The Obligation of Human Laws, Chapter 8
CAP. VIII.
I will not yet leave his laſt reaſon, ſeeing he layes ſo much ſtreſs on it, and his ſtrength of all comes to this. I do not take here his very words, but matter which he may expreſs as he will otherwiſe. The People muſt not be allowed to judge of their own actions, which are commanded by the Magiſtrate about civil things, becauſe they will be ſwayed by their own intereſts, and judge thoſe Laws againſt the publick good which are not for their private profit: by which means unleſs they be taught and hold that all Laws indefinitely do bind their Conſciences, they will notwithſtanding the Magiſtrates power, abſolve themſelves from what they pleaſe, no Laws will be obſerved, and all Government come to the ground, Unto this as his ſubſtance, beſides my anſwer I have already given, I ſhall crave leave to offer a few conſiderations.
In the firſt place, this is certainly a ſhal…w apprehenſion, which muſt ſuffer a conviction from the conſtant experience of the world. For how is the world governed? there is not one of a hundred that obſerves the Laws out of Conſcience; if they did, then muſt they for ought I know be careful to g…t the Statutes and read them as their bibles, which one of a thouſand never do. But men underſtand, it they do ſuch or ſuch things, they are l…able to be ſued, or to be bound to the Seſſions or the like, and to avoid the danger of the Law, they obſerve it. Now it is a fooliſh thing to ſay the Laws will not be obſerved, or the world will not be governed, unleſs by another means then that by which it is governed, and the Law are obſerved. Our Nations and Heathen Nations, and thoſe Nations which never had the fear of God to believe a judgement to come, have been kept under the obſervation of the Laws of their Country by theſe means.
In the ſecond place, this is not only againſt univerſal experience, but it confronts the very inſtitution of God, the appointment of the Magiſtracy, God hath made the Magiſtrate his Miniſter, and put the ſword into his hand, for the ordering and governing Societies, and Common wealths, and if this indeed will not ſerve that purpoſe, then you render his inſtitution inſufficient, and make his Miniſter to bear the ſword in vain. The Law (ſayes the Apoſtle) is not made for the righteous, but the diſobedient and unrighteous. If all were righteous and would of themſelves make Conſcience of doing what they ſhould do, there would be no need of Magiſtrate or Law: but when the Law and Magiſtrate is appointed for this end: to bring the refractory to order, and thoſe that make no Conſcience of what they do to be ruled, how fond muſt the imagination be which conceits, unleſs men do firſt beleive themſelves bound in Conſcience to obey, they will not obſerve the Laws?
In the third place, if it be for ſome perſons particular intereſt to break the Laws, it will be the concern of others that they be forced to keep them if they be indeed for the common good: & ſo ſhall they joyn with the Magiſtrate in his cauſing the execution of them. This indeed is that which upholds all Laws that are good. The publick intereſt being greater then the private does uphold them. Whereas if a Law be not really for the publick good, this is one certain reaſon at the bottom of its invalidity, and decay, becauſe it hath not root enough, upon the publick utility, to maintain it ſelf againſt particular enchroachments. If a Non-conformiſt come within five miles of a Corporation there is no body hurt by it, and no body like to be concerned at it, were this a thing truly conducing to the publick good, then muſt the publick be diſadvantaged in their breach of that Law; and if the publick, then muſt ſome more eminently, and thoſe ſhould be as much concerned, that they obey as themſelves to avoid the obſervation. By the way, when the advantage for the publick does not countervaile and exceed the private loſs or dammage that particular perſons ſhall ſuffer by a Law, ſuch a Law I take to be unjuſt, or at leaſt Politically evil, and binds not the Conſcience. However that which I here affirm is, that whether men make a Conſcience of a Law or not, if the Law be good: the publick advantage will prevail (when the Magiſtrate is minded) or cauſe it to be obſerved.
