The Obligation of Human Laws, Chapter 4 – Chapter 5
CHAP. IV.
I Proceed to that determination which he brings in oppoſition to mine, if I can find it, and know what to make of it when it is found. The caſe (ſays he about the begining) depends on this ſingle point, whether human Laws bind the Conſciences. In reſolving this, he acknowledgeth a difficulty. For if on the one ſide we ſay (ſaith he) the Conſcience … not concerned, I beſeech you what is? nothing but our common diſcreton, to help our ſelves out of the reach of the Princes Sword. So ſays Dr. Taylor. If Conſcience be not obliged then nothing is concerned but prudence, and care that a man be ſafe from Rods and Axes. If on the other ſide we ſay that Conſci…nce is obliged, then there may follow great perplexities when any thing is commanded, that proves an intollerable grievance. And this is alſo from Dr. Taylor, who does determine thereupon that in danger of death and intollorable grievance human Laws oblige not the Conſcience to obedience. And what does this Debater determine? why truly when he comes to it at the end, The morall Divines and Lawyers (ſays he) do grant ſo. Well! Theſe Divines and Lawyers are ſuch as Dr. Taylor knows, but what ſays this Evangellicall Divine and no Lawyer himſelf? why he has ſaid already that human Laws bind indefinitely, and he cannot find in his heart to go from it. Let me ask him then how comes it to paſs, that he pretends to ſome better Medium then I have propounded in this Caſe? Thoſe that ſay human Laws bind not the Conſcience at all, and thoſe that ſay they bind it indefinitely without diſtinction, are both in an extream. I and Dr Taylor have a Medium: and what mean is that which this man will ſet up in oppoſition to us? Here I turn to the place in his ſheets and I find his words come to theſe. I think good briefly to direct him in a better Medium then any that he hath propounded to find out the ſeverall degrees of ſin againſt human Laws. Ridiculous! if this perſon would have offered us a better Medium to determine the Caſe in hand, we ought to have thankt him: but as for a Medium to this purpoſe. what is it to me? Is there any queſtion or undertaking of mine about this in the leaſt throughout the Caſe? If I had a mind to know the difference or degrees of ſin againſt human Laws, I need not come to his I think good briefly, Dr. Taylor hath laid down at large Rules of diſtinction, or the meaſures by which we ſhall prudently conjecture, at the gravity or leſſening of the ſin of diſobedience to human Laws. The truth is, if a man may gueſs at ſuch a thing, this perſon as it is like upon the quotation, gets Dr. Taylor, where, in one place there being thoſe Rules of diſtinction, and in another he finds, cautions for thoſe that reduce into practiſe the rule he had laid down, that human Laws, not good, oblige not the Conſcience, he apprehends theſe to be both good materials for the building ſomething againſt me, but when he hath brought them here together into his books, there is no work for ought I ſee will come of them, and he may return them back where he had th…m. Here are a parcell of cautions, and notes of degrees of ſin againſt laws, his cautions in the Dr. who giving liberty to the Conſcience in ſome caſes as not bound by human laws are very ſignificant, that we may yet walk unblameably in ſuch caſes: but as for him who gives none, but makes the law of man to bind indefinitely, he hath nothing to do, but to require Univerſal obedience, upon the pain of ſin, and can admit of no tranſgreſſion under any caution what ſoever. His rules of diſtinction likewiſe, or of the degrees of ſin againſt human laws, may have good uſe in the Dr. but how will they ſerve his purpoſe? the caſe (ſays he) depends on this ſingle point, whether human laws …ind the conſcience. that is whether we ſin, if we be not obedient to them? It follows then when this ſingle point or queſtion is reſolved, that they do bind the conſcience indefinitely, and that we do ſin if we obey not, the point determined; and as for the diſcourſe of the degrees of ſin, it is another point, that never comes between us in controverſy. In the mean while if this be the determination of the point which is ſingle, what is become of the pretended difficulty? There is not the leaſt difficulty in this caſe at all, if that be all the determination.
