The Obligation of Human Laws, Chapter 6
CAP. VI.
THe great and principal exception he hath, and which will deſerve the pains, is upon a queſtion which comes in as neceſſary to be askt upon my determination, and it is this. It being ſuppoſed, and to be granted, that the will of God is that alone which does oblige the Conſcience, and that according as a thing commanded in human Laws does conduce to the pub…ick good or not, ſo is it agreeable or not to his will: the queſtion is who ſhall be judge, whether a thing commanded by a Law be for the common good or no, and conſequently agreeable to Gods will and obligatory to the Conſcience. I anſwer every Man muſt be Judge on neceſſity himſelf in reference to his own action. I prove this. Every Man muſt judge of his own actions whether they be agreeable to the will of God or no. But to judge whether a thing commanded by a Law be agreeable to Gods will, is to judge whether it be conducive to the common good or not. Therefore every Man is judge himſelf, whether a thing commanded be for the publick good or no, in reference to his own action. Again, to judge whether we are bound in Conſcience to any thing commanded in a Law, is to judge whether it have Gods authority or not. But a Law or any thing commanded by a Law hath Gods authority or not, according as it is conducive to the common good. Therefore a Man muſt judge, whether that which is commanded him in a Law be for the common good or not, to judge whether he be bound or not bound to it in Conſcience. I muſt needs ſay there are ſome have had occaſion to be more ready to reſolve this queſtion, then otherwiſe they have deſired. We have had late impoſitions, and thought many times in what ſenſe they might be taken. We have come quickly to ſee, if they be taken, it muſt not be in any ſenſe of our own, we can frame, which were moſt looſe; but it muſt be in the impoſers meaning. This meaning is not certain, but ſome have believed thus and ſome otherwiſe. In the upſhot then this is that I have been brought, in my laſt thoughts, to conclude, that if a Man after the beſt means he can uſe for the underſtanding the Impoſers meaning, can take what is impoſed in that ſence which he verily believes in his own heart to be their meaning, he ſhall do well and ought to take it; if he cannot, he muſt for bear and chooſe to ſuffer. Being thus prepared in order to the determining a mans own act, about the taking an impoſition, when the queſtion lyes upon the meaning of the Law-giver, and the ſubject I count being changed only into his generall end in this, I had no cauſe to ſtick here, where there is but one and the ſame anſwer to be given to all ſuch queſtions. To wit, that notwithſtanding there may be ſeverall good cautions of thinking reverendly of our ſuperiours judgments, and not leaning too much on our own, with the like words uſed in the way, we muſt come to this reſult at laſt, that according as every man for his own part (after the beſt enquiry or exerciſe of his reaſon he can make) does believe in his very Conſcience whether the thing commanded in a Law be for the publick good or no, I mean it in reference to his own doing it, that is moſt plainly according as he believes in his own ſoul that the doing the thing which is commanded (by his example or otherwiſe) is conducive to the publick good or not, ſo muſt he account it agreeable or not to Gods will, and his Conſcience accordingly be bound, or looſed in regard to the performance.
I will convince the Debater from his own mouth and from the thing it ſelf.
From his own mouth we have a Caſe hath fallen very luckily before mentioned. What if Magiſtrate miſtake in a Law, and the matter be not conducive to that end for the publick he ordained it? He anſwers he is not bound to be of the Magiſtrates opinion, but may judge it better the Law were otherwiſe, yet thinks he is bound to obey it. But if this man and ſo another may be, and is, of a contrary opinion to the Magiſtrate, that the thing commanded is not for the publick benefit, as he acknowledges in that Caſe of his own putting, then hath he acknowledged in effect all that for which he cavills ſo much at me upon my anſwer to this queſtion.