In the fourth place, it is a thing very unpolitick to offer to the world any principle upon which it ſhould be governed, which is other then that which does govern it. If the world be governed by the Magiſtrates ſword, and the Conſcience only that we muſt not rebell, and is governed as well as ever it is like to be governed: it is but an unhinging the world to pretend they muſt receive this principle, that human laws bind the Conſcience; or elſe there will be no need to obey, ſeeing the People may joyn and chuſe not to be forced as he ſpeaks. It is a ſaying, if a Horſe knew his ſtrength, what might he not do? he would not let man ride him and uſe him as he does. If the world knew their ſtrength, that the Magiſtrate indeed could not puniſh them whatſoever they did, unleſs they joyned with him one againſt another, when there is juſt cauſe for it, they might ſhake off every yoke: but as the whole body of the People cannot be made to know this, ſo as at once to agree upon it, any more then the Horſe can, though every particular man does know it: ſo were it an utterly ruinous thing to ſpeak of it if they could. It is true if the people did agree together (which agreement is their ſtrength, and they cannot know one anothers preſent minds all) that they would not be forced, they might chooſe: but then when they made no Conſcience to reſiſt, how ſhould this man think upon his principle, that they would make ſuch Conſcience to obey.
In the firſt place, it does ſeem to me a pernicious thing to the ſouls of pious and tender Chriſtians, to lay any ſuch load upon the Conſcience which is more then it can bear. I ſay there is no temptation hardly more dangerous to the undoing of a ſoul, then to preſs it upon ſuch things as goes beyond it, and over ſets it. If a man does believe he is bound to make Conſcience of every command of his ſuperiour and Law of the Realm or elſe he doth ſin, it is enough to make him caſt off all the Laws, and when his duty is made ſo grevious to him, that it ſeems impoſſible for him but to live in ſin, to be ready for reſiſtance next, and then all Magiſtracy is gon. The way to have ſome Laws obeyed out of Conſcience, is to take off its obligation from others; and if a Magiſtrate indeed might chooſe whether his Subjects Conſciences ſhould be bound by all his Laws or not, there is good reaſon for him to be content that the matter ſhould be as it is. They are bound in Conſcience not to reſiſt, and he knows not his own ſtrength if he deſire any more: although when a Law is for the common good, then is there Gods command alſo which takes place. There is one thing I cannot but add, which might make another conſideration, what if a deſpotical Prince was ſo wicked, as reſolving to be damned himſelf to ſeek the damnation of all his people, and ſhould thereupon make ſo many Laws, and about ſuch trivial things on purpoſe, that none of his Subjects might regard to keep them, but live and die in the wilful breach of them: I pray let this Debater tell me really whether according to his opinion it does not lye in the power of ſuch a Divel as this is, to carry a whole Nation to Hell with him.
In the ſixth place, let us ſuppoſe the Conſciences of men were bound indefinitely to all Laws, does this Author think really that the belief of this would make the world to obſerve them, and ſo maintain Government more then the Magiſtrates ſword? I doubt me he is here more wide: we ſee too well that when the worldly or carnal intereſt of men is concerned, what little regard Conſcience has. It were happy indeed for the Earth if the fear of God Almighty did but prevail more with the Generality then the fear of a ſuite at Law, or a Penalty of twenty ſhillings. If intereſt will prevail with a man, to judge a thing commanded him to be againſt the common good, when it is for it, the ſame intereſt of his it is like with ſuch a man would prevaile ſtill upon him not to obſerve the Law, though he were bound in Conſcience to it.
In the ſeventh place, then thoſe few honeſt perſons that would obſerve a Law if they thought themſelves bound in Conſcience to it, not withſtanding their private intereſt be againſt it, will likewiſe make the like Conſcience in their judging of a Law, ſo as not to be byaſſed by their particular concernment to think otherwiſe of it, then does comport with the publick advantage. And this in effect will come to the ſame iſſue.
