Authority of Magistrates About Religion, Section 4
Sect. 4.
To begin with the former. By me Kings Reign, ſays Wiſdom, and if they rule by God, it is fit they ſhould alſo rule for him. He is the Miniſter of God for our good, ſays the Apoſtle. The Miniſter is to look to his Lords will, and the good of the Subject is not only their Temporal but Spiritual good. And if he be Gods Miniſter for our good, there can be no exemption of Sacred things any more then Civils from his Authority, under God, for the good of his People. And hence are we taught to pray for Magiſtrates, that we may lead peaceable lives under them in all Godlineſs as well as Honeſty. Kings and Emperors (ſays Grotius from ſome other) are equally to take care of Sacred and Secular things: but onelyonly when we come to particulars, it muſt be confeſſed that the jus imperii is more narrow in matters of Religion, then in other matters upon this one account, that the Divine Law does appoint or determine more things concerning Religion, and ſo takes them out of the Magiſtrates liberty, then it does concerning other matters. In hoc Reges ſicut cis Divinitus praecipitur Deo ſerviunt in quantum Reges ſunt, ſi in ſuo regno bona jubeant, mala prohibeant: non ſolum quae pertinent ad humanam ſicietatem, verum etiam quae ad Divinam Religionem, ſays Auguſtine, Contra Creſco nium, l. 3. c, 51. The affairs of Religion I muſt ſay again are of the greateſt concernment, and it is not fit Gods Miniſter ſhould neglect his greater affairs, to take care only of the leſs. Beſides there are no matters in the Earth which have ſo great an influence on Mens ſpirits to put them in agitation, as the matters of Religion: and if they were exemted wholy from the authority of the Supreme Governour, it would be a very hard thing for any mortal to govern at all. The Non-Conformiſts therefore deny not the authority of the King in matters Eccleſiaſtical. No, they may perhaps be rather accuſed ſhortly for acknowledging it too much, (as hath been intimated) ſeeing they do accept of his Declaration, nor do they ſcruple his Title of Supreame Head. We diſtinguiſh indeed between a Civil head of the Church and the Conſtitutive head. The King we acknowledge the civil Head or Governour of the Church of England as well as the State, that is in whom the only Supream Coercive authority does lye over all perſons in Eccleſiaſtical as well as other matters. But as to the conſtitutive head of our Church as an Eccleſiaſtical organical body, it will be hard for thoſe who own not be Biſhops jure Divino, to aſſign. The National Church hitherto I took to be the Integrum of our Parochial Congregations, and the Paſtors of all the Pariſh Churches in England virtually aſſociated (for they are not actually) are I think the conſtitutive head of the Church of England under Chriſt, in that external formal Government of it, he hath committed to them. There is the internal Government of the Church, which belongs only to Chriſt and his Spirit, who alone can rule mens hearts: or the external Government of it. This external regiment is either formal which belongs to the Miniſters: or Objective, which belongs to the Magiſtrate. The Magiſtrate cannot therefore by vertue of his Office enter into the function of the Prieſt to do his work, though he can make the Miniſter himſelf do it, and puniſh him if he neglect his duty. He can give a call to the Paſtoral Rulers to meet and frame Eccleſiaſtical conſtitutions; and when himſelf cannot make them, they ſhall not yet be obligatory to the ſubject, unleſs they have his Sanction. This external authority over the Church, which is Objective (that is, which is converſant about Eccleſiaſtical affairs, but does not exerciſe them, which is Circa Sacra not in Sacris, according to Conſtantine of old, Epiſcopus foreign) does differ from the formal (which is from Chriſt to us as his Stewards and Embaſſadors, and ſo to be put in execution no otherwiſe then as it is preſcribed by him in the word) in this mainly, that the one is Declarative, that can direct what is Gods will, and perſwade to it, and threaten only with reference to another world; but the other is a power to make that our duty, which it requires, and enforce it to be done by preſent puniſhments, that is, a power which is juris Conſtitutinum and Coercive. There are two ſorts then of things, which are ſubject to the Magiſtrates Power or Government. Things or actions determined by God himſelf in his word: or things that are leſs undetermined by him, as neither commanded nor forbidden. For the former, the Magiſtrates power does lye in his being made the Keeper of the Tables, having no authority to change a title of Gods Law; ſo that his work in reſpect of ſuch things conſiſts in protecting thoſe that obſerve them, and encouraging ſuch by removing what will hinder, and promoting what will further them in their duty: as alſo in his diſcouraging the Tranſgreſſour, by withdrawing the occaſions of their ſin, and puniſhing them for it. For the latter, the power of the Magiſtrate does lye in his liberty to determine all ſuch things as being before not determined, ſo as by that determination to make them our duty which were indifferent before; to make it our duty, I ſay, to avoid, or do ſuch things according as he requires or prohibits them for the common edification. Haes ſive Sacra ſive profana ſint (ſays Grotius) determinare in alterum partem jus eſt ſummae poteſtatis. Provided always that ſuch commands as theſe do indeed anſwer that end; For ſeeing power in the original, is derived from God as Supreame Lord; [Thou couldſt have no power, ſays, Chriſt to Pilate, unleſs it were given thee of God]: and it is given of God to none but for the common good, we are to conceive that the things that are commanded in Civils are for the good of the Common-wealth, and in Eccleſiaſticals for our Spiritual edification, or elſe though they muſt be done, rather then we reſiſt or ſuffer, they do not bind us in our conſciences. The will of God that ſuch a one ſhould command, is I ſay, power in the root. This will is that he command nothing but for our edification, or the common good, [According to the power given us of God for edification]: If his command then be not indeed ſuch, it is deſtitute of Gods authority, and becoming thereby a command in foro alieno (that is in foro exteriori onelyonly), and in aliena materia, the conſcience (whoſe adaequate rule the will of God only is) muſt be left to its liberty. The Body indeed is bound (ſays Dr. Taylor), and we must ſuffer patiently the evil which we cannot deprecate: but Laws that are made to purpoſes beyond theſe meaſures do no ways oblige the conſcience. He is the Miniſter of God for good, ſays St. Paul, otherwiſe he is not Gods Miniſter, and hath to other purpoſes none of Gods authority, and therefore cannot oblige the conſcience to an active obedience, in ſuch where the power is incompetent to command. Duc. Dub. B. 3. c. 1. r. 3.
