inſtance is Kenneth the firſt the 50 King (He should have ſaid Kenneth the 2 the 69 King, for Kenneth the firſt died within a yeer after he was made King.) [Who deſtroyed the picts, and enlairged his Kingdom by the acceſſion of theirs, purchaſeing more and better lands, then he had before, which he diſtributed to his Subjects, he held not his purchaſed Kingdome of them by contract or paction] Anſ. What right a Prince hath unto lands, which he purchaſeth by conqueſt or war, is not the matter of our diſput, but what right Kenneth had to the crowne. Now, ſure it is that before this conqueſt made, he was crowned, upon the ſame ground, that his predeceſſours were: his future conqueſt, then uncertaine, could not alter the ground of his receiving of the crowne, when his father Alpin died 2. What ever ſuperiority, he might challenge over theſe Subjects unto whom he gave theſe new conqueſt lands, it had no influence upon his holding of the crowne: and that his very next ſucceſſour and brother Donald knew, who being given to his pleaſures, loſt a noble victory which they had obtained over the Englishes, and after he returned from captivity, following his old life, was caſt in priſon by his owne Subjects. And his Son knew it alſo, for he was put by the crowne conforme to the old law, until this Donald died. So that notwithſtanding of all this new purchaſe, the people knew that the conveyance of the crowne p. 127did ſtill run in the old channel, and was held of them after the old tenor.

His 4. Inſtance is of Robert Bruce, whom our Lawes of Regiam Majestatem call Conqueſtor Magnus, [He re-conquered the Kingdom after the Nobility of Scotland had first at Berwick, then at S, Andrewes, in plaine Parliament, ſworne homage to the King of England, who will aſſert there were pactions betwixt him and the People?] Anſw. We know out of Hiſtory, what a miſerable condition the Land was brought unto, through occaſion of that diviſion and ſad diſput that was in it, concerning the neareſt in the line: and this was the bitter frute, that Scotland reaped of the change of that laudable cuſtome eſtablished near the beginning of he conſtitution; whereas had not that been changed in the dayes of Kenneth the third, the fiteſt perſon to governe might have been choſen, and that had prevented all this confuſion and miſery, which the Land was brought unto. 2. Though Bruce at length recovered the Kingdome, yet he received not his crowne upon that account, but before he attempted it's recovery, out of the hands of the Englishes, he was crowned King at Scone, in Aprile 1036. and there received the Kingdom from the Scots, upon the old account, and according to the old tenor. 3. Though he be tearmed a great conquerour, as having recovered the Land, out of the hands of the Englishes, as if it had been a conqueſt, when as it was really, but a recovering of what, he was bound by his place and power, to recover; yet we never finde that he claimed a right to the Land, upon that ground of conqueſt, but ſtood upon the old baſis.

His fift & laſt inſtance is of this King, [It is known (ſayes he) our Nation was totally ſubdued by the English, and continued ſo, for the ſpace of then yeers, The Repreſentatives of Shires, and Cities, and Townes combined into a Commonwealth government, and ſent their commiſſioners to the meeting thereof at London, where the King's intereſt was diſclaimed; yet in a wonderful way God brought him in againe, and finding us at his coming, a fully conquered and ſubdued nation, reſtored us to our freedome, p. 128from the bondage of forraigners.] Anſw. 1. Through too great haſte, he hath forgotten a maine particular of this Inſtance. Before we were totally ſubdued by the Englishes, the King was crowned at Scone in as ſolemne a manner, as ever any of his Predeceſſours, except that he was not anoynted with holy Oyle, nor gote the Pop's benediction; and while crowned, was ſolemnely engaged to the People by Covenants, vowes and oathes, to defend Religion according to the National Covenant, and Solemne League and Covenant, and to proſecute the ends of theſe Covenants, and upon theſe conditions took his Crowne and Scepter: Were we a conqueſt then? 2. Ay but we were conquered afterward, and our Repreſentatives diſclaimed the King's intereſt. But how many were there of theſe Repreſentatives? And had theſe Repreſentatives power & commiſſion from the Land, to renunce his Intereſt? Or were theſe all accounted Enemies to the King? How is it then, that ſo many of them are now accounted his moſt loyal Subjects, and more loyal then ſuch as ſuffered much, becauſe they would not take that Tender, diſclaming his intereſt? how comes it, that that Arch-knave Sharp (ſufficiently now knowne by that name and notion both to King, Court and Countrey) who was the only Miniſter (ſo far as I know) in all Scotland, that took that tender, is advanced unto (in ſtead of a gallowes) an arch-prelacy, and primacy? But 3 when the King returned, did he make a re-conqueſt of us? what meaned then that compact betwixt Monck and the Nobles and others of Scotland, whom he ſent for, unto the borders, and to the end he might more cloſely carry