The Obligation of Human Laws, Chapter 7
CAP. VII.
THus far his exceptions are but words, let us paſs now to his reaſons againſt my anſwer.
His firſt reaſon is, It is no eaſy thing to judge what is beſt for the Peoples good, Kings themſelves find it neceſſary to have their Councets to adviſe about it. To judge what is beſt for the Peoples good is indeed a high matter. To judge only whether a thing be for the common good or not, is another matter. The judgement of every one is free, and any body may judge of any thing as he is able, and as he will. The Cock may paſs his judgement on the Pearl he ſcraped up. That which comes to carry any ſtreſs upon judging, is the conſideration of the effect that depends upon that judgement. The judging of a thing which a Man himſelf hath to do, hath this effect depending on it, the doing his duty, every one is to judge of all thoſe things and circumſtances which belong to his own acts, whether or no they be agreeable to Gods will, that he may do as he ought; and the rule of this will in politicals, I have declared. There is the act now of the Magiſtrate, and the act of the Subject. There is a great difference of the concern or moment that lies on a judgement of the ſame thing when the act of the one depends upon it, and when there depends upon it the act only of the other. The act of the Magiſtrate is to make the law, and ſee it executed; the act of the People is to obey it. By this firſt reaſon of his againſt my anſwer, do I ſee good reaſon for it, and the ſufficiency of it. The Magiſtrate judges whether a thing be for the common good, or according to our ſupream rule in reference to his paſſing it into a law, and then to cauſe it to be executed. The People and every particular perſon does judge, whether the thing commanded be for the common good, in reference only to the obligation of their Conſciences to obedience. Upon the judgement of the Magiſtrate, there does depend an effect of univerſal concernment, that is the obligation of a whole Nation to live according to the Law he makes, upon the judgdement of each particular when the law is made, there depends no concern but a mans own, and that reſpecting his inward man only. Now its certain that the Magiſtrate in regard of ſuch an effect as depends upon his judgement, hath need indeed of the greateſt wiſdome, and the ableſt Councel, and he cannot be too cautions in his proceeding, ſeeing if he be miſtaken, and the Conſciences of the Subjects be not obliged by ſuch a law, yet are their perſons liable to be compelled and they muſt not reſiſt, which may prove a vaſt inconvenience, and to be avoided only by a right information at firſt about the matter. But as for a private perſon who judges not what is beſt for the peoples good (as he ſpeaks right in regard to the Magiſtrate) but onelyonly judges of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the will of God, or the rule of his (which he hath given to the world about Politicals, if they forget not to minde it, to wit) that it be in …eneral for their good, the effect which (I have ſaid) does attend ſuch a judgement, is of that nature onelyonly as requires no greater underſtanding or diſcretion, then every man hath for himſelf to act by in all the reſt of his life and converſation. He judges here according to his Rule in theſe things, as he doth in other of his actions according to the word whether he be bound or not bound in Conſcience to them. And God requires of him to judge and act but according to his talent in all buſineſs whatſoever. He will acknowledge the outward man to be bound, and in a matter of his ſoul which concerns no body but him, or the inward obligation of his Conſcience, you muſt leave him to God and his own Judgement.
His next reaſon is, That when Men know what is conducing to their good, they are not apt to do it without a Law. And what does this prove or contradict? It proves it good therefore that the people have a Law-giver or Governor, and that he ſhould be wiſer and better then they, as Plato may urge it: But does it follow they may not therefore judge, whether the thing commanded be for their good; Surely this will be a good reaſon why the people ſhould judge of it. For if the good they conceive in it, is the reaſon they admit to have any Law, and the argument to preſs them to obey it, then muſt they judge of that good, and whether it be conducive to that good or not. In the mean while the difference of the reaſon and ends, (which is diſtinguiſhed, in the Magiſtrates judging of a thing to be for the common good or not, and the peoples does ſufficiently declare the weakneſs and vanity of ſuch ſpeeches, as this Man hath ſeveral of. He that makes every Man judge of what is for the peoples good, takes away the principal power of the Magiſtrate. And why ſo? as if it were an act of power, and that uſurped for any but the Prince to have a judgement of diſcretion over his civil actions. Again, if the people be able to judge of that there is no need of any Law or Law-giver. As if when men knew their duty they needed no Magiſtrate to make them do it, and that while himſelf too is telling us the need of Laws, becauſe men a…e not like to prefer the publick good though they comprehend it, before that of their own particular perſons. I cannot I perceive, be throughly intent to anſwer what is inſignificant, but the ſubſtance in the main of theſe two reaſons comes to this, that every man is not able to bring the thing commanded by the Magiſtrate to the rule, ſo as to judge whether it be for the common good or not, and therefore they muſt act only upon the judgement of the Law-giver, and conſequently be no reaſonable agents, in their Political obedience. For ſatisfaction therefore to this, Let us conceive the Magiſtrate commanding ſomething moral or Religious, there