Let us ſuppoſe the Negative extream to what he holds, that the conſcience were never concerned in human laws, and that to his words, I beſeech you what then, it were replyed tho outward man, which politickly is bound, and may not reſiſt, it were a queſtion might require more conſideration, whether every mans own ſecurity, and conſequently the common diſcretion alone of all men, to keep themſelves only from the danger they threaten, would not be a ſufficient preſervative of them: ſo far is this perſon wide who ſpeaks ſo ſlightly, as if we ſhould then care for the Princes commands not a ſtraw, when we our ſelves have known while we were boyes, and made no conſcience of the command of any, yet did we obſerve what we were bid more certainly through co…rtion, then the moſt of us God knows doe now the divine precepts through the due conſcience we owe to them. And if ſo, there is the more reaſon for this Author to be conſiderate, how he bends thus to this other extream, wherein he brings us into that open perplexity, which himſelf ſees, but cannot find the way out, either with his diſtinction of ſins, or ca…u…ons which will not ſuite his reſolution of the queſtion.
Obedience is not to be denyed (ſayes he in the firſt of theſe cautions) but when a law is againſt the publick good. This is the prime indeed of all the Drs. cautions, & what alone perhaps is enough to be regarded. For when the Dr. and I do both make this to be the determining diſtinction (though he hath not ſpoken indeed ſo dryly of it, through his large invention and multitude of matter as I do) between what does and what does not oblige the conſcience, in the matter of human laws, if a man does but obſerve this caution, the main of his care is over in this buſines; he neither will, for the ſaving of his own damage, dare to neglect the publick intereſt: nor will he omit obedience but when he can render a reaſon. The reſt of his cautions I will not concern my ſelf in, who have the ſame power to alter theſe, or frame others, to the over ruling truth I offer, as they had who at firſt did frame them; but as for this which I have named, the very propoſing of it in the firſt place, when the Dr. brings it in after others, doth ſeem to carry in it ſome conviction on this perſon (when otherwiſe it no wayes ſerves his purpoſe) that if a thing be not for the common good, it cannot in good earneſt bind the conſcience.
For his diſtinction or degrees of ſin, the main deſign of oppoſing my determination thereby being fruſtrate, let us ſee to what uſe elſe he can put it. That may ſtand him perhaps in ſome ſtead for his own excuſe, which will not ſtand his reader in any for his ſatisfaction. This Debater then we know in his late books, having deſigned to expoſe the Nonconformiſt to deriſion and contempt, as much as he could, for the withdrawing the people from Schiſm, and recalling them to Church (to ſpeak honeſtly of his end) hath thought it fit in his firſt book to b…gin his charge of theſe men with the breach of the Oxford Act, the charge is very high upon this, that they are not good Chriſtians, not Miniſters of Chriſt. To this end perſiſting in the ſame mind, through his books even to this Poſtſcript of his appendix, he gives us theſe notes for the diſcovering of the greatneſs of a ſin againſt human Laws, the Iſſue whereof comes to this, that though there may be ſeveral Inſtances of perſons beſides living in the breach of other ſtatutes the ſin of the Nonconformiſt againſt this act, muſt come under thoſ… more hainou… aggravations, that when ſuch are excuſed, yet as for th…ſe, we may find he had reaſon to ſay what he did, not to uſe any other then his own words. And what is that then he will acknowledge …e hath ſaid? I never ſaid that no man can be a good Chriſtian that tranſgreſſeth an Act of Parliament: nor that every tranſgreſſion of a ſtatute is a deadly ſin: Thoſe are inventions of his own upon occaſion of a ſingle Inſtance which I gave of defyance to a Law wherein ſome men live, mark my words, from whence he draws as Uninerſall propoſition. And does …e ſay ſo. Let me turn to his book and ſee how he can come of thus. The Nonconformiſt, ſpeaking of his Miniſter, the matter is thu… Uſhered in; How can he be a Miniſter of Chriſt (ſays the Conformiſt) who is diſobedient to his Sovereign, whom Chriſt blas to obey? And then Inſtancing wherein, he urges this Oxford Act, and concludes, therefore he is not a good ſubject, and conſequently no good Chriſtian or Miniſter of Chriſt. Let any man judge here whether theſe words, How can he be a Miniſter of Chriſt who is diſobedient to his Sovereign? be not aequivalent with this propoſition. No man that is diſobedient to his Sovereign is a Miniſter of Chriſt. With what face then can he accuſe me with drawing an Univerſal propoſition from his words, when there is one