For the thing it ſelf, In the firſt place no mortal man on Earth, can have power to make me, or him, or any underſtand, to think, or believe otherwiſe then we do. If I do think then, that ſuch a thing commanded be not for the common good, ſo I ſhall think, and muſt think do what the Magiſtrate can, or my ſelf either. And it … do believe ſo then do I judge or believe that i… is not according to Gods will, and conſequently that I am not bound in Conſcience …. If you ſay I ſhould not think ſo, it is unlawful to judge ſo, you contradict this man, who ſays, he is not bound abſolut…ly to be of the Law-givers opinion, that all ſuch things are for the publick good as he decrees; which is as truly, as ſtoutly ſaid againſt himſelf, for the matter will not bear it to be otherwiſe. In the ſecond place, Conſcience is a faculty which God hath put into Man, to judge of his own actions, in reference to his approving or condemning him for them. Whatſoever actions then are accountable unto God at the great day, are to be judged at preſent by Conſcience. We are accountable now no doubt to God for our civil actions, as well as others; and when in matters that are civil, thoſe things have or have not his approbation, as they do, or do not conduce to the common good, it follows that every man muſt judge of the things commanded him, whether they be or they be not to the common good, that he may be accountable unto God, according to what he is bound or not bound in Conſcience by them. In the third place our Proteſtant Divines in their cont overſy which the Papiſt Do judice, do allow to every man a judgement of private diſcretion which is the ſame with this judgement of Conſcience, that what means ſoever we uſe for our information, we muſt be the laſt judges our ſelves of the things we do, whether they are agreeable to Gods will or not, and according to our own belief muſt reſolve upon the practiſe or forbearance of them. It ſeems to me now a thing unreaſonable and injurious unto mankind, if we ſhall take away from the ſubject this judgement of private diſcretion in things that are political which we cannot but allow them in all other their morall and religious actions. If there be an infallible judge in Civils we may expect one in religions matters. But if there be no Pope nor Counſels but may erre in their Canons, there are no Law-givers but may erre in their Laws, and there is no cauſe why any ſhould indeed be more ſhy of granting the ſubject this judgement of diſcretion in reference to what the Prince hath Enacted, any more then what the Church hath declared, but only that they could not ſo well tell the rule to judge of things Civill as they could to judge of Doctrines and morall Precepts. As God therefore hath given us the Scriptures for a rule of religion, that when any thing is required of us to believe or practiſe as neceſſary to Gods worſhip or our ſalvation, we may and are to try it, by this rule, and can be obliged thereby no farther then we do judge it agreeable to this rule: and as in morals he hath given the law of nature for our rule: ſo hath the Almighty given to man his rule alſo in things politicall (which he hath written in his fleſhly tables, as ſure as there is any law of nature, and that is Gods will, as the ſcripture is) whereby the Laws of every Common-wealth are to be tryed and judged, the Law-giver being accountable to God according as he acts by it, and the People obliged in Conſcience, ſo far to obey his will as he commands agreeably to it: and this Rule or Law as I have before ſaid, is the common good. Things are religiouſly good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Scriptures. Things are moraly good or evill as they agree or agree not with the Law of nature. Things politically good or evill as they agree or agree not to the publick advantage. If I am commanded any thing about my religion I will go to the Scripture, if that commands me otherwiſe I cannot obey it. I will go to the morall Law in matters of vertue and vice. In politicall things, or things required by human Laws, I muſt go to this rule I have propoſed: I muſt judge of them as good or evill in their kind by that. If my doing the thing will not anſwer the rule, I am not bound in Conſcience to active obedience. In the laſt place if this be not granted, when you allow the ſubjects to be reaſonable agents in things religious, or morall, that may bring what is ſuperiour command's of that nature to the reſt of Gods will, you turn them into bruites in things civil while they may bring what they are commanded to no teſt, in relation to their own actions. If you deny me my judgement of private diſcretion, you will not let me act as a man. Indeed this perſon will have the liberty to judge otherwiſe then the Magiſtrate does, and yet be bound in Conſcience to obey, which is to be beneath a bruite, for the beſt act ſpontaneouſly, and follow the dictates of their ſenſe, if they be not hindred. But this man will have his judgement one way, that the thing is not good, and his will and actions another way, and that not upon conſtraint from without, but upon the principle of Conſcience, which is a contradiction againſt all good ſence. But as for others and this man too otherwhere (who makes it a placing our ſelves in the throne to determine otherwiſe concerning the publick welfaer, then the proper judge of it doth, ſo conſiſtent is he with himſelf, and ſuch need hath he to be angry if one adviſe him to be more reflective… on what he writes … that will not let us have a judgement different from the Lawgiver, and ſo to act only upon theirs, they make men to become Horſe as the and the Mule, upon whom the rider gets up, and they muſt go on, the why, and the whither as the driver pleaſes. But if this be the Iſſue which this mans opinion will lead us to, and this ſon of Circe ſhould expect by the conjuration of theſe few leaves to transforme us preſently out of our humanity, that we ſhould be content to be governed hence forward without, the exerciſe of our own reaſon, or aſſent that is, not to act out of election, but to be moved in civill obedience only as we are driven, we ſhall have little cauſe to be very forward to hearken to him. He may lay down his Penn and take a Whip in his hand and go Whiſtle.