are no Proteſtants but do hold that every man for himſelf muſt bring here what is commanded to the rule of the moral Law and Scripture, and according as himſelf believes it conſonant or not to the rule he judges it, ſo is he bound to obey it or not to to obey it. Now let any man who hath but the heart to think and ſpeak with integrity, conſider whether a rude and illiterate man that never could read a word in the Bible, be more able to judge whether a thing commanded by the Magiſtrate be agreeable or not to the word of God; or whether it be conducive or not to the common good? ſuppoſe the Waggoner as unlearned as any man, I will ask whether ſuch a man be not more able to judge of the Law concerning Waggons, that is whether it be good for the high wayes and conſequently whether he had beſt or not obſerve the act, then to judge whether the Doctrine and Diſcipline of the Church of England, or whether whatſoever is contained in the whole Book of Common Prayer with the Rites and Ceremonies, be agreeable or not to the Scriptures of the old and New Teſtament? I ſuppoſe there is no man will have the hardi…ſſe to oppoſe ſuch a manifeſt conviction. And if in regard to his practice, this man and every other that uſes the Common-prayer muſt judge as well as he can of the lawfulneſs of it, or elſe he cannot act in faith: and ſo likewiſe of all thoſe doctrines or practiſes he yields unto them, then will there I hope be no ſtumbling block left here upon this account, I do advance therefore and reſt upon this one argument, if the incapacity, unfitneſs, or little ability that ſome men have to judge of what is required by the Magiſtrate, whether it be agreeable or no to the common good, be a reaſon ſufficient for the denying to the ſubject ſuch a judgement: then muſt the leſſer ability of ſuch to judge whether that which is required be agreeable to the word of God, be a reaſon ſufficient to diſcharge them from judging of it by the word. But the conſequent is falſe, and therefore the antecedent. By the way, obſerve, if any man diſtinguiſh between judging of a Law whether it be for a common good: and judging of the thing commanded by a law, or rather of a mans own doing the thing commanded, whether it be for the publick good or not, I am to be underſtood of the laſt, when I ſay the Magiſtrate judges of the thing in reference to his paſsing it into a law and we judge of it ſo paſſed in reference to our obedience or obligation by it.
His third reaſon is the ſame with the firſt. The people are ſo far from being able to judge, that the wiſeſt Princes find it difficult, only we have more words for the enlargement; which conſiſt partly in a grave kind of diſcourſe from a paſſage of a Biſhop Bramhall, of the ſeverall things and circumſtances that the Law-giver is to weigh in his making of a law, which the people cannot conſider and attend unto: and then in an idle deſcant upon this, that it is not fit therefore that laws ſhould be ſuſpended till the ſubjects be agreed they are for their good, with the like words, as if there were any indeed ever dream'd that a Law-giver, who is with us the Parliament, could not make a law untill they had conſulted the people firſt, whether they all of them judged the matter ſuch, that if it were paſſed into a law, they ſhould be bound in Conſcience to the performance, and before they had an affirmative anſwer from them (who muſt be made loath too to be ſatisfied about it) they could paſs no act or ſtatute of the Realm. This is the ſenſe in which this man let his pen run here, and then concludes. The Prince is in an ill caſe who hath ſuch ſubjects, and he is not in very good, whoſe Divines begin to inſtill ſuch doctrine into them If there be any thing in thoſe more words and the ſame reaſon that ſeems of moment, it is already anſwered I count by diſtinguiſhing the part of the Law-giver, the ſubject, whoſe judgement of a thing commanded in a law already paſſed, for the ſatisfiying himſelf whether he be obliged in Conſcience to the doing, can by no means prejudice the act of the Law-giver in the paſſing the law as is manifeſt, nor does it throw it down being paſſed. For this is a miſtake in this perſon very palpable, as if a human law could not be of force unleſs a mans Conſcience be obliged by it. I obſerved this in him before where he ſaid, Laws while they do oblige tye the Conſcience, and that the cauſe of his error was the want of preſent knowledge to diſtinguiſh between Political and morall obligation. The obligation which is on the Conſcience is morall and can be no other, and paſſes on it I have ſaid from Gods inſtitution of our generall duty: but the obligation which is Political belongs to the outward man and may ſtand good when the morall ceaſes, and for as much as this obligation of the outward man it ſelf does ſo ariſe from the commandment of God for ſubjection, and that we ſhould not reſiſt, it may appear to the impartial that will conſider aright of what is ſaid, that the queſtion or ſingle point between this man and I concerning the obligation of human Laws, in reference only to the conſcience, is really and in good earneſt very little or not at all material to the Magiſtrate, or the civill Government, which way ſoever it is determined. And when there are ſo many learned men of divers ſorts who exerciſe their liberty in maintaining the opinion of either extream without controle or prejudice to the world, its a thing hardly becomming either a temperate minde, or modeſt Learning, or that I ſhould have moſt expected from this Authour a free Theology, to expreſs himſelf in this manner, as if a man could not endeavour the finding out a middle way that is ſo needfull in ſuch a controverſie but he muſt be adjudged one that is broaching of ſomething againſt the State, and deſerved correction.