his buſineſſe, made them all to abjure Charles Stewart and his intereſt (a ſad preſage of what would be our Epidemick diſtemper, when our change or turne begane with manifeſt perjury) did he not a acquante them with his deſigne? and had he not their concurrence? and if he had wanted this, and had thought that Scotland would have been an adverſary unto his deſigne, would he or durſl he have attempted it? 4. What way did the King reſtore us ſeing (if he would ſpeak the matter as it was, it was Monck that reſtored him and us both, as to any reſtauration p. 129we gote: vvere not vve and he reſtored together? What did he for our reſtauration? vvas He not as paſſive as we were and ſome what more? 5. Hence then it is falſe that he found us at his coming a fully conquered and ſubdued nation. He rather left us ſo, as found us ſo, for we were reſtored, to what we gote pari paſsu, vvith himſelf. 6. It is true at his coming (though not by him) vve vvere freed from the bondage of forraigners, but as for the freedome we vvere reſtored unto, vve are yet ignorant of it, and ſee and feel heavier bondage both as to Church and State, then vve did under ſtrangers of forraigners. But he addeth. [If any will ſay, That it was upon his account the Nation was brought to the ſuffering of that bondage; and that there did lye bands upon him, as our ſworne King to free ws, when he should be in capacity to do it. It may be anſwered. 1. It is knowne that when the fa…al ſtroke that ſunk us into bondage was given, there was an expreſſe diſowneing of his right, by publick judicatories of the land, in the quarrel with the English Sectaryes, before Dumbar.] Anſw. He should firſt have removed this objection. It was upon the Kings account that the English army did invade us: had we forborne to have ſent commiſſioners to have called Him home, The Englishes would never have invaded us: for that was their only quarrel; Becauſe we had taken the Head of the Malignant faction Into our beſome: and ſo, had we for-borne to have owned his quarrel, we had neither been invaded, nor ſubdued by them, and there had not been ſo much of our blood shed, as there was. And is this all the thanks that now we get for our vaſt expence of blood, oppreſſion, and Ten years bondage, that we muſt be declared a conqueſt and a ſubdued Nation? 2. It is a manifeſt lye▪ to ſay that his intereſt vvas expreſly diſowned by the publick judicatories of the land, before Dumbar fight: for that act of the Weſt Kirk (to vvhichwhich I knovv he looketh) vvas not an expreſſe diſovvning of his intereſt, as may be ſeen by the act it ſelf, which was as followeth, [ Westkirk the 13 day of August. 1650. The commiſſion of the Generall Aſſembly conſidering, that there may be juſt ground of ſtumbling from the King's Majeſties refuſeing p. 130to ſubſcribe and emit the declaration offered unto him by the commmitee of Eſtates, and commiſſioners of the General Aſſembly, concerning his former carriage, and reſolution for the future, in reference to the cauſe of God, & Enemies & Friends thereof; doth therefore declare that this Kirk and Kingdome, do not owne nor eſpouſe any Malignant party or quarrel, or intereſt; but that they fight meerly upon their former grounds and principles, and in defence of the cauſe of God, and of the Kingdome, as they have done theſe twelue yeers paſt, and therefore as they do diſclame all the ſinne and guilt of the King, and of his houſe; ſo they will not owne Him, nor his intereſt, otherwiſe then with a ſubordination to God, and ſo far as he ownes and proſecutes the cauſe of God; and diſclaimes his and his father's oppoſition to the work of God, and to the Covenant, and likewiſe all the Enemies thereof; and that they will with convenient ſpeed take in conſideration the papers lately ſent unto them from Oliver Cromwel, and vindicate themſelves from all the falshoods contained therein, eſpecially in theſe things, wherein the quarrel betwixt us & that party is miſ-ſtated, as if we owned the late King's proceeding's and were reſolved to proſecute and maintaine his preſent Majeſties intereſt, before and without acknowledgment of the ſinnes of his houſe, and former wayes, and ſatiſfaction to God's People in both Kingdomes] Which when the committee of Eſtates had ſeen and conſidered, they did approve the ſame, and heartily concurred therein: and what could this honeſt and moſt ſeaſonable declaration import, but only that if the King would not by a declaration, acknowledge his ſorrow, for his, & his father's carrying on a courſe deſtructive of the work of God, and his renunceing of the Malignant intereſt, and all who would owne the ſame, and his purpoſe to adhere unto the Covenants, they would not eſpouſe a Milignant quarrel, but fight upon the ſame grounds and principles, that they had done for twelue yeers before, aud only owne him with a ſubordination to God, and in ſo far as he did owne the cauſe of God, and renunce Malignancy and Milignants, p. 131and that they vvould take into conſideration Oliver Cromwel's papers, for their ovvne vindication, and clearing of the true ſtate of the quarrel, Which vvas neceſſary, before they did engage in fight? And vvould this Malignant Gnatho have had the Land and the publick judicatories thereof, contrare to their Covenants, & many Purpoſes, Reſolutions, Vowes & Engagements, poſtponing Chriſt's intereſts unto man's and hazard Religion, Libertyes & all, for one, who would not declare himſelf a friend to Chriſt, and his intereſt; but would perſiſt in a ſtated oppoſition to Chriſt and his cauſe? 