Having then granted and ſtated one member of the diſtinction, I muſt come to the other, which is, that though the Magiſtrate hath an authority over his Subjects, in the matters of Religion as well as civil matters, yet hath he no authority for all that over the conſcience of any. Conſcience is the judgement of a man concerning himſelf and actions with reference to the Judgement of God. It is a faculty whereby we diſcern what is Gods Judgement of us and our actions, and there is no man muſt do any thing contrary to that judgement. If the Magiſtrate then have power over the conſcience, in any thing whatſoever, he muſt have power, either to make us change our judgement of that thing, and judge otherwiſe: or elſe though we judge thus, to do otherwiſe then that judgement; that is though we judge that it is Gods will we ſhould do thus, the command of the Magiſtrate ſhall make it lawful for us to do oterwiſe. The firſt of theſe is againſt reaſon, there is no man can make himſelf, to judge otherwiſe of a thing in good earneſt then he does judge: and it cannot then be in the power of the Magiſtrate to make him do it, any more then it is in his power to make him fly in the Air, or live under water. This is ſo manifeſt, that this ingenious Author hath ſpoken enough of it himſelf in his firſt Book. The latter is againſt Piety, for to do the thing which I judge to be the will of God I ſhould not do, becauſe the Magiſtrate does command it, is manifeſtly a preferring the will of Man before Gods, that is, an having of other Gods before him, which is the ſin of the firſt Commandment. The truth is, to go about the making of the Magiſtrates will to be the rule of conſcience in any thing, let it be what it will, is manifeſtly to defloure conſcience, to make that which is peculiar to God to be common with man, or profane. For con-ſcientia importing in the very word and thing, the judgement of God together with ours, it muſt be his will, and that alone muſt be the rule of it, and if any thing elſe be once made its rule, it is gone. If the Magiſtrate have an authority over the conſcience in any thing, the reaſon will be the ſame for all. I mean, if I may do any thing which I judge contrary to Gods will (which judgement I ſay is my conſcience), then cannot that be a reaſon to reſtrain me in another. The reaſon why I dare not commit Adultery, or do the like hainous crime, is becauſe it is againſt my conſcience, and if that reaſon be rendred inſufficient, that a thing may be done, though it be againſt a mans conſcience, there is an end of Religion. If the Magiſtrate have an authority over the conſcience, then muſt the internal acts of men be ſubject to his Government, when it is God only that knows, and can rule the heart: But Grotius hath taught us well here. There are internal acts of men, and the external. Thoſe acts of men (ſays he) which do ſubiacere humano imperio are his external acts only: and our internal acts can be commanded no further then they are concerned in the external. The inward acts of mans ſoul in general, and much leſs his conſcience are not within his cognizance, and ſo not under his juriſdiction. If the Magiſtrate hath power over the conſcience, then good and evil ſhould be founded in jure poſitivo, and not in jure naturae: Then might he impoſe on us a new Faith, nor new Articles in our Creed: Then muſt we have no Religion but his Will, and no God but Leniathan only. It is true that when the Magiſtrate commands me any thing for my good, or for the common good though to my loſs, that thing is now become my duty; and as I know it is Gods will that I ſhould obey ſuch commands, I am obliged in conſcience: and if this very nimble Gentleman, will but be contented with this interpretation, and declare that by the Magiſtrates authority over the conſcience, he intends not either that he hath power to force the judgement, or the action againſt the judgement (when upon the laſt indeed it is he does intrench), I may deſcend to the other diſtinction.