expreſs in the book, and from thence this concluſion is deduced? I never ſaid, does he mean theſe are not his very words? away I nor do I ſay they are, but does not what he ſayes amount plainly to this very ſence? I prove it. Therefore (ſayes he) he is not a good ſubject, and conſequently not a good Chriſtian. I argue with him from hence this perſon is a man of Reaſon and Logick. Here then is a concluſion, no concluſion can be good but from an Univerſal propoſition. This Univerſal propoſition muſt be this, that whoſoever i… diſobedient to his Soveraign, or tranſgreſſes an Act of Parliament is no good Chriſtian. And the Univerſal propoſition in his book is this, which howſoever we underſtand (to help him out) that he means, whoſoever tranſgreſſes any act of Parliament in ſuch a high and hanious manner as the Non-conformiſt does the Oxford act, yet ſtill is a Univerſal propoſition: either this perſon therefore muſt renounce the words in his book as illogically or falſly concluded, which yet he cannot do, neither but by acknowledging the univerſallty, and the denying the truth of the propoſition: or elſe he muſt be aſhamed here of this unjuſt accuſation of me, who have done but right to him. But if this denial will not ſerve him, he is no… deſti…ute of other ſhifts. There is no occaſion (ſays he) for thi… queſtion whether every tranſgreſsion of a Statute be no leſs then a deadly ſin, unleſs he is of opinion that all ſins are equal. By theſe words he does ſeem manifeſtly here to make ſome eſcape upon that term deadly ſin, and then he muſt diſtinguiſh between ſin and deadly ſin, which no Proteſtant will allow him to do, who ſay that all ſi… is mortal; & there was nothing elſe intended by a deadly ſin, but a ſin that deſerves or makes one guilty of death. Indeed if this Perſon can tell me of any little ſin, in oppoſition to a greater, which a man may knowingly and willfully live in, without repentance unto death, and it ſhall not damne him, or do him hurt, then I ſhall like well of his comming off here, upon this term: but if he cannot, then will not this ſerve, he muſt ſeek another ſhift. And what is that in the next place, for he is brought here into a ſhuffling condition, that is plain? why we muſt diſtinguiſh between a wilful living only, in the tranſgreſſion of a law, and the living in the defiance of it. The inſtance I have (ſays he) is of the defiance of a law in which ſome men live. This word defiance therefore he hath up three or foure times, beſides the cotation in the margent, and bidding us mark the word. But I pray why muſt the Waggoner that every day tranſgreſſes the law concerning his Waggon, or any other the like inſtance, be accounted with this man only to live in the tranſgreſſion of that law. and the Non-conformiſt in his non obſervance of the Oxford act be adjudged to live in the defiance of it? Alas! who does not ſee here into what a pitiful ſhifting caſe he is driven? or who does not perceive what is worſe, that is, the animoſity, peviſhneſs, or overbe…tneſs (to ſpeak with candour) of the man… mind againſt the Non-conformiſt, which does hinder him the coming off here with that ingenuity as he ſhould do, which is by confeſſion of ſeveral of his imprudent ſpeeches, and craving pardon for the intemperance he hath uſed. But in the laſt place, there are ſtill degrees of ſin, and the man that breaks other laws may not be ſo deeply guilty as he that lives in the breach of the act at Oxford. Let us ſee then what he can alledge for this. The more needful a Magiſtrate judges a thing to be done or avoided or the more his will is ſet upon it, the greater or leſs is the ſin of him who breaks ſuch a Law. Now he argues from the Preface and the Penalty of the Oxford act, how much the will of the law-giver is ſet upon the obſervation of that act, unto which I anſwer, beſides that Dr. Taylor doth toll us that the greatneſs of the penalty doth ſometimes ſhow the ſmalneſs of a thing that is forbidden (as tha… which elſe would not be regarded) and not the haniouſneſs of the tranſgreſſion: it does appear that the will of the law givers in that act, was ſet upon the Non-conformiſt taking the oath there prepared, as that they would have enforced them to by ſo great and preſent a danger, and was the thing which ſeemed to them ſo apt to prevent, the evil ſuppoſed in the preface, when as for their living within five miles of a corporation otherwiſe, we cannot think the minds of the Majority to be at all engaged in it. Now this Debater ſhould have endeavoured to give the Non-conformiſt ſatisfaction in referrence to his taking the Oath, if he would have ſerved the State according as the will of the law-givert were then ſet, but this was a task which he hath declined, although he was put upon it, and directed to their objections, in the defence of the propoſition.