3. But let him make of this, what he will, ſure his intereſt was owned, when he, upon ſecond thoughts emited that declaration at Dumfermline upon his refuſal of which, this act made at the Westkirk paſſed, and this was before Dumbar fight. So was his intereſt ſufficiently owned, with the ſubordination requiſite, when he was crowned, which was not very long after that ſtroke a Dumbar, and after vvhichwhich vve gote blowes enew, and vvere redacted at length to bondage. What ſayes he next to this? [2. What ever engagements were upon him for the good of the Nation; yet if theſe mens principles were to be followed they could have had no force on him, to move him to labour our vindication into liberty, for do not they teach that in the mutual contract and Covenant betwixt King and People, the People are looſed from their duty, if the King fail in his, frangenti fidem fides frangatur eidem; and why then in not the King looſed, if the people fail on their part? It is known that (although the Nobles and body of the people were well enough affected to the King, and cordially loved him, when they were over powered and could do nothing) yet by their Repreſentatives, he was diſowned (which in law would be rekoned their owne deed: and if a ſworne people deſerte and diſclaime their King by their Repreſentatives, may not the King alſo have the benefite of the conditional Covenant, and leave them as he found them in bondage to forraigners. But ſuch was his Majeſties graciouſneſs and wiſdom as well as conſcience of duty, that although the Nation had failed much to him, he would not walk after the counſel of theſe men? And we may (all things conſidered) aſſert that the people of Scotland do rather owe their liberty to him, then he doth owe his authority to them, or by virtue of any Covenant with them.] Anſw. 1. By vvhat he hath been formerly ſaying, and by the inſtances p. 132vvhichwhich he hath brought, vve ſee vvhat is the ſcope he driveth at, viz. To have us novv a formal conqueſt, that ſo the King may tyrannize over us, and deal vvith us, as he ſeeth good, jure conqueſtus, as being novv free from all bonds and obligations, vvhichwhich ever paſſed betvvixt Him and the People. For the fift particular which he undertooke to cleare by theſe five inſtances, was, that the conſtitution of this Kingdome neither was, not is, founded on a Covenant betwixt King and People: and yet we ſee the poor man ſo ſtraitned that he knoweth not what to ſay: He would ſaine looſe the King from all Bonds and Covenants, and former obligations, and yet he dar not poſitively and clearly aſſert it, but only ſayes if the King would follow our principles, he would account himſelf looſed from all: but unleſſe, he aſſert it, clearly and poſitively, that the King, is really looſed from all his former obligations, he ſpeakes nothing to he poynt, but muſt grant, that at leaſt as to this King, the conſtitution is founded upon a conditional Covenant; and though we should yeeld all thereſt, if he grant this to us, we need deſire no more, for all our Ends. But 2. in good earneſt, let him tell us, Whether the former engagements which were upon the King at his coronation, be looſed or not? If they be looſed and made null, becauſe of what theſe ſuppoſed Repreſentatives did: Then 1. we have a new ground of diſſolving the ſacred obligations of the Oaths and Covenants, which the King made with God, and with his People, which was not thought upon till this needle-headed man did invent it. The King himſelf at his returne, gave no ſuch ground. 2. If he think that theſe Repreſentatives (having no expreſſe commiſſion to renunce Charles Stewart and his intereſt, from the land▪ did break their allaigance, why did not the King execute the law againſt them as traitours (as he did againſt ſome under that pretext, but really for their faithfulneſſe to the Covenant, as is made out by the Apologiſt) why did he ſeem to approve what they did, by Countenanceing them ſo much, as he hath done ſince his returne? 3. Doth not himſelf ſay that the Nobles and Body of the Land were well enough affected to the King, and cordially loved p. 133him, when they were overpowered and could do nothing? Sure then the land did not break, vvhatſoever ſome men did. Ay but, ſayes he, in lavv this vvould be reckoned their deed. Very hardly, ſince they gave no commiſſion for ſuch a deed. If he ſay that they virtually gave ſuch a commiſſion, in that they ſent their commiſſioners unto the commonvvealths Parliament. It may be anſwered, that not only that was a conſtrained and extorted act, but, that as matters then ſtood, no lavvyer, no politician, nor divine vvould condemne ſuch a deed as ſinful or unlavvful, or as prejudicial to the Kings intereſt, to ſend commiſſioners to a meeting, at command of the Conquerour, to labour for a mitigation of their bondage, and for propoſeing ſome things for the good of the land, vvhen their ovvne King vvas banished from them, vvithout all hope of a returne, and they, for his ſake, vvithout any treachery or perfidy in them, reduced to a ſtate of bondage. 