His fourth reaſon is, Grant the ſubjects ſuch a power (that is, a power only of judgeing of their own civill acts) and in a little time no law ſhall be obſerved. He proceeds, Taxes will not be paid. He goes on. There will be Inſurrections and Rebellion. Upon this, he brings in certain narrations, of the Subſidy of Head money in Richard the Seconds time and what followed; of the aid granted to Henry the Seventh in his third year and the Northern Rebellion; then of a ſubſidy in his thirteenth year when the Corniſh-men took up arms, then of the caſe of Henry the eight about Aliens, and of one John Lincoln a Broaker that was hanged. See more in a certain dialogue between a Couceellor of ſtate, and a Juſtice, he has in his ſtudy; for this it is for the man to light on a new book, he muſt by all means be teling us of what he was reading laſt. And thus had we at the begining of theſe Papers from the tenth argument of Bellarmine againſt Image worſhip, the relation of the Iconomachi and what befell them in the time of Leo Iſaurus; in the time of Conſtantinus Copronomus; in the time of the horrible cold and freezing of the Pontick Sea, the drought after, and the death of the Emperour, The man hath a ſtrange fruitful application. This brings to my remembrance an advice once I received from an ingenious and prudent Woman, who ſeeing me over ingaged in diſpute ſometimes with an Anabaptiſt, who was a man of much talk and being not willing I ſhould be ſo much concerned: you muſt not ſays ſhe, argue with theſe men in the way you do; you lay down the ſubject, and ſpeak upon that, and then think to hold them to it, and are moved when they ſpeak from the point, and ſo are confounded; but you ſhould (ſayes ſhe) give them leave to ſpeak ſo long until you can lay hold on ſomething that they ſay, and whatſoever it is, you muſt ſpeak of that; and by this means while you take them up ſtill upon their laſt words, whether it be to the point or not, you will never want matter no more then they do, and by the uſe of their own weapon may deal with them. I muſt profeſs if this man who hath ſo apt an expreſſion, do come to get this knack of it, as he appears to have in theſe continuations and apendix, he may continue his continuations while he lives, and I know no body able to diſpute with him, unleſs I could light on the fellow that would preach with any body, but it ſhould be (he ſaid) in a Negative way, And Peter went to Antioch. He went not to be drunk, here he ſpeaks of drunkenneſs, gluttony, and all manner of exceſs. He went not to lye with women, there he ſpeaks of fornication, and uncleanneſs and all other deadly ſin. But he went to preach, there he ſpeaks of the Scriptures from Geneſis to the Revelation, of the Fathers the Schoolemen, the Councels, and all the books that ever he read to this day.
For the reaſon it ſelf without its appurtenance, I have I account prevented it in the ſtate of my opinion. The ſtate alone of what I have ſaid, will wipe off any ſuch miſtaken conſequence, which he would injuriouſly bring upon it. It is one queſtion whether we are to obſerve a law: & another whether we are bound in Conſcience to obſerve it. The queſtion between us in the bottom of the point is not concerning outward obſervation: but the inward obligation of Conſciences. And the truth is as I was ſaying at the cloſe of the other reaſon, that this buſineſs does not really concern the Magiſtrate, or the Common-wealth directly at all (though indirectly and ex conſequenti any thing may concern any body) for what is it to the Magiſtrate or the community, ſo long as he can enforce the thing to be done if he will, whether a man does do it out of Conſcience, or out of diſcretion only: out of fear of God, or fear of the law, or his ſword. The Magiſtrate cannot take any cognizance out of what principle a man acts; the judgement is not within his jurisdiction, and if a man doth not act out of Conſcience, he cannot make him. It is ſufficient, ſo long as a man acknowledges his authority from God, that he muſt therefore be ſubject and muſt not reſiſt, and conſequently if in good earneſt he ſtand upon it, and will have obedience from him, let it be in any thing but ſin, there is no help for him that is, he may not help himſelf by reſiſtance) but he muſt yield to it, whether he will or no. This is that which ſecures government, and Governors. Let every man be held bound in Conſcience but thus far, and as for the reſt, it is a matter concerns each ones own ſoul only and his private peace, and it will become thoſe that are prudent to be very tender what they determine in the buſineſs.