In the laſt place. I will offer you one preſident to pinne the basket. It pleaſed God in the late times that this caſe became Dr. Saunderſons own caſe. The Act of Uniformity bound the Miniſter to read Common Prayer. This Law the Dr. acknowledges to be of force, for all the Times; but if he obſerves the Law he muſt looſe his living. Upon this he conſiders of the Act, and when he looks on the immediate particular end of it, he can find nothing but that their remains obliged to it. He then looks on the general and ultimate end, and that he conceives right to be the publick good, wch is intended or is to be ſuppoſed to be intended in all laws. Upon this end he comes to the conſideration whether all circumſtances being weighed, it be conducive for the common good for him to obſerve this Law or not: and being in the reſult fully perſwaded in his own mind that the benefit to the publick could no wayes countervail his particular loſs and ſuffering he concludes it lawful by the neglect of that Law to retain his living. There is a ſober perſon having read my Caſe ſhewed me a Manuſcript of the Doctors (but would not let me write any thing out of it) for the confirmation of my judgement. I cannot relate either the whole matter or words of it, but theſe two things I affirm for truth in it. That be comes off upon the conſideration of the general end of the Law, the publick benefit: and judges himſelf whether his obſerving that Law were conducive to that end in reference to the determining his own practice. And here I have (I account) my full weight for my ſelf, and think I had beſt to fetch the poor man before alſo, who finding no ſufficient relief from this Authour about his Cottage, may meet with it from this inſtance to his ſatisfaction, and it will come to this, whit… ſeems a little more then I have yet quite ſai… that not only when a Law is politically … vil, but when it is good in regard of its general obſervation, yet if a man be perſwaded fully in his Conſcience upon ſuch du… conſiderations and cautions as he ought to take, that his particular keeping of it under the preſent circumſtances he lyes, is not ſo much for the common good really as his not keeping of it is (which I will take to be plainly this poor mans caſe inſtanced, who if he holds not his houſe muſt with his Family preſently fall on the Pariſh), he is not to charge his ſoul with ſin for his wholeſome breach of it. After this I will yet ſubjoyn a little more in reference alſo to ſome others. When the Apoſtle gives us this precept, obey thoſe that have the rule ovér you, though there be no words added by way of exception, it is to be ſuppoſed the things they command are for our edification, this being a condition neceſſarily implyed to all rightful obedience, that the Ruler hath authority in what he injoynes. But the Miniſter hath authority only for mens edification, and hath none in things againſt their ſpiritual good, according to our authority (ſayes the Apoſtle) for edification, not deſtruction. The Caſe is the ſame with the Magiſtrate. His commands that have authority muſt be to our civil good. It is a miſtake therefore (how ingenious and ordinary ſoever it may ſeem in ſome that ſay, the people have liberty to judge indeed, whether a thing commanded be lawful, but not at all whether it be convenient. That by all means they count it to be denyed, as if the allowing any ſuch thing would preſently (as this author fancies too) ſubvert all Government. I heſe Perſons I perceive therefore diſtinguiſh not between judging what is ſit for the general, or univerſality, which judgment indeed is proper to the ſupream Magiſtrate: and judging what is fit for a mans ſelf only to doe. All things are lawful for our (ſayes the apoſtle) But all things are not expedient. I will not be brought under the power of any. a Chriſtian judges for himſelf of both theſe; of the lawfulneſs and of the expedience of his own actions. If this be not granted then muſt he be brought under the power of indifferent things, which he ought not to be: and then does he ſubmit himſelf unto the Ordinance of man or the human Creature as his ſervant and not as free and as the Servant of God. Again theſe perſons have not yet conſidered what I have been telling ſtill in theſe papers, that this liberty is aſſumed of us in reference only to the Conſcience or to our obligation in for interiori; and that while the outward man i… ſtill acknowledged to be bound, there is n… danger at all to Government in the matter On