3. But ſince the King at his returne laide claime to no nevv right, but ſtood upon the old ground, and upon this account vvas crovvned in England vvhere he had not been crovvned before, and vvas not crovvned in Scotland, becauſe he had been crovvned there formerly, all theſe quircks are to no prupoſe: for the King returning upon the old claime, acknowledged the former conſtitution, and re-aſſumed his auncient Kingdome upon the ſame tearmes he did before, which is alſo furder confirmed by the act of indempnity, which he paſſed; and other acts and deeds, which weer needleſſe now to mention. 4. We shall eaſily grant, that when a ſworne People deſert and diſclaime their King by their Repreſentatives: The King alſo may take the benefite of the conditional Covenant and leave them. and ſo might King Charles have done, and never owned us more: and if he had done ſo, and gone to ſome other part of the world, to have ſpent his dayes, as ſome would not have been grieved, ſo, I think both lawyers and divines would have thought him looſed from his obligation to the people, though not wholly from his obligation to God: But now ſince he did not ſo, but took the firſt occaſion that was feiſible, and returned to his old p. 134ſtation and relation, all the old bonds and engagements, which he took in theſe relations, recurred with their former force and vigour, and he became no leſſe bound then ever, yea, before the Lord, rather more: becauſe the goodneſſe of God in reſtoreing him without blood, should have engaged his heart ſo much the more unto God, & to his former vowes and Covenants. 5. What way he laboured our vindication into liberty, I know not; and if it be his Majeſties graciouſneſſe and wiſdome, as well as his conſcience of duty, that would not let him walk after the counſel of theſe men, (as he ſayeth) many think that we are yet to ſee theſe commendable diſpoſitions; for the effect mentioned is not viſible: for after the counſell of whomſoever he hath walked, ſure we are, he hath broken the Bonds and Engagements which he took on him, both before, and on the day of his coronation: He hath rejected the Covenant, which he made with God upon his knees, with his hands lifted up unto the Moſt High, and overturned that which was the Chief of our fundamental lawes, or tearmes of our conſtitution, as we ſee this day: and this is knowne, that of theſe who are moſt injured by him now, and preſecuted, there were feweſt that failed to him in that day; and therefore his graciouſneſſe and wiſdome and conſcience of duty, should have cauſed him remember theſe, who could not, out of conſcience of their obligation to him, by vertue of their Covenant, take that Tender, which, others, to ſave themſelves from a little ſuffering, ſwallovved dovvne vvithout much difficulty; and not have made them the objects of his ire and indignation, as he hath done, and is doing to this day. 6. He tells us, that He may aſſert, that the People of Scotland do rather ovve their liberty to him, then he his authority to them. But vvhat this bold aſſertor ſayeth, is not much to be valued; vvho theſe People of Scotland are, vvho ovve their liberty to him, I knovv not, unleſſe he meane the abjured Prelates, and their baſe naughty, ſcandalous Underlings, the ſcumme of the earth, the shame of the Church, and the diſgrace of the Miniſtry, who novv have freedome from Church-Diſcipline, and civil cenſures, and licenſe to p. 135corrupt the vvord of God, to deſtroy soulls, to tyrannize over conſciences, to oppreſſe the People, to inſlave the ſubjects, and to lead back the People into Egypt: And the dyvour Lords and others, vvho becauſe of their licentious, luxurious, ſenſual and brutish lives, vvhichwhich they lead like ſo many Epicures, having devoured their ovvne Eſtates, and are novv ſo drouned in debt, that if the poor could have but liberty to ſeek their ovvne, and if juſtice vvere running like a ſtreame, durſt not be ſeen, muſt novv have acts made in their favours liberating them from the ſentence of the lavv, and allovving them to preſſe upon their creditours, the moſt barren, fruteleſſe, and uſeleſſe of their lands, and that at tvventy years purchaſe, after they have by manifeſt iniquity, vvithheld aught yeers annualrent, vvhichwhich is near the equal half of the principal ſumme; and ſuch others acts of that nature. Is this the liberty he talkes of, That a fevv shall have liberty to drink avvay and vvith debauchery, deſtroy the ſubſtance of the land, and vvaſte it upon vvhores and cups? If theſe ovve that liberty, unto him, I am ſure he vvill have little reaſon, ere all be done, to ovve his ſtanding unto them, When the anger of God shall beginner to kindle, and his vvrath shall be revealed from heaven againſt all ungodlineſſe and unrighteouſneſſe of men. But laſtly, vvhat if vve should grant him, vvhat he dar