It is true this reverend Perſon thought I believe he had ſpoken well in his ſaying, that it is hard to write any thing more inconſiderate and dangerous then that I have: but if a man ſhould write any word againſt ſubjection to Magiſtracy, or his own preſent Magiſtrate, or that it were lawful to reſiſt if the Magiſtrate ſhould impoſe any law againſt the common good (when yet it is not ſin, I account many times not to obey it, and eſcape if we can without reſiſtance), this let me tell him were dangerous (I cannot ſay more dangerous becauſe the other is not dangerous,) that the man may receive ſome ſhame and conviction for his own being ſo inconſiderate in his cenſure of what he underſtood no better. This Debater ſhall not have I will warrant him, a breath or Title of this nature from me. Nay if a law be good I mean politically good (and a law is politically good where it is for the common good,) I am ready to believe and hold it is obliging, obliging to the Conſcience, not only that we muſt obey rather then reſiſt (which we muſt do if the thing be politically evil, unleſs we count ſuffering to be better) but if we could eſcape with man, we muſt yet do it, I count leaſt we offend God, if a law be not politically good, I ſay we muſt not reſiſt for all that, and upon that account rather then ſuffer we are lyable to obedience. And what is there now, or what reaſon is there that any ſhould deſire more. Let us here our man of Proverbs. A man muſt not reſiſt (ſayes our Caſuiſt) that is expreſs, and rather then reſiſt he muſt ſuffer, but this is to ſteal a gooſe, and ſtick a feather; I thank him firſt for this, that he hath not left out this paſſage wholly in this place, leaſt his Reader elſe might have thought me indeed ſome dangerous perſon, whereas theſe words have acquitted me; and I anſwer, that this Gooſe he ſpeaks of my ſtealing, is the thing ought to be ſtolen or removed, and that which he makes ſo light of, is to be brought in the Room of it, to wit, this man is of opinion that human laws even all laws indefinitely bind the Conſcience, ſo that a man muſt ſin if he break any of them, This is his Gooſe, that is, his fooliſh opinion, an opinion intollerable: and inſtead of this, that which I would bring in is, that though we conceive there be ſome laws, which if a man ſometimes obſerves not, he is not to charge himſelf with ſin, yet if he be compelled by the lawful Magiſtrate, rather then reſiſt he muſt ſuffer, and rather then ſuffer obey. But why muſt he (ſayes he) when he is already perſwaded that he need not unleſs he be forced? this is ſtrange! where is this Debaters reaſon! I ſay he muſt, though he ſhould not ſin elſe by neglect, becauſe he is forced, and cannot help it, but for avoiding of ſuffering, he does it. But wrath or ſuffering is not to be feared when the multitude is agreed not to be injured. I anſwer here is the want of the diſtinction which this author would not take from me, between the authority which is in the Magiſtrates Perſon, and that of his commands. The one is from God immediately, the other mediately by vertue of the things commanded being for the common good, and ſo particulars of that generall morall duty which is required of God. Some may uſe other words to expreſs this diſtinction by the Magiſtrates authority it ſelf, and the exerciſe of it in his commands or laws: but this muſt be known that diſtinguiſh we muſt here to the ſame ſenſe I intend, and be very careful too of the diſtinction or we ſhall be loſt. If the multitude be agreed not to do a thing that is ill, it is well I take it, and as they ought, it was manifeſtly Jonathans caſe. But if they agree together not to ſuffer, if the Magiſtrate will enforce the thing, let there be but the leaſt Officer will act in it, then they reſiſt, and ſin againſt God, and it is not juſtify able upon any terms, ſuppoſe a whole army and but two men in it will ſtand by the Prince, he may. I muſt affirm to ſpeak ſtrictly on the point of Conſcience, by theſe two men alone, puniſh a whole army for any thing they refuſe to do, and they muſt bear it, and cannot help themſelves, but with ſin which they muſt not do. For he that reſiſteth the power, reſiſteth the ordinance of God, and receiveth to himſelf damnation. We know the caſe under Maximinian, when a whole legion of Chriſtians were commanded to ſacrifice, and they choſe rather to ſuffer decimation twice over, being executed man by man, rather then defend themſelves while their lives were at ſtake, and the ſword was in their hands. Such a Conſcience ought we to have of our ſubjection (and ſo much does the concern of government and the whole World lye upon it,) when of obedience as to ſome particular commands we need to have none. In ſhort there lyes no obligation upon Conſcience ſometimes to obey, but there does alwayes not to reſiſt, and that both ſerves the Magiſtrate turn, and ſuffices when he pleaſes to have a civil thing done.