There is ſomthing after this, which may be ſaid, that though this diſtinction, or degrees of ſins will ſtand him in no advantage for the oppoſing my determination, or juſtifying his cenſure of the Non-conformiſt to be no good Chriſtian, yet may it be of uſe to him to alleviate the harſhneſs of his judgement in the main, that human laws do oblige the Conſcience ſo as without diſcrimination he that obſerves them not, does ſin. Hence when he propoſes the caſe of a law-giver enjoyning a thing to ſome particular good, for the publick, and it appears that he is miſtaken, this Debater does continue ſtill (ſuch an obedient Soul has he above others) that though he be not bound to be of the lawgivers judgement, yet does he take himſelf bound (he means bound in Conſcience) to follow his will even while it were better for the publick it were other wife or dained. There are caſts we know ſometimes wherein by the change of things and occaſions (as in Seiges) that which was for the publick good does ſuddenly turn to its hurt. In ſuch inſtances we are not to obey a law ſayes Aquinas, which Dr. Taylor hath noted: and there is no doubt to me in the Caſe, where the lawgiver is miſtaken in a matter, the like reaſon ought to prevaile. But if he be thus reſolved, let us know how the degrees of ſin will help him out at a need. Let me ſuppoſe a poor man who is render in his Conſcience and fears God, coming to this reverend Perſon and telling him this caſe. His Grand-father got a…ttle mony, and built him a ſmall Cottage on ſuch a waſte ground, his Father lived in it, and beſtowed more coſt of it, and hath left it him, where he and his wife and children have lived comfortably uppon his labour: but now it hath ſo hapned, that being the other day at his Maſters where he wrought, he heard one read a certain book called the Friendly Debate where he perceived, about the very begining that the Author was of the mind that a man could not live in the breach of the Law of the Land, and be a good Chriſtian: and he hath underſtood long by his Father that it is againſt the Law for any cottage to be erected withot four acres of ground belonging to it. Upon this he being afraid of his condition in regard of his open living in a known wilful tranſgreſſion of a ſtatute of the Realm, wherein he cannot think but that it is a very plain defiance of a-Law as that book ſpeaks, he is come to him to ſee what he can offer for the re…eiving his Conſcience. If this author here deal roundly and plainly with the man, he muſt tell him that there is no remedy but he muſt pull down his houſe, and he and his wife and children be turned to beging, rather then by his living in a known ſin without amendment he ſhould be damned. It he deal otherwiſe, then he may tell him that though indeed every tranſgreſſion of a human Law be ſin, yet there are degrees of ſin, and this ſin of his is a leſſe ſin then that of the Non-Conformiſt living in the breach of the Oxford Act and therefore he ſhould be of good comfort and go home in peace. I pray now will this indeed ſerve a Conſcientious man: It is nothing to him that another's ſin is greater then his, he is to look to his own ſoul, and if he lives in the leaſt ſin with full knowledge and conſent, and hardens his heart in it, he cannot ſee how he ſhould be ſaved. So that unleſs you ſatisfie him, and that upon good ground, that every tranſgreſſion of a Law is not ſin, and then ſhew him how his tranſgreſſion is but ſuch a one you are not able to ſtand him in any ſtead in his Caſe. I remember a text of our Lord which I hauehave often thought upon, that by a mans words he ſhall be juſtified and by his words he ſhall be cond…m…ed. The …hariſes were men very holy in their profeſſion and did tye very heavy burthens upon others, but when they were to perform the ſame themſelves they were it is like backward enough: our ſaviour Chriſt therefore meets with them, for theſe ſhews without reality, and words without performance. Verily I ſay unto you that for every Idle word a man ſhall ſpeak he ſhall give on account for it at the day of judgement. The word Idle in the Original as without work ſays Cauſabone de verborum uſu foreign is contracted of foreign every Idle word is every word without deed; and muſt import thus much (whatſoever it does more) that when men make ſtrict profeſſions, and determine ſo rigidly in points of duty, and do not anſwer their own dictates and ſayings, let them take heed leſt by their words (leaſt ex ore tuo) as being Idle words they bring not themſelves into a juſt condemnation. I will therefore adviſe this worthy perſon, and all men in reſolving Caſes of Conſcience that they take heed of ſetting down any matter for the binding of others, then according to which in their own practiſe they dare be content to be judged by. The determining the obligation of human Laws Indefinitely on the Conſcience is more then any mortall can bear. For my own part I will proteſt that whilſt I allow the Conſcience to be bound, by the Law of men when thoſe Laws tend to the common good, yet do I not hereby cut my ſelf of from the reſerve of any liberty that may ariſe to me from a farther diſquiſition: although I count it but neceſſary both to give my reaſon why in ſincerity I hold ſo, and to deliver my conception of that obligation.