not in plaine tearmes require: viz. That the King ruleth over us novv jure conqueſtus? Sure he muſt then be Tyrannus sine titulo, a Tyrant vvithout a title: for his old title, being gone and expired, he had no nevv title vvhereupon to ground the lavvfulneſſe of his conqueſt, and therefore by his ſcope and drift here, he proclaimeth a liberty to all the People of Scotland to carry tovvards him, as an uſurper; to ſeek to dethrone him, and to cut him off: for Polititians vvill grant that a Tyrant vvithout a title may be ſo dealt with: And thus vve fee that if he looſe the old fundations, he shakes the throne more then he is a vvarre of; And as in many other things through this pamphlet ſo in this, he doth his Maſter no good ſervice, notvvithſtanding of the great fee he hath gote for his paines.

The ſumme of what followeth, Pag. 92, 93. is this [That none before King James 6. did at their installing enter into Covenant with the People, (except what one ſayeth of Gregory the great, who ſwore to defend the libertyes of the Chriſtian Religion, &c. which then was Popery) and neither did King James himſelf do it, but only Morton and Hume in his name promiſed ſomehing like it; nay it is doubted, if King Charles the firſt did ſweare that oath, of if he did, he was the first, and yet he was aught yeers our King before, and it is to be beleeved on good ground, that if he had thought his taking of that oath, should have ſubjected him to the coactive and punitive power of the Subjects, in every caſe, wherein they or any party of them) being meer private perſons) might think him deficient, he would rather have endured any death. but it shall be avowed, that he did never shrink from the obſervation of that Godly oath, neither hath his Majeſty who now reigneth ſwerved from the obſervation of that oath hitherto, and we are hopeful, God's grace shall preſerve him hereafter, from any ſuch thing.]

Anſw. 1. We cannot expect that Buchanan, ſtudying much brevity, would ſet downe all the formalityes that were uſed at the coronation of the Kings, he only ſatisfying himſelf with a ſeries of the ſucceeding Kings, and with a relation of ſome of the moſt remarkable paſſages: And therefore, it is no good argument to conclude that no ſuch thing was; becauſe he doth not make mention thereof. 2. other hiſtorians name ſome other Kings beſide that Gregory, who tooke an oath at their coronation, as Corbred the 21. King, who ſwore ſe majorum conſiliis acquieturum. That he should be ruled by the counſel of a Parliament, whom he accounted his Superiours. So in Macbethus his dayes, it vvas ordained by the Eſtates, that the King should ſweare to maintaine the community of the Realme. 3. Whether they did actually ſweare an oath at their coronation or not, it is not much to the matter; for a virtual and implicite Covenant will ground all which we deſire, and that there was this much, cannot be denyed, ſeing Kings, who could not reigne, was layd aſide; others who corrupted government, were purſued, ſentenced, punished, impriſoned, and killed in battle, or otherwiſe made to promiſe amendment; And ſeing we p. 137finde bonds laid upon Kings, as that in the dayes of Finnanus the 10. King. [That Kings thereafter should do nothing of any great concernment, without the authority of their publick Councel, and should not rule the Kingdome according to the Counſel of his Domesticks; That he should manage no publick buſineſſe which belonged to the King, without the advice and conduct of the Fathers, and should neither make peace or war, enter into Leagues, or break Leagues by himſelf, without the concurrence and command of the Fathers & Heads of tribes.] This was a fundamental Law of the Kingdome, and all who accepted of the crowne thereafter muſt have accepted it upon theſe tearmes, though they had not been in plaine tearmes expreſſed, So Durſtus his Succeſſour did ſweare the ſame, and therefore in Mogaldus the 23. King his dayes, this is called the ancient cuſtome, for he ad conſilia Seniorum omnia ex priſco more revocavit, did all by a Parliament according to the ancient and received cuſtome: And becauſe Conarus the 24. King neglected, or refuſed to follow this received custome, he was caſt into priſone; So that the not obſerving of theſe conditions made them obnoxius unto the coactive power of the People. So was Romachus cenſured by the Parliament for the ſame crime. So we read of many others cenſured for their miſdemanurs as Constantine the 43. King, Ferchardus the firſt the 52. King, Ferchardus the 2. the 54. King, Eugenius the 62. King, Donaldus the 70. King, all which inſtances & many ſuch like, do abundantly cleare that the Kings of old were under bonds and obligations, if not explicite, yet tacite unto the People. 4. Whatever can be ſaid concerning the ancient Kings; yet now it is paſt doubt that all our Kings are bound to ſweare an oath at their coronation, and ſo are under conditions and Covenant-tyes and obligations, and this is enough for our preſent purpoſe. 