the contrary ſide there is this intollerable ſnare, or evil conſequence does follow on the denyal hereof, that every time any human Law (the matter whereof is not for bidden of God) is not obſerved, the ſubject muſt ſin, and conſequently if he live and dyes knowingly and wilfully, in his neglect he muſt be damned, I will yet propoſe therefore one or two inſtances. There is a Statute in Henry the eights time (if I miſtake not) which remains unrepealed, that no man ſhall brew with Hopps. I do ask hereupon whether there be any Brewer in this Nation knowing of this, that can be ſaved? I do not find my Debator can anſwer me this queſtion; and I do not doubt but there are many Brewers that are honeſt men and good Chriſtians, as well as I believe he is. If you will ſay that this Law now is antiquated through diſuſe; I will ask then what think you of thoſe Brewers that diſuſed it at firſt? was they all damned neceſſarily who willfully brought it into diſuſe? the Caſe is a frequent Caſe as to all the like Laws, and you muſt come at length to this, that thoſe who obſerved not this Law at firſt did judge it was not good for the Nation, or not fit to be kept: and upon that judgement are to be juſtified. It follows then both that a Law againſt the common good binds not the Conſcience: and that every man for himſelf may judge whether it be ſo or no in reference to his own acting. Another inſtance ſhall be this, ſuppoſe a Father or a Maſter lays ſome ſtrict charge on his Son or Servant to lay out a Thouſand pounds on a Commodity which is more perhaps (but for his Credit) then he is worth by half. This Son or Servant in going to do it, bears of the growing or coming in of this Commodity by great quantities in ſome parts of the Kingdome, and upon his own diſcretion alone and good conſideration of what may fall our, forbears, his Father or Maſter perhaps now at preſent is grievouſly chaſed: but within few days the price of the Commodity falls half, and then he ſees that if he had been obeyed he had been undone. From hence doe there appear not only the neceſſity, but benefit, of allowing a judgement of diſcretion unto Perſons of capacity, under the commands of their Superiours; and that I ſay not meerly to judge whether the thing commanded be lawful or unlawful in reference unto God whereof there is no queſtion: but whether it be convenient or inconvenient to that end or outward good which by that command is deſigned. It appears alſo from both theſe inſtances, that the commands of men do not by vertue of the fifth Commandement it ſelf bind the Conſcience immediately and abſolutely, but mediately and ex hypotheſi, to wit upon ſuppoſition thoſe commands are good, human laws Dr. Taylor will have it bind the Conſcience directly and properly. I do not love to diſpute about terms, but if any think he intends immediately, he is out, for they do bind only by the intervention of Gods will, he argues, the authority of the Magiſtrate is Gods authority. I anſwer the authority which is in the perſon of the Magiſtrate as Gods Miniſter is Gods authority, and binds directly and immediatly to ſubjection: but the commands of the Magiſtrate have not Gods authority, unleſs the things commanded be agreeable to his will, and then it is by the intervention of his will, I ſay, that the Conſcience is bound to obedience. A third thing appears that the Conſcience of man is not bound by vertue of Gods authority unto every command of our Superiors though the thing commanded be in a matter ſometimes which of it ſelf or its own Nature, is indifferent becauſe the conſideration then of the external commodity, or diſcommodity only, could not juſtifie the breaker of any of them. If as ſoon as a Father or Maſter had forbidden any thing, the Commandment of God took place immediatly, and he thereby is to be reckoned to forbid it too, this Son or Servant might not break ſuch a command though he did gain a thouſand pounds, or though either that Maſter or Father ſhould be undone by it There be ſeveral examples might be fech't from Hiſtories of great Commanders and Embaſſadors that to a chieve ſome great exploits have been forc't to leave the inſtructions of their Princes, for which though at their return they have begged their pardon (out of form) as being obnoxious to the Law, yet have they had that Conſcience of their own fact towards them and toward God, as not only to be free from ſin, in that diſobedience, but to expect ſome ſignal reward for the ſervice of ſuch tranſgreſſions.