It is a ſaying of the Antients, a man is not born for himſelf only, but for his Country which is not writ only in Cicero, but in the heart of all men, for this is a truth throughout the earth, and delivered by God all along his word, while he makes our own ſelves to be the rule of our carriage towards our Neighbours, that we mind not our own things only, but every one the things of others. Though we ſtudy and ſeek the tranquillity and peace of thoſe with whom we live: and conſequently in all Societies and Communities, we ſhould regard the publick concern, even above our particular advantage. Theſe are general moral precepts which are writ I ſay in the heart of man, and to be proved in Gods word. The Magiſtrate I account now is Gods Miniſter, to conſider of, and then deſign and appoint the particular things or inſtances wherein every one in their ſeveral places are ſerviceable in theſe duties and ends; and upon that deſignation of the particular things, the obligation flows from thoſe general precepts of God, upon the Conſcience, for their obſervation. I ſay there is the general Inſtitution of God for Societies, and that men in ſociety ſhall mind and endeavour in their place the publick concern, and not their own only. The Magiſtrate is his commiſſi…ted Officer to deſign appoint or ſet apart, and ſo declare the inſtances or particular things which are conducive to this good of the community which they all are bound to intend upon the deſignation, appointment or declaration of theſe things, the obligation flows immediately from the general inſtitution of God upon the Conſcience for the obſerving of them, when there could flow none elſe from theſe particulars themſelves. The particular laws or things themſelves we know are not the precepts of God, and the Conſcience is obliged only by Gods will; but the general inſtitution of ſociety, and that we ſhould ſeek and endeavour in our place the good of the Publick as our own, and above our own, in ſuch particulars as be conducive truly to that end, is of God; and the Magiſtrate (I ſay) according to his office deſigning theſe particulars, we come (not ratione conſequentis, or abſoluté, only becauſe ſuch things commanded, but ratione conſeq…ntiae, or ex hypotheſi, becauſe ſuch things commanded do come under the divine inſtitution) to have the Conſcience bound to their performance. From hence it follows likewiſe that if theſe inſtances or particulars do not indeed come under the ſervice of theſe general duties or end, ſuch a law is to be lookt upon as cut off from Gods inſtitution, and ſo can have no authority derived to it from God, for the obliging the Conſcience of any, when yet the outward man (out of the caſe of ſin) is ſtill acknowledged to be bound. The particular commands of the Magiſtrate does (I ſay) bind the outward man: but the general inſtitution or the moral duty in general of ſeeking the welfare of the Publick, and not our own only, is that which binds the Conſcience which otherwiſe were not bound.
As for the fifth Commandement, which requires honor and obedience (ſuch as is meet) to our ſuperiours, I do not here diſtinguiſh it from, but include it in this general inſtitution, for that command muſt be underſtood as a comprehenſive thing, containing in it the whole commiſsion, the ſuperiour hath from God, which granting him his power to command, doth alſo ſet the bounds and limitations to that power, that he command no other things, or no otherwiſe then as he hath appointed: and upon ſuppoſition that the ſuperior acts only according to his commiſſion, that is, according to his preſcribed duty, or rule in civil things, this Commandement of God do… lay an obligation on the ſubject to obey him out of Conſcience. If you will ſay upon this that the Magiſtrate hath a derived authority from God, for this very act of determining the material obj…ct of our obedience, and therefore beſides the obligation which flows from his inſtitution when the matter is determined, the Conſc…ence muſt be obliged from the Magiſtrats determination it ſelf, by vertue of that derived authority from him, I have no need to gain ſay it, and whether you will make it a double obligation, or an obligation from a double cauſality, or a mixt obligation divine and human, it matters nothing to our diſpute, ſo long as Gods authority in the things commanded, or his allowance that they be commanded be firſt acknowledged, before we look upon the Conſcience to be indeed concerned in them. This is certain, every authority that is derived muſt be limited, and that according to the will of him from whence it is derived. The authority God reſerves in his own hands is that alone which is unlimimited and infinite. Now the limits God hath ſet the Magiſtrate as to the determining the particulars of his ſubjects duty (which is his power of making laws) comes to this, that he chooſe them only out of that general matter that is conducive to the end of government, the publick good (that is to obſerve the rule of things political): If he ſhall therefore appoint any particular things for his own profit, pleaſure, or humour, which come not under this general matter, (to wit, quae habet rationem publici commodi) as God hath preſcribed, it is manifeſt that he acts not according to his commiſſion, and ſo can have no power derived from thence, for thoſe acts or laws, and conſequently however ſuch laws do bind us in his courts, they are of no validity in the court of Conſcience. We will acknowledge in whatſoever he commands an authority divine for his Office and ſo if he will inflict the penalty we muſt not reſiſt. But we can not acknowledge Gods authority in this or that exerciſe of his office. that we ſhould do the thing out of Conſcience. In ſhort, we are indeed bound upon the penalty of his law, (if you will) but we are not bound upon the pain of ſin, to obey the Magiſtrate in every caſe.