5. It was thought ſuffificient in point of formality & legality that the Earle of Mortoun and Hume should ſweare in name of the King, at this coronation. [That he should obſerve the Lawes, and according to his power should preſerve the doctrine, and rites of Religion, which were then taught, and publickly received, and oppoſe himſelf to all which was repugnant thereunto.] And this was the very ſumme of that oath, which was afterward concluded in Parliament, p. 138to be received by all Kings at their coronation. And the reaſon why they did not put King Iames to that oath thereafter, was becauſe, he was but once crowned, and the oath was to be ſworne at the coronation: and when King Iames was crowned, It was done by others for him, as is ſaid. 6. Though this man make a queſtion, whether King Charles did ſwear this oath or not at his coronation, yet it is notoure that he did, and though he beleevet…, that if the King had thought, that his taking of that oath, should have been ſo far miſtaken by his Subjects, as that he should have been thought thereby, to have ſubmitted himſelf to their coactive and punitive power, in every caſe, wherein they or any part of them might think him deficient, he would rather have endured any death, then ſo to have caſt himſelf away, at the pleaſure of malcontented partyes, amongſt the People, taking advantage againſt him by that oath: (all which we may give him good leave, to beleeve, for we aſſert no ſuch thing) yet he muſt ſuffer us to beleeve alſo, upon as good ground, That if King Charles had abſolutely or peremptoriely refuſed to have taken that oath, or had ſaid, That he would rule as he liſted, and have no regaird to the eſtablished lawes; and whould bring in what Religion he pleaſed, though it were Machometaniſme or Poperie; or that he did not account himſelf obliged to the Subjects by any oath he could take, The Nobles and others would have ſcrupled to have given him the Crowne, and acknowledged him King. And their after practices declared that they looked upon him, as a King obliged by tearmes and conditions unto them: which when he broke, they maintained their right againſt him, with their ſword, when no other meane could prevaile. 7. Though it be true, that King Charles the first was acknowledged King ſometime before he was crowned, yet that was with reſpect to the ſame conditions, unto which he was, by his taking the place, virtually obliged; and therefore afterward, when he came to be crovvned, and formally inſtalled, he did alſo formally and expreſly take on the obligation. And vvhether he did ever shrink from the obſervance of that godly oath, let this perfidious man avovv vvhat he vvill, many vvill aſſert p. 139it as certane, in ſome poynts, and too too probable in other. 9. But though he should doubt vvhether any King, before King Charles the ſecond, did ſvveare any oath or Covenant vvith the People; yet he cannot doubt of vvhat this King Charles the ſecond did: It being being beyond all denyall and contradiction, That he ſwore both that Oath which was injoyned in King Iames the ſi…t his dayes; and alſo the National Covenant, and the Solemne League and Covenant: and that according to theſe, the Subjects did ſweare obedience unto Him: Here was then a mutual conditional Covenant, explicitly, and in plaine tearmes, with all the ſolemnities imaginable, entered into: and what needs more to cleare all which we have ſaid, and to ground all which we would inferre, to juſtify the late action: For as for his vaine inferences, they concerne not us, and more shall be ſpoken of them afterward. 10. Though this Surveyer be ready to avow that this King hath never ſwerved from the obſervation of that oath enjoyed Anno 1567. yet all the World ſeeth, that he hath not, as he ought to have done, maintained the true Religion, nor right preaching, and adminiſtration of Sacraments; Neither hath he, according to his power, abolished and withſtood all falſe Religions contrary to the ſame, as appeares by the great indulgence, and toleration, if not countenance, granted to Popery and Papiſts. Neither hath he ruled us, according to the will of God, but rather perſecuted us for adhereing to the Word of God: nor hath he ruled us, by the laudable Lawes and conſtitutions of the realme, but hath with a packt Parliament, principled to his minde, overturned our lawes & libertyes, & hath framed & eſtablished iniquity by a law. 11. But what ſayes he to the Nat. Cov. & League & Cov.? Dar he avow that he hath not broken theſe? If he had not, we had not been troubled this day, with a Popish Prelatical and Malignant faction, nor had we ſeen theſe abjured and foreſworne Prelates, nor had we ſeen the work of reformation of religion, in worship, Doctrine. Diſcipline and Government, ſo overthrowne, overturned and trode upon, as it is this day. 12. So then, ſeing he cannot deny, but the King took and ſolemnely ſwore theſe Covenants, p. 140and that now he hath openly, and avowedly broken them, it is undenyable that he hath broken the conditions on which he was made King: yea, ſeing theſe were the maine conditions, and the only conditions conſiderable, and were become the fundamental law of our conſtitution, he hath violated the principal and only conditions covenanted, and what we shall hence inferre, we shall now show.