But let us hear his exceptions to this anſwer. Who ſhall be judge whether a Law be for the publick good or no. His anſwer is ready at his Tongues end, for he needs not go deep for it. The Magiſtrate muſt judge, what is for the publick good for the making the Law, and we muſt judge as to our obedience to it. Then which it is hard to write any thing more inconſiderate and dangerous. I do acknowledge this to be my judgement, and for which I have offered here ſome reaſons, and it is not his ſaying this anſwer is inconſiderate and dangerous ought to prejudice it, if it be well adviced, and there be no danger indeed in it. For neither doth this man know the previous thought on other occaſions upon which this hath been ſet down: nor hath he yet underſtood the ſtate of my opinion right, that he ſhould charge it with any of thoſe conſequences, as are but the Lyons, and the Bears, the Chariots and the Armies, that fly in the Clouds of his own Immagination. But let us hear the reaſon of this wonderful deciſion which he hath as ready as he had his anſwer. Becauſe ſaith he every man is made by God the judge of his own actions, I cannot for my life ſee how that follows from this, though I have put his reaſoning into the plaineſt form that ever I could. It is pitty but this mans life ſhould be ſaved, and therefore I will tell him my reaſoning Thoſe Laws, I was ſhewing, which be not for the common good are not agreeable to Gods will, or have not his Authority, and ſo bind not the Conſcience. The queſtion upon this was as it is ſet down, and the anſwer and the reaſon with the addition of the words following. Becauſe God hath made every man judge of his own actions, and conſequently of all circumſtances, whether they are agreeable or not to his will for his forbearing or doing of them. If God then hath made every man judge of thoſe things which he is to do in all the circumſtances, whether they be agreeable or not to his will, then muſt he judge whether thoſe things that he is commanded to do in human Laws be for the common good or no, becauſe thoſe Laws only are agreeable to his will (I had laid down before) which are for the common good, and thoſe that are not are devoid of his Authority and bind not the Conſcience. This I deny not to be my very ſubſtance, and as the reaſoning is manifeſt, and will appear ſo (I doubt not) to the indifferent, ſo muſt it not be thought to be inculcated too often, either there, or here, ſeeing no man can ſtand ſafe in diſpute, but he that knows what is, and when he is upon his foundation. For the mans diſdainful expreſſions I have (I account) my ſatisfaction, and he his ſufficient reproof, that he hath no more cauſe for them. It is not ſence to ſay the Magiſtrate muſt judge what is for the publick good in reference to his act of making the Law, and we in reference to ours of obedience to it; for he doth not only judge but enjoyn, when he makes a Law; which leaves us no liberty but to judge whether his will and Gods do not claſh together. And why is not this ſenſe, what reaſon is this that … is not ſenſe? if he could have ſaid the Magiſtrate does enjoyn, and not judge at all before he enjoyns it, then he might have pretended to ſay thus. But if the Magiſtrate muſt not enjoyn any thing before he hath conſidered, and judges it to be for the common good, and if he doth enjoyn any thing that is not for the common good he hath no Authority from God for it, then does it appear neceſſary, that we do conſider likewiſe, and judge whether it be for the common good, and have his Authority, or elſe we cannot be bound in Conſcience to it. And thus you ſee very good ſenſe, evidence and fulneſs in this anſwer to the queſtion and that the Magiſtrates will, declaration of his will, or enjoyning a thing, does not take away our liberty and duty, to conſider when he hath enjoyned it, whether we be yet in Conſcience in obliged, or in prudence only, and the outward man to obedience. The miſtake of this perſon is that he thinks we may not judge of a Law, but only whether it be againſt Conſcience, when we muſt no doubt judge alſo whether it be obliging to Conſcience, or otherwiſe how ſhall we make Conſcience of it? We are not to judge only whether it claſpes with Gods will, but whether it agrees with it. If the Magiſtrates will be not againſt Gods will, yet if it hath not his will and authority with it, it is not obligatory to the Conſcience. The Magiſtrates will binds not aſunder from Gods, In morals the caſe is not thus, whatſoever is not according to Gods will is againſt it: But in civil and indifferent things a thing may not be againſt his will, that is againſt any moral precept (as our obedience I ſpeak of to ſome human Laws) and yet have none of his Authority for it. Thus prudence, the preſervation of my ſelf, and the Magiſtrates honour, may prevail with me to do a thing which I think otherwiſe I have no obligation to do in my Conſcience.