I muſt profeſs here in the words of truth, and ſoberneſs that ſo far as ſo mean a perſon as I am can di…cern… there is a great deal of darkneſs hath ſpread it ſelf upon the face of the earth, and more eſpecially over many learned men, who when they have forſaken that light which they have flowing immediately from God, on their hearts to to ſeek unto the Ciſterns of others works and books, they have been not only miſled themſelves, but bereft us of many truths of the cleareſt evidence, and greateſt concernment, ſuch as this particular…y concerning the obligation of human laws, how, when and how far the Conſcience of man (which belongs directly only to the Regiment of Gods its or can be bound by them. If we will therefore but go as near as we can to the fountain, and look into our own minds, into all which God ſhines according to a ſeveral meaſure with his light, though he influence but ſome with his ſaving grace, we may find, that as we are inſtructed in matters of Religion to ſeek unto ſupernatural revelation, and ſo to account that whatſoever is agreeable to the rule of Gods word is obliging to the Conſcience, and what is not cannot oblige us as worſhip: and as in matters of morality, what is and what is not agreeable to the law of nature, does or does not oblige us as virtue or vice: ſo in theſe matters which are of a cival or political concern only, we do find that the rule which God …lmighty hath written in the heart for us to judge by, and is the ſupream law in ſuch matters, (which in words alſo is famouſly acknowledged) is the common good: ſo that according as any thing commanded in human laws is agreable or not, to that rule which is Gods rule for theſe things, the Conſcience is bound or not bound by the ſame. Nay as things are not only religiouſly or morally good and evil according as they agree and not agree with the word of God, and the moral law in the heart, but the more or leſs they agree with the rule, the more or leſs good or evil are they: ſo the more or leſs any thing commanded in a law doth agree with the ſupream rule of God, or law, in theſe political things, by ſo much the greater or leſs is the ſin of not obſerving them. So ſhort indeed is this Perſon and others in their notes of the degrees of ſin againſt human laws, that the formal difference it ſelf of theſe aggravations or diminutions in reſpect to the conſcience (whereof alone Divines ſhould ſpeak when this mans differences from the will of the law giver, belongs to the Lawyer) is not conſidered. And now when it hath pleaſed God Almighty by ſo inconſiderable a veſſel, and in ſuch a kind of careleſs and unregarded expreſſion, (which others may mend) that the exellency of the truth may appear to be the more from him, to deliver to the world this law of his, to govern and reſolve men in theſe caſes, I do not know how few, or how many there be that will receive it. When Moſes went up to God into the Mount, and brought down the law of the two Tables, it was a glorious matter? there is no man can go up to God now in that manner: but every one may go to him, (if we ſearch after him who is not far from any of us as Paul ſpeaks) as he dwels in that light which he hath put into our hearts, and from thence (as one who hath been converſing there rather then with the videturs of men) have I brought you down this law, or rule of his will in Politicalls, which though the generation of men no where, even amongſt the moſt ſavage, is without, yet have they taken notice of it ſo little hitherto, that waxing vain in their own imaginations, they have not underſtood, when they have acknowledged, that this indeed is the ſupream law to all others that are human, by which they muſt be tryed, approved overruled, and according to which, and to which alone, can the Conſcience of any be obliged in their obedience which they yield to theſe maters.
CA. V.
THere remains the laſt thing I have to do, which is the ſurveigh of this Debaters exceptions, or other paſſages not yet conſidered, and to ſay ſomething to them according as they are of moment. This general does contain the principle thing the Debater ſtands upon, and which requirers the larger field for my debate with him, I ſhall devide that one buſineſs, therefore into three ſucceding Chapters, and leave a laſt for the reſt.