Having thus vindicated and cleared the premiſes, we shall draw out our arguments and concluſions thence, and,

1. If People propoſe conditions and tearmes unto Princes, to be by them acquieſced in, and ſubmitted unto, and upon which they are to accept their Crowne and Scepter; Then, if the Prince of King violate theſe conditions which he once accepted, and contrare of his promiſe and engagement, deſtroy what he promiſed to build up; The People may very lawfully defend themſelves, and theſe good ends, which they endeavoured to have ſecured, by propoſeing theſe conditions unto the Prince, when he is ſeeking to deſtroy all, even by force vvhen there is no other remedy. But ſuch is our caſe. The King vvas formally and expreſly engaged by Compacts and Covenants to ſecure the Reformed Religion in Doctrine, Worshipe, Diſcipline, and Government; to ſecure all theſe vvho owned the ſame, and adhered to the Covenants; and to ratify and approve all lavves made for theſe Covenants, and for the ſecurity of ſuch as entered into theſe Covenants: and novv notvvithſtanding of theſe conditions agreed unto by him, the Covenant and vvork and all is overturned, People perſecuted meerly upon the account of their adhereing to theſe Covenants, all conditions are violated, all Covenants, Vowes, Compacts, Engagements and vvhat could be deviſed for ſecurity of the reformation and of the ovvners thereof, are broken. Who then can condemne even privat perſons if they ſtand to their defence in this caſe? See Althuſius polit. cap. 38. n. 30.

2. If People may lavvfully and laudably defend the fundamental lavves of the Kingdom, on vvhichwhich the conſtitution of the Kingdome ſtandeth, and on vvhichwhich the ſecurity of vvhat is dear to them as men, and as Chriſtians, relveth. Then p. 141the late act cannot be condemned; becauſe, in defending themſelves, they ſtood for that vvhichwhich vvas the maine and principal tearme of our conſtitution. But the former is true: becauſe the Prince violating theſe, deſtroyeth the conſtitution, and becauſe He cannot do this as a Prince, having already engaged as a Prince to maintaine the conſtitution, he muſt do it as a private perſon, or an enemy to the conſtitution and whole body of the land. Therefore he may wel be reſiſted, even by private perſones, ſee this fully made out by Althuſ. Pol. cap. 38. n. 37. both out of Lawyers and Divines.

3. If a People, even by reſiſtence, may defend their perſonal libertyes and rights, ſecured unto them by Compacts with the Prince, or by the fundamental lawes of the land, which the Prince as Prince is bound to maintaine. Then the late act cannot be condemned: becauſe by it they were but defending that, which the King had ſecured unto them, by his compact, and which was ſecured unto them by the fundamental law of the land. But the former is true: becauſe a privat perſon is allowed by law to maintaine his Lands and Rights, even though ſome, in the Kings name, should come, under whatſoever pretext, to robe and diſpoſſeſſe him, and shut him to the door. Therefore, this late act, though of private perſones, cannot be condemned.