I will yet add. I diſtinguiſh my obediénce, and my obedience out of Conſcience, or my obedience out of other generall rerſons, and my obedience out of Conſcience, to this particular command. I do not reſolve my obedience, into a judgement of private diſcretion whether a Law be for the common good or no, for I can apprehend eaſily that when God hath required the Magiſtrate to make no Law but according to this rule, no unjuſt, or unprofitable Law, he hath not yet commanded that I ſhould never obey ſuch a Law. I may obey out of a generall implicit apprehenſion of duty; or a ſingular love to my ſuperiors perſon, for fear of his diſpleaſure: to avoid the danger of the Law: or out of ſeverall prudentiall conſiderations, regarding the Magiſtrate, my ſelf, or others: when yet If I come to the point, whether I am bound in Conſcience to do the particular thing commanded, that is whether there lyes a divine obligation on me as well as that from the Law to do it I am on neceſſity then to examine it, by the rule which God hath ſet me, and that being no other but the common good in politicalls, I muſt reſolve my obedience out of Conſcience into this judgement, when I reſolve my prudentiall obedience otherwiſe. It may ſuffice me therein, ſo long as the thing is not ſinfull, that I am obliged by man. It may be but very rare if. I queſtion my Rulers commandment, which is like to be only perhaps in ſome grievous preſſure. If the Law be bad, my obedience yet and my example may do good, nor does the Magiſtrates abuſe of his office I hope take away my liberty to endure it if I pleaſe. The true ends moreover hapily of obedience, may be obtained, when the end of Ruling is neglected. Nay the common good may be promoted poſſibly, by my yeilding to a Law when the Law it ſelf does croſs it. And farther my diſobedience may do more hurt to the common good then the obeying that hurtfull command would do. So farre am I from diſcouraging any from obedience to human Laws (as a thing generally good and prudentiall) when I would keep the Conſcience free, and not have it burdened with ſin for every want of their performance. I ſee indeed by this and other learned perſons, what an immagination they have got, that if I reſolve the queſtion whether I am in Conſcience obliged to obey ſuch a Law, by my private judging of the thing commanded whether it be agreeable or not to the common good I do uſurpe the place of the Ruler and make myſelf only my own Lawgiver, as they are apt to ſpeak. But this is a miſtake, for beſides that when I judge of the thing commanded by its Rule, this judgement of mine is not the maker of my duty but the diſcerner of it, and ſo I do not become any Law-giver to my ſelf in the buſineſs: I diſtinguiſh the obligation of a human Law, and the obligation of Conſcience (formaliter. & ſimpliciter) by that Law. If I reſolved the whole obligation of human Laws into this Ru…e, and my judgement of the Law by it, ſo that I held it muſt never be obeyed on other reaſons, or that if I were puniſhed for not obeying, I was not bound to ſubmit, then did I offer injury indeed to my Ru…er and uſurped his Government. But if I reſolve only the obligation of my Conſcience by that Law into this rule, and my judgement of it accordingly, I uſurpe no power of the Magiſtrates, which I leave him ſtill over the exterior man, but I keep God only as I ought in his own feat of the Conſcience. And verily if the Conſcience of man be concerned in every human law, I would fain know, how any of our great Clerks can ſay that human laws bind not in the caſe of intollerable griveance. If God does command me to do the thing, it is not any griveance of minde can excuſe me, but if it be man indeed commands it only and not God, the griveance will be reaſon enough for me to call it in queſtion, and to avoid it if I may; but the reaſon of my non-obedience, muſt not have this foundation, that it is my grievance, or that I cannot endure it, but that conſideratis conſiderandis, I am not obliged to it in Conſcience.