4. If a Prince violating all, or he maine conditions, upon which he was made Prince, becometh ſtricto jure no Prince, but falleth from his benefice, not having done the offices, in conſideration of which, he gote that benefice conferred upon him [non enim (ſayeth Althuſ. ubi ſupra) commodum debet ſentire ex contractu quem vel omittendo vel committendo quis impugnat.] Then lawfully enough ſuch an one may be reſiſted, even by Private perſones; as is cleare. But the former is made clear above: and ſuch is our caſe now; for the King hath broken, palpably and avowedly, the maine and principal conditions, on which he was made King, having overturned the work of reformation, which, if he had not promiſed, vowed and covenanted to maintaine, he had never been crowned or admitted to the exerciſe of that Government. Who then can blaime a People ſtanding p. 142to their owne defence, when oppresſed and tyrannized over by his emiſſaries, who hath thus violated the principal and only conditions of the compact, and is forceing them to the ſame exceſſe of wickedneſſe and perjury? [deficiente hâc conditione ſayeth Althuſ. Pol. c. 38. n. 40.) deſinit …bligatio, & fidem non ſervanti, fidem ei quoque non ſervari aquum est. Nam qui non facit quod debet, nec recipit quod oportet, nec p…tere potest, quod ei ideo ab alio debetur: quam naturam eſſe conventionum in quibus utraque pars contrahens obligatur, teſtatur Tiraq. de Legib. Connub. Gloſſ. 1. part 13. n. 42. & la…è Maſcard. Concl. 1387. per Alleg. Ibid. Rolland. a Val. Conſil. 69. Vol. 4. & Conſil. 53. Vol. 1. quando ergo una pars promiſſa non praes;tat, facit eo ipſout & altera liberetur. Dynus Alexander & Jaſon, in L. cum proponas C. de pactis.]

5. If when a Prince violateth the maine and principal conditions, on which he was inſtalled, a People be ſiricto jure liberated from ſubjection unto him. Then much more may they reſiſt him, when he by his emiſſaries oppreſſeth, and unjuſtly violenteth them. But we have cleared the former to be ture. Therefore, ſo is the later. The conſequence cannot be denyed: for if ſtricto jure a people may diſowne a prince, then much more may they repell his unjuſt violence. If law admit the more, it will admit the leſſe alſo. The application of this is cleare from the former.

6. If the Covenant or Compact, which is betwixt Prince and People give law-clame to the People to purſue the Prince., in caſe of failing in the maine and principal thing covenanted: Then, ſure the People may reſiſt unjuſt violence; for they who purſue, for a broken Compact, according to their clame, may farr more defend their clame when invaded by force, contrare to the compact. The application of this is alſo cleare.

7. Since by this compact, it is clear as Althuſius tells us Pol. Cap. 19. n. 12. that the People or Kingdome are the full Lords proprietors of all the power, and have free liberty to diſpoſe of it, the frute and emolument thereof redounding to themſelves, having full power no leſe then any private perſon to manage diſpoſe, and diſpenſe in their owne matters p. 143as they pleaſe. Then when they finde the perſon to whom the Government is committed by compacts, adminiſtrating the ſame to their hurt and deſtruction, they may ſee to their owne good, and not ſuffer themſelves to be deſtroyed, but reſiſt him who inſtead of a mandatarius and ſervant, turneth a Tyrant and Enemy.

8. Since, as the ſame Althuſius ſayeth Ibid. n. 13. by this compact it is apparent, that the Ius the power or authority, which is given to the Supream Magiſtrate is not his owne, & is leſſe then the Ius of the People & inferiour to theirs; becauſe it dependeth upon the free will & preſcription of the People, & endeth with the death of the prince, who is Mandatarius; as other contractus Mandati uſe to do, and recurreth to its owne proper Maſter and Lord. Then it cannot be unlawful for the People the commander here, to ſee to their owne ſaiftie, and provide that their owne free gift deſtroy them not, and ſo to reſiſt the Prince abuſeing that power to their deſtruction.

9. If it be certane (as it is to Althuſ. Pol. c. 19. n. 47.) that the Prince hath no more power given to him by the People, then what is contained in the conditions upon which he undertaketh the government, and what more he aſſumes, he uſurpeth by tyranny from the People. Then when he uſurpeth more power then was given to him, he may be reſiſted: and the People are allowed to preſerve their owne: and when he ruleth contrare to the conditions, and deſtroyeth theſe, it is certane He arrogateth to himſelf a power which was never given to him, yea which was virtually prohibited and diſcharged to him: and in that caſe may lawfully be reſiſted, as is undenyable. The antecedent Althuſius proveth in the forecited place n, 48. ſaying [aequitas hujus rei naturalis demonſtrari poteſt ex natura mandati, quod dicitur contractus bonae fidei, obligans eum qui alienorum negotiorum adminiſtrationem ſuſcepit, ne limites & fines mandati excedat, ſed contineat ſe intraterminos praeſcriptos a mandante, ut latius docent J. CC. quibus addendus Vaſq. Illuſtr. Quaeſt. L. 1. c. 47. n. 13.